The General History Of Polybius (1823)

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THE
GENERAL HISTORY

OF

ISOU Y BIUS

GENERAL HISTORY

OF

POLY BIWS

Translated from the Greek x

BY MR. HAMPTON.

FIFTH EDITION.

VOL. I.
a: NN
fea
OXFORD, 8 ve |

PRINTED BY W. BAXTER, \ “p D

FOR f. PARKER; AND G. AND W. D, WHITTAKER,
AVE MARIA LANE, LONDON,

"1825.

THE
GENERAL HISTORY

OF

E Ody Y BIUS

BOOK THE FIRST.
CHAP. I. j

Ir those who have been employed before me in relating
the transactions of former times, had been altogether silent
concerning the use and excellence of History, it might,
perhaps, be nécessary to begin this work, with advising all
mankind to apply themselves with earnestness to that kind
of study; since the knowledge of past events affords the
best instructions for the regulation and good conduct of
human life. But as the greater part, or rather all of them,

have taken every occasion to declare, repeating it as we may „e |

say from one end of their writings to the other, that History
supplies the only proper discipline, to train and exercise
the minds of those who are inclined to enter into public
affairs; and that the evil accidents, which are there re-
corded to have befallen other men; contain the wisest and
the most effectual lessons, for enabling us to support our
own misfortunes with dignity and courage; there is surely
little need to repeat again, what others have so often urged
with ‘eloquence arid force. But indeed the subject itself,
which I am 'énjfaged to- treat, may well exempt me from
this task; since it is of a kind so new and singular, that it
cannot fail to excite the attention of every reader. For

VOL. 1. B = ,

2 THE GENERAL HISTORY BOOK I.

what man is there so sordid and insensible, that he would
not wish to be informed, what manner, and through what
kind of government, almost the whole habitable world, in
less than the course of fifty-three years, was reduced m
neath the Roman yoke: an event, of which there is no
example in any former time? Or who on the other hand is so
passionately fond of any other-kind of speculation, or of
any branch of science, as to think it more of his
care and pains, than this enquiry ?

That the subject of this work deserves more than a
common share of attention and regard, on account both of
its novelty and greatness, will most evidently appear, if we
take a view of all the ancient states that are chiefly cele-
brated in history, and compare them with the Roman.

The Persians were for some time possessed of a very
wide dominion: but whenever they laboured to extend it
beyond the bounds of Asia, the attempt was always unsuc-
cessful, and once indeed proved almost fatal tothem. The
Lacedzemonians, after many struggles, obtained the sove-
reignty of Greece: but, within twelve years, were again
divested of it. The Macedonian kingdom was at first
extended from the provinces that border on the Adriatic

coast, as far as the Danube; the whole including but a

small and inconsiderable part of Europe. After some time,
indeed, they found means to break the Persian monarchy,
and joined Asia to their empire. But though tlie general
opinion of mankind may perhaps have taught us always to
regard this people as a very flourishing and potent state, it
cannot be denied, that a great part of the world was totally
exempted from their sway. Afric, Sicily, and Sardinia,

‘were never visited by their arms. And those fierce and

warlike nations, who possessed the western parts of Europe,
were utterly unknown aud undiscovered by them. But
the Romans, disdaining to confine their conquests ‘within
the limits of a few countries only, have forced almost the
whole habitable world to pay ‘submission to their laws:
and have raised their empire to that vast height of power,

CHAP. I. OF POLYBIUS. 5

‘which is so much thé wonder of the present age, and which
no future times can ever hope to exceed. And this is the
event, which I design to explain in all its parts and cir-
cumstances in the following narration: and from thence it
will be evident, what great advantages may be derived from
an attentive and close perusal of political history.

The point of time, from whence I begin my work, is the
hundred and fortieth Olympiad. The transactions, are these
which follow. In Greece, the social war, conducted by
Philip, the son of Demetrius and father of Perseus, in con-
junction with the cities of Achaia, against the ZEtolians.
ln Asia, the war between Antiochus and Ptolemy Philo-
pator, for the sovereignty of Cele-Syria. In Italy and
Afric, that between the Carthaginians and the Romans,
which is most frequently styled the war of Annibal. These
events are the next in order to those with which the history
of Aratus is concluded.

Now before this period, the great transactions of the — |
world were single, distinct, and unconnected, both in place
and time; ‘while each proceeded from motives peculiar to
itself, and was directed to its own proper end. But from
this time history assumes an entire and perfect body. The
affairs of Italy and Afric were now conjoined with those of

~ Asia and of Greece: and all moved together towards one
fixed and single point. And this it was that first determined
me to choose this æra for the beginning of my work. For
it was not till after they had broken the strength of Car-
- thage in the war just mentioned, that the Romans, ima-
gining that by this success they had accomplished the chief
and most important part of their intended enterprise, and
opened to themselves the way to universal empire, now
first resolved to enlarge their conquests, and spread their .. >
‘arms over Greece and Asia. :

If mankind were already sufficiently acquainted with the
condition and past fortunes of these republies, which con-
tended thus together for the sovereignty of the world, there
would perhaps be no occasion to have recourse to the

22

uds.

4 THE GENERAL HISTORY BOOK I.

former parts of their story, in order to explain the strength
and number of their forces, or the probable hopes of suc-
cess, by which they severally were excited to so great and
difficult an undertaking. But because the Greeks are for
the most part strangers to the ancient'state, power, and
exploits both of the Carthaginians and the Romans, I
thought it necessary to prefix this book, and that which
follows, to the body of my history: to remove all doubts

that might óccur; and to exhibit clearly to the reader's

view, the counsels, strength, resources, ‘upon which the

‘Romans supported those great désigns, which rendered

them the masters of the world both by land and sea, For
from the recital which I design to make in these prelimi-
nary books, it will be seen beyond all doubt, that this vast
project was neither formed, nor carried into execution, but
upon reasons the most fair and solid, and which gave
strong assurances of success.

The circumstances of-this great event, which so justly

. raise the admiration ‘of the présent age, will also afford one

it from every other history. For as all the great transac-
tions of the world were how forcibly attracted to one side,
and compelled to move in one direction towards the same
single end, I shall fréin thence be able to connect together,
and dispose into one perfect body, the series of different
events, and to exhibit, in one point of view, the whole
variety of action. It was this, indeed, which gave me the
first inclination to write the history of these times. An-
other motive was, that no one has hitherto composed a
general history. For if this task had ever been before
attempted, I should myself have been less solicitous to en-
gage in such an undertaking. ' There are many, indeed,
who have written an account of particular wars; and
among them, some ‘perhaps have added à few coincident
events. But no man, as far at least as I can learn, has
ever yet employed his pains, in collecting all the great
transactions of the world into one regular and consistent

very eminent advantage to my work, which will distinguish

CHAP. I. OF POLYBIUS. 5

body ; remarking also the time of their commencement, the
motives to which they owed their birth, and the end to
which they were directed. I therefore judged it to be a
task that might prove highly useful to the world, to rescue
from oblivion this great and most instructive act of fortune.
For in all the vast variety of disorders, struggles, changes,
which the power of this deity introduces into human life,
we shall find none equal to that long and desperate scene

of contention, none worthy to be compared for their im-.

portance with those events which have happened in the

‘present age. But this is what the writers of partjcular

histories can never set before us in its full and proper light.
It might with equal reason be supposed, that by singly visit-
ing all the noted cities of the world, or from a view of each
delineated on paper, we should be able to acquire a right
notion of the figure of the earth, with the due order and

arrangement of all its parts. But surely this must be

thought a most, absurd conceit. In a word, whoever is
persuaded that the study of particular histories is alone
sufficient to convey a perfect view and knowledge of the
whole, may very properly be compared with one, who, on
surveying the divided members of a body that was once
endued with life and beauty, should persuade himself that
he had from thence obtained a just conception of all the
comeliness and active vigour which it had. received from
nature. But let these broken. parts be again placed in
order, restored to all their first activity aud life, and be

. once more offered. to. his view; he will then be ready to

acknowledge, that all his. former notions were as remote
from truth, as the shadows of a dream are different from
realities. For though some faint conception of the whole
may-perhaps arise from a careful examination of the part,
no distinct or perfect knowledge ean ever be expected from
it. In the same manner it must also be confessed, that
particular relations are by no means capable of yielding any
clear or extensive. view into general history: and that the
only method, which. can render this kind of study both en-
B 3

WwW

6 THE GENERAL HISTORY BOOK I,

tertaining and instructive, is that which draws together all
the meno events, and ranges them in their due place and
order, distinguishing also their connexion and their dif-
ference.

I shall begin this book with the first. expedition of the
Romans out of Italy; which is the next in order to those
events, with which the history of Timæus is concluded, and
which happened inthe hundred and twenty-ninth Olympiad.
I must therefore relate, at what time, in what manner, and
on what occasion, this people, after they had firmly settled.
and secured their government at home, resolved to pass.
over into Sicily : for that was the first country, beyond the
bounds of Italy, into which they sent their armies. I shall
mention in tlie plainest and most simple manner, what it
was that gave rise to this invasion: that the reader may
not be forced to perplex his mind, with searching after the
causes of that which was itself the genuine and immediate
cause, and the very entrance to the work be from thence
involved in insuperable darkness and uncertainty. And
since it will be necessary to give an abstract also even of-
. some events that passed before this period, I shall take care
to choose some known and undisputed æra; and to begin
from facts, which are clear, precise, and well established,
For when the beginning of a history is involved in any
kind of intricacy or obscurity, the parts which follow can
never obtain any great degree of credit or regard. But, on
the other hand, when the introduction to the subject is
made intelligible and clear to all, the subsequent narration
will easily gain admission and belief.

IN the year, then, which was the nineteenth after the
engagement near ZEgospotamus, and the sixteenth before
the.battle of Leuctra; the vear, when the. Lacedeemonians _
confirmed the treaty which’ Antalcidas had made with the

CHAP. I. OF POLYBIUS. - v]

Persians; and the elder Dionysius, having.some time be-
fore defeated the Greeks of Italy near the river Helleporus,
laid siege to Rhegium; in this same year, the Gauls took
Rome by storm, and remained masters of all the city, the
capitol alone excepted. But the Romans, having yielded
to such conditions as the conquerors thought proper to im-
pose, were once more restored, beyond all hope, to the
possession of their country. From this time, being, as it
were, again renewed in strength and vigour, they made war
upon the states that were contiguous to their own. And
having, partly by their bravery, and partly with the aid of
fortune, reduced all the Latins to their yoke, they next at-
tacked the Tyrrhenians; after these the Gauls; and then
the, Samnites; whose country lay contiguous to the terri-
tory of the Latins, and bounded it towards the north and
east. Some.time afterwards the people of Tarentum,
having treated an embassy from Rome with great indignity
and insult, and being apprehensive that the Romans were
preparing vengeance for the affront, invited Pyrrhus into
Italy. This happened the year before the Gauls invaded
Greece, and received that signal overthrow at Delphi, which
drove them with the remains of their army into Asia.
But the Romans, who had already reduced the ‘Tyrrhenians
and the Samnites to their yoke, and had returned with
conquest from many engagements also with. the Gauls,
were now beginning to enlarge their views; and resolved
to seize upon the rest of Italy, as if the whole country had
belonged to them by a natural and proper right. Their
former.combats had completely trained and exercised them
in the use of arms. -They attacked: the Tarentines with
vigour; and persisted. in the war with so much firmness,
that they at last. drove Pyrrhus out-of Italy; and then
turned their arms against the cities, which had been confe-
derated with that prince against them. And having, by a
course of wonderful success, forced all the inhabitants of

Italy, except the Gauls, to receive their laws, they were.

B 4

+7 (^ *^

8 . THE GENERAL HISTORY nook i.

now at leisure to march against a body of Roman soldiers,
who had possessed fid gar of Rhegium.

The two cities Messana and Rhegium, both situated
upon the same straits, had both experienced the same mis-
fortune. Not long before this time, a body of Campanian
mercenaries, who had served in the armies of Agathocles,
invited by the beauty, and rich condition of Messana,
watched their time for gaining possession of the place by
treachery. They soon, found means: to be received as
friends within the city; where they killed one part of the
inhabitants; and, drove the rest without the walls. And

having taken to themselves. the wives and children of those
unhappy men, as they fell into the hands of every one at
the very time of the disorder, they made afterwards a divi-
sion of their lands and riches: and thus, with little diffi-
culty, gained full possession of a very splendid city and
fertile territory. ‘This success soon excited others to follow.
the example. The inhabitants of Rhegium, alarmed by the
entrance of Pyrrhus into Italy, and. being also under no
small apprehensions of some danger from the Carthaginians,
who were at that, time the. sole masters of the sea, implored
the assistance of the Romans; who sent them. a garrison, of
four thousand men under the command, of. Decius Cam-
panus. These for some time remained firm in their, duty,,
and guarded the, liberties of the city; but being at last se-
duced by the commodious situation of the place, and by,
the wealth and flourishing condition of. the. citizens, they
resolved to imitate the example which the Campanians had,
so lately set before them :. and, being assisted also by them.
in, the execution of their, design, they drove out or killed,
the inhabitants, and obtained entire possession of, the city.

This. horrid, act of treachery raised great, indignation i in.
the Romans; but the. wars in, which they were, then in-
volved restrained: their, vengeance. . As,soon: as these were
ended, they marched. and laid siege to Rhegium. The
place soon fell into their hands; but the greatest part of;

CHAP. I. OF POLYBIUS. | 9

the garrison was destroyed in the assault : for. they fought,
Uwe men who well foresaw the consequences of their crime.
About three hundred only that were taken alive were sent.
to Rome; and, being. conducted by. the prezetors into. the
J forum, were, first, scourged, and, then beheaded. , By this
just, severity, the Romans hoped that, they, should again
recover. their. character of good faith among their allies.
They: restored the. city: also, with all the lands, to the tne
inhabitants. Y

The Mamertines of.. Messana, for, this, was. the name
which the Campanian mercenaries had assumed, as long as
they were supported, by the Romans who had possessed
themselves of. Rhegium, not. only. remained in, quiet. and.
secure, enjoyment of their own city and proper territory,
but. made frequent incursions also, into the adjacent coun-,
tries; creating no small terror and disturbance, both to the.
Carthaginians and the Syracusans; and exacting contribu-.
tions from many. parts of. Sicily. But nọ sooner had tbe.
siege of. Rhegium. deprived them of the assistance,of these.
allies, than they were themselves so. vigorously, pressed, by,
the Syracusan forces, that they were constrained. to aban-,
don all the open countrys and to keep clase behind, their,
walls. The occasion. was, this, that follows:

A, little before this time, when; some, dissension had bos.
deni between the citizens of Syracuse and the army, the
troops, while they. lay encamped in the neighbourhood. of:
Mergana, elected two magistrates out of their own, body ;.
Artemidorus, and. Hiero who was afterwards king... Hiero.
was then. extremely young; but he seemed to have been.
never formed, by nature to. sustain the, regal, dignity.
found s some means, by the Jn aci of bis accom to, gain.
admission. into the city. And, having, there drawn,all the
chiefs of the opposite faction into his power,, he, shewed. in,
his whole deportment, such proofs of. clemency, and true
greatness, that the people, though, they were by, no means
satisfied with. the liberty which, the army had. assumed, with,

10 THE GENERAL HISTORY BOOK L.

one voice declared him praetor. But it was easy to discern
from his first behaviour in this office; that he had some
more exalted post in view. For having remarked, that as
often as the forces, with the magistrates at their head, were
obliged to take the field, some new commotions and dis-
orders were always raised among the citizens, and observing
also, that a certain Syracusan, named Leptines, was the
first in favour with the people, and far superior in his in-
fluence and credit to all the rest of the inhabitants, he re-
solved to contract a close alliance with him, and to marry
his daughter; being persuaded, that by the help of his
authority, he should be able to keep all things quiet and
secure at home, whenever himself should be engaged in the
command of the army. abroad. Some time afterwards,
.observing that the mercenaries, who had been long em-
ployed in the Syracusan armies, were become untractable
and mutinous, he ordered all the forces to take the field;
and to march against the barbarians of Messana. Being
encamped within sight of the enemy near Centuripe, he
drew up his army in order of battle along the side of the
Cyamosorus. But having stationed the Syracusan troops,
both infantry and cavalry, at a distance from the rest, as if
he had intended an attack from a different quarter, he op-
pósed the mercenaries only to the enemy, by wliom they
were entirely defeated and destroyed. But as soon as the
slaughter was begun, himself with all the forces of the city
returned back again to Syracuse. Having thus happily
accomplished his design, and cleared the army of its sedi-
tious members, and having filled their place with a sufficient
number of new mercenaries: levied by himself, from that
time he continued to discharge the duties of his post,
without any tumult or disorder. And when the Mamer-
tines, elated by their past success, had spread themselves
over all the country without any fear or caution, he led.
against them the forces of the city, which were now com-
pletely armed and disciplined, and came to an engagement
with them upon the banks of the river Longanus, in the

CHAP. I. OF POLYBIUS. ll

plain of Myle. And having obtained an entire victory, in
which their generals also were taken prisoners, he gave an
effectual check to the insolence of those barbarians, and on
his return to Syracuse was saluted king by the army.

The Mamertines, who had been before deprived of the
assistance which they had been accustomed to receive from
Rhegium, were now so broken and disheartened by this
last defeat, that they considered their affairs as almost des-
perate. In this state, some among them had recourse to
the. Carthaginians, and delivered the citadel into their
hands: while the rest sent ambassadors to Rome, to make
an offer of their city, and to implore the protection of the
Romans, for a people sprung, as they pretended, from
one common stock with themselves. The Romans were.
for some time under great perplexity and doabt. To
comply with this demand, appeared 'to be in a high degree
improper and absurd. They had lately punished with the
last severity a body of their own citizens, for having be-
trayed the public faith in seizing Rhegium: and'if now
they should support the Mamertines, who not only had
surprised Messana by the very same kind of perfidy, but
had assisted in taking Rhegium also, it would be difficult:
to find any fair apology for such a conduct. On the other
hand, as the Carthaginians, besides the dominions which
they possessed in Afric, were masters also of many parts
of Spain, and of all the islands in the Sardinian and Tyr-
rhenian seas, it was greatly to be feared, that, if Sicily
should now fall into their hands, they would soon become
too formidable neighbours, since they would then lie close
to every part of Italy, and encircle them on every side.
It was easy also to discern, that they must very soon be
able to reduce this island, if the Mamertines were not now
supported. For if once they were permitted to possess
Messana, they would find it no hard task to conquer
Syracuse, since they were already masters of almost all:
the other parts of Sicily: ‘The Romans saw the danger,
and considered it as a matter of the last- necessity, to ob-

S

12 THE GENERAL HISTORY BOOK I.

viate and prevent these consequences; and not suffer Mes-
sana to fall into the hands of those who might from thence
be able to lay às it were a, bridge for passing into Italy.
Yet after many long debates upon the subject, the senate
even at last refused to pass any decree concerning it: be-
cause the manifest absurdity on one side dim still to.
draw with equal weight against the advantage on the other.
But the. people, "de had been: much exhausted by their
former, wars, and wished for some occasion to repair their
shattered fortunes, being incited partly by the great utility
which would confessedly accrue to the republic from the
war, and animated also by the show of those advantages
with which the praetors in their speeches flattered every
private. man, resolved that. the desired assistance should be.
sent, and made a law for that purpose, commanding Appius
Claudius, one. of the consuls, to pass over to Messana.
The Mamertines, partly by the means of fraud, and partly:
by open force, drove out. the Carthaginian commander from .
the.citadel, and delivered the city.to the Romans.

The Carthaginians, when they had first crucified their
general, for his cowardice and ill conduct in relinquishing
the. citadel, made, haste to draw together all their forces,
to. retake’ Messana, And having stationed their fleet near
Pelorus, and posted their land army on the side of Seng
they. began to press the siege with.vigour. At the same
time Hiero, imagining that this occasion might be favour-
able for driving the Mamertines entirely-out of Sicily, en-
tered. into treaty. with the Carthaginians: and beginning
his march from Syracuse, he came mii invested the city on
the other side, having encamped near the mountain called
Chalcidicus. i

The consul. Appius passed the —— in an adventurous
manner by night, and was received into Messana. But
finding that the place was closely pressed on every side, and
reflecting with himself that the affair was full of hazard, and
that little reputation was likely to be gained from a war in
which the enemy were so much superior both by land and .

CHAP. I. OF POLYBIUS. 13

séa, -he sent offers of accommodation to both camps;
desiring only that the Mamertines might remain untno-
lested. But as this proposal was rejected, he was forced
to’venture on à battle; and resolved to make his first
‘attack upon the Syracusans. He accordingly drew his
forces out of the city, and offered battle to Hiero, who
readily accepted it. ‘The fight was long and obstinate;
but at last the Romans obtained the victory, and drove
back the enemy to their camp: and having spoiled the
imm they returned again to Messana.

: But Hiero, beginning now to apprehend some worse

event, as soon as night came on, returned back again with
his army in all haste to Syracuse. When Appius, on the
following day, was informed of this retreat, he immediately
conceived new hopes, and resolved to attack the Cartha-
ginians without delay. ‘He gave orders, therefore, to the
troops to take their repast betimes; and marching out of
the city at break of day, he charged the enemy, killed
great nümbers, of them, and forced the rest to fly to the
‘neighbouring cities. After these signal victories, the siege
‘being raised, and no forces appearing in the field, the
‘Romans wasted at their leisure the country of the Syra-
cusans and their allies; and at last advanced to o
itself in order to besiege it.

‘Such were the causes, and such the time and manner,
‘of the first expedition of the Romans out of Italy; and
"here I fix the beginning of my work: having first run
"through the times which just before preceded it, in order
"more clearly to explain the genuine and real grounds of
‘this transaction. For that the reader might be able to
“obtain a just and perfect knowledge of the causes of the
- “present power and greatness ofthe Romans, it was proper
previously to acquaint him both with the time and manner
“in' which this people first recovered into better hopes, after
they had beheld their country lost; and by! what-means
afterwards, when they had vanquished all the neighbouring
states, they found occasion to extend their conquests

y

14 THE GENERAL HISTORY sooks.
beyond the bounds of Italy. Nor let it be thought in any

manner strange, if, in the subsequent parts of this history,
when I am speaking of the states that are chiefly’ cele-
brated in the world, I should look back to ages that are
more remote. For this I shall do, merely for the sake of
beginning from such facts as will best enable us to discern,
from what causes, and in what time and manner, they
severally grew to that’ condition, in which they are seen to
flourish in the present times. Bat I now must hasten to
the task that is before me; mentioning first, in few words,
the events which are designed to be the subject of these
preliminary books.

' The first, then, is the war in Sicily between the Car-
thaginians and the Romans; and after it the African war.
Next will follow a recital of the actions of Amilcar and of
Asdrubal in Spain: with the invasion also of Illyria by
the Romans, who then for the first time sent their armies
into those parts of Europe. After these transactions come

the battles, which the Romans were forced to sustain in
Jtaly against the Gauls: about which time it was, that the

war of Cleomenes broke out in Greece; with an account
of which I shall conclude the second book, and close the

introduction to my history.

To enter into a minute detail of all the parts and
circumstances of these wars, would be:a labour quite
unnecessary to myself, and attended with no great advan-
tage to the reader. For it is not my design to write the

history, but rather to give a general and summary account

of these transactions, such as may serve for an intro-
duction to my history: and by making a short recital of
the chief events, in the order in which they were trans-
acted, and carrying on the narration in one regular and
connected series to the time from whence my own work
commences, to prepare the reader for the accounts that
follow, and make the whole both easy ‘and intelligible. I

design, however, to be somewhat more particular and

copious in describing the war in Sicily between the Car-

CHAP, I. OF POLYBIUS. 15

thaginians and the Romans. For it is not easy to find in
history any one more considerable, either with respect to
the time of its duration, the diligence and forces by which
it was sustained, the constant and uninterrupted course of
important actions that happened in it, or the great and
sudden turns of fortune that attended it. And because
the public manners and civil institutions both of Rome
and Carthage were as yet pure and unimpaired; as their
wealth was moderate; their strength nearly equal; it will
be more easy to form a perfect judgment from this war, of
the powers peculiar to the constitution of each republic,
than from those that followed.

Another motive, which inclined me not less strongly to
‘give’a more minute description of the Sicilian war, was
because Fabius and Philinus, who are esteemed the most
-skilful writers on this subject, have by no means shewn a
due exactness or fidelity in their relations. I cannot,
indeed, persuade myself that they would knowingly deviate
from the truth. The characters of the men, and the whole
tenour of their lives, exclude all such suspicion. But as
it happens in the case of lovers, a certain secret affection
and partiality towards their friends and countrymen seem
to have fixed insensibly some prejudices upon them. To
these it must be imputed, that Philinus in every part of his
history so highly praises the virtue, courage, and wisdom
of the Carthaginians; allowing none of all these qualities
to the Romans: while Fabius on the other hand takes all
"occasions to depreciate the Carthaginians, and extol the
Romans. Now such a disposition, when it is shewn in
other circumstances, is truly commendable. It is, in part,
the character of a good man to love his country and his
"friends, and to hate the enemies of both. But a historian
must divest himself of these affections: and be ready, on
many ‘occasions, to speak largely in the praises even of an
enemy, when his conduct ‘deserves applause; nor scruple
to condemn his most esteemed and dearest friends, as
often as their actions call for censure.

~

16 THE GENERAL HISTORY BOOK I.

i Truth is the eye of history. : For as an ‘animal, when
‘deprived of sight, becomes incapable of performing its
natural and proper functions, so if we take away truth
from history, what remains will be — but a useless
tale.
^ “Now, if we pay a proper regard to truth, we shall find
it necéssary not only to condemn our frietids on some
occasions, and commend our enemies; but also to com-
mend and condemn the same persons, as different circum-
stances may require. For as it is'not to be imagined, that
those who are engaged in great ‘affairs should always be
pursuing false or mistaken measures; “so neither is it pro-
bable that their conduct can, at all times, be exempt from
error. A historian, therefore, in all that lie relates, should
take care to be directed in his’ judginent by the genuine
and real circumstances of every action, without regarding
the actors of it. The following examples may serve ‘to
shew the truth of these remarks.

^ Philinus, in the beginning’ of his second book, gives this
account -of the affairs of Sicily: **'That Messana was
invested by the Carthaginians and Syracusans: that the
‘Romans had no sooner passed the Straits, and ‘gained
admission into the city, than they sallied out and attacked
the Syracusans, but were repulsed with considerable loss:
that they next made a like attempt upon the Cartha-
ginians; in which engagement they not only were defeated,
but lost.also many of their men, who fell alive into the
hands ofthe enemy." He then adds; ** that immediately
after this action, Hiero was so struck with terror, that he
not'only set fire to his camp, and fled away by night to
Syracuse, ‘but abandoned all the fortresses in the district
of Messana :: that the Carthaginians in the same manner
deserted their intrenchments, and retired'to their citiés,
not‘daring to oppose the Romans in the field: that the
generals, observing that their troops were quite ‘dis-
heartened, were nfraid to venture on a second battle: that
the Romans pursued closely after them in their retreat;

CHAP. II. -OF POLYBIUS. M

and having plundered and destroyed the Baud advanced
even to Syracuse, in order to besiege it." :

A relation so absurd must needs confute itself. The
armies which, as this historian writes, were laying siege to
Messana, and which had gained the victory in two engage-
ments, on a sudden become dispirited and . heartless,
abandon all the open country, and are themselves be-
sieged: while the Romans, besieged and twice defeated,
are yet described as pursuing the flying enemy, in pos-
session of the open country, and at last laying siege to
Syracuse. Facts so opposite can never be reconciled
together. It is evident, that either the first, or the subse-
quent part of this narration must be false. But the latter
is undoubtedly true: for the Romans. actually laid siege
to Syracuse, as this writer himself admits; and afterwards
to Echetla, a city standing on the frontier between the
Carthaginian and the Syracusan territories. It follows,
therefore, that. the facts are false which are first affirmed:
and that the Romans were victorious in the two engage-
ments, in which they are represented by this historian to
have been defeated. Such then is the character of Phi-
linus. For the same mistakes are to be found in almost
every part of his performance. Nor is the history of
Fabius in this respect more accurate; as I shall hereafter
take occasion to demonstrate. ` But I now return from
this digression; and shall endeavour, by a regular though
short deduction of the chief events; to set before the reader
a clear and just description of the war.

CHAP. II.

AS soon as the news of these victories which had been

gained by Appius were received at Rome, the Romans

chose for consuls M. Octacilius and M. Valerius, and

sent them both into Sicily, with all the forces. The

armies of this republic, besides the troops which are raised
VOL. I. c

18 THE GENERAL HISTORY BOOK I.

among the allies, are composed of four legions. ‘These
are levied every year: and each of them. consists of four
thousand foot, and three hundred horse. At their first
arrival, many cities, both of the Carthaginians and the
Syracusans, immediately submitted to them. When Hiero
saw that a general dread and consternation had spread
through.all the island, and considered likewise the num-
bers and the strength of the legionary forces, he:began
to think, that the issue of the war would necessarily be
determined by these circumstances in favour of the Ro-
mans: he sent ambassadors, therefore, to the. consuls,
with proposals for a treaty. The offer was embraced with
pleasure by the Romans; chiefly for the sake of securing
provisions to their army. For as the Carthaginians were
masters of the sea, it was greatly to be feared that their
supplies would be all intercepted. And, indeed, the forces
ofthe former year. had been reduced to great extremity,
through the want of necessaries. Perceiving, therefore,
that the friendship of this prince might prove highly
serviceable to them in this respect, they accepted it with
joy; and agreed to a treaty with him upon these con- -
ditions: ** That he should pay a hundred talents of silver,
and restore, without ransom, all the Roman prisoners."
Thus the alliance was concluded; and from this time
Hiero, sheltered under the protection of the Romans,
whom he supplied from time to time as their necessities
required, possessed his kingdom in security; pursuing
always the right paths of glory, and employing all his
pains to gain the applause and favour of his subjects.
And, indeed, so wise and prudent was his conduct, both
in the general tenour of his policy, and in every single act
of government, that he reaped from it the most lasting
fruits; and enjoyed a faine to which few princes have been
ever able to aspire. E

As soon as the treaty was confirmed at Rome in an
assembly of the people, it was resolved, for the time to
come, to send two legions only into Sicily. For as by

CHAP. II. OF POLYBIUS. 19

this alliance the burthen of the war was become much
lighter to them than before, so they considered likewise,
that a smaller army might more easily be supplied with
necessaries. But when the Carthaginians saw that Hiero
was become their enemy, and that the Romans were pre-
paring to pursue the war with all imaginable vigour, they
soon were sensible, that it neither would be possible for
them to oppose the enemy in the field, nor even to retain
what they then possessed in Sicily, without a more consi-
derable force. They therefore made great levies in Li-
guria, and among the Gauls, and greater still in Spain; and <
embarked them allfor Sicily. And because Agrigentum
was the strongest of all the places in the island that were
subject to their power, and the most-commodious also for
the occasions of the war, they resolved to make that city
their place of arms, and removed into it their stores and:
all the forces. l
, The consuls, who had made the alliance with the king
of Syracuse, were now returned to Rome; and L. Postu-
mius and Q. Mamilius, who succeeded them in office and
command, arrived in Sicily with the legions. As soon as
they had seen the designs and preparations of the enemy,
they resolved to act more vigorously than before. Neg-
lecting therefore all the other business of the war, they
marched directly to Agrigentum with all their forces ; and
encamping at the distance of eight stadia from the city,
shut up the Carthaginians within their walls. It was now
the time of harvest: and as the siege was likely to be of
long continuance, the Roman soldiers were eagerly em-
ployed in getting in the corn, and had spread themselves
over all the country, without care or caution. The Car-
thaginians seeing this disorder, sallied out upon the fo-
ragers, and routed them with little difficulty. ‘They then
ran towards the camp to plunder it, and with great fury
attacked the troops that were left to guard the intrench-
ments. But the excellence of the Roman discipline, upon
this occasion, as on many others, proved the cause of their
c2

20 THE GENERAL HISTORY BOOK I.

safety. For the soldiers, remembering that those. who
yielded their place in battle, or fled basely from their post,
were always punished with death, not only sustained the
charge against an enemy that far exceeded them in num-
bers, but also pressed their adversaries with so much force
and vigour, that though they lost many of their men, they
destroyed a great number of the Carthaginians: and having
at last surrounded them on every side, when they were just
now ready to tear away the palisade of the intrenchments,
they drove them back with considerable loss, and pursued
them even to thecity. After this action, the Carthaginians
were less frequent in their sallies; and the Romans used
more precaution, when they went abroad to forage.

As the enemy never appeared without the walls, unless
to engage in some slight skirmishes, the consuls having
divided their army into two bodies, posted oneof them near
the temple of /Esculapius, and the other on the side which
looked towards Heraclea, and fortified with works on both
-sides of the city the space that lay between the camps.
They drew a line round the city, to obstruct the sallies of
the besieged ; and another on the side towards the country,
to repel all approaches from that quarter, and to intercept
all succours. The space between the lines and the camps
was secured by advanced bodies of troops, and by works
thrown up at proper distances, as the nature of the ground
required. "The allies had brought together to Erbessus
provisions and every kind of stores. And as this city stood
at no great distance from the Homan camps, their convoys
went and returned continually, and supplied them with all
things in great abundance.

In this condition things remained for near five months:
in which time, many slight engagements happened, but no
decisive action. But the besieged were now greatly pressed
by famine: for the numbers that were within the walls
were not fewer than fifty thousand men. Annibal, there-
fore, who commanded in the city, finding that all things
tended to the last extremity, dispatched messenger after

CHAP. IT. OF POLYBIUS. 2]

messenger to Carthage, to solicit some relief. The Car-
thaginians embarked some troops and elephants, and sent
them into Sicily, to Hanno their other general. Hanno
ordered all these forces to be drawn together to Heraclea:
and having made himself master of Erbessus by some secret
practices among the citizens, he cut off all supplies from
the Roman camp, and constrained them in their turn to
feel the miseries of the besieged. Indeed, so great was the
extremity to which they were reduced, that they often were
inelined to raise the siege: which at last they must have
been compelled to do, if Hiero had not practised every
method of address and diligence, to furnish them from
time to time, in moderate quantity, with such supplies as
were chiefly wanted.

But when Hanno saw that the Roman army was dis-
heartened and distressed by sickness as well as famine,
while on.the other hand his own troops were fresh and fit
for action; taking with him the elephants, which were
about fifty in number, and the rest also of his forces, he
marched in haste from Heraclea, having sent away the
Numidian horse before, with orders that they should ap-
proach the Roman camp, provoke their cavalry to action,
and immediately retire back again towards the main army.
These troops accordingly advanced: and no sooner had they
reached the nearest camp, than the Roman cavalry came
pouring out against them, and began the attack with fury.
But the Numidians observed their orders, and maintained
a flying fight, till they were joined by Hanno with the
other forces: and then suddenly facing round, they fell
with vigour upon the enemy, killed great numbers of them,
and pursued the rest even close to their intrenchments.
After this action Hanno fixed his camp upon a hill called
Torus, at the distance of ten stadia from the Romans.

' In this situation they both remained during two whole

months. Many slight engagements happened every day

between them; but no action, that was general or decisive.

But as Annibal now made continual siguals by fires from
c3

22 THE GENERAL HISTORY BOOK I.

the city; and sent messengers from day to day to Hanno,
to acquaint him, that the multitude were no longer able to
süpport the miseries of the famine, and that great numbers
had deserted to the enemy, this general resolved at last to
venture on a battle. The Romans on their part also, for
the reasons which have been already mentioned, shewed an
equal eagerness to engage. They drew out their forces on
either side, and ranged them in order upon the ground
that lay between the camps. The fight was long and ob-
stinate: but after some time, the Carthaginian mercenaries
who composed the first line gave ground, and falling back
upon the elephants and the ranks that were behind them,
threw the whole army into;/such disorder, that a general
rout ensued. The greatest part of the troops were de-
stroyed in the place: a small number only escaped to He-
raclea. The baggage and almost all the elephants were
taken. When-night came on, the Romans, partly from
—— _the joy which their victory inspired, and partly through
the fatigue which they had suffered in the action, neglected
.to guard their camp with the usual care. Annibal, whose
affairs were desperate, considered this as the very moment
of his safety. About midnight, therefore, he began his
march out of the city with all the foreign troops, filled up
the lines with sacks of matting that were stuffed with chaff,
and passed undiscovered by the enemy. In the morning,
the Romans perceiving what had happened, gave some
little disturbance to the rear; but soon returned, and
marched directly to the gates of Agrigentum: and finding
no resistance, they entered the city and plundered it, and
brought away many prisoners, with rich spoil of every
kind. à
The news of this success filled the Roman senate with
joy, and inspired them with greater hopes than those which
they had at first conceived. Instead of being satisfied
with having relieved the Mamertines, and enriched them-
selves by the war, they now began to think, that it would
be no hard task to drive the Carthaginians entirely out

CHAP. 1I. OF POLYBIUS. i 9$

of Sicily, and by the acquisition of that island, to add no
small increase to the strength of their republic. To this
point, therefore, they directed all their views. And, indeed,
on the part of the land forces, every thing seemed to pro-
mise a fair accomplishment of their designs. "The two new
consuls, L. Valerius and T. Octacilius, maintained their
ground in Sicily, and carried on the war with equal pru-
dence and success.. But, on the other hand, as long as
the Carthaginians should be suffered to remain sole masters —
of the sea, the event must still be doubtful. For though
after the time when Agrigentum had first fallen into their
hands, many of the inland cities, in despair of being able
to resist the Roman legions, had embraced their party, yet
a greater number of those that stood along the coast re-
volted from them, through terror of the Carthaginian fleets.
Thus the success on one side was still balanced by some
equal loss. It was considered likewise, that the maritime
parts of Italy were often pillaged and insulted by the ene-
my, while the coasts of Africa remained secure and un-
molested. From all these reasons, they at last resolved,
that they would oppose the Carthaginians upon the sea. ^

Among the motives which induced me to enter into a .
more minute description of the war in Sicily, this was not
the least: that I might take occasion to explain the time
and manner in which the Romans first equipped a naval
armament, together with the causes that gave birth to that
attempt.

Their design then was, to bring the war to a speedy and
effectual conclusion. With this. view, they resolved to
build a hundred quinqueremes, and twenty triremes. But
one- great difficulty occurred. . Their builders were entirely
unacquainted with the manner of constructing quinque-
remes; the use of which was then unknown in Italy. But
in this design, we may observe a most conspicuous proof
of that bold and daring spirit which is peculiar to the Ro-
mans: who, though destitute of all the means that such
an enterprise required, and before they had even gained

c4

24 THE GENERAL HISTORY BOOK I.

the least degree of knowledge or experience in maritime
affairs, could at once conceive, and carry into execution,
so vast a project, and make the first trial of their forces .
against the Carthaginians, who had received from their
ancestors the undisputed sovereignty of the sea. The
following fact may serve to confirm the truth of this re-
flection. When this people first resolved to send their
forces over to Messana, they had neither any decked vessels,
, Or ship of transport, nor even a singleshallop. But having
^ borrowed among the Tarentines, Eleates, Locrians, and
Neapolitans, some boats of fifty oars, and a few triremes,
they boldly embarked the legions in those vessels.

| The Carthaginians bore down upon them in their pas-
sage: when one of their quinqueremes, advancing to the
fight with too great eagerness, struck upon the sands, and
was taken by the Romans. ‘This vessel was now made use
of as the model of their fleet: and indeed without some
such accident, their want of skill must soon have forced
them to abandon the design.

While the workmen were busy in building and fitting
the ships, others were employed to draw together a body of
sailors, and instruct them in the exercise of the oar. This
was done in the following manner. ‘They placed benches
along the shore, upon which the rowers were’ ranged in
the same order as at sea, with a proper officer among them
to give the command. In this situation, they accustomed
- themselves to perform all the necessary motions. of the
body: to fall back together, and again to bend forwards;
to contract and extend their arms; to begin, or leave-off,
according to the signals.. After this preparation, the ves-
sels being now.completely finished, they sailed out to sea,
and, when they had spent some. little time in perfecting
their exercise, advanced along the coast of Italy, agreeable
to the orders which they had before received.

For Cn. Cornelius, who commanded the naval forces,
had sailed a few days before with seventeen ships towards
Messana, to provide whatever might be wanted for the fleet;

CHAP. II. OF POLYBIUS . . 25 ~

and had left directions with the other captains that they
should follow him as soon as they were ready. But while
he lay at Messana, having received some intelligence which
_ gave him hopes of taking the town of Lipara by surprise,
he too easily engaged in the design, and steered his course
towards the place, with the ships just mentioned. But on
the news of this attempt, Annibal, who then was stationed
at Panormus, immediately sent away the senator, Boodes,
with twenty ships.. Boodes, sailing to the place by night,
‘blocked up the Romans in the port. As soon as day ap-
peared the sailors all fled from their ships, and escaped to
land; and Cornelius, being struck with terror, and per-
ceiving no means of safety, surrendered himself to the
enemy, who immediately returned back again to Annibal,
carrying with them the Roman consul, and all his squa-
dron. Not many days after this exploit, while the mis-
fortune of the Romans was still fresh and recent, an acci-
dent of the same kind proved almost fatal to Annibal him-
self; for having received information that the whole Ro-
man fleet had steered their course along the coast of Italy,
and were now at no great distance, he presently advanced
with fifty vessels, designing to take a view of their numbers,
and of the order in which they sailed. But he had scarcely
doubled the promontory of Italy when he found himself at
once in the very midst of the enemy, who were all disposed
in perfect order, and ready to engage. A great part of
his ships were taken: but himself escaped with the rest,
though not without the greatest difficulty. The Romans
then held on their course to Sicily; and being there in--
formed of what had: happened to Cornelius, they sent mes-
sengers to Duilius, who commanded the land forces in the
island, and waited his arrival. At the same time, having
received intelligence that’ the Carthaginians were at no
great distance, they began to make the necessary prepara-
tions for an engagement. But, because their ships were
built with little skill, and were both slow and heavy in their
motions, it was resolved to balance these defects by the use

26 THE GENERAL HISTORY BOOK I.

of certain machines, which some person in the (leet had
invented for the occasion, and which were afterwards called
by the Romans, corvi. The description of them is as
follows: :

They erected on the prow of every vessel a round pillar
of wood, of about twelve feet in height, and of three palms
breadth in diameter, with a pulley at the top. ‘To this pillar
was fitted a kind of stage, eighteen feet in length and four
feet broad, which was made ladder-wise, of strong timbers
laid across, and cramped together with iron: the pillar
being received into an oblong square, which was opened
for that purpose, at the distance of six feet within the end
of the stage. On either side of the stage lengthways was
a parapet, which reached just above.the knee. At the
farthest end of this stage or ladder, was a bar of iron,
whose shape was somewhat like a pestle; but it was
sharpened at the bottom, or lower point; and on the top
of it was a ring. The whole appearance of this machine
very much resembled those that are used in grinding corn.
To the ring just mentioned was fixed a rope, by which,
with the help of the pulley that was at the top of the pillar,
they hoisted up the machines, and, as the vessels of the
enemy came near, let them fall upon them, sometimes on
their prow, and sometimes on their sides, as occasion best
served. As the machine fell, it struck into the decks of the
enemy, and held them fast. In this situation, if the two
vessels happened to lay side by side, the Romans leaped
on board from all parts of their ships at once. But in case
that they were joined only by the prow, they then entered
two and two along the machine; the two foremost extend-
ing their bucklers right before them to ward off the strokes
that were aimed against them in front; while those that
followed rested the boss of their bucklers upon the top of
the parapet on either side, and thus covered both their
flanks. Having, in this manner, prepared their vessels for
the combat, they now only waited for the time to engage.

As soon as Duilius heard of the misfortune that had

CHAP. II. OF POLYBIUS. 27

happened to the other consul, he left the care of the army.
to the tribunes, and- hastened to the fleet; and having re-
ceived information that the enemy were employed in ravag-
ing the plain of Mylæ, he presently steered his course that
way. The Carthaginians beheld their approach with joy;
and immediately drew out their fleet, which consisted of a
_ hundred and thirty ships: despising the inexperience of
the Romans, and flattering themselves with such assurance
of success, that they even disdained to form their squadron
into any kind of order, and, turning their prows towards
the enemy, bore down instantly upon them, as to.a certain
spoil. ‘The commander of the fleet was the same Annibal
who made his retreat by night from Agrigentum. He
sailed in a vessel of seven banks of oars, which had for-
merly belonged to Pyrrhus. As they approached more
nearly to the Roman fleet, the sight of those strange ma-
chines, erected on the prow of every ship, occasioned some
little hesitation and surprise. After some time, however,
as their contempt of the enemy again took place, they ad-
vanced with the same ardour as before. But when their
vessels, as soon as they were joined in action, were grappled
fast by these new instruments of war, and when the Ro-
mans, instantly advancing along the machines towards
them, maintained the fight upon their very decks, one part
of the Carthaginians were immediately destroyed, and the
rest threw down their arms, being struck with terror by

this new kind of combat, which seemed so > nearly to resem-
ble an engagement upon land. The ships that had ad-
vanced the foremost of the fight, being thirty in number,
were taken with theirmen. Among these was the general’s
ship. But Annibal himself found means to get on board
a boat, and = though not without the greatest
hazard.

The rest of the didi were now advancing to the
fight, but having observed the fate of their companions,
they at first turned aside, in order to elude the stroke of
"the machines. But as their ships were light, and easy in

*

-

28 THE GENERAL HISTORY mook 1.

their motions, they soon resumed their confidence, and be-
gan to fall upon the Roman vessels, some in stern, and
some upon their sides; being persuaded, that, with this
precaution, they should be secure from danger. But when
they saw, with great astonishment, that, on which side
soever they advanced, the corvi still hung over them, they
were at last content to seek their safety in flight, witb the
loss of fifty ships.

n This great and unexpected success upon the sea en-
"we. the Romans: to pursue the war with double ar-
dour. They land their forces upon the island, near
JEgesta; raise the siege of that city, when it was reduced
to the last extremity, and take Macella by storm.

About the time when this victory was gained by sea,
Amilcar, who commanded the land forces of the Carthagi-
nians, and was encamped near .Panormus, having heard
that some disputes had happened between the Romans and
their allies, concerning the post of honour in the field, and
that the allies were preparing to encamp a part between
Thermz and Paropus, fell suddenly upon them with all
bis forces, when they had just raised their camp, and killed
near four thousand men.

` About the same time Annibal returned back to Carthage,
with the ships that had escaped in the late engagement.
Not long afterwards he sailed from thence to Sardinia with
the fleet; taking with him also some officers of the chiefest
note. But being there surprised one day by the Romans,
who, from the time when they first appeared upon the sea,
had resolved to attempt the conquest of this island, and
being blocked up by them in a certain harbour, so that
many of his vessels fell into their hands, he was seized and
crucified by the Carthaginians who got safe to land.

The succeeding summer produced in Sicily nothing
memorable on the part of the Romans. But the consuls
of the following year, A. Atilius and C. Sulpicius, having
led the army to Panormus, where the: Carthaginians then
lay in winter quarters, drew up their forces in order of

^

* /

f
i
]
4

CHAP. II. : OF POLYBIUS. 29

battle before the town. .But when the enemy kept close
behind their walls, they directed their routs back again to
Hippana, and took it in the first assault. Mytistratum was
also taken: but not without much labour, and a siege of
long continuance; for the natural situation of the place had
rendered it very strong. They then marched to Camarina,
which not long before had revolted from them; and having
advanced their works close against the city, and with their
engines battered down the walls, they soon forced it to sur-
render. After this success, thé town of Enna, with many
other little places that belonged to the Carthaginians, sub-
mitted to the Romans, who then resolved to form the siege
of Lipara.

In the following year, Atilius, the Roman consul, who
then lay at anchor in the port of Tyndaris, having perceived
the Carthaginian fleet passing very near him, in a careless
manner and without any order, made haste immediately to
pursue them with ten ships, and gave orders to the rest to
follow as soon as they were ready; but when the Carthagi-
nians saw that one part of theenemy werealready under sail,
while others had scarcely yet got on board, and that the fore-
most ships had advanced far before the rest, they suddenly
turned uponthem, and surrounding them on every side, sunk
the other vessels, and had almost taken that in which the
consul sailed; but, because his ship was lighter than the

rest, and well supplied with a body of the most skilful
' rowers, by the help of those advantages he escaped the
danger. ` But in a short time afterwards the rest of the
Roman squadron advanced in order: and, having all
turned their prows in one line against the enemy, they
engaged them with such vigour and success, that they took
ten of their ships with all the men, destroyed eight more,
and forced the others to retreat in haste towards the Lipa-
rean islands. ,

As the advantages in this engagement had seemed to be
on both sides equal, they both resumed their naval prepa-
rations with greater vigour than before; and resolved to

30 THE GENERAL HISTORY mook t.

employ their . whole attention to obtain the sovereignty of
thesea. During this time, the armies upon land performed
no exploit that deserves to be related, but wasted the whole
campaign in slight and inconsiderable actions, of little
moment or importance.

In the following summer the Romans, having employed,
as we have said, their utmost diligence to complete their `
naval preparations, sailed out to sea, with a fleet of three
hundred and thirty decked ships, and cast anchor at
Messana. From thence, leaving Sicily on the right, and
doubling the promontory Pachynus, they steered their
course towards Ecnomus, where their army at that time
lay. The Carthaginians, having also drawn together a
fleet, which consisted of three hundred and fifty ships: of
war, sailed first to Lilybzeum, and from thence to Heraclea
of Minos. The design of the Romans was, to divert the
war from Sicily to Afric, and constrain the Carthaginians
to employ their strength in the defence of their own proper
country. The Carthaginians, on the other hand, being
sensible that their coasts were open, and that the people of
the country must become an easy prey, if the enemy should
once gain the land, resolved to intercept them in the at-
tempt, and force them to a battle.

When such were the sentiments on either side, it was
easy to discern, that an engagement soon must follow.
The Romans, therefore, made such a disposition of their
forces, that they were equally prepared either to proceed in
their intended descent upon the coasts of Afric, or to
accept a battle, in case that it should now be offered by the
Carthaginians. They selected from the land army all
their choicest troops; and having divided the fleet into
four separate bodies, assigned to each of them a double
name. The first division was called the first legion, and
the first squadron; and so the rest. The last only, being
not distinguished by any such particular denomination, was
styled, ingeneral, thetriarii; the name which isappropriated
to the last division in the armies upon land. The whole

CHAP. II. OF POLYBIUS. _. 3l

fleet consisted of a hundred and forty thousand men: -each
vessel containing one hundred and twenty soldiers, and `
three hundred seamen. On the other hand, the forces of
the Carthaginians, whose preparations were made wholly
for the sea, amounted to more than a hundred and fifty
thousand; if we compute them from. the number of their
ships. How impossible is it, I do not say to behold so vast
an armament, but even to hear a bare description of it,
without being fixed in admiration, both of the importance
of the contest, and of. the power and strength of the two
republics that were thus engaged!

The Romans, having considered that the course which
they were obliged to steer lay through the open sea, and
that the chief advantage of the enemy consisted in the
lightness and celerity of their ships, resolved to make such
a disposition as might render their whole fleet firm, com-
pact, and very difficult to be broken. For this purpose,
two vessels carrying six banks of oars, being those in
which the consuls sailed, were first placed side by side in
front; Each of these was followed by a line of vessels; the
first squadron making one line; and the second the other:
the ships of either line extending themselves to a greater
distance still as they advanced, and gradually widening the
area of the figure. "Their prows were all turned outwards.
The first and: second squadrons being thus disposed in
form of a wedge, they drew up the third division in a line
behind:.so that the whole resembled the figure of a tri-
angle; the third squadron constituting the base. These
last were followed by the transports, which they held in
tow. Last of all came the triarii, or fourth division,
ranged likewise in a line of single ships, but so extended,
as to cover both the flanks of the line before them. This .
disposition resembled, as I said, the figure of a triangle,
the upper part of which was hollow, and the base solid;
the whole being strong, and proper for action, and such as
could not easily be brokeri by the enemy.

The Carthaginian generals, having animated titir men

32 THE GENERAL HISTORY BOOK I.

as the occasion required, and represented to them in few
words, that if they should gain the victory in the present
combat, the business of the war would still be confined to
Sicily as before, but that in case they were defeated, they
must then be forced to defend their country, families, and
possessions against the Romans, ordered all immediately to
get on board. The forces being fully sensible of the truth
of what was spoken to them, received the order with
alacrity, and came sailing from the harbour full of hope
and eager resolution. The generals, having remarked the
disposition of the enemy, ranged three parts of all their
fleet in a line of single ships, extending the right wing far
out to sea, with design to surround the Romans, and
turning all their prows towards them. The remaining
part was posted on the left, very near to the shore, and in
the figure which is called the forceps. The right wing,
composed of all the quinqueremes and galleys, which, from
their lightness and celerity, were most proper for the
design of surrounding the enemy, was led by Hanno,
whose army was defeated in the siege of Agrigentum; and
the left was committed to the care of Amilcar, who com-
manded in the former battle of Tyndaris. This general
took his station in the centre of the line, and, as soon as
the fight began, put in practice the following stratagem.
The Romans, when they saw that the enemy were
ranged in a line of single ships, began the combat by
attacking their centre. But the. Carthaginians :in the
centre received orders from Amilcar immediately to retreat,
that they might thus force the Romans to break the order
of their battle. ‘They fly accordingly with the greatest
haste: and the Romans followed them with eagerness;
By this contrivance the first and second squadrons of the
Romans were soon divided from the third, which held the
transport ships in tow, and from the triarii, who were
drawn up behind to support the rest. When they were
separated to a sufficient distance, the Carthaginians, upon
a signal given from Amilcar's ship, suddenly turned about

CHAP, If. | OF: POLYBIUS.: 33

and fell-with fury upon the vessels that pursued them.
The fight was obstinate, and the advantages on both sides
for some time equal. For though the Carthaginians were
far superior in the lightness of their ships, and in their: -
skill in advancing or retreating, and attacking tlie enemy
on every side; yet the Romans derived no less assurances
of victory from the vigour and courage of their troops, the
advantage of their machines, and the presence of both the
consuls, under whose eyes the soldiers fought. Such was
the state of the action on that side.

About this time Hanno, who commanded in the right
wing-.at some distance from the vessels that. were -first
engaged, stretched out to sea, and bearing down upon the.
triarii, threw them into great disorder. The Carthaginians
also. that_were ranged along. the coast, having changed:
their - first disposition, and turned their prows in front
towards the enemy, advanced. against the squadron that
towed the transports. - Thus the whole engagement con-
sisted at once of three different combats, maintained in
different places. - And, because in each of these divisions
the. strength of the ‘combatants was nearly equal, the
success was also for some time equal. . But in the progress
of the action the affair was brought at last to a decision: a
different one, perhaps, than what might reasonably have
been: expected in such circumstances. For the Roman
squadron that had begun the engagement gained so full
a victory, that Amilcar was forced. to fly, and the: consul
Manlius brought away the vessels that were taken. -

The other consul, having now perceived the danger in
which the triarii and the transports were involved, hast-
ened to their assistance with the second squadron, which
was still entire. The triarii, having received these suc-
cours, when.they were just upon- the point of yielding,
again.resumed their courage, and renewed the fight with
vigour: so that the-enemy, being surrounded on every side
in a.manner so sudden and unexpected, and attacked at

VOL. I. i D

4

34 THE GENERAL HISTORY BOOK I.

once both in the front and rear, were at last constrained
to steer away to sea,

About this time Manlius also, returning from the.
engagement, observed that the ships of the third squadron
were forced in close to the shore, and there blocked up by
the left division of the Carthaginian fleet. He joined his
forces, therefore, with those.of the other consul, who had.
now placed the transports and. triarii in security, and hast-
ened to assist these vessels, which were so invested by the.
enemy, that they seemed to suffer.a kind of siege. And,
indeed, they must have all been long before destroyed if
the Carthaginians, through apprehension of the corvi, had.
not. still kept themselves at distance, and declined. a close;
engagement. But the consuls, having now advanced:
together, surround the enemy, and take fifty of their ships.
with, all the men. The. rest, being few in number, steered:
close along the shore, and saved themselves. by flight.

^, Such were the circumstances of this engagement; in:

which the victory at last was wholly on the side of. the.
Romans. Twenty-four of their ships were. sunk in the
action, and more than thirty of the Carthaginians, No.

. vessel of the Romans, fell. into the hands of the enemy ;

but sixty-four of the Carthaginians. were-taken with their.
men.

After this success, the, Romans, having. ai the
fleet with new provisions, repaired the vessels. that, were:
taken from the enemy, and shewn such care of their
naval forces as the.late victory. well deserved, again sailed
out to sea, and steered their course towards the coast of
Afric. The foremost ships, arriving. at Hermeea, cast
anchor there, and waited for the rest of the fleet. The
promontory, called Hermzea, is situated upon the extreme
edge of the Gulf of Carthage, from whence it. extends far
out to sea, and points towards the .coast of Sicily.
When. the other vessels were arrived, they all.sailed to-
gether along the coast, till they came to "ien And:

CHAP. III. OF POLYBIUS. - 35

having there disembarked their forces, drawn their ships
to land, and thrown up an intrenchment round them, they
resolved immediately to’ invest the city, having first in
vain invited the inhabitants to surrender.

prms CHAP. IIT.
Ti HE Carthaginians, who’ had escaped from the late

engagement, and returned safe to Carthage, were per-
suaded that the Romans, elated by so great a victory,
would immediately direct their course towards that city.
‘They’ made, therefore, the necessary disposition, both’
by land and sea, for securing all the approaches, to the
coast. But when they heard that de enémy had already’
disembarked their troops, arid were laying siege to Aspis,
having now lost all hopé of being able to prevent: their
landing, they began to levy forces, and employed all
their care to fortify the city and the adjoining country.

The Romans soon forced Aspis to surrender: and
having left in the place a proper garrison, they sent some
méssengers to Rome to convey the news of their success,
and to receive. instructions with regard to the measures
that were next to be pursued. qs, then decamped.with
all their forces, and marched through the country, to
waste and plunder it. Finding no resistance from the
enemy, they destroyed many houses of great magnificence,
and returned back again to their ships, carrying with’
them a' great quantity of cattle, and more than twenty
thousand slaves.

The messengers about this time returned from Rome with
orders that one of the consuls should remain in Afric with’
the forces that were necessary, and the other carry back ‘the
fleet. Regulus, ther efore, was left behind with fifteen thou-
sahd foot, five hundred horse, and forty of the ships; while
Manlius, taking with him the prisoners, and the rest of the
naval forcés, passed safely along the coast of SRM and ar-
rived at Rome.

n2 = ~

36 THE GENERAL HISTORY BOOK I.

The Carthaginians, perceiving from the preparations
that were made, that the enemy had no design to leave the
country, chose at first two generals, Bostar, and Asdrubal
the son of Hanno, and sent afterwards for Amilcar likewise
from Heraclea. Amilcar sailed in haste to Carthage with
five thousand foot and five hundred horse; and, being de-
clared third general; he held a.consultation with Asdrubal
and the other chief, concerning the measures that were
most proper .to be taken. It was soon resolved that they
should lead the forces against the enemy, and not suffer
them thus to waste the country without resistance. The
consul, .after some days, advanced again with his army.
through the country, storming all the posts that were not
fortified with walls, and reducing the rest by siege.. Being
at last arrived near Adis, a city of some importance, he
encamped -before it, prepared his works, and began. to
press the siege with vigour. "The Carthaginians, in order

-to relieve. the place, and save the country round it from
destruction, directed their march that way with all their
forces, and fixed their camp upon a hill, which indeed.
overlooked the enemy, but was, in every other respect, a
very improper situation for their army. For as their chief
strength consisted in their elephants and cavalry, they.
should, in prudence, have encamped upon the open plain ;.
whereas by marching into places-that-were steep, confined,
and craggy, they seemed to instruct their enemies in what
manner they best might act against them. And this,
indeed, was the event; for the Romans, wisely judging
that the strongest and most serviceable part of the Cartha-.
ginian army, and that which they had the greatest cause
to dread, was rendered wholly useless by their situation,
resolved to seize the occasion, and engage the enemy before,
they should descend into the plain. ‘They drew’ out their
forces, therefore, at break of day, and began ihe attack on
both sides of the hill. The Carthaginian cavalry. and
elephants ‘were not able to perform any service in the
action. But the mercenaries stood for some time firm,

CHAP. IJI. OF POLYBIUS. eeu

and maintained the fight with so much vigour, that they
forced the first legion to give ground. ‘ But when these
troops were attacked behind, and-dispersed with little dif-
ficulty by the Romans who had ascended the hill on the
other side, the whole army then fled at once from the
camp, and a general rout ensued. The elephants, with
- the cavalry, gained the plain, and escaped. The Romans,
. having for some time pursued the infantry, returned back
to the camp, and pillaged it; and marched ‘afterwards ‘at
leisure through the country, wasting and destroying all
the cities in their way; and having, at last, possessed them-
selves of Tunis, they there encamped, because this city not
only seemed commodious for the occasions of the war, but
was also situated with great advantage for infesting Car-
thage itself and all the adjoining country.

— The Carthaginians were now reduced to a condition
which, indeed; seemed next to desperate. For besides
these two defeats, the one by sea the other by land, which
were both occasioned not so much through any want of
courage in the troops, as by the unskilful conduct of the -
generals, the Numidians had also sent detachments into
their territories, and committed even greater devastations
than the Romans. The people all left their habitations in
the country, and fled to Carthage. "Their numbers soon
occasioned a most dreadful famine in the place; while the
apprehensions also of a sudden siege filled every heart with ©
consternation and dismay. But Regulus, who had given
so great a shock to the strength of Carthage both by land
and sea, that the city itself seemed almost ready to surren-
der to him, began now to fear that a new consul might
arrive from Rome, and rob him of the. glory of finishing
the war. He invited, therefore, the Carthaginians. to a.
treaty. The offer was embraced with pleasure ; and some
of the chiefs of the city were sent to settle the conditions
with him. But so far were they from yielding their con-
sent in any point to the terms that were proposed, that
they scarcely pu submit to hear them; for, Regulus, as, —

D3

38 THE GENERAL HISTORY noox t.

if he had been already master of their fate, seemed to think
that every thing which he was inclined to grant should be
accepted by iru as mere grace and favour. But the
ambassadors, perceiving that though they should entirely
be reduced beneath the Roman yoke, no worse conditions
could be imposed than those that now were offered, not
only returned again without concluding any treaty, but
were greatly offended also, and incensed by the unyielding
haughtiness of the consul. The Carthaginian senate, when
they knew the terms that were ‘demanded, assumed a noble
constancy; and, though. they were almost ready to despair
of safety, resolved to encounter every danger, and put in
practice every expedient that time might offer, rather than
by a base submission to disgrace the glory of their former
actions.

About this time, one of those that had been sent by v
Car thaginians into Greece, to raise some mercenaries in
that country, returned to Carthage, bringing with him a
large body of troops, Among them was a certain Lace-
daemonian, named Xantippus, who had heen educated in
the Spartan discipline, and from thence had gained ; a per-
fect knowledge in the art of war. As soon as he was in-
for med of 2 the circumstances of the late defeat, and had
seen the nature of the Carthaginian forces, with the num-
bers of their horse and elephants, he began first to reflect
within himself, and afterwards to declare among his friends,
that the Carthaginians had not been vanquished by. the
Romans, but od their losses to their own mistakes, and
to the want of skill in their commanders. This discourse
being soon spread among the people, as it happens in
such conjunctures, came at last to the ears of the generals
and the magistrates, who ordered Xantippus. to be called.
When he came before them, he explained : with so much
clearness the causes of their late misfortune;, aud: ‘shewed
such strong assurances of victory, in, case that they now
would yicld to his advice, and choose the open. plains .for
their encampments, ‘marches, battles, that the chiefs with

CHAP. II. OF POLYBIUS. 39

one voice applauded all his sentiments, and committed the
care of the army to him.
From the time when this discoursé was first known
among the people, a kind of joyful rumour began to spread
through all the city, and raised a general expectation of
some happy change. But when Xantippus dréw up the
troops in order without the walls, and formed them into
several bodies, training and instructing each of them to
move according to the rules of military discipline, a skill
so visibly superior to that of the other generals, forced
loud applauses froni the multitude. They demanded to
be led immediately against the enemy; and seemed to be
assured, that under such a chief they could never suffer
any loss. The generals, when they saw the courage of the
soldiers thus restored, harangued them in such words as
the time required, and in a few days afterwards began their
march. Their army was composed of twelve tid
foot, and four thousand horse, besides elephants, which
amounted to near a hundred. The Romans were under
some surprise when they saw that the Carthaginians now,
for the first time, chose the open plains both for their
marches and encampments. They resolved, however, to
meet and engage them without delay. Having advanced,
therefore, with all their forces, on the first day they fixed
their camp at the distance of ten stadia only from the
enemy: On the following day the Carthaginian generals
held a consultation, in order to determine what was neces-
sary to be done; but the soldiers ran together in crowds,
and calling aloud upon the name of Xantippus, demanded
to be led without delay against the enemy. The generals
perceiving the great’ aisetity and confidence of the troops,
and being also strongly urged by the entreaties of Xan-
tippus, who pressed them instantly to seize the occasion
that was offered, gave orders to prepare for the engage-
ment, and committed to Xantippus thé care and disposi-
tion of the whole. Xantippus, being entrusted with this
power, ranged the elephants in a single line, in front; and
D4

40 THE GENERAL HISTORY BOOK I.

behind them, at a moderate. distance, ‘the Carthaginian
phalanx. He posted on the,right wing one part of the
mercenaries ; the rest that were more lightly armed, were”
equally Bitribnted into.either wing, together with the
horse.

` The. Romans also drew up their army in battle with
equal readiness. Their chief care was, to secure them-
selves against: the elephants; which they greatly dreaded.
For. this purpose, having placed their light-armed troops
in front, they drew up the legions in deep and close order
behind, and divided the cavalry upon the wings. Thus
they lessened the usual extent of their front; but gave. a
greater depth to the body of their army; so that, upon the
whole, their ‘disposition was well adapted to. sustain the
shock of the elephants, but was wholly ineffectual for re-
sisting. the Carthaginian cavalry, which in’ numb far
exceeded that of the Romans.

In this order both armies stood awhile, expecting the
signal. to engage: but when Xantippus ordered the ele-.
phants to. approach, and break the ranks of the enemy,
while the horse on either wing, advancing:in the same
moment .to the charge, endeavoured to surround them,
then the Romans, clashing their armour after their custom,
ran forward , with loud cries to the engagement. Their
horse, overpowered by numbers, were soon turned to.
flight; but the infantry of the left wing, led on by their
contempt of the mercenary troops, and being desirous like-
wise to avoid the shock of the elephants, fell furiously upon
the right wing of the Carthaginians, and, having routed
them with little difficulty, pursued them even to’ their
camp. . The troops that first encountered with the ele-
phants were soon destroyed, and trampled down in heaps;
but the main body of the army remained for some time
firm, by reason of the depth and closeness of the files; but
when the hindinost ranks were obliged to face about, and
engage the cavalry that had now surrounded them; and
when those who had forced their: way beyond the ele-

CHAP. II.. OF POLYBIUS. "A 41

phants, were-charged by the Carthaginian —— which
was still entire; then were the Romans distressed on every
side, and destitute of all resource. The greatest part were
trodden down in heaps, under the enormous weight of the
elephants; and the rest destroyed in their very ranks by

the javelins thrown from the horse. A small number only .

hoped to find their safety in flight. But as their way lay
through a flat and open country, the elephants and ca-
valry:soon overtook and destroyed the greater part. About
five hundred only were taken alive; and among these, the
consul Regulus. The Carthaginians lost in the action
eight hundred of their mercenary forces, who were attacked
and routed by the left wing of the Roman army. Of the
Romans, about two thousand men; being those that had
charged the mercenaries, were separated, in the course of
the pursuit, to a distance from the army; and, having thus
escaped the general slaughter, they retreated safe to Aspis.
The rest all were slain upon the place, the consul alone
excepted, and those that were taken with him. The Car-
thaginians, having spoiled the dead, returned back again
to Carthage, exulting in their success, and carrying with
them the consul Regulus, and the other prisoners.

How wide a field of reflection is opened to us by this
event; and what admirable lessons does it contain for the
good conduct of human life. In the fate of Regulus we .
may discern how little confidence should be reposed in
Fortune; especialy, when she flatters with the fairest
hopes. For he, who a few days before beheld the mise-
rable state to which the Carthaginians were reduced, with-
out remorse or pity, was now himself led captive by them ;
and forced to implore his safety of those very enemies to
whom he had shewn no mercy. We may also remark, in,
this event, the truth of that saying of Euripides, “‘ a.
one wise counsel is better than the strength of many."
For here; the wisdom of one man defeated legions that
were thought invincible ; infused new life into a people
whose losses had even almost rendered them insensible of

-

"unos

42 THE GENERAL HISTORY ^. sooxt.

misery, and saved their toftering state from ruin. Let the
reader then take care to reap some profit from these exam-
ples, and apply them to the improvement of his life and
manners. For since there are two sources only from
whence any real benefit can be derived; our own misfor-
tunes, and those that have happened to other men; and
since the first of these, though generally perhaps the most
effectual, is far more dangerous and painful than the other,
it will always be the part of prudence to prefer the latter,
which will alone enable us at all times to discern whatever
is fit and useful, without any hazard or disquiet. And
hence appears the genuine excellence of history; which,
without exposing us to the labour or the cost of suffering,
instructs us how to form our actions upon the truest:
models, and to direct our judgment right in all the dif-
ferent circumstances of life. But let us return from this
digression.

After a victory so complete, the Carthaginians set no
bounds to the expressions of their joy, but poured out
incessant acknowledgments to the Gods, and strove to
outdo each other in ui iro noe af hospitality and kind-
ness. But Xantippus, who had thus saved their state

i from ruin, returned back again to Greece, within a short

time “after. In this he shewed great prudence and dis-
cernment; for signal and important services seldom fail to
excite sharp malevolence and calumny; which, though a
native of the country, supported by his friends and family,
may, perhaps, be able to resist and conquer, yet foreigners
are usually oppressed and ruined by them. Some writers _
give a different account of the departure of this ADR
which I shall examine in its proper place.

As soon as the Romans heard that the affairs in Afric
had proved so contrary to all their hopes, they immedi-
ately prepared a fleet to bring away the men that had
escaped in the late engagement. On the other hand, the
Carthaginians advanced and laid siege to Aspis, hoping to
get these troops into their hands; but, meeting with a

CHAP, HI. . OF POLYBIUS. 43

stout and vigorous resistance; they were at last obliged to
raise the. siege. Being then informed that the Romans
were fitting out a fleet, with design to return to Afric,
they repaired all their old vessels, and built some new; and
having, in a short time, equipped a fleet of two hundred
MN sailed out to sea to 'ebterve the motions of the
enemy.

In the beginning of the summer the Romans came out
to sea with a fleet of three hundred and fifty ships, under
the command of the consuls, M. Aimilius, and Servius
Fulvius; and'sailed along the coast of'Sicily, towards
Afric, Near the promontory Hermea, having met with
and engaged the Carthaginians, they defeated them even
in the first attack with little difficulty, and took a hundred
and fourteen of their vessels, with all the men. They then
received on board the troops that had escaped to Aspis,
and directed their route back again to Sicily. But when
they had completed the greatest part of their course, and
were. now approaching the Camarinean coast, they were
suddenly attacked by a tempest so great and terrible, that
no words can sufficiently describe the horrors of it.’ Of
four hundred and sixty-four vessels, ‘no more than eighty
escaped the fury of this storm; the rest being either buried
in the ocean or dashed against the rocks and promontories.
The whole shore was covered with dead bodies, and with
broken ships; so that history scarcely can afford another
exampleʻof so great and general a destruction. This mis-
fortune was not so much to, be ascribed to accident as to
the imprudent obstinacy of the consuls; for the pilots had
given them repeated warnings not to sail along the exterior
coast of Sicily, wbich looks towards Afric, where the shoré
was open, and afforded no convenient harbour; espécially
too as the season was then the most unfavourable for
navigation, ‘the constellation of Orion being’ not quite
passed, and the Dog-star just ready to appear. But the
consuls Vespuet ^e» admonitions, and held on their
coursc along the coast; being tempted by the hopes of

44 THE GENERAL HISTORY “Booki.

gaining certain towns,. which they flattered themselves
would surrender to them without resistance, upon the first
approach of their victorious fleet. "Thus were they hur-
ried, by the prospect of some slight advantage, into mis-
. fortunes that were irretrievable, and which forced from
them an acknowledgment of tlieir rashness, when it was
now too late to remedy it, But such, in truth, is the dis-
position of the Romans. Hot and violent in their pursuits,
they persuade themselves that whatever they undertake
must of necessity be accomplished, and that nothing is
impossible which they have once resolved to carry into
execution. Their success bas been often owing to this
persuasion ; though it cannot be denied that, on many
occasions, it has also proved the only cause at their mis-,
fortanes, especially upon the sea, for in land engagements,
where the contest only lies against the strength of men
and human preparations, this confidence alone will fre-
quently force the victory to their side. Yet, even in such
conjunctures, they have sometimes been deceived in the
event; but when they presume to encounter with the
_ winds and sea, and challenge all the elements to combat,
what wonder is it if they are then involved in the worst
calamities?. For such was now the punishment that befel
their rashness; the same that, in former times, had hap-
pened to them, and which must again hereafter happen,
unless they find some means to moderate that daring and
impetuous spirit, by which they are persuaded, that both
land and sea are at all times subject to their control.

" The destruction of the Roman fleet, together with the
victory that had been obtained by land against them not '
long before, inclined the Carthaginians to believe that they
now should prove superior to the enemy both by land and
sea. They resumed their preparations, : therefore, with
greater diligence and vigour than before, and, in a short
time afterwards, sent Asdrubal to Sicily; having added to
his army the forces that were brought from Heraclea,
together with a hundred and forty elephants. They refit-

CHAP. III. OF POLYBIUS. . 45

ted also two hundred ships, and equipped them for the
war. Asdrubal, being arrived at Lilybzeum without any
accident, exercised his troops and elephants, and seémed
resolved to maintain the field against the enemy.

The Romans having received a full: account of the
destruction of their vessels from those that had escaped
the storm, were sensibly afflicted for their loss; but, being
determined not to yield, they resolved to build another
fleet, entirely new, which should consist of two hundred
and twenty ships. And, what will scarcely obtain belief,
in three months’ time this vast armament was all com-
pletely finished, and sailed out to sea under the command
of the two new consuls, A. Atilius, and Cn. Cornelius.
They passed the Straits, and being joined at Messana by
the vessels that had escaped the storm, so that their whole
fleet now consisted 'of three hundred ships, they directed
their course towards Panormus, the most considerable of
all the Carthaginian cities, in order to besiege it. "They
threw up works on both sides of the place, and planted
their machines against it; and having, with little diffi-
culty, battered down the fort that stood nearest to the sea,
they entered immediately by the breach, and made them-
selves masters of the new tówn upon the first assault.
The old, despairing to make any long resistance, surren-
dered at discretion. ‘The consuls having thus gained
possession of the city, left in it a sufficient garrison, and
returned to Rome.

In the following summer the consuls, Cn. Servilius and
C. Sempronius, sailed again to Sicily with all the fleet,
and from thence steered their course to Afric. They
‘made many descents upon the coast, but without perform-
ing any action of importance. But as they were sailing
near the island Meninx, which is inhabited by the Loto-
phagi, and lies contiguous to the little Syrtis, their igno-
rance of the coast proved almost fatal to them; for as the sea
was then at ebb, their fleet stuck fast upon the sands. In
this distress they had almost lost all hopes of safety.. But

46 THE GENERAL HISTORY BOOK I.

some time afterwards the tide suddenly returned, when
they least expected it, and. freed ‘them. from the danger;
for, having thrown over all their-baggage and ‘heavy’ furni-
ture, they at last set their vessels: afloat again, though not
without much: pains and labour; and steering batk to
Sicily with great precipitation; cast anchor ‘at’ Panormus.
From thence, as they passed the Straits, and wefe' sailing
on to Rome; with their usual disregard of every thing that
might. befal them, they were again attacked by a very
dreadful storm, in which a hundred and fifty of their
vessels perished. -~ : : a
The’ Romans were unable to. ‘support such great and
repeated.losse$; and though their ardour was not slack:
ened, nor their zeal in the least abated, they were forced
by mere necessity to lay aside all farther attempts upon
the'sea, and depend entirely upon their land forces for a
happy issue of the war. They, therefore, sent the con:
suls; L. Cecilius and Cn. Furius; into Sicily with the
legions; equipping only pei vessels, to convey provisions
to the army. : i
-On'the' other hand, these misfortunes seemed to open tó
the Carthaginians’ the fairest prospect of advantage and
success. ‘They: were now sole masters of the sea, witch
was: abandoned: by the Romans; and, with regard to the
armies upon land, they began to be: persraed and not
without good reason, that’ their troops would prove supet
rior to the enemy; for the Romans, having héard what
horrible destruction the elephants had spread ańnong their
ranks, in the’ battle that was fought in Afric; were ‘so
possessed with apprehensions’ of the fury of those beasts,
that, during the course of two whole years from that
engagement, though they frequently fixed their camp i
within the distance of five or six stadia from the enemy,
in: the' neighbourhood of Selinus and Lilybæum; they
never once dared to’ venture on’ a’ battle, or even to trust
their army ‘in the’ plains. They reduced, indeed, the:
towns of Lipara and 'Therms; but during the siege of

CHAP. HI. OF POLYBIUS. ` aT

both, were always careful to post their troops in places
that were steep: and difficult of access. When the Ro-
mans saw that so great dejection’ and dismay had spread
through all. the army, they resolved to change their mea-
sures, and’ resume their naval preparations. As. soon,
therefore, as C. Atilius and L. Manlius were elected
consuls, they: built fifty ships, and: began to make levies
ae the sea. with the greatest: diligence..

' The- Carthaginian general Asdrubal, having remarked
the consternation that lately had appeared among the
Romans, whenever their armies were forced to take. the
field; and. being informed that one. of the consuls..had
returned. to: Italy with one half of the troops, amd that
Cecilius was left behind at. Panormus with tlie rest, to
cover the harvest of the allies, which was just now ripe;
marched: his army from Lilybreum towards. Panormus,
and’ encamped upon-the frontier of the. district; — Cecilius
saw the confidence with. which. the enemy advanced! to-
wards him, and, with design still more to heighten it, kept
his: army close within the city. Asdrubal;, deceived . by
this appearance, grew bolder than before:. and being per-
suaded: that the Romans wanted courage to oppose him,
advanced: with: his army through the passes, destroyed:the
harvest every where, and wasted. all: the country. Fhe
consul. still: kept: close. behind: the: walls; till the: enemy:
should have passed a‘river that ran: near tHe city.. But-no
sooner had tlie elephants: with the army. gained the other
side, than Cecilius: sent against them a. part of his light-
armed forces, to harass‘the foremost troops, and constraint
the Carthaginians to draw’ up. all their army: in order of
battle. When this was done,.he placed his: light-armed
troops before the intrenchments; with orders that: they,
should: throw their javelins: at the elephants as they: ad^
vanced, and, whenever: they found themselves too closely
pressed, retire: back again to-the trenches, and from thence
sally’ out. from time to time, and make':a fresh: discharge
upon them.. The combatants were supplied‘with weapons

48 THE GENERAL HISTORY BOOK 1.,

in great numbers by the artificers of the city, vis were.
drawn up in order for that purpose at. the foot of the
walls. The consul himself was posted with the legions
without the gate that looked towards the left wing of the
enemy, and sent away continual detachments to support
the light-armed forces. .As.soon as the fight grew warm,
the leaders of the elephants, in hopes of securing to them-
selves the honour of the victory, advanced with eagerness
against the foremost combatants, turned them to flight
with little difficulty, and pursued them -close to the in-
trenchments. But the elephants, being now exposed to
all the fury both. of the archers from the walls, and of
those that were posted in the trenches, who lanced their.
weapons at them without remission and with sure success,
grew mad at last with rage; and turning back upon their
own forces, trampled them down in heaps, and broke and:
dissipated all'the ranks. Cecilius seized the time of this.
confusion, and advancing against the left wing of the
Carthaginians, with the legions which were still entire and
disposed in perfect order, fell upon the enemy in flank,
and soon caused a general rout. Many were destroyed i in
the place, and. the rest forced to fly in great disorder.
Ten elephants were taken, with the Indians who con-.
ducted them. The rest, having thrown their guides, were
surrounded after the engagement, and were all likewise.
taken, After this great victory, it was confessed by all,
that Cecilius by his wise and skilful conduct had ivi
new ‘life ‘and spirit into the Roman armies, and given
them confidence once more to face the enemy in the field.
The account of this success was received at Rome with
the greatest joy: not so much because the loss of the ele-
phants had weakened. the Carthaginian army, as because
a victory once gained against those beasts had. restored the
courage of the iain, They therefore resumed their
first design, and resolved to employ again a naval arma-
ment; and thus by exerting together all their strength, to
bring the’ war at last to a conclusion. . When all their.

TT.

CHAP. HI. E OF POLYBIUS. j 49

preparations were completed, the consuls with a fleet. of
two hundred ships steered their course to Sicily. Tt was
now the fourteenth year of the war. They arrived at
Lilybzeum ; and being joined by the legions that were thus
encamped, they prepared to lay siege to the city. For
they had considered with themselves, that if they could
once be able to obtain possession of this place, it. would be
easy to transport their forces from thence to Afric. The
Carthaginians on their part penetrated into this design,
and' made the same reflections upon the « consequences of it.
Neglecting, therefore, all the other business of the war,
they made haste to draw together their forces, and resolved
to use their utmost efforts to defeat the enemy in this at-
tempt. For in their present circumstances, the loss of
Lilybæum would leave them destitute at once of all re-
source: since the Romans already were possessed of all
the other cities of importance in the island, Drepanum
alone excepted.

^. But lest this part of the history should prove obscure
and unintelligible to those who are unacquainted with the
places of which we now are speaking, we shall endeavour,
in few words, to give the reader some right conception of
the manner in which the island and its several parts are
situated. -

-The feeit Sicily in its situation bears the same re-
spect to Italy, as the Peloponnesus does to the rest of
Greece. But in this they are different; that the one is an
island, separated from the continent by a narrow sea; the
other a peninsula, the approach to which lies along a small
neck of land. The form of Sicily is triangular: and the
angles are so many promontories. The first, inclining to
the'south, and extending into the Sicilian sea, is called
Pachynus. : The second, named Pelorus, and standing to
the north, bounds the Straits upon the western side, and is
distant from Italy about twelve stadia. The third, which |
is the western promontory, called Lilybeeum, stands op-
posite to the shore of Afric; and lies cominodious for pass-

VOL. I. E

50 THE GENERAL HISTORY BOOK I.

ing over to those promontories which we before have men-
tioned, being distant from them about a thousand stadia.
It also: uides the seas of Afric and Sardinia.

.. Adjoining to this last promontory was a city of the & same
ME dich: ‘the Romans were now preparing to besiege.
It was secured by a wall and ditch, of a very uncommon
strength and depth; ‘and by standing lakes that were filled
with the waters of the sea. And as the passage to the
harbour lay over these, it was not to be entered without
the greatest hazard, by those that were unacquainted: with
the ground. ‘The Romans encamped on both sides of the
town: and having fortified the space between their camps
with an intrenchment and a wall, began their first: attack
against a fort that stood upon the shore, on the side of the
African sea. By making their approaches without remis-
sion, and adding new, works continually to the former, they
at last eee tte six of the towers that stood contiguous
to the fort, and prepared to batter down the rest. As the
siege was, pressed with all imaginable earnestness and.vi-
gour, the towers already in part destroyed, and the rest. so
weakened as to threaten speedy ruin, while the enemy
gained ground in their approaches every day, and advanced
their, works still nearer to the city, the garrison within, `
though it amounted to full ten thousand men besides the
inhabitants, was seized with the utmost consternation.
But Imilco, who commanded in; the.city, by his pains -and
unwearied ardour, gave no small resistance to the progress
of. the. enemy; repairing every where the breaches; dig-
ging countermines; and transporting himself from. place
to;place, hoping to find some moment. in, which he might
be able to set fire to the Roman works. For this purpose,
he made many desperate sallies both by night and day; in
which, greater, numbers sometimes were destroyed, than
even in regular engagements,

While things were.in this condition, some of the chief
‘officers that led the mercenary troops formed the design of
betraying the city.to the enemy; and.thinking themselves

CHAP. III. OF POLYBIUS. 51

secure of the compliance of the soldiers, went privately by
night to the Roman camp, and concerted the project with
the consuls. But a certain Achzan, named Alego, who
some time before had saved the town of Agrigentum from
some treacherous attempts that were contrived against it
by the Syracusan mercenaries, having made discovery of
this treason likewise, informed the Carthaginian com-
mander of it. Imilco presently called together the other
officers; and having partly by his earnest exhortations and
entreaties, and partly also by the promise of great rewards,
engaged them to stand firm in the interests of the Cartha-
ginians, he sent them to confirm the troops in their fide-
lity. To the Gauls he deputed likewise Annibal, who had
long served among them. He was the son of that Annibal
who lost his life in Sardinia. ‘To the other mercenaries he
sent Alexo, who was held in high esteem and credit by
them. "These generals having assembled all the troops,
and harangued them as the time required, and having en-
gaged their own assurance for the payment of those re-
wards that were now promised by Imilco, prevailed with
little difficulty, and-checked al their inclination to revolt.
When those therefore who had left the city were returned,
and began to propose aloud the terms which they -had
brought, the garrison were so far from embracing the con-
ditions, that they even refused to hear them; and with
stones and javelins drove back the traitors from the walls. :
Thus were the Carthaginians brought to the very brink of
ruin by the treason of their mercenaries; and in this. man-
ner were they rescued by Alexo; whose virtuc, as we havé
observed, had once before afforded the means of safety to
the Agrigentines upon'a like occasion, and preserved to
them their city, liberties, and laws.

E2

52 THE GENERAL HISTORY | spook.

CHAP. IV. ‘

DuniNG this time, no accounts had .been. redis at
Carthage of any thing that passed at Lilybeum. But
being persuaded that the besieged must certainly be in want
of some relief, they filled fifty ships with soldiers, and sent
them away under the command of Annibal, the som of
Amilcar, who was general of the triremes, and an intimate
friend of Adherbal. . They exhorted him to use the.greatest
diligence, to take advantage of the first favourable moment,
and to make some bold attempt to enter the city with his
succours. Annibal soon sailed out to sea with all. the
forces; which amounted to ten thousand men ; and casting
anchor at Ægusa, between Carthage and Ling waited
fora fresh and favourable wind. .As soon as it. began to
blow, he spread all his sails, and steered his course directly
towards the harbour's mouth; the troops being ranged in
order upon the decks, and ready to engage. The Romans,
surprised by an attempt so bold and unexpected, and being
apprehensive also, that their own vessels might be carried
into the harbour by the wind together with those of the
enemy, stood fixed in wonder and astonishment, and made
no resistance to the entrance of the Carthaginians. - The
multitude within the city ran together in crowds upon the
walls; anxious for the event, but filled with joy at the sight
of these unexpected succours, which they now invited and
encouraged by the loudest cries and shouts. - At last the
Carthaginians gained the port, and safely disembarked
their forces, aont any opposition from the Romans: a
circumstance which afforded greater pleasure to the Lily-
bæans, than even the arrival of the troops themselves;
though these were then so necessary to their affairs, and
so greatly increased both their strength and hopes.

When Imilco saw that both the former forces of the
city, and those that were now arrived, were animated to a
high degree of alacrity and confidence; the first; on ac-
count of the relief which they had received; the latter,

cap. TY. OF POLYBIUS. 53

because they had yet encountered with no hardships; he
resolved to take advantage of their present ardour, and
endeavour to set fire to the Roman works. He therefore
called all the troops together; and having harangued them
in such words as his design required, and promised great
rewards to those that should perform any eminent and
signal service, besides the gifts and honours which they
might all expect in common from the state of Carthage,
^ he raised their minds to such a point of courage and impa-
tience, that. they all with one voice cried out, that he
should lead them against the enemy without delay. The
general applauded their good disposition, and dismissed
the assembly: having exhorted them to retire betimes to
their repose, and hold themselves in readiness to execute
thé orders of their leaders. He then. called together the
chief among the officers; assigned to each his several post;
acquainted them with the time, and signal, of engaging;
and directed them to attend in the appointed places, with
their respectivé companies, by break of day. '

These orders being carefully observed, the general at
break of day led out his army, and fell upon the works in
different quarters. But the Romans, who for some time
before had expected this attempt, and had neglected no
precaution, were now ready with their succours wherever
they were most required, and vigorously opposed the enemy.
The engagement soon became general: and was maintained
on both sides with the greatest obstinacy. For the num-
bers from the city amounted to twenty thousand men: on
the part of the Romans, they were greater. And as the
soldiers fought without. regarding any order, every one in
the place to which his inclination led him, the battle was
on that account more fierce and terrible. For man with
man, and rank with rank, engaged with all the fury and
jealous emulation, that are found in single combats. But
the clamour was far the loudest round the works; and the
dispute most close and obstinate. For those whose task it
was to ruin and destroy them, and those who on the other

E^3

5i THE GENERAL HISTORY mook1.

side were posted there for their defence, maintained the
fight together with so much steadiness and ardour, that,
while the one still. laboured to advance, the other still .re-
fusing to give ground, it happened in the end, that both
were alike destroyed in the places where they had begun
the combat. Dut there were some among them, who, with
flaming torches in their hands, invaded the machines with
so pouch force and fury, that the Romans, unable to repel
their efforts, were reduced to great extremity. But the
Carthaginian general, perceiving that his troops were de-
stroyed in heaps, and that he had not yet been able to ac-
complish his design, commanded the trumpets to sound
the signal of retreat, and called the soldiers from the en-
gagement. Thus the Romans preserved their works en-
tire; even in the very moment, when they were just upon
the point of being utterly destroyed.

After this action, Annibal, leaving the harbour in tlie
night, sailed out to séa with all the fleet, undiscovered by
the enemy, and joined Adherbal who lay at Drepanum.
This town is distant from Lilybaeum about a hundred and
twenty stadia; and both on account of its commodious
situation, as well as for the excellence of the harbour, had
always been considered by the Carthaginians as a place of
the last importance, and was guarded by them with the
greatest care. B

At Carthage, the people were impatient to be informed
from tinie to time of all that passed at Lilybeum; but
knew not any method by which their wishes could be
satisfied. For the besieged were closely confined within
their walls; and the port as closely guarded by the Ro-
mans. But a certain man of rank among them, Annibal,
surnamed the Rhodian, engaged to sail into the harbour,
and when he had seen the condition of the city, to return
again to Carthage, with an account of all that they desired
to know. His offer was received with joy, though the
success was greatly doubted. But Annibal, having equipped -
a vesscl of his own that was proper for his purpose, sailed

CHAP. Iv. ^ OF POLYBIUS. 55

and cast anchor near one of the islands that lie opposite
to Lilybeeum: and on the morrow, taking advantage of a
brisk and favourable wind, steered his course through the
midst of all the enemy, who stood astonished at his bold-
ness, gained the harbour, and prepared to return again on
the following day. The consul, more effectually to guard
the entrance w: the port, got ready in the night ten of his
swiftest ships; and himself with all the forces stood atten-
tive to the motions of the Rhodian. The ten ships were
stationed on both sides of the harbour’s mouth, as near to
it as the shallows would permit: their oars being sus-
pended in the air, and ready-to bear them in an instant
down upon the Carthaginian vessel. But the Rhodian,
steering out of the port in sight of all, insulting and em-
barrassing the enemy both by his boldness and agility in
sailing, not only esceped unhurt through the midst of the
Roman ships, which seemed to stand with design to let
him pass; but when he had: gained a little distance, he
turned about again, and resting upon his oars, challenged
the enemy to engage him. And when none dared to ad-
vance, by reason of the lightness and celerity of his vessel,
he at last retired; having in one single galley insulted and
defied the whole Roman fleet. After this time; he went
and returned continually, as often as occasion required;
and rendered no small service both to the Carthaginians
and the besieged. For as the first were by this contrivance
punctually informed of all that was necessary to be known;
so the latter were encouraged still to sustain the siege:
while the Romans on the other hand were much dis-
heartened. The Rhodian was encouraged chiefly in ‘this
bold attempt, by his perfect knowledge of the coast; which
taught him in what manner he might best avoid the banks
of sand that lay at the entrance of the harbour. For this
purpose haying first gained the open sea, he from thence
held on his course as if he had sailed from Italy: taking
care to keep a certain tower, that stood upon the shore, in
a line so direct and even with his prow, that it covered
E 4

»

56 THE GENERAL HISTORY Book 3.

from his view the other towers, which looked towards the
coast of Afric. And this, indeed, is the only route, by
which a vessel, sailing before the wind, can gain the port
in safety.

The example of the Rhodian was in a short time fol-
lowed by many others, who like him were well acquainted
with the proper course of sailing. The Romans, therefore,
who were greatly incommoded by this proceeding, endea-
voured to prevent it for the time to come, by choking. up
the mouth of the harbour. But this was a task too diffi-
cult to be completed. For as the sea was very deep, the
materials that were thrown into it would neither rest, nor
hold together; but were presently dissolved and washed
away by the tides and torrents, even before they had gained
the bottom. In one place, however, more shallow than
the rest, they at last threw up a mole, after much pains
and labour. A Carthaginian galley, sailing out of the
port by night, struck upon it, and was taken. As this
vessel was built upon the most perfect model, the Romans,
having equipped it with a select body of men, resolved to
employ it in observing those that should hereafter steer
towards the harbour, and above all the rest, the Rhodian.
It happened, that in a short time afterwards he came in.
sight. He had entered the port the night before; and was
now returning back again in open day. The Roman.
galley pursued with eagerness, and attended closely to all.
his. motions.. The Rhodian soon knew the vessel, and
fearing for the event, began to exert his utmost efforts to.
escape by flight. But. finding that the enemy gained `
ground upon him, he was at last forced to turn, and try
the fortune of a battle. The Romans, who were. far
superior both in the strength and number of their. men,
obtained an easy victory; and being now masters of this.
ship. likewise, they fitted it with all things necessary ; and
from this time effectually secured against the s o
the entrance of the port.

The besieged were now employed without. remission’ in

CHAP, IV. OF POLYBIUS. i : 57

repairing the breaches of. their walls: but had thrown
away all hopes of being able to. destroy the works of the
enemy: when on a sudden a strong wind arose, and blew
with so much. violence that it shook the.Roman galleries;
and threw down the towers that' were built before them
for. their: defence. Some of the Greek mercenaries, having
favourable for ‘ruining all the works at-once, communicated
their sentiments to the general, who readily approved them;
and gave immediate orders for the attack. The young
men sallied out’ in separate bands, and set fire to three
different quarters. As the-buildings, being old, were easily
inflammable: and were now so loosened likewise by the
wind, that both the machines and towers were shifted from
their place; the fire soon spread with great rapidity and
force. The Romans were struck with consternation, and
knew not in.what manner. they might best resist the im-
pending ruin. "Terrified by an attack so unexpected, and
blinded by the smoke and darkness, and sparks of fire, that
rolled continually towards them, they neither saw nor com-
prehended any thing that passed: so that great numbers
fell, without being able even to come near the fire. The
more the Romans were incommoded, the greater also were
the advantages of the enemy. For while the wind still
blew. against the faces of the former whatever could annoy
or hurt their sight, the latter, who saw clear before them,
were able to direct their aim with certainty, both against:
the machines and combatants; the wind also driving for-
wards every thing that was thrown, and giving -greater:
strength and efficacy to the stroke. In the end the, de-'!
struction was so complete, that the towers were all con-:
sumed to their foundations, and the heads.of the battering:
rams.melted in the fire. After this great loss, the: Romans:
laid aside all thoughts of being able.to reduce the place:
by their works: and having thrown up an. intrenchment:
round the city, and fortified. their .camp: also with a wall,
they committed the event to time. The Lilybzans on

58 THE GENERAL HISTORY soox1.

their. part repaired their breaclies; and resolved to expect
with patience the determination of the siege. |
Assoon as they heard at Rome thenews ofthis misfortune,
and that the greater part of their naval forces had been
destroyed, either in defending the works against the enemy,
or' in the former business of.the siege, they immediately
ráised new levies, which àmounted to ten thousand men,
and sent them away to Sicily. When they arrived in the
camp, the consul, P. Claudius, assembled all the tribunes,
-and represented to them, that they ought to seize the
present moment, and.sail away immediately to Drepanum;
*5 where Adherbal," continued he, “lies unprepared, and
suspecting nothing; is unacquainted with the arrival of
these ‘new levies; and persuaded that our losses in the
siege liave disabled ‘us from sending out a fleet to sea.”
As this; design was readily approved, he ordered the
sailors immediately to embark, both those that were in
the camp before, and those that had lately landed; and
added to them some of the bravest soldiers from the
legions, who were tempted by the shortness of the voyage,
and the prospect of assured success, to make a voluntary
offer of their service in the expedition. When all his
preparations were completed, about midnight he began
the voyage, undiscovered by the enemy, and keeping the
island on his right, sailed in close order along the shore.
As soon as it was morning, and the foremost ships had
arrived in sight of Drepanum, Adherbal, who had no
expectation of this accident, was at first under great
surprise. But when, he had viewed them more atten-
tively, and perceived that they were the Roman fleet,
he resolved to exert his utmost efforts, rather than sub-
mit to be invested in the place. Having assembled, there-
fore, all’ thé naval forces upon the shore, and called the
mercenaries from the city, he shéwed them in a short
harangue with how great case they might obtain thc
victory, if they had coyrage to engage the Roman fleet ;
and represented to them on the other hand all the miseries

enapav coo OF POLYBIUS. .- 59

of a siege, to which, if they now declined the combat, they
must inevitably be exposed. They all cried out at once,
and demanded to be led against the enemy without delay.
Adherbal commended their alacrity, and ordered them
immediately to get on board; :to observe the motions of
his ship ; and to follow close behind, in the course which
they should see him take. He then sailed away the first,
and steered his vessel along the rocks that lay opposite to
that side of the harbour by which the enemy designed to
enter. When the consul saw that the Carthaginians were
so far from being struck by his arrival, and surrendering
to him as he had before expected, that, on the contrary,
they were making all things ready for the combat, he
ordered all his vessels to turn about again, when some of
them were already within the harbour, others in the
entrance, and tbe rest making sail that way. "The ships
that had gained the port, as they directed their course
back again, fell against those that were now just entering,
broke their oars, and occasioned great disorder. As fast,
however, as they returned, the officers ranged them all in
a line along the shore, with their prows turned towards the
enemy. The consul Publius, who at first had followed in
the rear, was now carried out to sea, and took his station
in the left wing of the fleet; but Adherbal, having passed
this wing with five of his largest vessels, and gained the
open sea, turned his prow towards the enemy. ‘The rest
of his ships, as fast as they came up, received orders to ex-
tend themselves in the same single line. As soon as they
were all ranged in front, he gave the signal to engage, and
advanced against the Romans, who still stood close along
‘the shore, in order to receive their ships as they sailed
. back again from the harbour; but to this situation were
chiefly owing the losses which they afterwards sustained:
When the fleets were joined, the contest was for some
time equal; being maintained on either side by the choicest
of the legionary troops. ` But, by degrees, the Carthagi-
nians drew tlie victory to their side, by the help of many

60 THE GENERAL HISTORY Booki.

favourable circumstances in which they were superior to
the Romans during the.whole engagement. "Their vessels
were light, and. swift in sailing; their rowers skilful and
experienced; and lastly, they derived no small advantage
from having ranged their fleet in battle on the side of the
open sea. Whenever they were closely pressed, as they
had full room to retreat, so were they able also by their
' swiftness to transport themselves at once out of the reach
of danger. If the enemy advanced too far in the pursuit,
they then turned suddenly upon them, and making their
attack with vigour and agility, now upon the sides, and
sometimes on the stern, sunk many of the Roman vessels,
which, being uriwieldy by their bulk, and incumbered with
unskilful rowers, performed all their motions heavily and
without success. ' When any of their vessels seemed ready
to be mastered by the enemy, they advanced securely
through the open sea, and by' ranging some fresh galleys
in-the stern of those that were engaged, rescued their
friends from danger. ` But, on the part of the Romans,
every circumstance was contrary to these. When pressed,
they had no room to retreat; for every vessel that retired
before the enemy either stuck fast upon the sands, or was
dashed against the shore. As their ships were also heavy,
and their rowers destitute of skill, they were quite deprived
of the advantage, the greatest that is known in naval
battles, of sailing through the squadron of the` enemy, and
attacking in stern the ships that were already engaged with
others; nor could .they, on the other hand, send any

succours, or support their own vessels from behind, as the —
distance was so narrow between them and the land. Such
were the disadvantages under which the Romans laboured
through the whole engagement. Many of their vessels,
therefore, were: broken against the shore; and many stuck
fast upon the sands: The consul, with about’ thirty only that
stood with him: upon the left, withdrew from the engage-
ment, and directed. his flight along the coast. .The re-
maining ships, in number ninety-three, fell into the hands

CHAP. 1V. OF POLYBIUS. 61

V

of the Carthaginians, together with all the men; a small
number only excepted, who forced. their vessels close to
“shore, and escaped the danger.

: Thus ended the engagement; from whence the Cartha-
‘ginian general reaped, among his countrymen, all the
applause and honour that were due.to his brave and skil-
ful conduct; while the Romans, on the contrary, pursued
‘with curses and invectives the consul Publius, whose rash
imprudence had. brought such heavy losses upon his
country, and, after his return to Rome, condemned him
by a public sentence to the payment of a heavy fine.

The Romans, notwithstanding this defeat, were so fixed
in their design to conquer, that they continued all their
preparations for the war with the same ardour as before;
and, when the election of their magistrates was past, sent
L. Junius, one of the consuls, into Sicily, with a convoy of
sixty ships, to carry corn and other necessary stores to the.
army that invested Lilybeeum. Junius arriving at Mes-
sana, and having there received some vessels that came to
join him, both from the camp and from the other parts of
the island, sailed soon afterwards to Syracuse. His whole
fleet now consisted of a hundred and twenty ships of war,
besides eight hundred transports. Having given the half
of these, together with a small part of the former, to the
queestors, he ordered them to sail with the provisions to
the camp; while himself stayed behind at Syracuse, to
receive the ships that were not able to attend him from
Messana, and to collect the corn which the allies from the
inland parts of Sicily were obliged to furnish.

About the same time Adherbal, when he had sent to
Carthage the prisoners and all the vessels that were taken
in the last engagement, joined thirty of his own ships to
seventy others that were under the command of Carthalo,
and gave orders to that general to go and fall suddenly
upon the Roman fleet, which lay at anchor in the port of
Lilybeum, to bring away as many of their ships as he
could get into his hands, and to burn the rest. Car-

62 THE GENERAL HISTORY BOOK T. _

thalo, having received this commission, steered his course
towards the harbour; and-entering it before break of day,
he set fire to one part of the fleet, and made himself master
ofthe rest. This accident occasioned no small disorder in

the Roman camp; for while the soldiers ran together with —

loud cries from every quarter, to succour and save their
fleet, Imilco, who commanded in the town, perceiving
what was done, sallied out upon them with the merce-
naries Thus were they surrounded by danger on every
side, and their consternation became complete.

The Cartliaginian general, having taken one part of the
vessels, and destroyed the rest, the whole amounting to no
very considerable number, steered his course from Lily-
bzeum towards Heraclea, with design to intercept the fleet
that was sailing to the camp from Syracuse. Elated by
his.past success, he no sooner was informed by the scouts
whom lie had sent before, that the Roman fleet, composed
of a great number of ships of every kind, was arrived
almost in sight, than he advanced i in haste to meet them.
The Romans, having received notíce likewise of his ap-
proach, from the frigates that sailed at the head of all their
squadron, and thinking it unsafe, in their present circum-
stances, to venture on a battle, directed their course
towards a little town that owned their jurisdiction; where,
though there was indeed no harbour, certain creeks, that
were inclosed on every side by a kind of promontories
which ran out into the sca, afforded a convenient shelter
for their fleet. Having here disembarked their forces, and
disposed in order some catapults and balistee which the
town supplied, they waited the arrival of the enemy. The
Carthaginians, as soon as they approached, made haste to
begin the combat; being persuaded that the Romans,
upon the first attack, would abandon all their vessels, and.
take refuge in‘the town. But when their expectations
were so far from being answered, that, on the contrary,
they found a vigorous and stout resistance; and as the
place was also, in all respects, disadvantageous to them;

——

CHAP. IV. _ OF POLYBIUS. 63

they were at last obliged to retire from the engagement,
carrying with them a small: number of the transports only ;
and, sailing to the mouth of a: certain river that.was near,
they cast anchor there, and resolved to wait for the de-
parture of the Roman fleet. -

. The consul Junius, having now transacted his affairs at
Syracuse, doubled the promontory Pachynus, and’ was
steering his course to Lilybeeum, ignorant of all that had
happened to the questors. The Carthaginian general,
being informed by his scouts of their M e ‘sailed out
to sea with the greatest haste, designing to engage them
before they could be joined by the other fleet. The consul
saw that the enemy approached fast towards him, and that
their fleet was very numerous. Being unwilling, there-
fore, to venture on a battle against so great a force, and
not able on the other hand to fly because they were so

near, he cast anchor upon a rough and dangerous part of
— the coast; and resolved to suffer every thing that might
there befall him rather than deliver up his ships.and all his
forces to the enemy. The Carthaginians, not daring to
risk a combat in places so unsafe, cast anchor also near a
certain promontory, which lay between the Roman fleets, `
and.from thence observed their motions. ;

About this time a most dreadful tempest was just ready
to break upon the sea. The Carthaginian pilots, who,
from their long experience, and their knowledge of the
coasts, were able to foresee such accidents before they.
happened, advised the commander to double the Cape
Pachynus without delay, and shelter himself from the
impending storm. The general wisely yielded to this
advice; and having .passed the promontory, though not '
without the greatest pains. and difficulty; cast anchor in a:
place of safety. But when the storm came on, the Roman.
fleets, being quite destitute of shelter, and’ far removed:
from any harbour, were both so, miserably wrecked and
broken, that the account almost exceeds belief. For so.

64 ` THE GENERAL HISTORY Book 1.

complete was the destruction, that scarcely a single plank
remained entire. ‘This accident gave new life and hopes
to the Carthaginians; for the whole naval strength of
Rome, which had already been greatly weakened by
repeated losses, was now all at once destroyed. The
Romans, indeed, were still superior in their armies; but,
on the other hand, the Carthaginians were sole masters of
the sea, and their affairs by land were by no means desperate.

` This great misfortune raised a general grief and con-
sternation, both at Rome and among the troops that
invested Lilybzeum. The siege, however, of this city was
still pressed as closely as before; while all the necessary
stores were carefully supplied by the allies, and sent by
land into the camp.. The consul Junius, who had- escaped
the storm, returned to the camp full of grief; and resolved
to repair, if possible, by some signal and important action,
the loss that he had sustained by sea. With this design,
having conceived some hopes of taking Eryx by surprise,
he so well improved the slight occasion that was offered,
that he became master both of the city and of the temple
of Venus that was near it. The mountain Eryx is situated
on that part of the Sicilian coast which looks towards
Italy, between Drepanum and Panormus ; but lies nearest’
to the former of these cities, and is most difficult of access
on that side. It is the largest of all the mountains of
Sicily, ZEtna alone excepted. On the top of it, which is
& level plain, stands a temple dedicated to Erycinian
Venus; which, in splendour, wealth, and beauty, is ac-
knowledged to be far superior to all the. other temples of
the island. Below the summit lies the town; the ascent
to which is long and difficult. The consul having placed
some troops upon.the top, and on the road that led to
Drepanum, designed to act chiefly on the defensive, and.
was persuaded that, by guarding carefully these two posts,

he should be able to keep possession both of the town and

all the mountain.

CHAP. V. OF POLYBIUS. 65

CHAP. Y.

AFTER these transactions the Carthaginians appointed
Amilcar, surnamed Barcas, to be their general in chief;
and gave to him also the command of all the fleet. This
¿was now the eighteenth year of the war. Amilcar, having
drawn together the naval forces, sailed away to plunder
the coast of Italy. When he had wasted all the lands of
the Brutii and the Locrians, he then steered his course
with the whole fleet to Sicily; aid encamped in a certain
place upon the coast, between Eryx and Panormus, whose
situation was, in all respects, so advantageous, that an
army no where could be lodged with more convenience or
security. It was a rough and craggy mountain, rising
from the plain to a considerable height, whose top was
more than a hundred stadia in circumference. The lands
beneath the summit were rich in husbandry and pasture;
refreshed by wholesome breezes from the sea; and not
infested by any noxious beast. On every side stood pre-
cipices not easy to be surmounted, and the space between
them was so straight and narrow, that no great force was
required to guard it. There was, besides, an eminence
upon the very top of the mountain, from whence, as from
a watch-tower, every thing might be discerned that was
transacted in the plain below. The harbour that was near
it was deep and spacious, and lay commodious for all
vessels that were sailing towards Italy from Drepanum or
Lilybeum. There were three ways only of approaching
this mountain; two on the side of the land, and the other
towards the sea. -In this post it was, that Amilcar had the
boldness to encamp: throwing himselfinto the very middle
of his enemies; having no confederated city near him; nor
any hopes of succour beyond his own army. Yet even in
this situation, he contrived to engage the Itomans in many
desperate contests, and distressed them by continual alarms.
Sometimes he sailed-out with his fleet, and wasted all the
coast of Italy as far as Cume. And afterwards, while the
Romans lay encamped within five stadia of his army, in
VOL. I. F

66 THE GENERAL HISTORY BOOK I.

the district of Panormus, he waged against them, during
the course of three whole years, an almost infinite variety
of battles, which cannot particularly be described. For,
as in the public games, when two champions of dis-
tinguished bravery and strength contend together for the,
prize, the strokes on either side fall so close and frequent,
that neither the spectators, nor the combatants themselves,
are able precisely to remark the direction, scope, and force
of every single blow, though it be no hard thing to form a
judgment upon the whole of the emulation, spirit, strength,
and skill of those who are thus engaged: so in the present
instance, it would neither be an easy nor a useful task, to
recount the manner, or the aim, of all the various snares,
contrivances, attacks, surprises, which both sides practised
every day; and from which, if known, the reader never
could obtain so just an apprehension of the characters and
conduct of the,two commanders, as from surveying the
whole together, and attending to the final issue of the
contest. In general, every stratagem which history has
recorded, every invention which circumstances could sug-
gest, or necessity require, every attempt to which the
most impetuous and daring spirits could excite them, were
all severally embraced and carried into practice. But no
action passed that was decisive. For as the forces on both
sides were equal, as their camps were strongly fortified,
and at the same time separated from each other by a very
moderate distance, hence it happened that they were every
day engaged in partial combats, without performing any
thing that was complete or general. Great numbers fell
in these engagements: but when either side were too
closely pressed, they presently retired to their intrench-
ments; and from thence sallied out again upon the enemy.

But fortune, like an experienced judge of combats,
removed these champions not long afterwards into a nar-
rower ground, and engaged them in a closer and more
desperate fight. For while the Romans guarded Eryx in
the manner before mentioned, by’ posting some troops

CHAP, V. OF POLYBIUS. 67

upon the summit, and others at the foot of the mountain,
Amilcar found means to gain possession of the city that
lay between. ‘The Romans on the top, being thus be-
sieged, maintained their post, and encountered, with a
‘most amazing fortitude, the dangers to which they were
now exposed. On the other hand, the courage and the
firm resistance of the Carthaginians were such as scarcely
will obtain belief. For it is not easy to conceive, by what
means they were able to sustain the efforts of the enemy,
exposed as they were to their attacks both from above and
from beneath, and having no way by which they could
receive supplies, except one single passage which lay open
to them from the sea. Yet, notwithstanding these great
difficulties, all the methods, both of art and violence, which
especially belongs to sieges, were practised in their turn
by either party. And when they had exhausted the whole
variety of attacks and combats, and, been pressed by every
kind of distress and misery, they did not at last decline the
contest through weariness or weakness, as Fabius has
affirmed; but both sides still remained unyielding and
unconquered, till the war was brought by other means to
a conclusion, two years after. Such was the condition of
the armies, in the neighbourhood of Eryx.

If we stop now to make reflection upon the conduct and
the various efforts of these two republics, we may properly
enough compare them with those generous and valiant.
birds, which, when they have fought so long together that
they are quite disabled from making any farther use of
their wings in the engagement,’ yet retaining still their
courage, and exchanging mutual wounds, at last unite by
a kind of instinct im a closer combat, and maintain the
fight together with their beaks, till the one or other of
them falls beneath his adversary’s stroke. In the same
manner, the Carthaginians and the Romans, exhausted by
continual expence, and weakened by the miseries and the
losses which the war had brought upon them, were now
reduced on both sides to the last extremity. But the

F2

68 THE GENERAL HISTORY BOOK I.

Romans still maintained their firmness: and though they
had for five years past abandoned all attempts upon the
sea; partly by reason of the heavy losses which they had
there sustained; and partly also because they were per-
suaded, that their armies upon land would alone be able
to give a favourable issue to the war; yet, when they found
that all their expectations were likely to be frustrated, by.
the vigorous and intrepid conduct of Amilcar, they re-
solved for the third time to make trial of a naval arma-
ment; conceiving it to be now the only kind of force which,
if conducted with dexterity and prudence, would end the
war upon such conditions as their interest and their hopes
required. Nor were they, indeed, deceived in the event.
They had twice before, as we have said, been forced to
abandon all attempts upon the sea: once, by the shipwreck
of their fleets; and afterwards, by the loss which they
sustained in the fight of Drepanum. But having now
once more resumed the same design, and gained the victory
in one naval battle, they deprived the Carthaginian troops
that were in Eryx of the means of receiving any farther
supplies or succours from the sea, and thus gave a full
determination to the war. This resolution was wholly the
effect of that strong and ardent zeal with which the Ro-
mans then were animated. For the treasury afforded no
supplies that were sufficient for the undertaking. But
the generous sentiments and spirit of the chief among the
citizens, and their earnest love of the republic, enabled
them to carry it into execution. For each particular man,
or two or three together, in proportion to their wealth,
engaged to provide a.quinquereme completely fitted and
equipped; on condition only of being reimbursed, in case
that the design should be attended with success. By this
method they brought together a fleet of two hundred quin-
queremes,* which were all built upon the model of that
vessel that was taken from the Rhodian. With this new
armament, the consul C. Lutatius, in the beginning of the
‘summer, sailed out to sea; and appearing suddenly upon

CH AP, V. OF POLYBIUS. . 69

the.coast of Sicily, gained possession of the ports and bays
of Drepanum and Lilybzeum without resistance. For the
enemy had sailed back to Carthage with their fleet some
time before. The consul advanced his.works against the
town of Drepanum, and. began to press:the siege with
vigour. But being at the same time sensible that the Car-
thaginian fleet would . soon .return, and keeping always in
his.mind the chief design and purpose of the. expedition,
which was to end the war at once by a naval victory, he
suffered no moment to be lost, but employed the sailors. in
such constant tasks and exercises as might best conduce to
that design; and by training them in all the parts of naval
discipline, he rendered them in a short time hardy and
expert, and completely prepared for action.

The Carthaginians heard.with great astonishment, that
the Romans again appeared at sea. They immediately
got ready their fleet; and being desirous to supply in the
amplest mauner.the wants of the troops that were at Eryx,
they filled their vessels with provisions and other stores,
and sent them away under the command of Hanno; who
sailed and cast anchor at the island Hiera. His intention
was, to arrive. at Eryx undiscovered by the Romans; and
when he had eased his ships of their heavy lading, and
taken on board a sufficient number of the choicest troops,
together with Amilcar, to sail back and engage the enemy.
But the Roman consul, informed of the motions of this
fleet, and penetrating also into the views of Hanno, selected
all. the bravest. of the legions, and sailed to. /Ægusa, an
island that lay opposite to Lilybeeum.., He there harangued
his forces, as the time required; and acquainted the pilots
that he. should next day offer battle to the Carthaginians.
But. when the morning came, observing that the wind blew
strong and fvoutialiie to the enemy, but contrary to the
course which. himself was obliged to steer, and that the sea
was rough and turbulent, in was for some time in doubt
what resolution he should take. But when he, bad rę-
flected within himself, that if he should now engage, not-

r$

Lo

70 THE GENERAL HISTORY BOOK I.

withstanding all the roughness of the season, the contest
would only be with Hanno and the naval forces, and with
ships that were heavy and encumbered; but that, if by
waiting till the sea was calm he should suffer .the enemy
to pass and join the camp, he must then be forced to en-
counter. with troops selected from the army, with ships
which would be light and easy.in their motions, and above
all the rest, with the bold and daring spirit of Amilcar,
who was now become very terrible to the Romans; he at
last resolved to seize the occasion, and to venture on a
battle. As the enemy were sailing full before the wind, he
made haste to get out to sea. ‘The rowers, strong and
dexterous, broke with ease the force of the wind and waves;
and the vessels soon were.ranged in a single line, with their
prows turned towards the enemy. The Carthaginians,
being thus intercepted in their course, take down their
salls, and, after mutual exhortations, begin the combat.
As the condition of the several fleets was now in all points
different from what it had been in the former battle, it was
reasonable to expect that the event would be also different.
The Roman fleet was built in a more skilful manner than
before. Their vessels were not encumbered with any heavy
furniture, except such only as was necessary for the fight.
Their rowers had been exercised with so much diligence
and care, that they were able to perform the greatest ser-
vice. And in the last place, their soldiers, being all se-
lected from the choicest of the legions, were men who knew
not how to retreat or yield. But on the other side of the
Carthaginians, all things bore a different face. "Their
ships were burthened with a heavy lading, which rendered
them unfit for action. Their sailors were unpractised in
their art, and such as had been hastily thrown together for
the present voyage:.and their troops were new raised
levies, not yet acquainted with the terrors or the toils of
war. For so strongly were they assured, that the Romans -
never would appear again upon the sea, that they had for
some time past neglected all their naval forces. From

' CHAP. V. CR POLYBIUS. ' 71

these causes then.it happened, that they were in every part
defeated, even in the first encounter. Fifty of their ships
were sunk, and seventy taken by the Romans, with all the
men. But the wind, as if engaged to favour them, turning
suddenly about in the very moment of their danger, filled
all their sails, and carried the rest of the fleet safe back to
Hiera. The consul steered his course to Lilybeum; where
his first care was to dispose of the captive ships and men:
a task which gave him no small trouble; for the numbers
of the latter amounted to near ten thousand.

This defeat, however great and unexpected, abated
nothing of the former zeal and ardour of'the Carthagi-
nians: but they saw themselves at once deprived of all the
means by which they-could hope to carry on the war. As
the enemy were masters of the sea, it was now no longer
in their power to send supplies to the troops in Sicily: so
that being forced, if we may so express it, to betray and
abandon these, they had in truth neither general nor army
left on which they could at all depend. ‘They sent therc-
fore to Amilcar, and left to his discretion the care and
management of the whole. The conduct of Amilcar, in
these circumstances was such as well became an expert and
wise commander. While any prospect of success remained,
or any reasonable ground of hope, he boldly attempted
every thing, how full soever of hazard and of danger, that
could distress the enemy; and rested all his hopes of vie-
tory upon the strength and vigour of his arms, everi more
than any general that had lived before him, But when
the face of affairs was changed, and all probable resources
cut off and lost, he resolved no longer to expose his troops
to danger; but wisely yielding to the necessity of the times,
sent ambassadors to the Romans to treat of peace. For
the part of a consummate genéral is not only to know
when to conquer, but when also to renounce all hopes of
victory.

The consul, knowing that the Romans were on their
part also-weary of a war, which so greatly had exhausted

F 4

72 THE GENERAL HISTORY BOOK I.

the strength of the republic, embraced the offer with little
difficuity; and a treaty was soon afterwards concluded in
the following terms.

** There shall be peace between the Carthaginians and
the Romans, with the approbation of the Roman people,
upon these conditions. The Carthaginians shall relinquish
every part of Sicily. They shall not make war upon
Hiero; nor give any disturbance to the Syracusans, or
their allies. They shall restore, without ransom, all the
Roman prisoners: and pay a tribute of two thousand two
hundred ibi da talents of silver, withiu the course of
twenty years."

When the conditions were sent to Rome the people at
first refused to confirm the treaty; and deputed ten com-
missioners to examine into the state of affairs in person.
When these arrived in Sicily, they made no considerable
alteration in the whole of what had been agrecd: but only
added to the tribute a thousand talents more; shortened
the time allotted for the payment of it; and demanded
also, that the Carthaginians should retire from all the
islands that lay between Sicily and Italy.

.. Such was the end of the war of Sicily between the Car-
thaginians and the Romans; when it had continued during
the course of twenty-four years, without any intermission.
A war, the longest in its duration, the least interrupted in
its progress, and upon the whole the most considerable, of
any that we find in history. For, not to mention again
the various combats, which have already been recounted,

in one naval battle only, which happened in this war, five
hundred quinqueremes were engaged together in action;
and in a second, scarce fewer than seven hundred. The
Romans, in the course of the war, lost seven hundred
quinqueremes; if we reckon those that were destroyed by ~
tempests: the Carthaginians, about five hundred. And
now let those, who have been accustomed to contemplate
with surprise the naval preparations and engagements of
Antigonus, Demetrius, and Ptolemy, let them I say con-

CHAP. V. OF POLYBIUS. 73

sider, whether the present war be not a subject far more
worthy of their admiration and regard. For if we care-
fully reflect upon the difference between these quinque-
remes and the trireme vessels that were made use of by the
Persians in their expeditions against the Greeks, and after-
wards by the Lacedzemonians and Athenians in all their
naval combats, it will very clearly appear, that no state or
people ever brought so great a force upon the sea, as those
that were engaged in the war before us. From this view
of things we may also be. convinced, that it was by no
means an effect of chance or rashness, as the Greeks fool-
ishly imagine, that the Romans had afterwards the bold-
ness to attempt, as well as:the power to reach, the conquest
of the whole known world: but, on the contrary, that
having first been trained in a course of great and important
actions, and disciplined for such an undertaking, they
built their project upon very solid grounds, and such as
gave the fairest prospect of success.

It will perhaps be asked, from whence it happens that
the Romans, in all the present greatness of their power,
and extent of territory, to which they have advanced their
empire by the conquest of the. world, are yet unable to
. equip so many ships, or send such powerful fleets upon the
sea, as in former times. I shall endeavour to. give a clear
solution of this difficulty, when I come to treat of the con-
stitution of the Roman government: a subject which I
design to examine in its full extent; and which will well
deserve the closest attention of the reader. For, besides
that the matter in itself is curious, it has also hitherto been
but little known, through the fault of those that have
attempted to write concerning it. For while someof them
were themselves entirely unacquainted with every part of
this enquiry, others have pursued it in a manner so per-
plexed and intricate, that no kind of satisfaction or ad-
vantage can be expected from their labours.

In the present war we may remark, that the same ardent

zeal, the same designs, the same generous perseverance, ^

74 THE GENERAL HISTORY BOOK 1.

and the same passion for dominion, animated alike both
republics. The Roman soldiers, indeed, in all points of
bravery and spirit, exceeded those of Carthage. But, on
the other hand, the Carthaginian general, both in conduct
and in courage, was far superior to any of those com-
manders that were sent against him. ‘This general was
Amilcar, surnamed Barcas, the father of Annibal, who
afterwards waged war with Rome. s

Soon after the conclusion of the peace, both nations
were involved in the same misfortune, and forced to employ
their arms to quiet some domestic troubles. ‘These were
raised against the Romans by the Falisci; who were re-
duced however in the course of a few days only, and their
chief city taken. But the Carthaginians were engaged in
a war of much greater moment, against their mercenaries,
and against the Africans and Numidians, who joined in the
revolt. A war, which in the progress of it filled them with
the greatest terrors aud alarms, and threatened even the
entire subversion of their state.

It will not be improper or unuseful to rest awhile upon
the subject of this war, and to recount in few words the
chief transactions of it. The task, for many reasons, well
deserves our pains. For first, we may from hence be fully
informed of the nature, circumstances, and whole conduct,
of that kind of war which is usually called, Inexpiable.
We shall likewise learn from the misfortunes which now
happened to the Carthaginians, what foresight and pre-
caution should be used, and what dangers apprehended,
by those who employ mercenary troops: and also, how
great the difference is, between a mixed assembly, made
up of barbarous and foreign nations, and an army com-
posed of those who had been educated in the discipline,
and trained under the laws and customs of their country.
In the last place, the transactions of these times may serve
to lead us to the true causes of that war which Annibal
made afterwards upon the Romans: and enable us to fix
with some assurance what has been hitherto a matter of

— OF POLYBIUS. ` 75

much dispute and doubt; not only among historians, but
even among the parties also that were themselves engaged
in the war.

CHAP. VI. n

‘AS soon as the treaty was concluded, Amilcar led the
army from Eryx to Lilybeum; and there laying down his
command, left it to the care of Gesco, the governor of the
city, to send the forces back to Carthage. Gesco, having
some kind of foresight and apprehension of what might
happen, conducted the affair with great prudence and pre-
caution. He embarked the soldiers in small divisions, and .
sent them away at different times, that the Carthaginians
might be able to pay them their arrears as they arrived,
and so dismiss them to their several countries, before the
others joined them. "This was Gesco's design. But the
Carthaginians, finding that their treasury was much ex-
hausted by the late expences of the war, and persuading
themselves that if the mercenaries were to be drawn together
and entertained for some time at Carthage, they might be
prevailed on to abate some part of the stipend that had
been promised them, admitted them all within the walls as
they arrived, and gave them quarters in the city. But
when many tumults and disorders began to grow among
them, and to break out both by night and day, being now
in apprehension of some dismal consequences from the
licentiousness and insoleuce of such a multitude, they were
forced to entreat their officers to conduct them to a certain
town called Sicca, giving to each a piece of gold for de-
fraying their present wants, and to keep them there, till
every thing was ready for the payment of their stipends,
and the rest of the forces also arrived from Sicily. The
soldiers readily agreed to this proposal of removing, but
designed to leave their families and baggage behind at Car-
thage, as they had hitherto done, especially as they ex-

76 THE GENERAL. HISTORY BOOK I

pected to return shortly back again to receive their pay.
But the Carthaginians, fearing that some among them,
detained by the caresses of their wives and children, whom
along absence had now endeared to them, might altogether
refuse to quit the city, and that others invited by the same
tender motives, would make frequent occasions to return,
aud renew the late disorders, obliged them, iu spite of all
their wishes and inclinations to the contrary, to carry with
them their families and all their goods. ‘The troops being
arrived at Sicca, began to live according to their own
discretion, without any control or rule. ‘They were now
fallen at once into a state of ease and.inactivity, from a
course of long fatigue and hardship: a state which ought by
no means ever to be permitted among mercenary soldiers;
and. which is often of itself the principal and only cause of
seditions.

During this time of leisure, some among them began to
compute together the arrears that were pretended to be
due; accumulating various articles without any shew of
reason, and enlarging the sum beyond its just. amount.
Others called to mind the rewards which the generals had
promised to their services in times of extraordinary difficulty
and danger. Upon the whole, their expectations -were
raised to such a height, that when the rest. of the forces
had joined them, and Hanno, who presided over the affairs
of Áfric, being arrived at Sicca, instead of giving satisfaction
to their hopes, began to enlarge upon the bad condition of
the republic, burthened as he said by heavy taxes, and an
uncommon scarcity of all things, and requested them to
abate some part even of that which was acknowledged to
be.due, immediately the whole army fell. into discontent
and mutiny. Meetings and cabals were formed, and as-
semblies. held continually; sometimes of the troops apart,
according to their several tribes and countries; and some-
times of all together in a body: while, from the various
and discordant mixture of different languages and nations,
every place. was filled with confusion, noise, and tumult.

~

CHAP. VI. OF POLYBIUS. oy

If the Carthaginians, in filling their armies, as their
constant custom was, with mercenaries drawn together
from different countries, designed nothing more than to
prevent conspiracies, and render the authority of their
generals more absolute and effectual, they may seem per-
haps in this .respect to have judged not unreasonably ; for
troops of this sort cannot easily unite together in factious
counsels. But, on the other hand, this practice must be
allowed to be highly impolitic and rash, if we consider.how
difficult and desperate a task it is, to instruct, convince, or
soften the minds of an army so composed, when once their
passions are inflamed, when hatred and resentment have
taken root among them, and a sedition is actually begun.
Under these circumstances, they are no longer men, but
wild beasts of prey. Their fury will not be confined within
the ordinary bounds of human wickedness or violence; but
breaks out into effects the most terrible and monstrous that
are to be found in nature. -This was now experienced
by the Carthaginians. Their army: was composed of
Spaniards, Gauls, Ligurians; of some from tlie Balearic
islands; of spurious Greeks, the greater part of whom
were fugitives and slaves; but chiefly of Africans. To
assemble all these together, and harangue them with any

` good effect, was a thing impracticable ; unless the general

had been acquainted with all their different languages.

‘And to address them separately by interpreters, repeating

still the same thing four or five times over, seemed a task
as difficult as the other, and not more likely to succeed.
It remained therefore, to engage their officers to employ
such entreaties and arguments among them as the occasion
required. And this was the method that was now pursued
by Hanno. But it happened, that some of these under-
stood not what was said: while others, seeming to consent
to, and approve of the instructions that were given them,
repeated all things differently to the soldiers; some through
ignorance, and some from malice: so that suspicion, doubt,
distrust, and discord reigned.through all. They sus-

`

78 THE GENERAL HISTORY BOOK t.

pected likewise, that it was not by accident, but with
deliberate design, that the Carthaginians had deputed to
them a man who was not present at any of their services in
Sicily; instead of sending any of those generals, who had
been eye-witnesses of their exploits, and had promised
them the rewards which they now demanded. ` At last,
being fully inflamed against the Carthaginians, despising
the authority of Hanno, and distrusting severally their own
officers, they began their march towards the city with all"
their forces, amounting to more than twenty thousand
men; and encamped at Tunis, which was distant from
Carthage about a hundred and twenty stadia.

The Carthaginians were sensible of their imprudence
when it was now too late. 'They had been guilty of one
great error, in drawing together to one place so large a
body of foreign soldiers; while the forces that they were
able to raise at home, were such as could not greatly be
depended on, in case of any difficult emergency. But it
was still more rash and inconsiderate, to oblige them to
take along with them their wives and children, and all
their goods; for these might have served as hostages, by
the help of which the Carthaginians might have made the
troops at all times tractable and compliant, and pursued in
full security such measures as their interest required.

In consequence of these mistakes, they now were thrown
into so great a consternation, upon the near approach of
these enraged mercenaries, that they submitted to try
every expedient that was likely to soften their resentment.
They ordered al kinds of provisions to be conveyed to
their camp in great abundance, and there to be sold at
such prices as the soldiers were pleased to fix. They sent
continual deputations to them from the senate, promising
to consent to all their demands as far as their power would
reach. But as this denoted the extreme apprehension and
dismay with which the Carthaginians were seized, so it
served only to increase the insolence of the mercenaries.
Their demands rose higher every day. And so much

CHAP. VI. OF POLYBIUS. 19

were they elated by their past exploits in Sicily against the
Romans, that they began to be persuaded that neither the
Carthaginians nor any other people of the world were
able to stand against them in the field. No sooner there-
fore were the stipends settled upon their own conditions,
than they made a new demand of some allowance for the
horses which they had lost in battle. This being likewise
consented to, they next insisted, that their appointment for
provisions, which was now run into a long arrear, should
be adjusted according to the highest price that corn had
borne during any part of the war. In a word, some new
pretences were every day suggested by the seditious that
were among them; till their demands upon the whole were
such as it was not possible for the republic to discharge.
The Carthaginians however engaged to satisfy them to
the utmost of their abilities; and at last prevailed to have
the dispute referred to one of the generals under whom
they had served in Sicily.

Amilcar Barcas, who was one of these, was by no means
agreeable to the troops: for as he never had been joined
in any of the deputations to them, and had also shewn
such willingness and haste to lay down his command, they
considered him as in part the cause that so little respect
had been paid to their demands. But Gesco was a man
whom they all regarded with esteem and favour. He also
had borne command in Sicily; and had, upon all occa-
sions, seemed attentive to their interests; but most par-
ticularly so, when he was entrusted with the care of
embarking them for Carthage. ‘To his decision, therefore,
they readily consented to refer the whole.

Gesco, being furnished with such sums of money as were
necessary, sailed away to Tunis. As soon as he arrived,
he called together first the officers, and afterwards the
soldiers by their several nations. And having reproved
them for the past, enlarged upon the state and circum-
` stances of the present times, and above all things recom-
mended to them a better conduct for the time to come;

80 THE GENERAL HISTORY mook ir.

conjuring them to look more favourably upon the Car-
thaginians, under whose pay they had so long borne arms;
he next applied himself to distribute among the troops,
according to their several countries, the stipends that were
due. | ‘
There was among them a certain Campanian, a fugitive
slave, named Spendius, who was noted both for an uncom-
mon strength of body, and for a spirit in war that’ was
fearless and enterprising even to rashness. This man,
being apprehensive of falling again into the hands of his
master, and of being put to death in torture, according to
the Roman laws, employed his utmost efforts, both by
words and actions, to prevent all treaty with the Cartha-
ginians. There was also an African, whose name was
Matho, who was indeed of free condition, and had served
regularly in the army: but having been the chief incendiary
in the late commotions, and fearing lest the punishment
even of those disorders which others had committed should
fall most heavily upon himself, he entered eagerly into all
the views of Spendius, and resolved to pursue the same
design. Having therefore assembled the Africans apart,
he endeavoured to convince them, that as soon as the rest
of the troops were satisfied, and dismissed to their re-
spective countries, they alone would be exposed to all the
vengeance of the Carthaginians, who-would not fail to
punish their revolt in a manner that should strike a
terror into all the states of Afric. These suggestions
increased the rage with which they were before inflamed.
And because Gesco only discharged the stipends that were
due, but reserved the allowance for their corn and horses
to a distant time, on this slight pretence the soldiers ran
together tumultuously in a body. Spendius:and Matho
harangued the assembly, in terms ‘full of the bitterest
accusations against the Carthaginians. ‘These were greedily
received, and attended to with pleasure: but if any other
persons advanced to speak, the multitude, without waiting
till they were.informed whether their sentiments were

CHAP. VI. OF POLYBIUS. 81

contrary to, or the same with those of Spendius, instantly
fell upon them, and destroyed them with stones. A great
number, as well of.officers as private men, lost their lives
in this: manner, The single word which they all in com-
mon understood was kill; for this was now become their
constant practice: especially in their afternoon assemblies,
when they were inflamed with wine. At those times, as
soon as any one began to call out Xill, the attack was made
so suddenly, and with so much fury from every quarter,
that it was not possible for any to escape, who had fallen
within their reach. 'This fury having in a short time
silenced all debate, Spendius and Matho were declared
generals. . :
Amidst all the madness and disorder, which had now
taken possession of the camp, Gesco, preferring the safety
of his country to every other consideration, and fearing lest
the savage fury, with which these mercenaries were in-
flamed,- should bring entire destruction and ruin upon
Carthage, never ceased to expose himself to danger, but
tricd every remedy which care or vigilance could suggest:
sometimes addressing himself to the officers apart; and
sometimes ` calling together the soldiers of each sevcral
nation, and exhorting them to return again to their duty.
But it happened, that when the Africans, in one of these
assemblies, were bold and importunate in their clamours
for the allowance for provisions, which they had not yet
received, Gesco, in order to check their insolence, bade
them go and demand it of their general Matho. This
answer inflamed their minds to such a height of fury, that,
not admitting the least delay, they ran to lay hands upon
the money that had been brought from Carthage, and
afterwards seized Gesco and his company. Spendius and
Matho. employed all their arts to feed and keep up the
rage of the soldiers; being persuaded, that if they could
once be drawn to commit'some violent and desperate
action, a war must necessarily follow. "The attempt suc-
ceeded; they seized the money into their hands; plun-
VOL. I. G

82 THE GENERAL HISTORY BOOK I.

dered the Carthaginians of their goods and: equipage; and:
having ignominiously loaded Gesco and his companions
with chains, threw them into prison; and from this time
declared open war against the Carthaginians, in defiance
of all the laws of justice and religion, and of the established
rights of mankind.

` Such were the causes, and such the beginning of the war
against the foreign mercenaries, which is usually called the
Mican war.

When Matho had thus far pcoammalieled his design, he
sent ambassadors to all the citics of Afric, inviting them to
join in this attempt, and lend their assistance inar the
recovery of their common liberty. The greater part of
these readily embraced the occasion, and raised large
supplies both of troops and stores. The army then divided
itself into two separate bodies, and marched to lay siege to
Utica and Hippo, two cities that had refused to join in the
revolt.

The Carthaginians were deeply affected by this state of
their affairs, which seemed to be almost desperate. Whiat
their own territory produced was, indeed, at all times
sufficient for the common occasions of the people; but all
the public necessities had constantly been supplied by
stores and contributions drawn from the African cities;
and their battles were always fought by foreign troops.
But now these resources not only failed, but were turned
against them to their destruction. The misery, too, was
more severely felt, because it had happened so contrary to
all ticir hopes. Wearied and exhausted by the length
and close continuance of the war in Sicily, they flattered
themselves that, after the conclusion of the peace, they
should be able to enjoy some little repose and ease. But
the event proved different; a war was ready to receive
them, far greater and more terrible than the other. In
the first, the only contest was for Sicily against the
Romans: the latter was a civil and domestic war, in which
their country, lives, and liberties, were all in danger..

cHERE 1 OF POLYBIUS. 83

Besides this, they had no store of arms, nor any naval
force; for their fleets had been all destroyed in the late
engagements. They had uo method of procuring supplies ;
no revenues to support an army; nor so much as one
single ally or friend, from whom they could expect assist-
ance. Now were they sensible, how much more civil dis-
sensions are to be dreaded, than a war maintained in a
foreign country against a foreign enemy. But these dis-
tresses were in a great measure owing to themselves. For
during the late war they had treated all the Africans with
extreme severity; being persuaded that the necessities of
the times would justify their conduct. Upon this pretence,
they exacted through the country one half of all the annual
produce; and imposed a tribute on the cities, double to
what was paid before the war. No favour or remission
was ever shewn to any, how poor or indigent soever.
Among the governors of provinces, such as were of a mild
and gentle disposition, were held in no esteem at Carthage;
but those were most caressed and honoured who collected

the amplest stores, and practised the greatest cruclty upon

‘the country. Hanno was one of these. A people so op-
pressed wanted no persuasions to excite them to revolt; a
single message was sufficient. The very women, who had
often quietly beheld their husbands and their children
dragged to prison, when they were unable to discharge the
tribute, now met together in every city; and having
solemnly engaged themselves not to conceal any part of
their goods, they brought together all their ornaments, and
threw them into the common treasure; by which means
Spendius and Matho were furnished with supplies in such
abundance, that they not only paid the soldiers their ar-
rears, as it had been promised them in the beginning of
the revolt, but were able also from that time to defray all
the necessary expences of the war. So true it is, that in
affairs of government it is the part of prudence not to
confine our views to the exigencies only of the present
time, but rather to look forwards to the future.
c2

84 THE GENERAL HISTORY BOOK I.

The Carthaginians, though besct by so many evils,
made haste to draw together new troops of mercenaries,
and appointed Hanno to be their.general; who, some
time before, had bcen successful in reducing Hecatompylus,
together with the adjacent parts of Afric, to the Carthagi-
nian yoke. They armed, likewise, all the citizens. that
were of sufficient age; trained and disciplined the cavalry
of the city, and refitted what was left them of their fleet ;
some triremes, a few vessels of fifty oars, and the largest of
their boats.

Spendius and Matho, being joined by all the Africans,
to the amount of seventy thousand, had divided their
forces, and were now laying siege to Utica and Hippo.
They held also a strong camp at Tunis; so that the Car-
thaginians were cut off from all communication with
exterior Afric; for Carthage is situated within a gulf
upon a long tract of land, which bears. the form of a
peninsula, being almost every way surrounded, partly by
the sea and partly by a lake. The isthmus, which connects
it with the rest of Afric, is about twenty-five stadia in its
breadth. At a moderate distance from the isthmus, and on
that side which is bounded by the sca, stands Utica; on
the other side, upon the lake, is Tunis. The mercenaries
having gained possession of these two posts, and. thus
blocked up the Carthaginians within their walls, made
frequent incursions both by night and day even to the
very gates, and filled the city with continual terror and
alarms.

Hanno completed all the necessary preparations with
diligence and dexterity. This, indeed, was his peculiar
talent; but his abilities in the field were wholly contempti-
ble and mean. He wanted penetration to discern the
proper opportunities of action; and his whole conduct
shewed him to be destitute both of skill and spirit. For
though, upon his first march to Utica to relieve the siege,
he obtained great advantages.against the enemy, who were
seized with terror at the number of his elephants, which

CHAP. VI. OF POLYBIUS. 85

were not fewer than a hundred; yet so far was he from
improving this success, as he might have done, so as to
gain a complete and decisive victory, that, on the contrary,
he endangered even the safety of those whom he came to
succour. He had ordered catapults, and all the train of
military engines, to be brought to him out of the city; and
sitting down at no great distance from the besiegers, he
resolved to attack their camp. The elephants advanced
with so much violence that they soon broke through the
intrenchments; and the mercenaries, unable to sustain the
shock, fled from the camp with the utmost precipitation.
A great part of them were killed by the beasts; the rest
escaped to an adjoining hill, that was rough and craggy,
and covered with woods, and relied upon the strength of
the place for their security. Hanno, who had been always
used to fight against the Africans and Numidians, whose
custom it is, whenever they are routed, to continue their
flight for two or three days together, till they are quite
removed from the place of action; Hanno, I say, imagining
that the war was ended, and all danger past, abandoned at
once all care both of the soldiers and the camp: and
retiring into the city, began to spend his time in luxury
and ease. But these troops, who saved themselves upon
the hill, had been trained under the discipline of the bold
Amilcar; and, during their campaigns in Sicily, had been
accustomed to retreat before the enemy, even many times
in the same day, and to return again as often to the charge.
When they therefore saw that the general was gone into
the city, and that the soldiers, through confidence from
their late victory, neglected to guard the camp, and were
dispersed up and down without any care or caution, they
suddenly returned, and marching in close order, forced
their way through the intrenchments, killing a great number
of the Carthaginians, and constraining the rest to save
themselves by a hasty and ignominious flight. They be-
came masters also of the inca and of all the military
machines which Hanno had ordered to be brought out of
G3

86 THE GENERAL HISTORY ` .moók.

the city, and which were now by that means lost. “But this
was not the only instance in which this general shewed his
want of sense; for in a few days after, when the two armies
lay encamped very near each other in the neighbourhood
of Gorza, though he had twice an opportunity of. forcing
the enemy to an engagement, and twice also of attacking
them by surprise, yet so absurd and foolish was his conduct,
that he suffered all these occasions to escape him.

At last the Carthaginians, seeing that their affairs were so
ill conducted, made choice of Amilcar Barcas for their
general, and entrusted to him the care of the war. The
army consisted of seventy elephants; of such bodies of
mercenaries as they had been able to draw together; of
some deserters from the enemy; and of the cavalry and
infantry of the city, which amounted to about ten thousand
men. Amilcar, by the very first action which he performed;
struck the enemy with inconceivable dismay and terror, and
forced them to raise the siege of Utica. It was an action
equal to the greatness of his past exploits; and such as
fully answered the expectations which his country had
conceived of him. ‘The manner of it was as follows.

The extremity of the isthmus, which joius Carthage to
the rest of Afric, is secured by a chain of rough and craggy
hills, over which there are roads made by art, which give
access to the other side. Upon these hills Matho had
taken care to place a guard in every part that was commo-
dious for the purpose. Every other passage from Carthage
to the country was obstructed by the Macar; a deep and
rapid river, that was scarcely fordable in any part, and
which had only one single bridge across it. The merce-
navies had built a town upon the bridge, and guarded it
with the greatest care, so that it was not possible not only
for an army, but even for a single man, to pass without
discovery. Amilcar haying carefully considered all these
obstacles, and employed his thoughts on every probable
method of surmounting them, at last put in practice the,
following expedient. Having observed, that as often as.

CHAP. VI. OF POLYBIUS. . 87

certain winds began to blow, the niouth of the river was
always filled with sand, so as to afford a firm and easy
passage over it, he made all things ready for his design,
and waited for the time, without disclosing to any one his
intention. The winds blew accordingly; and Amilcar,
beginning his march by night with all possible secrecy,
appeared on the other side of the river before break of day,
tothe great astonishment both of the enemy aud of those
that were besieged in Utica. He then continued his march
along the plain, to attack the forces that were stationed at
the bridge.

When Spendius saw what had happened, he made haste
to meet the enemy, at the head of ten thousand men, from
the town upon the bridge. About fifteen thousand more
marched at the same time from the camp before Utica to
support the first. As soon as they were joined, they
mutually exhorted each other, and advanced to the fight,
imagining that it would be easy to surround the Cartha-
ginian army, and inclose them as in a snare. Amilcar
was marching with the elephants in front; behind these
were the light-armed troops and cavalry; and last of all,
his heavy forces. But when he remarked the impetuosity
with which the enemy advanced against him, he suddenly
inverted his whole disposition; commanding the troops
that were in front to wheel off and fall behind, and
those that were behind to advance and form the front.
The.mercenaries, imagining that this motion was the effect
of fear, and that the Carthaginians already were preparing
to retreat, quitted their ranks, and ran on briskly to the
charge. But no sooner had the cavalry faced about again,
and come forwards to. cover and support the rest of the
forces that were standing in perfect order, than the Afri-
cans, astonished by a motion which they had not looked
for, turned their backs and fled; and fell back upon their
own forces in great disorder. Many were destroyed in
that confusion ; ^ but the greater part were trodden down in
heaps by the Carthaginian cavalry and elephants. Upon

G 4

88 THE GENERAL HISTORY BOOK 1.

the whole, about six thousand of them were killed, and two
thousand taken. The rest escaped, some to. the camp
before Utica, and some to the town upon the bridge.

Amilcar having thus gained the victory, pursued the
enemy to the town, which they abandoned on: his first
approach, and retired to Tunis. He afterwards marched
‘his army through the country, drawing many cities to sub-
mission, and reducing many more by force; and by this
success he restored the courage and raised the Magius
spirits of his countrymen.

But Matho, who was at this time employed in the siege
. of Hippo, advised Spendius, and Autaritus the general of
the Gauls, to follow closely after the Carthaginians, and
attend to all their motions; taking care only to avoid the
plains, by reason of the cavalry and elephants; and keep-
ing their route along the sides of the mountains, to wait
their opportunity of falling upon the enemy, wlienever
they should be engaged in any difficulties. He sent like-
wise to the cities of Afric and Numidia, to solicit new sup-
plies; and conjured them not to let pass the present oc-
casion, so favourabie for recovering their. common liberty.
Spendius, taking with him six thousand men from all. the
different nations that were at Tunis, together with the
Gauls, who now amounted to two thousand only, the rest
having deserted to the Romans during the siege of Eryx,
followed the advice of Matho, arid marched along the
sides of the hills and mountains, waiting still upon the
motions of the Carthaginian army. It happened, that
Amilcar lay encamped in a certain plain surrounded on
every side by mountains, when the expected succours also
arrived from Afric and Numidia, and joined the army of
the rebels. This threw the Carthaginians into the greatest
consternation. The Africans had fixed their camp before
them; Spendius with his forces lay on one side, and the
Numidians were in their rear. The danger was so threaten-
ing, that there seemed to be no way left to escape it.

Put while things were in this situation, a ccrtain Numi-

4

CHAP, V1. OF POLYBIUS. 89

dian prince, named Naravasus, a man of a noble and ge-
nerous disposition, and one whose inclinations had always
led him to favour the Carthaginians on account of former
connexions between his family and that people, and who
was now the more confirmed in those sentiments by what
he had heard of the great abilities and fame of Amilcar
Barcas, ‘considered this as a proper time for settling an
entire and perfect union between himself and the republic.
He went therefore to the Carthaginian camp, attended by
about a hundred horsemen; and advancing close to the
intrenchments, stood boldly there, making signals with his
hand. Amilcar, surprised at the appearance, sent one. to
enquire his business. He answered, that he desired a con-
ference with the general. And when Amilcar seemed still
doubtful and irresolute, as if suspecting some ill design,
Naravasus, delivering his horse and javelins to some of the
attendants, entered unarmed into the camp; with such an
air of confidence and intrepidity, as struck the Carthagi-
nians with astonishment and awe. They conducted him
however to the general, to whom he declared, “ that he
was attached by inclination to all the Carthaginians, but
more particularly solicitous to obtain Amilcar’s friendship:
that he was therefore come to enter into treaty with him:
to assist in all his undertakings; and to share in all his
counsels, without deceit or fraud.” ` The candour and sin-
cerity that appeared in this discourse, together with the
confidence with which the young man had at first ap-
proached the camp, gave so much joy and satisfaction to
Amilcar, that he not only consented to admit him as a
partner in all his counsels and designs, but promised also
with an oath to give him his daughter in marriage, if he
continued firm in his alliance with the Carthaginians. The
agreement being thus concluded, Naravasus brought over
to the camp the Numidians that were under his command,
amounting to two thousand men.

As soon as Amilcar had received this reinforcement, he
drew out his army in order of battle. Spendius likewise,

90 THE GENERAL HISTORY BOOK I.

being joined by the Africans, descended into the plain,
and advanced to engage the enemy. The fight was ob-
stinate:: but the Carthaginians at last prevailed. The ele-
phants performed great service in the action: and Nara-
vasus signalized himself above all the army. About ten
thousand of the enemy were killed, and four thousand
taken. Spendius and Autaritus saved themselves by flight.
When the action was ended, as many of the prisoners as
were willing to serve among the Carthaginians, were rc-
ceived into the army: and Amilcar, having ordered the rest
to be brought before him, informed them, that they should
now be pardoned for all that was past, and be permitted to
-depart to what place soever their several inclinations led
them; but that if ever again thoy were found in arms
against the Carthaginians, they must then expect to be
d troated with the last severity. »

About this time, the mercenaries that were garrisoned
in Sardinia, being encouraged by the example of Spendius
and Matho, revolted from their duty ; and'having shut up
their general Bostar in the citadel, destroyed him and all
his countrymen. The Carthaginians sent Hanno to reduce
them with an army. But these troops also joined the
party of the rebels: and Hanno having fallen alive into
their hands, was immediately nailed to a cross. ‘They
afterwards put to death all ‘the Carthaginians that were in
the place, by new and unusual tortures. And having
seized the principal towns, they maintained themselves by
force in the possession of the island. But some time after-
wards, when they had engaged in some disputes against the
people of the country, ithe latter drove them from the |
island, and forced them to fly to Italy for refuge. In-this
manner was Sardinia lost to the Carthaginians: an island
famous for its size, fertility, and number of inhabitants;
arid so fully celebrated on these accounts by many writers,
that it is not necessary to repeat in this place what has
already been observed and confessed by others.

Matho, Spendius, and Autaritus, jealous of tlie effects

CHAP. VI. OF POLYBIUS. . 91

of Amilcar's gentle treatment of the prisoners; and fearing
lest the soldiers, seduced by that shew of clemency, should
run to embrace the pardon that was offered, resolved to
engage the multitude in some horrid and inhuman action,
which might render their minds quite furious and impla-
cable towards the Carthaginians. For this purpose, having
called the troops together, they introduced among them a
‘courier, as bringing letters from the rebels in Sardinia.
The contents of these were, to advise them to look more
carefully after Gesco and his companions, whom they had
seized at Tunis; for that there were some persons in the
camp, who were concerting measures with the Carthagi-
nians to set them free. Spendius immediately laid hold
on this occasion to harangue the assembly. He conjured
them to give no credit to the affected lenity of Amilcar:
that his intention was not so much to save the prisoners
whom he had taken, as to seduce by that shew of mercy
the whole army into his power, that he might afterwards
include them all in one common punishment. He ex-
horted them to guard Gesco with all imaginable care: that
the escape of a man so eminent, and of such abilities in war,
would not only make them appear contemptible to the
enemy, but might also prove the entire ruin of their affairs ;
since if he once should find himself at liberty, he would
not fail to turn against them, ‘and become their most for-
midable enemy. He had scarcely ended, when a’ second
courier entered, as if sent from Tunis, with letters of the
same advice and import. Upon this, Autaritus rose up to
speak. He observed to tliem, that they could now have
no view of safety, but in rejecting every thing that looked
towards an accommodation with the Carthaginians: that
in propottion as any were suspended in their thoughts by
the hopes of pardon, they must by consequence become
less sincere and steady in the cause in which they were
engaged. He advised them to place their only confidence
in those whose sentiments were most severe and bitter
against the Carthaginians; and to consider all besides as

92 THE GENERAL HISTORY “BOOK I.

enemies and traitors. In conclusion, he urged it as’ his
opinion, that Gesco, and the rest that were prisoners with _
him, should presently be put to death in torture: and
that the same treatment should be also shewn to all the
Carthaginians, who should from that time fall into their
hands. -

Of all the chiefs, Autaritus was able to make the great-
est impression in these assemblies, because he had learned
to speak in the Punic language; which the long con-
tinuance of the war had rendered so familiar to the soldiers,
that they used it for the most part on all occasions of com- -
mon intercourse and civility. His opinion, therefore, was
received with general acclamations, and assented to with
eagerness. Yet some of every nation, moved by the re-
membrance of the kindnesses which they had received
from Gesco, came forwards in the assembly, and began to
beg, that at least the torture might be spared. As they
all spoke together, and each in the language of his country,
they were not presently understood. But no sooner was
it declared, that they were pleading against the punish-
ment, and one of the assembly had called out kil, kill them
all, than they were instantly overwhelmed with stones by
the furious multitude, and their bodies carried off by their
companions, as if they had been slaughtered by some
savage beasts. Spendius and the soldiers then took Gesco,
together with the rest of the Carthaginian prisoners, in
number about seven hundred; and having conducted them
to a little distance without the camp, cut off their hands,
beginning first with Gesco: the same whom they had pro-
claimed not long before to be their benefactor and their
friend, and chosen as the judge of all their wrongs and
differences. They afterwards tore away the scalp from the
heads of these unhappy men; and having broken and
miserably mangled all their limbs, cast them still breathing
into a pit together. ` l

The news of this horrible transaetion affected the Car-
tbaginians with the deepest grief. They ordered their

CHAP. VI. OF POLYBIUS. 93

generals Hanno and Amilcar to take some speedy and
effectual vengeance upon the murderers of their country-
men. They likewise sent some heralds to those impious
wretches, desiring leave to remove their bodies. But the
rebels returned for answer, that they should from that time
send neither herald nor ambassador to their cemp, on pain
of their being punished with the same cruel death. "They
also made a law for the time to come, by which it was re-
Solved, that all the Carthaginians that were taken should
lose their lives in torture, and their allies have first their
hands cut off, and be then sent back in that condition to
the camp. And this was punctually observed and ex-
ecuted.

Whoever makes reflection upon these horrid cruelties,
will easily be convinced, that if the human body is some-
times invaded by certain corrupt and ulcerous humours
which resist all remedy, the minds of men are also not less
liable to some disorders that prove as obstinate and fatal.
And as in the former case, the very medicines which are
designed to effect a cure, often serve only to inflame and
irritate the parts to which they are applied, and even
quicken the progress of the evil; yet, on the other hand,
if the disease be totally neglected, the corruption soon
spreads itself through all the neighbouring parts, infecting
every thing within its reach, till the whole body becomes
unsound: just so it happens to the mind, whenever it is
tainted with those dark and malignant passions, which ren-
der man. more impious and savage even than the beasts
themselves. If you offer to men in this condition the
softening remedies of clemency and pardon, they presently
suspect it to be mere fraud and artifice; their diffidence
grows stronger, and their aversion to you is more deeply
rooted than before. But if you resist their violence, and
oppose revenge to cruelty, there is then no crime too
horrible, no attempt too monstrous for them to engage in.
"They exult and glory in their impieties, and by degrees
divest themselves of every sentiment and passion that dis-

94 THE GENERAL HISTORY ~ Book i.

tinguish human nature. It is not to be doubted, but that
these disorders are chiefly owing toa bad education, and
impure manners ; though there are many other causes,
which may sometimes assist to bring them on: among
which none is so likely to be effectual, as the insolence aci
rapaciousness of public governors. ‘The truth of these
remarks is evident from all that now passed among the
mercenaries; and more particularly, from the. cornet of
their chief commanders.

Amilcar being now in the highest degree incensed against
the enemy, and "finding bise too n to encounter with
their unbounded' rage and. madness, invited Hanno to
come and join him: qu by means of their united forces
to put a speedy end to the war. And being persuaded,
that nothing less than the entire extirpation of these
wretches could bring the affair to any effectual conclusion,
he ordered all those that should fall within the reach of
the sword in battle, to be instantly destroyed; and such as
were at any time brought prisoners to be cast alive to the
elephants. The Carthaginians were now beginning to
flatter themselves with better hopes, when on a sudden
their whole prospect was fatally reversed. "The generals
were no sooner joined, than they were found to differ from
each other i in all their sentiments. And to such a height
was this dissension raised between them, that they not
only neglected every fair occasion of doing hurt to the
enemy, but even exposed their own troops to frequent
attacks and losses, by their mutual jealousies and contests.
The Carthaginians, therefore, were forced to send orders,
that one of them should quit the army; but left it to the
troops to make the choice. It happened also, about the
same time, that the convoys that were sailing to the army
from Emporia, a place from whence they usually drew
their largest supplies of corn and other necessaries, were
all sunk -in the ocean by a storm. Sardinia likewise,
which, in times of danger or necessity, had always furnished
üeeuly to their wants, was now revolted from them.

CHAP. VI. OF POLYBIUS. 95

But the severest’ stroke of all was the loss of Utica and
Hippo. For among all the African cities, these two alone
had remained unshaken in their duty; not only in the
_ beginning of the present war, but during the time also of
Agathocles, and when the Romans invaded Afric; and
had, on all occasions, served and supported the republic
with singular affection and fidelity. Yet now, they not
only embraced the party of the rebels, without any kind of
pretext or excuse, but shewed even an uncommon zeal and
activity in the cause; expressing, at the same time, the
most implacable enmity and hatred against the Cartha-
ginians. They seized the troops that had been sent among
them for their defence, which were not fewer than five
hundred men, and put them all to death, together with
their commanders, and cast them without the walls. Nor
would they even grant permission for their bodies to be
buried, though this was requested by the Carthaginians.
This -situation of affairs so much raised the hopes of
Spendius and Matho, that they resolved to lay siege to
Carthage.

Amilcar being joined by Annibal, who was sent to
command in the room of Hanno, whom the army had
displaced when the differences between the chiefs were
referred to their decision, marched his troops through the
country, endeavouring to cut off all supplies from the
enemy. In the execution of this design, Naravasus, and
his cavalry were of great service to him; as indeed they
were upon all occasions of the war. Such then was the
state of the armies in the field.

But the Carthaginians, being thus on every side closely
invested by their enemies, were forced to have recourse to
the states that were in alliance with them. Hiero, whose
attention was fixed upon the war, had all along complied
with every thing that was requested of him. But at this
time, especially, he applied himself to serve them with all
imaginable zeal ; as, judging that his interest required him,
in order to preserve his own dominions and his alliance

95 THE GENERAL HISTORY ‘rook.

‘with the Romans, to assist in saving the Carthaginians
from destruction; lest the conquerors should become too
powerful to be controlled in any future projects. In this
he certainly was guided by the dictates of good sense and
prudence. For these conjectures are by no means to be
slighted; nor ought we ever to permit any growing power
to raise itself to such a degree of strength, as to be able to
'tear from us without resistance even our natural undisputed
rights.

"The Romans also punctually observed the terms of the
late treaty: which they had made with Carthage, 'and
espoused their interests with zeal. At first, indeed, an
accident had happened which threatened to embroil anew
the two republics. Some persons, sailing from the ports
of Italy to Afric, had conveyed supplies to the camp of
the mercenaries. The Carthaginians seized" on these,
who were in number about five hundred, and threw them
-into prison. The Romans were greatly offended at this
proceeding; but as the men were all immediately released
again upon the first demand, they were so much pleased
and: softened by that eompliance, that they not only: sent
back all the Carthaginian prisoners that were left from the
Sicilian war, but from that time cheerfully ‘assisted the
republic with every office of humanity and friendship:
They gave permission to their merchants to export all
kinds of necessaries to Carthage; at the same time pro-
hibiting them from carrying any to the enemy. They
refused to invade Sardinia, though invited to it by the
mercenaries that had revolted there. And when the.
inhabitants of Utica offered to put them in possession of
that city, they rejected the proposal, and ‘adhered re-
ligiously to their treaty. By the help of all these succours,
the Carthaginians were enabled to sustain the siege; while
Spendius and Matho were themselves no less “besieged ;
for Amilcar had intercepted all provisions from their
camp; and at last reduced’ them to such : —Ó p
they were forced to raise the siege.

7 OF POLYBIUS. 97

‘Some time afterwards these generals, having drawn
together the bravest of their forces, to the number of fifty
thousand, among whom was Zarxas, an African, with the
‘troops under his command, resumed their first’ design, of
following Amilcar close in all his marches, and attending
to the motions of his army.. Their chief care was, to
avoid the plains, from apprehensions of the elephants and
cavalry; and to possess themselves, before the enemy, of
all the mountainous defiles and narrow passes. In acts of
courage and enterprising boldness, they shewed them-
selves to be in no point inferior to the Carthaginians; but
their want of skill was often fatal to them. Upon this
occasion, the difference was clearly seen, between a con-
duct that is built upon the rules of military science, and
an irregular and unskilful method of making war. For
Amilcar would sometimes contrive to separate small bodies
from their army, and, like an artful chess-player, inclosing
-them on every side, by that means destroy them. Some-
times, when his motions seemed to promise a general
engagement, he drew them into ambuscades of which they
had no suspicion. In a word, he was ever ready to attack
them both by night and day, when they least expected his
approach. Great numbers of them were thus destroyed;
and as many as were taken alive were thrown to the
elephants. At last, coming upon them by surprise, he
fixed his camp near them in a place that was very proper
for his own forces, but incommodious to the rebels. In
this situation, not daring to risk a battle, nor able to
escape, by reason of the intrenchments which Amilcar had
extended round them, they were reduced to so great
extremity by famine, that they were forced to feed upon
each other: as if the Deity had designed to inflict a
punishment upon them that might be equal in its horror
and impiety to the crimes which they had committed
against their-fellow-creatures. But if they wanted courage
to venture on an engagement, in which they were sure
of being defeated, and exposed toa eruel punishment if

3 VOL. I. H

98 THE GENERAL HISTORY BOOK I.

taken, they were much less able to entertain any thonghts
of treaty or accommodation, when they reflected upon
their past transactions. "Their only hopes were in the
succours which they expected would arrive from Tunis;
for with this hope their chiefs continued still to flatter
them. Under this assurance, they submitted yet for some
time longer to practise this horrible barbarity against each
other. But when they had impiously devoured all their
prisoners and slaves, and no succours’ were arrived, the
multitude grew impatient of their misery, and began to
threaten their chiefs. Spendius, therefore, with Autaritus
and Zarxas, resolved to go themselves to the enemy, and
treat of peace.. Having first dispatched a herald, and
obtained a safe conduct, they went accordingly to the
Carthaginian camp, and concluded a treaty with Amilcar
upon these conditions: ** That the Carthaginians should
choose from among the enemy ten persons, whomsoever
they -thought proper, and that the rest should be dis-
missed, each with his single garment.” Amilcar then said,
that in consequence of the treaty, he made choice of those
that were there present. Thus the Carthaginians got into
their power Spendius and Autaritus, and the rest of their
officers of greatest eminence.

The Africans, who were ignorant of the terms of the
treaty, no sooner found that their chiefs were made
prisoners, than they ran tumultuously to arms, in order to
resent the supposed treachery. But Amilcar, surrounding
them with the elephants, utterly destroyed them all, to the
amount of more than forty thousand men. The place
where this action happened was called the Saw, because
the figure of it somewhat resembled that instrument. . By
this victory, Amilcar raised the hopes of his countrymen a
second time, when they had almost begun to despair of
safety. He then marched through the country, with
Annibal and Naravasus; and having received the Africans,
who were ready every where to submit, and recovered
most of the principal towns to their party, they next ad-

CHAP. VI. OF POLYBIUS. : 99

vanced to lay siege to Tunis, into which Matho had retired
with all his forces.

Annibal fixed his camp before the city, on that side of
it which looked towards Carthage; while Amilcar posted
himself on the opposite side. They then took Spendius,
and the rest of the prisoners, and carrying them near the
walls, crucified them there, in sight of the enemy. But
Matho, perceiving that Annibal, elated by the past success,
was remiss and negligent in his post, sallied out upon him,
and attacking the intrenchments, killed a great number of
the Carthaginians, and forced the rest to fly out of the
camp. All the baggage was lost, and Annibal himself
taken prisoner. This last was immediately conducted to
the cross of Spendius, and fixed alive upon it; after he had
first been forced to suffer the most cruel torments. They
killed also thirty of the noblest Carthaginians round
Spendius’s body. As if fortune had taken unusual pains,
to afford alternately to either party the means of retali-
ating upon the other by the most inhuman methods of
revenge. à

The distance of the two camps prevented Amilcar from
being informed in time of what had happened. Nor was
. he able, when he knew it, to send any succours, on account

of the difficulties of the way that lay between. He there-
fore immediately decamped, and marching along the
Macar, sat down near the mouth of that river.

The Carthaginians had just begun to recover new life,
and were entertaining better hopes, when this unhappy
affair threw them again into no small dejection and amaze-
ment. They did not, however, neglect the care of their
safety; but choosing thirty of their senators, they sent
them away to Amilcar, together with Hanno, the former
general, and all the citizens that were left of age to bear
arms; so that this was considered as their last and only
effort. They earnestly recommended it to the senators, to
use all their power to reconcile the generals, and to engage
them to regard only the exigencies of the republic, and act

H 2

100 THE GENERAL HISTORY ` nook& r.

together with such harmony as the state of affairs required.
After many conferences and debates, this was at last
effected. Hanno and Amilcar were constrained to agree
in sentiments,.and yielded up their differences to the
public good. From this time all things went prosperously
for the Carthaginians; who gained -continually some ad-
vantage over the enemy, in a variety of little combats, am-
buscades, pursuits, both in the neighbourhood of Leptis,
and in other places; till Matho, finding himself so greatly
harassed and distressed, was determined to engage in a
decisive action. . The Carthaginians, on their side, shewed
no less eagerness. Both parties, therefore, summoned all
their allies; recalled their garrisons from the towns; and
resolved to risk the whole upon a single battle. When all
things were ready, the generals, by agreement, drew out
their forces, and the fight began. The victory was on the
side of the Carthaginians. The greatest part of the
Africans were killed in the action; the rest escaped to
a certain city that was near, but surrendered tliemselves in
a short time after. Matho was taken prisoner. All the
parts of Afric soon submitted to the conquerors, except
the cities of Utica and Hippo; which alone were forced to
disclaim all thoughts of peace, because their past behaviour
had left them no hopes of pardon. Of such importance is
it, in dissensions of this kind, to observe a moderate con-
duct, and abstain from all such excesses as are too great
for mercy. But no sooner had Hanno invested one of
them, and Amilcar the other, than they were forced to
surrender at discretion. Thus tlie war, which had threat-
ened entire destruction to the Carthaginians, was now
ended in reducing all the parts of Afric to their former
obedience, and in punishing the authors of it; for the
youth of the city, after they had led the prisoners in
triumph, inflicted upon Matho and the rest every kind
of indignity and torture that invention could contrive.
Such was the conclusion of the war between the Car-
thaginians and. their mercenaries, after a continuance of

CHAP. VI. OF POLYBIUS. 101

three years and about four months; a war by far the most
impious and bloody of any that we find in history.

About this time the Romans, invited, as we have already
mentioned, by the mercenaries that had revolted in Sar-
dinia, resolved to take possession of that island: and when
the Carthaginians began to shew their resentment of this
proceeding, and were preparing to oppose by force the
rebels that had thus robbed them of their rights, the Ro-
mans presently declared war against them; pretending that
their preparations were not so much designed against the
people of Sardinia as against themselves. The Carthagi-
nians, who had been just before delivered, when they least
expected it, from a most dreadful war, and were by no means
able, in their present circumstances, to contend against the
Romans, yielded to the necessity of the times, and not
only gave up. Sardinia, but consented also to pay twelve
hundred talents, rather than be involved in a war which
they were too weak at that time to sustain.

H3

102 THE GENERAL HISTORY Gg»oox 11.

S

BOOK THE SECOND.

CHAP. I.

WE shewed in the preceding book at what time it was
that the Romans, after they had fully settled the affairs of,
Italy, began first to extend their views abroad; the manner
in which they passed over into Sicily; and the reasons that
induced them to declare war against the Carthaginians, in
order to drive them from that island. We took notice
also of the time in which they first employed a naval ar-
mament; and recounted all that had happened to the two
republics in the progress of the war; in the end of which
the Carthaginians were forced to abandon Sicily, and leave
to the Romans the sovereignty and possession of all the
island, those parts alone excepted which belonged to
Hiero. We next related, in what manner the Carthagi-
nian mercenaries revolted from their duty, and kindled
that which was called the African war. We saw to how
monstrous a height their impieties were raised, with all the
unnatural excesses and' dreadful circumstances that at-
tended them; till the Carthaginians became at last superior
to their enemies. We now go on, to give a concise and
general abstract of the chief events which followed these
transactions, agreeably to our first design.

As soon as the Carthaginians had quieted their domestic
troubles, they sent Amilcar Barcas with an army into
Spain. Amilcar, taking with him Annibal his son, who
was then about nine years old, passed the Straits between
the Pillars of Hercules, and in the course of almost nine
.years which he spent in that country, greatly extended the

CHAP. I. OF POLYBIUS. 103

dominions of the republic; reducing many different nations
to the Carthaginian yoke, some by persuasion and some by
force; and at last ended his life in a manner worthy of his
former great exploits. For being engaged in battle with a
- certain people distinguished by their bravery and strength,
and who had Wight a very numerous army against him
into the field, he fell nobly in the nction, after he had
shewn amazing proofs of hardiness and courage. The

Carthaginians made choice of Asdrubal to succeed him,
who was general of the triremes, and nearly allied in blood
to Amilcar. ,

About this time it was that the Romans prepared to
invade Illyria, and, for the first time, sent their armies into
those parts of Europe. An event which must be carefully
considered and attended to by those who are inclined -to
enter into our design, and comprehend in its whole extent
the gradual progress and advancement of the greatness of
this empire. The expedition, then, owed its birth to the
cause which I am going to relate.

: Agron, king of Illyria, the son of Pleuratus, whose forces
both by land and sea were greater than those of any of his
predecessors, was gained with large sums of money by
Demetrius, the father of Philip, to send relief to the
Mydionians, who were besieged by the Aétolians. For
when the Ætolians had employed in vain all the methods
of persuasion, to prevail upon this’ people to unite them-
selves to their republic, they resolved to subdue thein
to their laws by force. Having, therefore, drawn together
a numerous army, they invested the city, aud pressed it
closely; employing against it all kinds of machines, and
every method of attack. When the place, reduced to
great extremity, was every day expected to surrender, the:
praetor of the /Etolians, reflecting that the time was also
drawing nearin which the magistrates were usually elected,
and that his place must soon be yielded to a successor,
called together an assembly of the people, and represented
to them, that as he had all along sustained the chief fatigue

H4

104 THE GENERAL HISTORY BOOK If.

aud burden of the siege, it was highly reasonable that he
alone should possess the right of distributing the spoil, and
the honour of having his name iuscribed upon-the trophies,
whenever the city should be taken. But as this motion
was opposed by many, and especially by those who had
any hopes of gaining the pretorship for themselves, who
insisted that no judgment should be given before the event,
but the whole be reserved entire, till they should see upon
whom fortune intended to bestow that honour; it was at
last resolved, that if the new magistrate should take the
city, the distribution of the spoil and the inscription of the.
trophies should be adjudged to him, in conjunction with
the prætor of the former year.
When the affair was thus deter sings and the very fol-
lowing day was the time appoiuted for the new prætor to
be elected and to enter into his office, according to the
custom of the /Etolians; a hundred barks, having on:
board five thousand Illyrians, arrived in the night, and cast
anchor as near the city as was possible. At break of day.
the troops were disembarked iu great haste and silence;
and having ranged themselves in order of battle after the
manner of their country, they marched, divided into
cohorts, towards the camp of the enemy. The /Etolians
were thrown at first into some kind of consternation, by an
attempt so bold and hardy, and which they had not in the
least expected. But that spirit of arrogance and haughty.
fierceness, by which this people bad been long distinguished,
and their confidence in the strength and number of their.
forces, soon took place, and in some degree dispelled their
fears. They drew up the greater part of the cavalry, to-
gether with the heavy-armed troops, upon the plain before
the camp; and having, at the same time, possessed them-
selves of certain eminences that stood commodious for the
action, they posted the rest of the cavalry upon them, with
the light-armed forces. But these, being first attacked,
were not able to stand against the numbers and close order
of the enemy ; who dispersed them with little difficulty, and

. CHAP. I. X OF POLYBIUS. 105

forced the cavalry also to retreat back to the lieavy-armed
troops. The Illyrians then came pouring down with
violence from the eminences upon the troops that were
drawn up in battle on the plain; and being, at the same
time, assisted by the Mydionians from the town, they made
their attack with such success that the ZEtolians were com-
pletely routed. Many of tlem were killed in the action;
and a greater number taken, together with all the arms
and baggage. When the Illyrians had thus happily ex-
-ecuted the orders of their king, they loaded their vessels
with the spoils, and steered their course back again towards
their own country.

'The Mydionians, having obtained their safety in a man-
ner so strange and unexpected, called together an assem-
bly of the people, and, among other public resolutions,
made also a decree concerning the inscription of the tro-
phies; in which, following the example of the /Etolians,
they adjudged it in common to the prætor that was then
in office, and to those who should afterwards be elected to
it; as if fortune had designed to give a most conspicuous
proof of her power in all human affairs, by thus enabling
the Mydionians to retort upon their enemies the very act
and manner of disgrace which but a little time before had
been decreed against themselves. What happened now to
the Ætolians may serve also to instruct us, never to deli-
berate upon the future as if it were already arrived, nor
build any certain expectations on events which, perhaps,
mày take a very contrary turn from what at first they seem
to promise; but in all human affairs, and especially in
those that relate to war, to leave always some room to for-
tune, and to accidents which cannot be forescen.

When the fleet was returned to lllyria, and bad given
an account to the king of their success, Agron being over-
joyed that his troops had given some check to the insolence
and haughty spirit of the ZEtolians, indulged himself in
feasts and banquets to so great excess, that he was seized
with a pleurisy, of which he died in a few days after. His

106 THE GENERAL HISTORY BOOK 1I.

wife Teuta took possession of the kingdom, and governed
it with the assistance of her friends. This queen, who in
her disposition was a perfect woman, dazzled with the splen-
dour of the late success, and utterly regardless of all the
states around her, at first permitted private men among her
subjects to fit out ships for piracy; and afterwards, having
drawn together a very considerable fleet, with an army not
inferior to that which was employed in the former expe-
dition, she gave commission to her generals, to exercise
hostilities upon every nation without reserve. Their first
descent was made upon the coasts of Elis and Messenia;
which were, indeed, at all times more exposed to insults
from the Illyrians than any other countries. For as their
coast was of great extent, and their principal towns also
situated far within the land, it was easy for the enemy to
over-run and lay waste the country, before any effectual
succours could be sent to their relief. At this time it hap-
pened, that the Illyrians had one day advanced as far as to
Phoenice, a town of Epirus, in search of provisions; and
finding there a body of Gallic troops, in number about
eight hundred, whom the Epirots had retained in their
_ service, they immediately began to concert measures with
them for surprising the town. The Gauls soon consented
to the project; and the Illyrians, having landed their
troops, and being joined by the soldiers of the garrison,
made themselves masters of the place upon.the first assault.

As soon as the Epirots had received the news of what
had happened, they drew together an army with great dili-
gence; and, marching towards Phoenice, they there en-
camped, having in their front the river that runs before the
town; and for their greater safety, thev removed the planks
of the bridge that was uponit. Being afterwards informed
that Scerdilaidas was advancing by land against them, at
the head of five thousand Illyrians, and that he designed
to take his route along the passes of Antigonia, they sent
away one part of their army to secure that city, while thc
rest lay quiet in their post; indulging themselves in full

CHAP, I. i OF POLYBIUS. ` 107

security in the plenty of the country, and neglecting even
to place the necessary guards about the camp. The Illy-
rians, having heard of the division which the enemy had
made of their forces, and of the negligence that now reigned:
among them, began their march by night, and laying planks
across the bridge, passed the river without resistance; and
having possessed themselves of a strong and advantageous
post, they continued there till break of day. In the
morning both armies drew up their forces in order of
battle, in sight of the town. The Epirots were defeated
in the engagement; many of them being killed, and a
greater number taken prisoners. The rest directed their
flight towards Atintania, and escaped.

The Epirots, after this ill success, finding themselves
too weak to repel the enemy, and recover what they had
lost, implored assistance from the Ætolians and Achzeans;
who, in compassion to the desperate state of their affairs,
raised an army for their relief, and marched toward Heli-
eranum. The Illyrians that had seized Phoenice, being
now joined by the troops that were brought by Scerdi-
laidas, came also to the same place, intending to offer battle
to the enemy. But as the ground was not commodious
for their design, and because they had about this time also
received letters from the queen, pressing them to return
with all possible diligence, to reduce some towns that had
revolted to the Dardanians, they wasted all the province,
and afterwards consented to make peace with the Epirots ;
restoring their city to them for a sum of money, and re-
leasing all the inhabitants that were free. And having
sent the slaves on-board their vessels, together with the
rest of their booty, they sailed away to Illyria: while
Scerdilaidas, with the troops that were under his command,
took his route back again through the passes of Antigonia.
The success of this invasion struck no small terror into all
the Greeks that inhabited the coast. For when they saw
that the strongest and most powerful town of all Epirus
had fallen so suddenly into the hands of the enemy, they

108 THE GENERAL HISTORY mooki.

no longer trembled for their lands and country only, as in
former times; but began to fear, that there would now be:
no security either for themselves or any of their cities.

' The Epirots, thus rescued from ‘destruction when they:
had. scarcely any hopes of safety left, were so far from:
shewing any resentment of the injuries which they had:
suffered, and so forgetful likewise of what they owed to
their deliverers, that they sent ambassadors to Teuta, and,’
in conjunction with the Arcanians, entered into an alliance
with her. And from this time they constantly supported:
and assisted the Illyrians, in opposition to all the interests.
of the Achzans and /Mtolians: affording, by this declared
ingratitude towards their friends and benefactors, a:no less.
signal instance of their want of sense and judgment, than
that which had appeared in their former conduct. When-
ever we fall into any of those calamities which are natu-
raly incident to mankind, and from which no care or
foresight could have saved us, the fault is justly charged
on fortune, or an enemy. But when our sufferings are
purely the result of our own indiscreet and foolish conduct,
the blame can be: imputed only to ourselves. And as: the:
strokes of fortune usually excite the pity of mankind, who
seem willing to partake in our distresses, and are ready
to lend us their assistance; so on the other hand, an open
and deliberate folly cannot fail to draw after it the censure
and reproaches of all who view it in its proper light. And
this was. plainly: the treatment, which the Epirots at. this
time merited in the eyes of Greece. For, in the: first
place, the common and well-known character of the Gauls
might have rendered them more cautious of entrusting any
of that nation with the defence of a noble city, whose
wealth and flourishing condition must continually tempt
them by strong incitements to revolt. "But this body of
troops especially were men, whose temper and designs de-
served to have been watched with more than ordinary care.
For they not only had been driven from their country by
the people of their own nation, on account.of some.acts of

CHAP, I. OF ROLYBIUS. 109

treachery and violence which they had committed against
their kindred and common tribes; but when the Carthagi-
‘nians, who were at that time pressed by the war of Sicily,
had received about three thousand of them into their pay,
and stationed them in Agrigentum, they took occasion,
from some dissensions that arose between the soldiers and
their chief commanders on the subject of their pay, to pil-
lage that very city which they had been engaged to protect
and guard from insult. Being afterwards in garrison at
Eryx, while the Romans were besieging it, they formed a
‘project for delivering up the town and inhabitants to the
enemy: and when the treason was discovered, they went
over in a body to the Roman camp. Yet among these
also, they not long afterwards betrayed their trust; and
plundered the temple of Erycinian Venus. As soon there-
fore as the war was ended, the Romans, having seen such
proofs of their abandoned profligacy, stripped them of
their arms, and putting them on board some vessels,
banished them all out of Italy. "These were the troops to
whom the Epirots now committed the defence of their go-
ernment and country; and trusted the most flourishing
of all their cities to their care: so that in justice, them-
selves alone must be considered as the chief and only cause
of the misfortunes that ensued.: A conduct so repugnant
to all sense and reason deserved not to pass without some
reflection: and it may serve hereafter as a caution to all
'states, never to admit too strong a garrison within their
cities, especially if it be composed of strangers and bar-
barians.

The Illyrians had in former times very frequently mo-
lested vessels that were sailing from the ports of Italy.
But while they had possession of Phoenice, they sent out
large detachments from their fleet; and made depredations
every where upon the Roman merchants; killing great
numbers of them, and carrying many into slavery.. The
Romans had: hitherto paid no great regard to the com-
plaints that had been offered on this subject. But at this

110 THE GENERAL HISTORY BOOK TI.

time these complaints were brought in such numbers to the
senate, that they resolved to send Caius and: Lucius Corun-
canius ambassadors to Teuta, to demand some clear ac-
count of these transactions.

The queen, when she saw the beauty and immense quan-
tity of the spoils which her fleet had brought back from
Phoenice, the most opulent town of all Epirus, had been
struck with admiration; and was the more confirmed in
her intentions, of continuing that kind of war against the
states of Greece. But some domestic commotions gave a
stop to the present execution of that design, and forced her
to employ her whole attention to bring back the rebels to
their duty. "The greater part of these being soon reduced,
she was laying siege to Issa; the only town of her do-
minions that still refused to submit to her authority.

To this place came the Roman ambassadors; and having
gained a time of audience, they recounted all the injuries
which their people had received from the Illyrians. The
queen assumed high airs of disdain and fierceness during
the whole time of their discourse. And when it was
ended, she replied, that she would take care that her state
in general should afford. no matter of complaint hereafter
to the Romans; but that it was not the custom in Illyria,
for their kings to restrain their private subjects from en-
deavouring to enrich themselves upon the sea. The
youngest of these ambassadors was unable to bear this
haughtiness: and, with a freedom which could not have
been condemned if it had been more in season, he an-
swered, ** But among the Romans, O queen, it is one of
their best and noblest customs, to exact public reparation
for.private wrongs; and at all times to redress the com-
plaints of their subjects: and we shall endeavour, with the
assistance of the gods, to force you shortly to reform the
kingly customs of Illyria.” The queen received this an-
swer like a true woman; with much absurd passion and
resentment: which carried her to such excess, that she
ordered the ambassadors to be pursued as they were re-

CHAP. I. OF POLYBIUS. 111

turning home, and, in defiance of the law of nations,
killed the person who had spoken those words. The Ro-
mans, being greatly enraged by so daring and flagitious an
affront, ‘immediately jew; troops, get sie a fleet, and
make all the necessary preparations for war.

In the beginning of the spring, the Illyrians, having
drawn together a greater number of vessels than before,
sailed away to invade the coasts of Greece. One part of
the fleet steered their course to Corcyra: while the rest
cast anchor in the port of Epidamnus, on pretence to take
in water and provisions. But their true intention was, to
make themselves masters of the town. The Epidamnians
received them without suspicion, and neglected all pre-
caution. A party entered, dressed in an under garment
only, and carrying pitchers in their hands, as if they came
for water. But they had swords concealed within the
pitchers: with which they attacked and killed the guards
that were posted at the gate, and took possession of it.
And being at the same time joined, as it had been con-
certed, by a larger body of forces from the ships, they
made thernselves masters of a great part of the walls
without much difficulty. But the Epidamnians, though
taken by surprise, when they were in no apprehension of
an enemy, resisted with such bravery and vigour, that,
after a very long and obstinate dispute, they at last forced
the Illyrians to retire from the town. "Thus they recovered
by their valour, what their negligence had almost lost;
and were instructed by this accident to use greater care
and circumspection in all future times.

The Illyrians, being thus repulsed, made haste to get
out to sea; and having overtaken the rest of the fleet, they
sail together to Corcyra, disembark their troops, and lay
siege to the city. The Corcyreans were under no small
consternation; and finding themselves too weak to en-
counter with so great a force, they sent to the ZEtolians
and Achezans imploring their assistance. ‘The inhabitants
of Apollonia and Epidamnus likewise deputed messengers

112 THE GENERAL HISTORY zook it.

to tbe same states; conjuring them to interpose with some
speedy and effectual succours, and not permit the Illyrians
to dispossess them of their towns and natural country.
The Achzans and /Etolians consented readily to this
request. And having, in a few days, equipped at their
joint charge ten ships of war that belonged to the Achzeans,
they steered their course towards Corcyra, hoping to raise
the siege. But the Illyrians having received seven ships
of war from the Acarnanians, in consequence of their
alliance with them, sailed out and engaged the enemy near
the island Paxus. The fight was equal between the Acar-
nanians, and that part of the Achzan fleet that was
engaged against them; nor was any harm sustained,
except that some were wounded on either side. But the
Illyrians, having tied their vessels four and four together,
came on to tlie engagement with much seeming negligence,
and even presented their flank to the enemy, as if to aid
them in their attack, and render it more effectual. But
no sooner were they grappled close, and the beaks of the
Achezan ships had fixed them fast to the sides of the
vessels that were thus bound together, than the Illyrians,
entering along the decks of the enemy, overpowered them
by the number of their soldiers, took four of their qua-
driremes, and sunk one quinquereme to the bottom. In
this latter perished Marcus the Carynian, whose whole
life had been distinguished by a zealous and close attach-
ment to all the interests of the Achzan Commonwealth.
When those that were engaged against the Acarnanians
saw what had happened to the rest, they immediately
prepared to fly, trusting to the celerity of their ships:
and having the advantage of a fresh and favourable wind,
they sailed back again to their own country, and escaped
without any loss. The Illyrians were much elated by this
victory, and received no farther interruption in the siege.
But the Corcyreans, being quite disheartened by the: ill
state of their affairs; and despairing of all means of safety,
sustained the siegé but a short time afterwards; and then

CHAP. I. OF POLYBIUS. 115

submitting to the enemy, received a garrison under the
command of Demetrius of Pharos. The Illyrians then
steered away to sea, and returning again to Epidamnus,
prepared to lay siege to that city.

About this time, one of the Roman consuls, Caius
Fulvius, set out to prosecute the war, with a fleet of two
hundred ships; while his colleague Aulus Postumius began
his: march at the head of the land forces. ‘The former of
these had resolved to sail in all haste to Corcyra; flattering
himself, tliat he might perhaps arrive before the siege was
ended. And though he was disappointed in that hope,
yet he chose still to hold on his course; not only for the
sake of getting more perfect information concerning all
that had happened there, but also that he might make
trial of the reality and importance of some advices, which -
had been sent to Rome by Demetrius; who, finding that
Teuta had conceived some jealousy of his conduct, and
dreading the effects of her resentment, had privately
offered to the Romans, to deliver Corcyra into their hands,
with every thing besides that was within the reach of his
authority. ‘The Corcyreans saw with pleasure the arrival
of the fleet, and with the consent of Demetrius delivered
up the garrison to the Romans, and put themselves under
their protection; as judging this to be the only measure
by which they could hereafter be secure against the
lawless attacks and insults of the Illyrians. The Romans
then sailed away to Apollonia, taking Demetrius with
them, by whose advice they were chiefly guided during the
rest of the war. The other consul, having embarked the
troops at. Brundisium, arrived also about the same time at
Apollonia. His army consisted of twenty thousand foot,
and two thousand horse. The inhabitants received them
without any difficulty, and submitted themselves entirely
to their discretion. But the consuls, on the news that
Epidamnus was invested, immediately hastened their
march that way. The Illyrians, being informed of their
approach, raised the siege in disorder, and fled. ‘The

VOL, I, I

114 THE GENERAL HISTORY BOOK II.

Romans, having received the Epidamnians also into their
protection, DE farther into Illyria, and reduced the
Ardysans. They now were met by deputations from
many different towns and districts. Among these were the
Atintanians, and Parthinians; who offered to receive their
laws. The Romans admitted them all to terms of friend-
ship and alliance; and continued their march to Issa,
which was besieged by the Illyrians. And having raised
the siege, and taken the inhabitants under their protection,.
they then sailed along the coast, and took many towns by
storm. But in the attack of one of these, called Nutria,
they lost not only a great number of their soldiers, but
some tribunes also, and a queestor. They took likewise
twenty boats, that were returning with plunder collected
in the country. A part of the army that was employed in
the siege of Issa, having declared for the interest of Deme-
trius, retired to Pharos, and were permitted to be safe.
The rest fled in disorder, and escaped to Arbon. The
queen herself, with very few attendants, got safe to Rizon;
a little town of considerable strength, which stood at a
distance from the sea, upon a river of the same name.

The Romans after this success, by which they had
greatly enlarged the dominions of Demetrius, having
prevailed on many cities of Illyria to receive him as didi
master, took the route back again to Epidamnus, with the
fleet and army. Fulvius then returned to Rome, and
carried with him the gréater part of all the forces: But
Postumius, having drawn together forty vessels, and raised
some troops among the neighbouring towns, resolved to
pass the winter there, that m might’ be ready,'i in case of
danger, to repress all commotions that might arise among
the Ardyzans, and the rest of the people who had sub-
mitted, and put themselves under the protection of the
Romans.

But in the beginning of the spring, ambassadors arrived
at. Rome from Teuta, and agreed to a peace upon these
conditions: ‘* That the queen should pay a certain tribute,

- CHAP. II. OF POLYBIUS. 115

and abandon all Illyria, a few places only excepted; and,
which was of the greatest importance to all the states of
Greece, that he should never after that time sail beyond
Lissus with more than two frigates, and those unarmed.”

'The treaty being thus concluded, Postumius sent ambas-
'sadors to the Achzans and /Etolians, to acquaint them
with the causes of the war; the progress and circumstances
of it, and the terms of the peace which they had made.
The ambassadors were received with great respect and
favour by the two republics; and from thence they sailed
away to Corcyra. The Greeks were delivered by this
treaty out of no small terror; for the Illyrians were the
common enemies of all. !

Such was the first expedition of.the Romans into Illyria
and the neighbouring parts of Europe; which gave birth
‘also to the first correspondence, in the way of embassy,
between that republic and the states of Greece. From
this beginning, they took occasion to depute, within a
short time afterwards, another embassy to Corinth and to
Athens. And it was on that occasion, that the Corinthians
first admitted the Romans to be present at the Isthmian
'games. |

CHAP. II.

DURING this time Asdrubal, for it was here that we
left the affairs of Spain, conducted all things in his
government with great dexterity and wisdom; enlarging
the power, and advancing the interests of his republic in
that country, both by a whole course of his administra-
tion in it, and more particularly by building that city,
which by some is called Carthage, and by others the New
City; whose situation with respect both to Spain and
Afric rendered it a place of the greatest moment and im-

portance. We shall take a proper occasion to describe
12

116 THE GENERAL HISTORY Book rn.

more fully the advantages of this situation, and the use
that may be made of it, in governing the affairs of those
‘two countries. The Romans could not behold so sudden
an increase of power without the greatest apprehensions.
They saw the necessity of turning their thoughts to Spain;
-and resolved to raise themselves from that state of indolence
and inactivity, which had as it were shut their eyes, and
-prevented them from paying a due attention to.the pro-
gress of their enemies. At this time, however, being
themselves in almost daily expectation of an invasion from
the Gauls, they neither dared to declare war against the.
Carthaginians, nor demand any hard conditions from
them; but chose rather to have recourse to mild and `
gents measures, till their.arms had freed them from the
apprehension of an enemy, whose situation in their very
neighbourhood not only rendered their sovereignty in
Italy precarious, but even threatened to deprive them of
their own natural and proper country. They sent, there-
fore, to Asdrubal, and concluded a treaty with him, by
which, no mention being made of the rest of Spain, it only
was agreed, that the Carthaginians should not pass the
Iberus with: an army. This being settled, the Romans
immediately turned their arms against the Gauls. y.
It will by no means be a useless task, nor foreign to the
design of this introduction, to give here a short account of
this people, from the time of their first settlement in Italy.
For besides that the subject itself is curious, and such as
well deserves the pains of being particularly considered, it
is also a point of the last importance, that we should in
this place previously be acquainted with it, in order to
gain a right conception what the country was into which
Annibal afterwards led his army, and what the forces, by
whose assistance he attempted to subvert the Roman em-
pire. We shall first describe the nature of the country,
and its situation with respect to the other parts of Italy;
that when. we have thus acquired a knowledge ofthe places,

-

CHAP. IL > OF. POLYBIUS. 117

we'may be able more easily to comprehend whatever was
great and worthy of:our notice, in the transactions that
happened in them.

The whole of Italy resembles a triangle in its figure.
The eastern side is bounded by the Ionian sea and Adriatic
Gulf; the south and west by the Sicilian and Tyrrhenian
seas. The third side, towards the north, is terminated by
a chain of mountains called the Alps: which, beginning
near Massilia, and the places above the Sardinian sea, ex-
tend without any interruption to within a very little dis-
tance of the inmost extremity of the Adriatic, and are
considered as the base of the triangle. At the foot of
these mountains, on the southern side, lie those plains, of
which we are now to speak; which, both in their fertility
and wide extent, are far superior to any other part of
Europe that have been yet discovered. These plains
form also the figure of a triangle; the top of which is made
by the junction of the Alps and Apennines, a little above
Massilia. The northern side is bounded by the Alps, to
the length-of two thousand and two hundred stadia; the
southern, by the Apennines, to the extent of, three thou-
sand: and six hundred. The coast of the Adriatic forms
the base of this figure, and contains in length, from Sena
to the inmost part of the Gulf, almost two thousand and
five hundred stadia. So that the whole plains together
include a space of near ten thousand stadia in circum-
ference. — .

The fertility of this country is greater than can be well
expressed. They have grain of all kinds in such abun-
dance, that, even in our times, a Sicilian bushel of wheat is
sold there for four oboli; and of barley, for two. For a
firkin of wine, they exchange an equal measure of barley.
Panick also, and millet, are found among them in so great
plenty, that nothing can exceed it. "Their forests, which,
at certain distances, are spread over all the country, afford
so large a quantity of acorns, that though great numbers
of:swine are constantly consumed by the inhabitants of

13

118 THE GENERAL HISTORY BOOK H.

Italy, as well in the uses of private families, as for the
supply of their armies, yet are they «hiefly furnished with
them from these plains. Such, in a word, is the cheap-
ness and the plenty of all common necessaries, that when
travellers stop to take refreshment in their inns, instead of
settling by agreement the prices of any particular provi-
sions, they only fix a certain rate for every person. This
rarely exceeds the fourth part of an obolus; and for this
small expence, they are supplied in full abundance with all
things that are requisite. The numbers of the people by
whom these plains are filled, the size and comeliness of their
bodies, and their prowess in war, may be fully understood
from those great actions for which they are justly cele-
brated. Both sides of the Alps, as far as the ascent is
easy, are inhabited by different nations. On that side,
which looks towards the north and the river Rhone, dwell
those that are called the Transalpine Gauls. On the other
side, the Taurisci, and Agones, and other various tribes.
The Transalpine Gauls derived their origin from the
same common stock with the rest, and obtained that
appellation from their situation only; because they fixed
themselves beyond the Alps. The tops of these moun-
tains, on account of the steepness of the ascent, and the
perpetual snows with which they are covered, have hitherto
remained without inhabitants. From the place where the
Apennine mountains first begin, a little above Massilia,
and from their junction with the Alps, the country on the
side of the Tyrrhenian sea quite down to Pisa, the first
town of Tyrrhenia to the ‘west, and that also on the side
towards the plains, as far as to the confines of the Arreti-
nians, was all inhabited by the Ligurians. Adjoining to
these were the T'yrrhenians, and next to them the Umbrians,
situated on both sides of the mountains. In this place the
Apennine, at the distance of about five hundred stadia
from the Adriatic, leaves these plains, and turning suddenly
to the right, directs its ‘course towards the Sicilian ‘sea,
dividing the rest'of Italy in the middle; so'that what re-

CHAP. IJ. ~- OF. POLYBIUS. 119

mains to complete the southern side of this triangle is
formed by the plains.themselves: which are num.
from the. point. where the Apennine turns away, quite
down to Sena, a town upon the Adriatic coast.

The river Po, celebrated by the poets under the name
of Eridanus, takes its sotrce among the Alpine mountains,
near the upper point of the triangle which we have now
described, and first bends its stream towards the south, till
it has gained the plains. Afterwards flowing eastward, it
runs to empty itself by two mouths*into the Adriatic Gulf.
It divides these plains into two unequal parts: the largest
of which is that which lies extended between the Adriatic
and the Alps. In the quantity of its waters, it far exceeds
the rest of the rivers of Italy. For all the streams that
descend from the Alps and Apennines, are discharged into
the channel of the Po. About the time, especially, when
the Dog star first appears, and the melted snows flow
down in great abundance from these mountains, the fulness
of its stream is remarkably great and beautiful. 'This river
is navigable from the mouth which is called Olane, to the
distance of.two thousand stadia within the land. From its
first sources it flows in one single channel as far as to the
country of the Trigobali; and there, breaking into a
double stream, runs, as we have said, to discharge itself by
two mouths into the sea. 'The first of these is called
Padoa, the other Olane; the last of which affords a safe
and commodious port for ships, not inferior to any upon the
Adriatic coast. This river is called Bodencus, by the
natives of the country. |

"There is no need to add to our description of this river
the many sad and tragical fables with which the Greeks
have filled their histories, of the fall of Phaéton; the tears
of the poplars; and that race of black men who live upon
the river, and are said still to wear the habit of mourning, in
memory ofPhaéton’s death. A closediscussion of such stories
would very ill suit with the design of this introduction.
But perhaps we shall take some fairer occasion in another

14

120 THE GENERAL: HISTORY BOOK 11.

place, to consider them in as full a manner as the subject
may, require, if it be only for the sake of shewing some
proofs of the inaccuracy of Timeeus, with regard to the
places which we have been describing.

These plains were formerly inhabited by the Tyrrhe-
nians; who gained great fame by their exploits in the
country round Capua and Nola, which, at that time, was
called the Phlegraean Fields. Whatever, therefore, we
read in history concerning the ancient dynasties and for-
tunes of this people, must be all referred, not to the country
which. they possess at present, but to the plains just men-
tioned; whose fertility and wide extent afforded them the
means of becoming great and powerful. But the Gauls,
who often visited this country for the sake of commerce,
and had seen its beauty with a jealous eye, found occasion,
from some slight pretence, to fall ‘suddenly upon the Tyr-
rhenians with a powerful army, when they were in no ex-
pectation of an enemy; and having driven them from their
native seats, they took possession of all the country that
was round the Po. The first part of it, which lay nearest
to the sources of the river, was seized on by the-Laians and
Lebecians. Next to these were the Insubrians, a great and
powerful . nation; and after them, the Cenomans. Below
all these, and nearest to the Adriatic, were the Venetians :
a very ancient people, whose dress and manners greatly re-
sembled those of the Gauls, though they used a different
language. This is that nation of whom the tragic poets
have recorded so many monstrous fables. On the other
side of the Po, the first in order, and the nearest to the
Apennines, were the Ananes; and next to these, the Boii.
Between the Boii and the Adriatic were the Lingonian
Gauls; and lower down, upon the coast, the Senones.

These were the principal nations that were seated in that
tract of country which we have now described. Their
manner oflife was extremely plain and simple. They had
no walled towns, nor any kind of furniture in their hamlets.
The ground was their constant bed, and flesh their chief

CHAP, 1I. OF POLYBIUS. 1*1

food. Their sole employment was agriculture and. war.
All other sciences and arts were utterly unknown among
them. Their wealth consisted in gold and cattle; because
these alone were at all times most easily removed from
place to place, as occasion might require. But that which
engaged their greatest care, was to procure a numerous
train of followers, all ready to support their interests, and
execute their commands. For every one among them was
strong and formidable, in proportion only to the number
of these dependants.

From the time of their first settlement in these plains,
the Gauls not only maintained themselves in safe possession
of the country, from whence they had driven the Tyrrhe-
nians, but by the terror of their arms forced many of the
neighbouring nations also to receive their yoke. Some
time afterwards, having defeated the Romans and their
allies in a set engagement, and pursued them, during a
flight of three days’ continuance, to the very gates of
Rome, they made themselves masters of all the city, the
capitol alone excepted. But when they heard that the
Venetians, taking occasion from their absence, had entered
their territories with an army, they consented to a treaty
with the Romans, restored their city to them, and returned
back again to their own country. "They were afterwards
for some time engaged in domestic wars. Some of the
people also that lived among the Alps, envying them the
possession of a country that was so much better than their
own, turned their arms against them, and made frequent
incursions upon their territory. During this time the
Romans had full leisure to recover by degrees their wasted
strength; and to reduce the Latins, who had a second
time dcoleed.

Thirty years after the time when Rome was taken, the
Gauls advanced with a powerful army as far as Alba.
'The Romans, being thus attacked when they had no appre-
hension of a war, and not having time to draw together
the troops of their allies, were afraid to take the field.

122 THE GENERAL HISTORY © sook u.

But twelve years afterwards, when they were again invaded
by as great a force, having received timely notice of the
design, and being joined by their confederates, they
marched out against the enemy with great alacrity and
confidence, designing to engage in a decisive battle. But
the Gauls were struck with terror at their approach; and
as their army was distracted: also by dissensions, they re-
treated, or rather fled, with great precipitation back again
to their own country, and remained quiet during the course
of thirteen years. And having then remarked the great
increase aud progress of the Roman power, they consented
to a league of peace. ' y

During thirty years they firmly adhered to the con-
ditions of this treaty; but being then threatened with a
war from the Transalpine Gauls, and apprehending that
the consequences of it might prove fatal to them, they pre-
vailed upon those nations, partly by large presents, and
partly also by pleading their descent from one common
stock, to desist from their design, and to join their forces
with them against the Romans. They march together
through Tyrrhenia; and being assisted also by a people of
that country, ravage the Roman borders, and return safely
back again with the spoil. But no sooner were they ar-
rived in their own country, than some disputes arose
among them concerning the division of the plunder; which
were carried to so great excess, that they lost the most
considerable part, not only of the booty, but of their army
likewise. Such disorders are, upon these occasions, very
frequent among the Gauls; especially when they are filled
with feasting, and their senses lost in wine.

Four years afterwards, the Gauls, in conjunction with
the Samnites, engaged the Romans in battle, in the country
of the Camertines, and killed great numbers of them. ‘The
Romans, incensed by this defeat, drew together all their
forces; and having met the enemy, within a few days after
the former action, in the district of the Sentinates, they
destroyed the greatest part of their army, and forced -the

CHAP. II. OF POLYBIUS. 123

rest to fly homewards in disorder. About ten years after-
wards, they returned again with a very great force, and
laid siege to Arretium. The Romans attempted to raise
the siege; but were defeated in an engagement before the
city, and the consul Lucius killed. M: Curius, who suc-
- ceeded him in office, sent to treat with the enemy concern-
ing the redemption of the prisoners. But the Gauls, in
defiance of the laws of nations, killed the messengers.
The Romans, being greatly enraged by an action so per-
fidious, raise a numerous army, and march immediately
. into Gaul. The Senones advance against them, but are
defeated in a set engagement. The greater part of them
were destroyed in the action; and the Romans, having
forced the rest to leave their habitations, seized the country
into their hands. This was the part of Gaul to which
they, for the first time, sent a colony; and built a city
which was called Sena, from the name of the former inha-
bitants. We have already spoken of the situation of this
place; which stands upon the Adriatic coast, in the extre-
mity of those plains that are watered by the Po.
The. extirpation of the Senones alarmed the Boian Gauls
with apprehensions of being next involved in the same
destruction. They, therefore, drew together all their forces ;
and having prevailed on the '"Tyrrhenians also to assist
them, they marched out and engaged the Romans, near
the lake called Vadimon; but the greater part of the
Tyrrhenians were killed in the action, and a small number
only of the Boians saved themselves by flight. Notwith-
standing this ill success, they joined their forces again to-
-gether in the following year; armed all the youth that
were of sufficient age; and ventured on a second battle.
But their defeat was so entire, that, in spite of all their ob-
stinacy and reluctance, they were forced to sue for peace,
and accept conditions from the Romans. ‘These trans-
actions happened three years before Pyrrhus invaded Italy,
and five years before the memorable overthrow of the Gauls
at Delphi. For Fortune, about this time, seemed to have

124 THE GENERAL HISTORY "BOOK 1I.

infected all the Gallic nations with a spirit of v which ,
proved every where fatal to them. a ,

< ‘The Romans: derived two advantages of very great im-
portance from these wars. For first, as-they had so often
been defeated by the Gauls, they had nothing left, either to
apprehend or suffer, more dreadful than that which they
had before experienced; so that in all their contests against
Pyrrhus they performed the part of skilful and well-prac-
tised combatants. The other advantage was, that having
given a timely check to the ambition and the restless spirit
of the Gauls, they had afterwards full leisure to join all
their forces, and employ the whole strength of the republic,
first against Pyrrhus, when he invaded their dominions,
and afterwards against the Carthaginians in the war of
Sicily.

During forty-five years after their. TUN defeat, the Gauls
punctually observed the conditions of the peace, and gave
no disturbance to the Romans. But when those who:had
beheld the past calamities had, in the course ‘of time, left
the world, the race of young men that succeeded in their
place, being hot and violent in their disposition, unused to
hardships, and unpractised in misfortunes, began, as it na-
turally happens in such circumstances, to sow the. seeds of
fresh commotions. They took up matter of offence against
the Romans upon.: the slightest pretexts; and engaged -the
Gauls that lived beyond the Alps .to.assist them with their
forces. But as this design had been concerted privately
between: the chiefs alone, without the approbation or- the
knowledge of the multitude, the Transalpine Gauls:.no
, sooner were advanced as far as Ariminum with their army, .
than the people among the Boians, ‚having conceived a
jealousy of their intentions, rose tumultuously against-their
chiefs, killed their two kings, Galatus and Ates, and op-
posed the march of the strangers, engaging. them in a set
battle, in which great slaughter ensued on both sides. The
Romans, alarmed by.the first account of this invasion, had
ordered the legions to take the field; but when they heard .

CHAP. II. OF POLYBIUS. 125

that the.Gauls had thus defeated and destroyed each other,
they returned back again with their forces.

Five years after this event, in the consulship of M. Le-
pidus, the lands of Picenum, from whence the Senones had
been often driven out, were divided among the Romans by
lot, in consequence of a law proposed for that purpose by
-Flaminius, in favour of the people. But this measure, as
it proved afterwards one of the chief causes of the corrup-
‘tion of the Roman manners, was also the occasion of the
wars that now followed with the Gauls. For all that people
in general, and especially the Boians, who lay nearest to
the Roman borders, conceived great jealousy from this
proceeding; which seemed plainly to declare, that the de-
sign of the Romans was not so much to extend their con-
quests, and reduce them to pay obedience to their laws, as
utterly to exterminate and destroy them. The Boians,
therefore, and the Insubrians, the most numerous and
powerful of all these nations, agreed to unite their forces;
and sent ambassadors also to the Gauls who lived upon the
Alps, and along the Rhone. These were called Gesate,
because their custom was, to serve in armies for a certain
hire; for this is what the name imports. The ambassadors
gave large sums of gold to the two kings, Concolitanus and
Aneroestus, in order to gain them to their party, and ex-
cite them to a war against the Romans. ‘They set before
their eyes the wealth and flourishing condition of that em-
pire, and the immense treasures which must accrue from
the conquest of so great and powerful a people. They
promised, that themselves would bear an equal part in all
the dangers of the war. They reminded them of those
great exploits which their ancestors had performed against
the same people. That they not only had defeated them
in battle, but had taken Rome itself upon the first assault,
and obtained all the riches of the place. And that when
they had kept possession of the city during seven whole
months, in mere grace and favour they restored it to the
Romans, and returned back again to their country safe and

126 THE GENERAL HISTORY X .sook ir.

unhurt, and loaded with spoil of every kind. This@dis-
course excited in the minds of all the chiefs so great an ea-
gerness and impatience for the war, that they soon drew
together an army, which, in the number of the troops, as
well as from tlie bravery and distinguished characters of
the men who served among them, far exceeded any that
ever had been known in former times to march from this
part of Gaul.

The Romans, having been informed in part of these
preparations, and partly conjecturing what would happen,
were seized with no small consternation. They used all
diligence in raising troops; filled their magazines with pro-
visions, and other necessary stores, and often led their
forces to the frontiers of their country, as if the Gauls
already were arrived, when they had not even yet begun
their march. j

In the mean while, these commotions afforded full time
and leisure to the Carthaginians to extend their conquests,
and to secure the acquisitions which they had gained in
Spain. For the Romans were forced, as we have said,
to neglect that country till they had first reduced an enemy,
who alarmed them with the apprehensions of a nearer
danger, and hung close upon their very borders. They,
therefore, were content with having set some bounds to the
progress of the Carthaginians, by the treaty that was made
with Asdrubal; and, as the circumstances of the times re-
quired, turned their whole thoughts and care upon the
present war.

It was now eight years after the division of the Picenian
lands, when the Geesatee passed the Alps with a numerous
army, completely furnished and equipped, and advanced
along the Po. ‘They were joined by the Boians and Insu-
brians, who persisted firmly in their first design. But the
Venetians and the Cenomans, having been gained by some
ambassadors that were deputed to them, had made an alli-
ance with the Romans. The Gauls, therefore, were
‘obliged to leave a part of their forces behind them in the

CHAP. II. OF POLYBIUS. 127

`

commtry, to keep those. nations under due restraint; while-
the-rest continued their route towards Tyrrhenia. Their
numbers were, fifty thousand foot, and twenty thousand
horse and chariots.

As soon as the Romans were informed that the Gauls
had passed the Alps, they sent away the consul L. Æmilius
with an army to Ariminum, to oppose the entrance of the
enemy on that side. One of the prztors was sent to
command in Tyrrhenia: for C. Atilius, the other consul,
had sailed with some forces to Sardinia some time before.
The people all were under the greatest consternation, and
dreaded every thing that was terrible and fatal. Nor were
these fears unreasonable. What they had formerly suf-
fered from the Gauls were always present to their minds.
In apprehension of the same misfortune, they make haste
to draw together their troops, and raise new levies: serid
notice to their allies, to be in readiness to join them; and
order public enrolments to be made of all the men in their
dominions that were of age to bear arms. "They resolved
that the armies of the consuls should be composed ‘of the
choicest and the most considerable part of all their forces.
Their magazines were filled with corn, and furnished with
all kinds of military stores, in much greater abundance
than had been ever known before. All manner of sup-
plies were readily sent in from every quarter. For the
alarm had spread through all the states of Italy, and filled
all the inhabitants with terror. They no longer considered
themselves as allies, that were invited to sustain the Roman
cause; or thought that this invasion was designed against
the power of that republic only: but rather regarded the
Gauls as their common enemies; ~whoseé ‘approach por-
teiided the last destruction to themselves, their towns, and
all their territories. ‘They complied, therefore, with the
greatest cheerfulness with every thing that was desired or
éxacted from them.

"But we shall here pause awhile, to give a more minute
detail of the strength and preparations of the Romans,

128 THE GENERAL HISTORY BOOK 11,

and ofthe numbers of their troops. For from hencetwe
shall be able to discern with truth, what was the condition
of this republic, when Annibal had the boldness to invade
it: and what the forces, which that general not only dared
to encounter in the field, but also gained such eminent
advantages against them, as threw the Romans into very
Disperare circumstances.

The armies that were under the command of the con-
suls, consisted of four Roman legions, each of which
contained five thousand and two hundred foot, and three
hundred horse; besides the troops: of the allies, which
amounted to thirty thousand foot, and two thousand horse.
The Sabines and Tyrrhenians had raised for the present
exigency above fifty thousand foot, and four thousand
horse, which were stationed upon the frontiers of ‘Tyrrhe-
nia, under the conduct of a prætor. Twenty thousand
Umbrians and Sarsinates came also from the Apennines;
together with an equal number of Cenomans and Vene-
tians. ‘These were posted upon the Gallic borders, with
design to make incursions into the territory of the Boians,
and constrain that people to return again, and defend their
own country. Such were the forces that were disposed
upon the frontiers. They had also drawn together an
army in the neighbourhood of Rome, to cover the city
from surprise and to be held in readiness against all
accidents. It consisted of twenty thousand Roman foot,
and fifteen hundred horse; besides thirty thousand foot,
and two thousand horse, from the allies. ‘The numbers
that were severally enrolled in the public registers were
as follows. Among the Latins, eighty thousand foot, and
five.thousand horse. Among the Samnites, seventy thou-
sand foot, and seven thousand horse. ‘The lapygians and
Mesapygians sent the names of fifty thousand foot, and
sixteen thousand horse: the Lucanians, thirty thousand
foot, and three thousand horse. The Marsians, -Maru-
cinians, Ferentinians, and Vestinians,. brought twenty
thousand foot, and four thousand horse. In Sicily, and

CHAP. II. OF POLYBIUS. 129

at Tarentum, there were also two legions; each of which
consisted of four thousand and two hundred foot, with two
hundred horse. ‘The numbers of the Romans and Cam-
panians, enrolled together, were. two hundred and fifty
thousand foot, and twenty-three thousand horse. Thus
the armies that were disposed abroad upon the frontiers
consisted of near a hundred and fifty thousand foot, with
about seven thousand horse. And the entire numbers of
those that were capable of bearing arms, both among the
Romans and their allies, were seven hundred thousand
foot, and seventy thousand horse. Such were the forces of
this republic, when Annibal had the boldness to penetrate
into the very heart of Italy, with an army which scarcely
equalled twenty thousand men. But this is a point, which
we shall be able to shew in a clearer light, in the sub-
sequent parts of this history.

The Gauls, having entered Tyrrhenia, wasted all the
country without resistance; and at last directed their
march towards Rome. But when they had advanced as
far as Clusium, which is about three days' journey distant
from the city, they were informed, that the army, which
had at first been posted upon the frontiers of Tyrrhenia,
was following close behind, and ready to overtake them.
They therefore directed their route back again in haste,
with a design to meet and engage them. ‘The two armies
arrived in sight about the time of sunset, and encamped
at a moderate distance from each other. But when night
came on, the Gauls, having lighted all their fires, and left
the cavalry behind them in the camp, with orders, that
when they had just shewn themselves to the enemy in the
morning, they should immediately pursue the route which
they were going to take, retreated unperceived to Feesula, .
and there encamped; designing to receive their horse as
they came up, and to fall suddenly from thence upon the
Romans. As soon as it was day, the Romans, perceiving
that the cavalry alone was left in sight, persuaded them-
selves that the Gauls had already fled; and began to follow

^

^ A YOL. I. K

130 THE GENERAL. HISTORY Book ir.

in all haste along the road by which the horse now
retreated. But as soon as they approached the main body
of the enemy, the Gauls suddenly appeared, and fell upon
them. ‘The action was for some time warm and obstinate.
But:the Gauls, superior both in bravery and numbers, at
last obtained the victory. Six thousand Romans were
destroyed in the place: the rest escaped by flight. The
greater part of these, having gained a neighbouring
eminence, seated themselves upon it. The Gauls at first
designed to attack them immediately in this post. . But as
they had been much exhausted and fatigued by the march
which they had made the night before, and were impatient
to take’ some refreshment and repose, they placed a part
of their cavalry only round the hill, and resolved to force it
in the morning, in case that the Romans should then
refuse to surrender at discretion.

It happened, that Lucius: JEmilius, - who was at fives
encamped on the side of the Adriatic sea, but had hastened
his march from thence, upon the news that the Gauls had
taken their route through Tyrrhenia, and were advanced
almost to Rome; arrived now most fortunately in the very
moment when his assistance was chiefly wanted, and fixed
his ‘camp at a small -distance only from the enemy. : The
Romans that had saved themselves upon the hill, having
perceived‘ his fires, and guessing the occasion of them,
resumed their courage, and sent some men unarmed, in
the night,: through the: forest, to acquaint the consul with
what had happened to them. — /Emilius, finding that there
was no time left to deliberate, immediately began his march
towards the hill, at the head of all.the cavalry;. having
commanded the tribunes to follow with the infantry at
break of day. The Gauls, on their part, also perceived
the fires, and conjecturing that the enemy was near, called
together a council of their chiefs. In this assembly Ane-
róestus, one of the kings, observed to them, .“ that as they
had gained.so immense a booty, both in slaves, and cattle,
and spoil of every kind, it seemed to be by no means

CHAP. 1I. OF POLYBIUS. 18k

prudent- to venture on a battle, which must expose them,
to the danger of being stripped of all; that they rather
should resolve to return. again directly to their country,
while there was yet time to retreat with safety: and that,
when they had lightened the army. of its treasure, they,
might again take the field, if it should then be thought
expedient, and renew the war against the Romans."
These sentiments were readily embraced by all.. They
decamped therefore before break of day, and took their
route back again through Tyrrhenia, marching along the
coast. The consul Lucius, though he had increased his.
army with the troops that were saved upon the hill, was.
unwilling to venture on a set engagement; and rather
chose to follow close upon the enemy; with design to seize
such opportunities. as chance should offer for attacking
thém with some advantage, and recovering part of the,
booty.

At this very time, Atilius, the other consul, returning
from Sardinia, had.disembarked his troops at Pisee, nnd,
was marching towards Rome, by a route directly opposite,
to that which the Gauls had taken. The. latter had now.
almost reached the town. of Telamon, upon the coast of
Tyrrhenia, when some of their foragers were met by the
foremost of the Roman troops: and being carried pri-
soners to the consul, and examined by him, they informed
him of all that had been transacted, and of the approach
of both the armies: that the Gauls were extremely near;
and /Emilius following close behind them.’ The consul
was surprised at an event so strange, and greatly overjoyed
to find, that he had fallen thus happily upon the enemy,
and inclosed them between two armies. He commanded
the tribunes to draw up the troops in battle; to extend
their front as much as the nature of the ground would
suffer, without disturbing the order of their march: and.
to move slowly towards the enemy. And having observed
an eminence that overlooked the road along .which the
Gauls must necessarily pass, he made haste, at the head of

K 2

132 THE GENERAL HISTORY BOOK II.

all the cavalry, to seize that post; in the hope, that by;
being the first to begin the action, he should secure to
himself the chief honour of the victory. The Gauls, who
as yet were ignorant of the arrival of Atilius, and imagined
only that the other consul had stretched his march before
them in the night, in order to possess himself of all the
advantageous posts, detached their cavalry, together with
a part of their light-armed troops, to force the Romans
from the hill. But being soon acquainted with the truth,
by one of the prisoners that were taken, they immediately
ranged their infantry in order of battle: and that their
disposition might be suited to the present exigency, they
gave to their whole army a double front; that thus they. :
might be able to sustain at once the attack of those that
were coming upon them from behind, and of those whom
they now likewise knew to be advancing in front anm
them.

Though Æmilius had been before informed, that these
legions had arrived at Pise, he had conceived no kind of
expectation that they were yet so near. But being now
assured of their approach by what passed upon the hill, he
presently sent away his cavalry to the place, to assist the
combatants: and having also ranged his infantry in order
of battle after the usual manner, he advanced against the
enemy.

Among. the Gauls, the Gæsatæ, and after them the
Insubrians, composed the front behind, that was turned
towards JEmilius. The Taurisci and the Boians formed
the opposite front, and stood ready to receive the attack of
Atilius and his legions. The chariots were placed in the
extremity of either wing. The plunder had been all
removed to a neighbouring hill, and. a detachment was
left to guard it. The army, being thus formed in double
front, was not only terrible to behold, but very proper also
for action. The Boians and Insubrians wore the breeches
of their country, and were covered with light military
vests. But the Gesata, who were both vain and fearless,

.

. CHAP. Il. OF .POLY BIUS. 183

being apprehensive that the bushes which grew upon the
aa might be- entangled in their habits, and obstruct
their motions, threw away all covering, and keeping their
arms only, presented themselves naked to the enemy.
The fight was begun by the horse upon the hill, in the
clear view of all the armies. For the numbers that were
engaged were very great; the whole cavalry having run
together in promiscuous crowds from all sides to the
combat. In this action, the consul Caius, while he ad-
vanced without sufficient caution too far among the enemy,
lost his life; and his head was carried to the Gallic kings.
The Romans, however, maintained the fight with so much
firmness, that they gained at last a perfect victory, and
kept entire possession of their post.

_ The infantry now approached each other: offering to.
view a spectacle, which must needs appear most strange
and singular, I do not say to those alone that were present
at it, but to all who can at this time form in their minds a
distinct conception of the scene. For certainly an engage-
ment between three different armies at once must strike
with many circumstances, which are wholly different from
those of other combats, both in the appearance, and in the
course of action. Nor is it easy even now to determine,
whether the advantages, which the Gauls derived from
this disposition of their forces, were not greater than the
danger to.which they were exposed. For though they
were attacked on both sides, yet as their army was formed
with a double front, they were not only able to oppose
both enemies at once, but also mutually to protect and
cover each other from any attack behind. But the chief
advantage was, and which is indeed peculiar to this kind
of disposition, that there was no place or room for flight,
nor any hopes of safety but in victory.

The Romans were elated with no small joy, when they
saw that they had thus inclosed the enemy as in a snare.
But on the other hand, the appearance of the Gallic
forces, and the unusual noise with which they advanced to.

K 3

>»

134 THE GENERAL HISTORY Jnoox ii.

action, struck them with great amazement. For, besides
their horns and trumpets, the number of which was almost
infinite, the whole army broke together into such loud and
continued cries, that the neighbouring places every where
resounded, and seemed to join their voices with the shouts
and clamour of the instruments and: soldiers. "The very
looks and motions also of the Gauls, that stood naked in
the front, and were distinguished by their comeliness and
strength, greatly increased the terror. In the foremost
ranks, the combatants were all adorned with chains of
gold about their necks and hands. The Romans fixed
their eyes with eagerness upon these; and if the appearance
ofthe enemy disheartened them with fear, the prospect of
so rich a spoil served only to inflame their courage.

The light-armed forces of the Romans, advancing first,
as their custom is, to the front of all the army, began the
fight: by discharging a close and formidable shower of
darts and javelins. 'The Gauls that were in the. ranks
behind were in part secured against thése weapons by
their breeches, and their military vests. But those that
stood naked in the front were thrown into great disorder
and confusion, by an attack which they had not at all
expected, and which they knéw not how to obviate or
resist. For the Gallic buckler was too small to cover
them: and as their bodies were also naked, and of the
largest size, the javelins that were thrown made their
entrance more effectually, and in greater numbers. To
turn the attack against these men was a thing impossible,
` by reason of the distance from whence they fought. Nor
was it easy to force their way through so thick a storm of
darts: In this perplexed and wretchéd situation, some of
them, being reduced at last to a state of senseless rage and
madness, threw themselves among thé enemy, and rushed
voluntarily upon death: while the rest fell -back upon
their friends; treading down the ranks behind them, and
_ exhibiting in their faces all the marks of consternation and
“extreme dismay.. Thus the fierce and daring spirit of the

CHAP. II. OF POLYBIUS. ^ 185

Geesatee was effectually checked and rendered useless, even
in the first onset by the Roman javelins.

«+ The Romans, having made the signal for their light-
med forces to. retire; moved forwards with the. legions.
Against these, the Insubrians, Boians, and Taurisci, suc-
ceeded to the fight; and sustained it with.the greatest ob-
stinacy. Though closely pressed, and most dreadfully
wounded, yet still they maintained their ground, and re-
sisted with. amazing force. Nor were they.in any point
inferior .to the Romans, except in the advantage of their
weapons. For as the Gallic buckler-was of a smaller size,
so’ their swords likewise were formed to strike only. with
the edge; whereas the Roman swords were made both to
push, and strike. But when the horse came pouring down
upon them from the hill, and attacked their flank, the
victory was soon determined. ‘The infantry were slaugh-
tered in their ranks, while the cavalry precipitately fled.
Forty thousand Gauls were slain; and ten thousand taken
prisoners. Among the last was Concolitanus, one of their
kings. The other king, Aneroestus, escaped with a few
attendants to a neighbouring place;.and there killed him-
self, with his companions. The consul, having collected
together all the spoil, sent it away to Rome, and restored
the plunder to the people from whom it had been taken.
He then led his army through Liguria into the Boian ter-
ritory: and having satiated his soldiers with the plunder
of the country, he returned to Rome within a few days
afterwards, and hung up in the capitol the standards, brace-
lets, and golden collars, The rest of the spoil, together
with the prisoners, was reserved to adorn his triumph.
Such was the fatal end of this invasion; which had
threatened ruin and extreme destruction to all the states of
inl and especially to the Romans.

- The Romans, elated by a victory so signal and complete,
were persuaded, that they should now be able to drive. the
Gauls entirely out of all the country round the Po. They
make great preparations, and having raised a numerous

K 4

`~

*

136 THE GENERAL HISTORY BOOK II.

army, send it away under the command of the new consuls,
Quintus Fulvius and Titus Manlius. The Boians were
terrified by.their approach, and surrendered at discretion.
But by reason of the rains that fell afterwards in great
abundance, and because a dreadful pestilence raged also in
the Roman camp, the rest of the season passed over with-
out any action.

The consuls of the following year, P. Furius and C.
Flaminius, led the army a second time: into Gaul, through
the country of the Anamares, who were situated at no
great distance from Massilia: and having first gained that
people to their alliance, they advanced into the territory
of the Insubrians, near the place where the Addua falls
into the Po. But because they had suffered greatly from
the enemy, both as they passed the river, and while they
were employed in their encampment, they were forced to
remain for some time quict without attempting any thing;
and afterwards made a treaty with the Insubrians, by which
they consented to leave the country. But when they had
marched for some days round the borders of the province,
they passed the river Clusius, and came into the district of
the Ananes their allies: and having increased.their army
with the forces of the country, they again invaded the In-
subrians, on the other side towards the Alps, and spread
fire and devastation over all their lands and villages.
When the Insubrians saw, that the Romans were thus de-
termined in their hatred, and not likely to be moved from
their designs against them, they resolved to try the fortune
of a general engagement. Having therefore brought to-
gether all their military ensigns, and among the rest, the
golden standards from the temple of Minerva, which were
called the Immoveable, and having raised an army of full
fifty thousand men, and furnished it with every kind of
necessary stores, they marched in terrible array, as if as-
sured of victory, and encamped before,the enemy.

As the Romans were much inferior in their numbers,
they at first designed to take the assistance of the Gallic

CHAP. It. OF POLYBIUS. 137

troops, that were with them in the camp. But when they
had considered on the other hand, that this people all were
noted for their fraud and perfidy, and that the present con-
test was against an enemy of the same race and nation, it
seemed most prudent not to trust them in so critical and
dangerous a conjuncture. ‘They forced them therefore to
pass the river, and broke all the bridges, keeping their
own army still on this side. By this precaution, they not
only were secure against all treason from the Gauls, but
laid their own troops also under the necessity of sustaining
the battle bravely, to the last. For as they had now a
river in the rear that was not fordable, there were no hopes
of safety for them but in victory. When this was done,
they made the necessary dispositions for the engagement.
Upon this occasion, the Romans used a very wise and
sensible expedient, which was first suggested by the tri-
bunes, who also instructed all the army, and every soldier
in particular, in the manuer in which it should be prac-
tised. They had remarked in all: their former combats,
that the Gauls were always fierce, impetuous, and very
formidable, in their first attack: but that their swords were
such as could make but one single stroke; by the force of
which they were so bent and twisted, that unless the soldiers
could have leisure to rest them upon the ground, and with
the assistance of their feet recover them to their former
shape, the second stroke was wholly without effect. They
took, therefore, the pikes from the triarii, that were in the
last line of the army, and distributed them among the co-
horts of the first: with orders, that they should begin the
attack with these, and afterwards use their swords. They
then advanced in order of battle against the front of the
enemy. The Gauls, by making their first stroke upon the
pikes, rendered their swords unfit for any farther use.
The Romans then ran forwards with their swords, and
pressing close upon them, deprived them even of the power
of attempting any second stroke. For as the Gallic swords
were only formed to give a falling blow, a certain distance

—

138 THE GENERAL HISTORY nook nx.

_- was always necessary for that purpose. -But the Romans,
who were armed with swords that were sharpened at the
point, were able to direct their thrusts against the breasts
and faces of the enemy, and gave wound after wound. with-
out remission, so that the greater part of all this numerous

army: was at last destroyed upon the place. .

;. As the success in this engagement was chiefly to be
Birdies to the prudent foresight of the tribunes, so, on the
other hand, the conduct of the consul Flaminius seems to
deserve some censure. For, by having ranged his troops
in battle upon the very banks of the river, so that there
was no space left sufficient for the cohorts to retreat, he
deprived the Romans of one advantage, of‘ which they
make great use in:all their combats. If the enemy had
gained but the least, ground upon them in the action, the
whole army must have been pushed into the river. But
the courage and dexterity of the Romans saved thein from
this: disgrace, and carried the victory to their side, in: the
manner which we have now described. They then returned
back to Rome, loaded with various spoils, and. with tich
booty of every kind in great abundance.

After this defeat, the Gauls sued for peace, and offered
to submit to any conditions. But the consuls of the fol-
lowing year, M. Claudius and Cn. Cornelius, prevailed: to
have all thoughts of peace rejected. The Gauls, being
thus disappointed in their hopes, resolved to make a last
and desperate effort. They sent a second time to the
Geesatee; and having hired a body of their troops, to the
amount of thirty thousand men, they kept themselves in
readiness, and waited for the arrival of the Romans. In
the beginning of the spring, the consuls led the army into
the Insubrian territory, and encamped before Acerree,
which stood between the Alps and the river Po. As tliey
had secured, upon their first arrival, all the advantageous
posts, the Gauls were unable to throw any relief into the
place. But, in order to force the Romans to raise the
siege, they sent a part of their army into the country of

CHAP. II. OF POLYBIUS. 139

the.Ananes, beyond the Po, and laid siege to a town that
was called Clastidium. As soon as the Romaus heard of
this attempt, the consul .Claudius, taking with him the
cavalry, together with a part also of the legions, marched
in all haste to succour the besieged. The Gauls, being
informed of their approach, raise the siege, and advance
in order of battle against the enemy. ` W hen -they came
‘in’ sight, the Roman horse flew briskly to the charge.
The Gauls for some time sustained their fury; but being
afterwards surrounded by them, and attacked at once both
in flank and rear, they were at last completely routed by
the cavalry alone,. and forced to fly in great disorder.
Many of them were pushed into the river, and perished in
the stream: but the greater part were gm by the
enemy in the place.

After this action, the Romans became masters of pare
and of all the stores that were laid up in it in very. great
‘quantity. For the Gauls had fled in haste to Mediolanum,
the chief city of the Insubrians. Cornelius followed after
them without delay, and presented himself before the town.
The Gauls lay-quiet and attempted nothing. But when
the Romans had begun their march back again towards
Acerræ they then sallied out, and falling suddenly upon
their rear, killed a great number of them, and forced some
to fly. But the consul, having ordered the advanced
bodies of the army to return, encouraged them to stand,
and repel the efforts of the enemy. ‘The fight now grew
warm and obstinate. For the Gauls, emboldened by their
first success, for some time maintained their ground with
firmness. At last, however, they were entirely broken and
‘defeated, and obliged to fly towards.the mountains. Cor-
nelius pursued closely after them; plundered all the
country; and took Mediolanum by storm. After these
great losses, the chiefs of the Insubrians, despairing of any
further means of safety, submitted their country and them-
selves to the Romans at discretion.

Such was the end of the Gallic wars: which, if we

140 THE GENERAL HISTORY spoox 11.

regard only the daring spirit and undaunted bravery- of
the combatants, the forces that were brought into the
field, the battles that were fought, and the numbers that
fell in those engagements, must certainly appear as great
and formidable as any that are known in history. But,
on the other hand, if we’ reflect upon the rashness, with
which these expeditions were projected, or the absurd and
senseless conduct, by which they severally were carried
into execution, nothing will be found more trifling or
contemptible. For the Gauls, I do not say most fre-
quently, but even in every thing that they attempt, are
hurried headlong by their passions, and never submit to the
rule ofreason. From hence it happened, that ina short time
they, were, dispossessed of all the plains that are watered
by the Po; some few places only, at the foot of the Alps;
excepted. I thought it necessary, therefore, to give some
account of the conduct and the fortunes of this people,
from. their first settlement in the country, to the time of
their final exclusion from it. Such incidents very properly
belong to history; and well deserve to be transmitted to
all future times. For from these, posterity may learn,
what little cause there is to dread the rash and sudden
expeditions of any of these barbarous tribes: and in how |
short a time their strongest forces may be dissipated, by
those who are determined bravely to resist, and to struggle
even to the latest hope, rather than be deprived of their
just and natural rights. I am persuaded, that what histo-
rians have recorded of the expedition of the Persians into
Greece, and of the defeat of the Gauls at Delphi, has
served greatly to confirm and animate the Greeks, in the —
contests which they so often have sustained in defence of
their common liberty. For whoever revolves in his mind
the wonderful transactions of those times, and considers
the vastness of the preparations, the bravery of the armies,
and the almost infinite number of the forces, which were
all vanquished and dispersed by the superior conduct of
those troops, who were able to oppose sense to violence,

CHAP. III. OF POLYBIUS. 141

and skill to rashness, will easily be assured, that no provi-
sion of arms or stores, no forces however numerous, can
strike so great a terror into men that are brave and reso-
lute, as to force them to abandon all thoughts of safety, or
ever part with the hope of being able to defend their
country. ' With regard to the Gauls especially, their
armies, even within these later times, have often spread
the alarm among the states of Greece. And this was still
a farther motive, by which I was inclined to give a short
. account of the events that happened among this people,
even from the earliest period of their history. We now
return to the place from whence we made this digression.

CHAP. III.

THE Carthaginian general Asdrubal, when he had now
for eight years governed the affairs of Spain, and in the
course of his administration greatly enlarged the sway of
his republic, not so much by force of arms, as by his
address, and dexterous management of the princes of the
country, was one night murdered in his tent by a certain
Gaul, in resentment of some private injuries. Annibal was
at this time young: yet, because in all his actions he had
shewn great proofs of courage and capacity, the Carthagi-
nians bestowed upon him the command of the army. He
was no sooner invested with this charge, than it was clear
to all who observed his conduct, that his intention was to
make war upon the Romans; as indeed it happened not
long afterwards. From this time therefore, suspicions,
mutual jealousies, and complaints, began to break out
between the two republics. The Carthaginians, stung by
the disgrace and losses’ which they had sustained in Sicily, `
looked earnestly for some occasion to revenge themselves
upon their enemits. The Romans, on = other’ hand,
watched all their motions, suspected their designs, and
kept themselves upon their guard against them. When

142 THE GENERAL HISTORY BOOK Il.

such were the sentiments on both sides, it was manifest to

all men of judgment, that a war must soon ensue.

. ** About this time the war commenced in Greece, in which

;. the Achzans, in conjunction with king Philip and the rest
- of the allies, were NE against the —m This was

called the Social war. | .

"We have hitherto been employed in giving such an
abstract of the chief transactions both in .Sicily and Afric,
and of those events that were connected with them, as was
agreeable to the design of these preliminary books. And
thus we are arrived at that point of time, from whence we
proposed to begin our history: the commencement of the
second war between the Carthaginians and the Romans,
which is usually called the war of Annibal, and the Social
war now mentioned. But before we engage in the descrip-
tion of these wars, we shall give also some account. of-the
affairs of. Greece which preceded this period : that our in-
troduction may be complete, and the way be opened to
every part of the history that follows. For as my design
is not to write.the annals of any particular country, to
relate the affairs of Persia only or of Greece, as former
historians have done, but to include in one general history
all the known parts of the earth; a design, in which I was
encouraged to engage by many circumstances that are
peculiar to the present times, and which will more fully be
explained hereafter; it seems. necessary, that we first
should take a short review of the past fortunes and condition
of those states and countries that are chiefly —— in
the world. :

With regard indeed to the people of Asia, and. t to diem.
of Egypt, there is no need to look back beyond the times
which we have just now mentioned. For the events that
happened among them in a former age, have already been
recorded by many writers, and are sufficiently known to
‘all. Nor have they suffered, in these latter times, any
change or revolution of so great importance, as might

CHAP, HI. OF POLYBIUS. 148

make it necessary to recount any of those actions that pre-
ceded. But we shall trace from a period more remote the
fortunes of the royal house of Macedon, and those of the
Achaean republic: the first of which, within the course
even of our own times, has fallen to ruin; and the latter
grown to an amazing height of power, through the consent
and harmony of its several parts. For though great pains
were formerly employed to engage the cities of Pelopon-
nesus into this confederacy, yet the labour was without
effect. The interests, or the ainbition, of particular states
still influenced all their actions: and stifled their attention
to the common liberty. But in these days, their union is
so entire and perfect, that they are not only joined together
in bonds of friendship and alliance, but even make use of
the same laws, the same weights, coins, and measures, £he
same magistrates, counsellors, and. judges: so that the in-
habitants of this whole tract of Greece seem in all respects
to form but one single city, except only that they are not
inclosed within the circuit of the same walls. In every
other point, both through the whole republic, and in every
separate state, we find the most exact resemblance and
conformity. : ZU :

Let us first enquire then, by what means the name of
Achzeans came to be so generally received in all the parts
of Peloponnesus; since those to whom this appellation
originally belonged were far from being superior to the
rest, either in the number of their cities, the extent or
wealth of their territory, or the courage of their people.
For both the Spartans and Arcadians are far more nume-
rous, as well.as in possession of a much larger tract of
country ;. and in all the acts of valour and martial prowess,
they are well known to be inferior to none of the states of
Greece. From whence then has it happened, that not the
people of these countries only, but all the rest of the in-
habitants of Peloponnesus, are so well pleased to receive,
not only their laws and form of government, but their
very name also, from the Acheans? To ascribe all this to

144 THE GENERAL HISTORY | nook un.

chance is, in a high degree, absurd and foolish. It would
become us rather.to search out some cause, since nothing
happens without acause; nor even among those events which
seem to be the most fortuitous. In my judgment, then,
this cause is nothing clse than that equality and liberty, in a
word, that democratical species of government, which is
found more just and perfect in its kind among the Achzeans
than in any other state. "This republic was at first com-
posed of a small part only of the inhabitants only of Pelo-
ponnesus; who voluntarily associated themselves into one
body. But a greater number soon joined themselves to
these, induced to it by persuasion, and the manifest advan-
tages of such a union. And some, as opportunities arose,
were forced into tle confederacy, but were soon well satisfied
with the violence by which they had been compelled to
embrace so excellent a form of government. For the new
citizens were suffered to enjoy all the rights and privileges
that were permitted to the old. Every thing was equal
among them all. Thus, by employing the means: that
were of all things most effectual for their purpose, equality
and gentleness, they soon arrived at the point which they
had in view. To this we must ascribe the growth and
strength of the confederacy; and the flourishing condition
which the people of Peloponnesus have from that time
enjoyed.

This form of government was of very ancient date
among the Achzans. Of this there are many proofs; but
it will be sufficient to mention only one or two. After
those disorders that happened in the part of Italy that was

‘called Great Greece, in which the Pythagoreans were con-

sumed in fire, together with the house in which they were
assembled, the whole country was thrown at once into a
state of anarchy and wild confusion. For tlie chief men of
every city had perished in that horrible destruction. The
towns all were filled with tumult, slaughter, and the most
dreadful outrages. Upon this occasion, though deputies
were sent from almost all the states of Greece, to quict their

CHAP. III. OF POLYBIUS. "^£ 145

dissensions, and restore peace among them, the. Achæans
were the only people upon whose assistance and advice they
consented to rely. .Nor was this the only instance in which
they shewed their approbation of the institutions of this re-
public. For not long afterwards, they resolved to imitate
the whole model of their government. In this design the
people of Croton, Sybaris, and Caulonia, associated them-
selves by mutual agréement into one confederacy, and built
a temple for holding their common synods and assemblies,
inscribing it to Jupiter Homorius. ‘They adopted likewise
all the laws and customs of the Achzans, and began to
direct their whole administration by them. But Dionysius
the Syracusan tyrant, and their barbarous neighbours, who
were very strong and powerful, in a short time forced them
to desist from the design. Üj
When the Thebans, after the great and unexpected vic-
tory which they had obtained against the Lacedeemonians.
in the battle of Leuctra, began, with the surprise of all, to
lay claim to the sovereignty of Grecce, various troubles and
commotions arose among the people of the country;
and especially between the. two. contending parties: for
the one refused to submit as conquered, while the other
persisted still to claim the victory. In these circumstances
they at last agreed to yield all the points that were in dis-.
pute between: them to the sole judgment and decision of
the Achzans. Nor was this preference obtained by any.
superiority of strength or power; for they were at thattime
the least of all the states of Greece; but was confessedly
bestowed upon that integrity and love of virtue by which:
they were distinguished above all other people. n
At this time, therefore, they were powerful in inclination
only, and not from any real strength. Their government:
had not yet been able to acquire any considerable increase,
for want of a chief that was capable of giving full accom;
plishment to their designs. For as often as any appeared.
among them, whose views and conduct were suspected to:
tend that way, they were immediately opposed in every
VOL. I. L

146 THE GENERAL HISTORY Book it.

enterprise, and checked in all: their motions, ‘either by
the Lacedsemonians, or still more frequently by the kings |
of Macedon. But when they had at last found one, whose
abilities were equal to the task, they then soon made
known the inherent excellence and power of their republic,

by carrying into execution that vast and glorious project,

of uniting all the states of Peloponnesus to the.body of
their own confederacy. ‘The first and chief author of this
union was Aratus the Sicyonian. Philopcemen of Me-
galopolis, after many struggles, conducted it to its com-
pletion; and Lycortas, with others who pursued his
measures, added to it its last firmness and stability. We
shall take occasion to relate their several actions, with the
time and manner in which they were performed, as fully -
and particularly as the design of this history may require.
We shall, indeed, both now and at all times hereafter,
touch but lightly on the several parts of the administration —
of Aratus; because he has left behind him a very faithful
and clear account of his own transactions. But in all that
regards the rest, we shall enlarge more copiously, and
survey their conduct with a nicer care. At present, in
order to make this whole enquiry more easy to ourselves,
as well as more intelligible to the reader, we shall look
back to the time when the Acheeans, after they had been ^
broken into separate bodies by the kings of Macedon, first
formed the resolution of uniting again their several cities
into oné community. For from this beginning their re-
public gradually enlarged its bounds and power, till it
arrived at last.at that state of perfect ` greatness in — it
has been seen to flourish in these latter times. .

It was in the hundred and twenty-fourth Olympiad that
the Patrians and Dymeans associated themselves the first
into this confederacy. In the same Olympiad, Ptolemy,
the son of Lagus, Lysimachus, Seleucus, and Ptolemy Ce-
raunus, all died. The state of the Achzans before this
time was, in few words, as follows. Tisamenes, the son of
Orestes, being driven from Sparta upon the return of the

ES

CHAP, III. OF POLYBIUS. "147

Heraclide, gained possession of Achaia by: force, and
was declared.sovereign of the country. His descendants
reigned after him in natural succession, down to Ogyges.
"But when the children of this prince had ceased to make
the laws the rule of their administration, and began to
govern all things by their own arbitrary will, the Achzeans
changed the constitution from monarchy to a common-
wealth. ` In this state they continued: afterwards to the
times of Alexander; and though different accidents might

in some conjunctures introduce a temporary change in .

their affairs, yet, upon the whole, they still preserved the
form of a genuine democracy. Their republic was com-

posed of twelve cities; all of which now exist, except

Olenus and Helice, which were swallowed by an inun-
dation of the sea, not long before the battle of Leuctra.
The names of the twelve were, Patre, Dyme, Phare,
Tritza, Leontium, Z7Egiray Pellene, ZEgium, Bura, Cary-
nia, Olenus, and Helice. But after the death of Alex-
ander, this union was dissolved by various contests and
dissentions that were raised among them, chiefly through
the arts of the kings of Macedon. Every city was now
engaged in a separate interest, and no longer acted in
concert with the whole. "The effect of this discord was,
that some of them received garrisons from Demetrius and
Cassander, and afterwards from Antigonus Gonatas; and
some were seized by tyrants; for Antigonus gave: both
establishment and support to a great number of these
throughout all Greece. But in the hundred and twenty-fourth
Olympiad, as we have already mentioned, they saw their
error, and began to think of returning to their former
state. This was the time in which Pyrrhus invaded Italy.
Dyme, Patre, Phare, and Tritza, were at first the only
cities. that agreed to unite themselves again in one com-
munity; and it is on that account that there is now no
monument remaining of this new confederacy. ` About five
years afterwards, m people of ZEgium drove out the
garrison, and joined their city to the league. Their ex-
: L2

148 THE GENERAL HISTORY BooK m.

l -—
ample soon was followed by the Burians, who killed their
tyrant, and afterwards by the Carynians also. For when
Iseas, the tyrant of Carynia, saw that by thé management

of Marcus and the Achzans, the garrison was driven out^

of /Egium, and the tyrant of the Burians killed, and that
their forces were preparing to invest his territory upon
every side, he laid down his royalty, and, having’ obtained
a promise of life. and safety, associated. his city to the
confederacy.

Some, perhaps, will be solicitous.to know the motives,

by which I have been led back to this early period. My ~

design then was, first, that-I might mark precisely the
time and manner, in which this second ‘confederacy com-
menced;. and what were the cities which laid the first
foundation of that establishment, which has subsisted even
to the present times: and in the second place, that the
state and real circumstances of the facts themselves might
declare the truth of what-we have affirmed, concerning the
genius and the spirit of the Achzean commonwealth. For
from these it will be evident, that that equality and liberty,
upon which the republic first was founded, have been the
chief causes of its great increase. To which' we may also
add, the constancy and unshaken resolution, with which
they never cease to wage perpetual war against all those
who, either by their own power, or with the assistance of
the neighbouring kings, attempt to force their cities into
slavery. Upon these principles, and by this conduct, they
brought their work to its desired perfection; using partly
their own strength, and partly that of their allies. For all
the assistance, which they received afterwards from these,
was applied solely to promote the grand purpose of their
government. And even after those great exploits, which
they performed jointly with the Romans, they were not in
the least ambitious of obtaining any private advantage to
themselves; nor cver claimed any other reward for all
their services, than the establishment of the common
liberty, in the union of All the states of Peloponnesus.

e

-CHAP. II. OF POLYBIUS. - 149

-The truth of these remarks will, I say, be confirmed
beyond.all doubt, by the recital of the facts.

The cities, which we have just now mentioned, remained
under. this form of government during the course of
twenty-five years: in which tire, they elected annually

two preetors, and a common secretary. But afterwards, .

they chose to place the whole administration in one single
prætor. The first who obtained that honour was "Málreus
of Carynià. Four years after this preetorship, Aratus the
Sicyonian, though he was then no more than twenty years

old, by his bravery and courage gave liberty to his country, .

'and joined it to the dein league; for he had always
greatly admired the constitution of this republic. Eight
years afterwards, being himself elected prætor of the
Achzeans for the second time, he found means to take

— 2.

Acrocorinthus by surprise, in which Antigonus had then a `

garrison. By gaining this important ‘place, he delivered
all the people of Peloponnesus from no small appre-
hensions; restored the Corinthians to their liberty; and
engaged them to become a part of the Achæan govern-
ment. In the course of the same year, he made himself
master of the city of Megara by some secret management,
and joined it likewise to the confederacy. This was the
year before the final defeat of the Carthaginians in Sicily ;
which forced them to abandon all the island, and pay a
tribute to the Romans, "Thus Aratus, in a short time,
greatly enlarged the growing power of the Acheans: and
ever afterwards, as long as he was employed in the ad-
ministration of their affairs, his conduct was uniform and
constant, and never deviated from the points which he had
at first in view: to drive the Macedonians out of Pelopon-
nesus; to destroy the tyrants every where; and restore to
the people all their natural rights, and that common
liberty which their ancestors had before enjoyed.

During the life-time of Antigonus Gonatas, it ‘was a
task of no small difficulty, to resist on one hand the

intrigues and artful policy of that prince, and the fapa-

L3

150 THE GENERAL HISTORY nooku.

ciousness and bold ambition of the ;A&tolians on the other.
For these two powers had advanced ‘so. far together in
their unjust attempts, that they,even formed the project of
a league, for the entire destruction of the Achæans. But
Aratus, by his wisdom and indefatigable pains, cmd
broke and frustrated the design.

After the death of this prince, the cien entered into
a treaty of alliance with the Ætolians, and assisted them
in the war against Demetrius. , By this compliance all
past jealousies were removed: and their former enmity
gave place to confidence and friendship. "When Deme-
trius was also dead, after a reign. of ten years. only, and
about the time in which the Romans first passed into
Illyria, the Achaans found this conjuncture to be highly
favourable to them .for advancing their designs. For all
the tyrants of Peloponnesus were now disheartened, and
diffident of their future safety. They had lost their master
and their chief: the sovereign, by whom they were sup-
ported and maintained in pay. On the other hand Aratus
urged them close: and shewed his resolution to abolish
every tyranny. -He promised great rewards and honours
to those that would voluntarily submit: and threatened
ruin and extreme punishment to all such as should refuse.
By these means they were all engaged to divest themselves
of the royal power; to restore liberty to their several
cities; and to unite them to the Achæan league. Lysiadas,
the tyrant of Megalopolis, whose wise discernment taught
him to foresee what would shortly happen, had resigned
his dignity, and joined his country to the republic, even
in the life-time of Demetrius. His example .was now
followed by Aristomachus, the tyrant of Argos: and by
Xeno and Cleonymus, the tyrants of the Hermionians and
Phliasians.

The AKtolians, who were by nature rapacious and unjust,
could not behold without envy this great increase of the
Achæan power and strength. ‘They began to flatter them-
selves with secret hopes of breaking the confederacy and

CHP. IlI. OF POLYBIUS. 151

enriching themselves with the spoil. As they had formerly
shared with Alexander the towns of Acarnania, and had
afterwards ‘formed the project of dividing also between
Antigonus Gonatas and themselves the cities of. Achaia,
they were now persuaded, that it would be:no hard task to
carry into execution-this last design. With this view, -
they. resolved to concert the matter first in private with
Antigonus, the guardian of young Philip, and with Cleo-
menes king of Lacedeemon, and to demand assistance
from those princes. ‘They knew that Antigonus at this
time governed Macedon in full security; and that he was
the declared and open enemy of,the Achzans, because
they. had taken ‘Acrocorinthus from him by surprise,
They imagined therefore, that if they could once inspire
the Lacedzemonians with the same hostile disposition, and
engage them: into this design, the Achæans, attacked at
once on every side as occasion should direct, must neces--
sarily sink beneath the efforts of their united forces.. In
truth, the prospect of success seemed very fair and pro-
mising. But in concerting this project, one circumstance
of great moment. was forgot. For it never once occurred
to their reflection, that Aratus was the man, who was to ~
oppose all their measures, and counteract their motions:
a man, whose abilities were superior to every difficulty.
And indeed so effectually did he oppose them, defeating
all their counsels, and turning their projects to their: own
destruction, that this unjust and unprovoked attack,
instead of accomplishing any part of that which was
intended from it, served only to give new life and vigour
to the Achzan.commonwealth. We shall give a distinct `
and clear. account of the manner in which the whole was
then conducted.

When Aratus saw that the Ktolians were restrained by
shame from declaring themselves the open enemies of the
Achzans, from whom they had received great services in
the war against Demetrius; yet that they were acting in
private concert with the Lacedaemonians, and had suffered

L4

152 THE GENERAL HISTORY BOOK II.

their jealousy, and their hatred of the Achaans, to carry
them to such excess, that.when Cleomenes had taken by
surprise Tegea, Mantinea, and Orchomenus, which were
at that time not only in alliance with the /Etolians, but
associated also to their governinent, they not only shewed
-no resentment of this insult, but even yielded to him the
full possession of those cities; when he saw, that a nation,
whose character it was to, declare war upon the slightest
pretexts, even against those from whom they had received .
no wrong, was now ona sudden so much changed, that
they not only bore with patience an attack made upon
them in direct breach of treaties, but were even content to
give up all their claim to three ‘cities of importance, that
by means of this new strength Cleomenes might beable to
maintain the war against the Achwans: when Aratus, I
say, and the rest of the chiefs of the republic, had fully
considered and debated all these circumstances, the result
of their deliberations was, that they would not yet take
arms avowedly against any power, but only hold them-
selves in readiness to oppose all attempts that should be
made against them. This was their first determination.
But some time afterwards, when Cleomenes had: built the
fortress, ‘called Athenzeum, in the Megalopolitan territory,
and began to act against them in a hostile manner without
reserve, the Achzans then called a general council, and it
was there resolved, that war should be ium -— the
Lacedeemonians. :
_ Such was the beginning of that which i is s called the Cleo-
menic war. The Achzans at first. designed to employ
their own proper forces only, in defence of their state and
country. For it seemed less honourable to. owe .their
safety to a foreign army: and they were willing also to.
preserve the friendship of king Ptolemy; to whom .they
were indebted for many favours; and who on that account
might perhaps shew some resentment, if they now invited
any other power to their assistance. But as the war began
to advance fast upon them, and was pressed with equal

cuar. ui. °. OF POLYBIUS. 153

vigour and dexterity by Cleomenes, who had subverted
the lawful constitution of his country, and established ` a
tyranny in. Sparta, Aratus, having carefully weighed the
danger, and made due reflection also upon the daring spirit
and malicious disposition of the /Etolians, peresived that

it was necessary to have recourse in time to some expe- |

dient, which might divert the fatal consequences that were
in view. In this design, he turned his eyes towards Anti-
gonus, whom he knew to be a prince of perfect judgment
and experience; at all times ready to make alliances, as
occasion should require; and punctual in observing them
when made. But he remembered also, that kings natu-
rally bear neither enmity. nor friendship towards any; but
are in both determined bv the rule of interest alone. He

resolved therefore to explain at large to Antigonus the.

dangers that would, probably arise, even against himself,
from the present situation of affairs in Greece; and endea-
vour by that mean to draw him from his party, and engage
him to join his forces with the Achszans. It was requisite,
however, that he should keep this resolution for some time
secret. For he knew, that if it should be once discovered,
Cleomenes and the ZEtolians would employ every art to
defeat his purpose. He was apprehensive also, that it
might too much depress the courage of his countrymen, if
he should seem to despair of saving the republic by its own
genuine forces: and more especially, if he. should now
apply for succour to the Macedonians, whom they always
had regarded as their enemies. In the conduct therefore
of this whole design, he was forced to employ the greatest
secrecy and caution; and both to speak and act in a man-
ner very opposite to.his real sentiments. And from hence
it happens, that many circumstances, which relate to this
transaction, are omitted in his memoirs.

When he saw, then, that the Maguidpolienee were the
first and: greatest sufferers in the war, both because their
country lay nearest to isnt def ty and because. the
Achzeans were themselves too much embarrassed to send

d

154 THE GENERAL HISTORY soox u.

the succours to them that were necessary; when he con-
sidered also, that this people were already favourably dis-
posed towards the house of Macedon, on account of. some
good offices which they had received from- Philip the son
of Amyntas; he made no doubt,.but that as soon as the
` war should become too heavy for their strength, they
would immediately have. recourse to Antigonus and the
Macedonians. . He sent therefore for Nicophanes and
Cercidas; two Megalopolitans,.who had formerly .been
connected with his family by the ties of hospitality; and
who by their abilities were very capable of promoting his
design. To these he privately disclosed his project :. and,
through their means, soon afterwards engaged the Megalo-
politans to send some deputies to the Achzan States, re-
questing their .permission to invite Antigonus to their
assistance. Nicophanes and Cercidas .were themselves
appointed for the embassy: and their instructions were, to
proceed without delay. to the court of Macedon, in case
that the Achzeans should approve of tlie design.

The Achzans yielded their consent: and the deputies
began their journey without delay, and were admitted. to a
conference with the king. With respect to their own par-
. ticular country, they spoke in a few words only, what.the
occasion seemed barely to require. But they. enlarged
more copiously upon the. general situation of affairs in
Greece; according to the instructions, which they had
received in: private.from Aratus. They explained the views
of the ZEtolians and Cleomenes; shewed the tendency of
their designs; and warned the king of the fatal conse-
quences that were likely to result from this confederacy.
For though the Achzeans only were most imminently
mise yet the danger must at last extend even. to
Antigonus himself. It was clear to every judgment, that
the Achzeans could not long maintain their ground, against
the efforts of two so powerful enemies. -Nor was it less
clear and evident, that Cleomenes and the ZEtolians would
never be contented with the conquest of the Achzeans oily.

cma. urn -OF POLYBIUS. we

For such was the disposition of the Ætolians, that the
bounds not only of Peloponnesus, but even of Greece
itself, would be thought too narrow for.their rapaciousness
and wild ambition. And though the whole design and
purpose of Cleomenes seemed at present to aim at nothing
more, than the supreme command in : Peloponnesus, yet
when this should be once obtained, there was no room to
doubt, but that he would immediately enlarge his views,
and endeavour to seize the sovereignty of the rest of
Greece; at which he could never arrive, but by the ruin
of the Macedonian monarchy. They therefore advised
the king to turn his thouglits upon the future: and to con-
sider with himself, whether it would not be far more suited
to his interests, to join his forces with the Achzans and
Boeotians, and contend with Cleomenes in Peloponnesus
for the supreme command of Greece, than, by neglecting
at this time to save a great and powerful nation, to be
forced at last to maintain a war in the very heart of Thes-
saly, and defend his own proper kingdom, against the
united forces of the ZEtolians and Boeotians, the Lacedz-
monians and Achzans. They farther added, that if the
ZEtolians, softened by the remembrance of the services
which they had received from the Achzeans in the war
against Demetrius, should forbear to take arms against
them, they would themselves starid singly against the efforts
of Cleomenes, and should want no foreign succours, unless
the fortune of the war should prove in all points contrary
to their hopes. But in case that the success should fail to
answer their endeavours, or the Ætolians declare. them-
selves their enemies, they then earnestly besought Anti-
gonus, that he would interpose without delay, and give
safety to the states of Peloponnesus, while there was’ yet
time to save them. With regard to any terms of caution
and security, they assured the king, that Aratus would take
care to find such expedients, as should fully satisfy: all
parties: and that he would send him notice also of the

156 THE GENERAL HISTORY BOOK 11.

time, in which it would be seasonable for him to begin’ his
march to their assistance.

Antigonus was. convinced that this kind of reasoning
was perfectly just and solid; and began to apply his whole
attention to the affairs that were before him. -He sent
letters to the Megalopolitans, assuring them that he was
ready to assist them with his forces, in case that the
Acheeans should approve of the design.

"When Nicophanes and Cercidas were returned, id had
delivered the letters, and made report of the favourable
iucliriations of the king, the Megalopolitans, being greatly
pleased with their success, sent in all haste to the council of
the Acheans, and pressed them to invite Antigonus with- '
out delay, and leave to him the whole conduct of the war.
Aratus likewise, when he had heard in private from Nico-
phanes of.the disposition which the king had shewn with
respect both to the Achzans and himself, was beyond mea-
sure filled with joy. . He now perceived, that he had not
bestowed his.pains upon a vain or fruitless project: and ,
that Antigonus was by no means so entirely alienated from
him, as the /Etolians had believed. He judged' it also to
be a most happy circumstance, that the Megalopolitans, in
referring to Antigonus tbe care of their affairs, had resolved
to use the. mediation of the Achzean states. For his first
wish was, that there might be no want at all of foreign
succours, But if necessity:should force them to have re-
course to any such assistance, he rather chose, that the ap-
plication should be made by all the states of Achaia, tharr
by himself. For there seemed to be some cause to fear,
that if Antigonus, when he had first subdued the Lacedze-
monians .and Cleomenes, should engage in- any ill designs
against the republic of the Achzeans, the blame would all
be imputed to him alone: since all men would consider
such a conduct as the effect of a just resentment, for. the
injury that had been done to the Macedonians by Aratus,
in taking Acrocorinthus from them. When the Megalo-

CHAP. HI. OF POLYBIUS. 157

politans therefore had shewn the letters in the council of
the Achzeans, and conjured them to invite Antigonus to
their assistance without delay ; and when the people began
to declare aloud their readiness to comply with this request,
Aratus came forwards in the assembly, and spoke largely
in praise of the zeal and good inclinations of Antigonus,
and commended also the disposition of the people. But
he exhorted them in the most earnest and pathetic manner,
** to employ in the first place their utmost efforts, and en- `
deavour by every expedient, to defend their cities and
their country, by their own genuine forces: that both their
honour and their interest required it from them: and in
case that fortune should fail to give success to their endea-
vours, that it would then be early enough to implore the
assistance of their friends, when they had first’ been forced
to abandon all hopes of safety from themselves.”

These sentiments were applauded by the whole assembly.
They resolved, therefore, to adhere to this opinion, and
sustain the war alone. But some time afterwards, when
king Ptolemy, being persuaded that the Lacedzemonians
would be able to assist him more effectually than ‘the
Acheeans in the .designs which he had formed against the
kings of Macedon, had rejected the alliance of the Achzans;
and engaged to furnish Cleomenes with such supplies, as
might enable him to carry on the war against Antigonus;
when the Achzeans had been surprised by Cleomenes upon
their march, and suffered great loss near Lyceum; when
they had also been a second time defeated in the Laodician
plains near Megalopolis, in which action Leusiadas was
slain; and lastly, when they had suffered & complete and
dreadful overthrow in a general engagement, at a place
called Hecatombeum in the Dymean territory; their
affairs were then so desperate, that, without any new delay,
they with one voice agreed to invite: Antigonus.to their
assistance. Aratus sent his own son to the king to settle
the terms of their agreement. But there was one point
which caused no small embarrassment. It was not pro-

158 THE GENERAL HISTORY ` Book m.

bable that Antigonus would march to their relief, unless
Acrocorinthus should be first restored, and the city ‘of
Corinth likewise yielded to him for his place of arms.
But the Achzans would not venture to surrender Corinth,
without the consent of the inhabitants. Some little delay
was therefore made in their deliberations, till an expedient
could be found, and such sureties offered, as might satisfy
the king.

In the mean time Cleomenes, having spread gut terror
every where by those victories that have now been men-
tioned, advanced at leisure through the country; drawing
the cities to submission, some by gentle means, and some
by force. In this manner he gained Caphye, Pellene,
Pheneum, Argos, Phlius, Cleone, Epidaurus, Hermiona,
Treezen, and lastly Corinth, and then went and encamped
before Sicyon. Happily these rapid conquests freed the
Acheans from that great difficulty which had obstructed
all their measures. For no sooner had the inhabitants of
Corinth commanded all the Achzans to leave the city, and
sent a deputation to Cleomenes to invite him’ to take pos-
Session of it, than Aratus, having now obtained a fair and
honest pretext, surrendered Acrocorinthus to Antigonus.
Thus he wiped away at once all remembrance of his for-
mer offence against the house of Macedon; gave a strong
assurance of the sineerity of his intentions, with regard to
the present treaty; and furnished the Macedonians with a
commodious place of arms for the approaching war.

CHAP. IV.,

AS soon as Cleomenés heard that the Aclizans had con-
cluded a treaty with Antigonus, he marched from before
Sicyon, and encamped upon the isthmus.’ He cast up an
intrenchment round all the space that lay between Acro-
corinthus and the Onian mountains: and persuaded him-

CHAP. IV. OF POLYBIUS. 159

self, that he was now secure of obtaining the sovereignty
of Peloponnesus.

Antigonus had long ago completed all his preparations,
and waited only for the proper time of action, as Aratus
had advised. But when he saw the rapid progress of
Cleomenes, he began to apprehend, that this prince would
soon advance, and attack him even in the very heart of
Thessaly. He sent word therefore to the Achzans, that
‘they should be punctual in the execution of the measures
that had been concerted; and himself began his march
with the army towards the isthmus, through Eubcea. For
the ZEtolians, among other expedients which théy contrived
to prevent Antigonus from lending any assistance to the
Achzans, had sent him notice, that his army should have
no passage through Thermopylæ; and in case he should
attempt to march that way, that they would oppose him by
force of arms. '

While Antigonus and Cleomenes lay in opposite camps
upon the isthmus, the one watching his opportunity to
pass into Peloponnesus, the other ready to oppose his en-
trance, the Achzans, though much weakened by their
losses, still maintained their courage, and resolved to pursue -
the war with vigour. And when Aristotle, a citizen of
Argos, had formed a party in the place against Cleomenes,
they immediately sent away Timoxenus with a body of
forces, who made themselves masters of the city. "This
happy accident gave instantly a new face to their affairs.
For so effectually did it depress the ardour of Cleomenes,
and damp the courage of his army, that though this general
was possessed of all the advantageous posts, and furnished.
with supplies of every kind in greater abundance than An-
_ tigonus; though he was far more bold ‘and enterprising
than that prince, and more strongly animated by the love
of glory; yet no sooner had he received the news that
Argos was taken by the Achzans, than he at once ‘aban-
dowed all his conquests, and rather fled than retreated
homewards; as if he had feared, that the enemy would

160 THE GENERAL HISTORY BOOK II.

soon surround him on every side. In this way, he found’
means to enter Argos, and for some time had hopes of re-
covering the city, but was at last repulsed. For as the
Achzeans maintained their post with courage, so the inha-
bitants especially resisted with a more than common force
and obstinacy, as.if they had designed to make atonement
for their past offence, in having embraced his party.
When this attempt had failed, he continued his route
through Mantinea, and returned again to Sparta. ,
Antigonus now entered Peloponnesus without resistance;
took possession of Acrocorinthus ; and advanced with great
celerity to Argos: from whence, when he had first bestowed’
high commendations upon the courage of the inhabitants,
and settled the:affairs of the city, he continued his march
towards Arcadia. He drove out the garrisons from all the
forts that had been built by Cleomenes, in the territory of
the ZEgians and Belminates, and filled them with the
troops of Megalopolis. He went afterwards to Ægium,
and was.present in.the council of the Achaean states. He
there shewed at. large the, motives of his conduct: pro-
posed his sentiments with regard to the future operations.
of the war, and was declared the general in chief wi the

allies.
After some time spent in winter. amd in the naigh

bourhood of Sicyon and Corinth, as the spring now ad-
vanced, he, again began his march with’ the forces, and
arrived in three days before Tegea: and being joined there.
by the Acheeans, he immediately invested the town. The
siege was pushed by the Macedonians with so much vigour,
as well by mining as by. the other. methods of attack, that
the inhabitants in a short time lost all hope, and submitted
at discretion.’ Antigonus, having secured the place by a
sufficient garrison, advanced in haste towards Laconia.
When he approached the frontiers, he engaged the Lace-
deemonians, who were there encamped, in some slight skir-
mishes, hoping to draw on a general battle. But having
received notice by his spies, that the garrison of Orcho-

s

CHAP, Ty. OF POLYBIUS. 161

menus had retired from the place and joined Cleomenes,
he immediately decamped, and directing his march that
way, took the town in the first assault. He next laid
siege to Mantinea, which was struck with terror, and sur-
rendered. Marching from thence, he gained Hertea and
Telphussa; which were yielded voluntarily to him by the
inhabitants; and afterwards, as the summet now was past,
returned again to ZEpium, to be present. at thé council of
the states: He sent away the Macedonians to take their
winter quarters it their own country, while himself stayed
behind at ZEgium, to deliberate with the Achzans on the
measures that were proper to be pursued. ‘
When Cleomenes saw that the Macedonians- were dis-
missed, and that Antigonus was left in ZEgium -with only
the mercenary troops; that he was distant full three days’,
journey from Megalopolis; that this city, on account both
of its great extent, and the small number of the inhabitants,
could not easily be guarded against an enemy; that at this
time especially, it actually was guarded with less attention
than .before, because Antigonus was near; and that the
greater part. of the citizens, who were of age to bear arms,
had been already lost, in the engagements near Lyczum
and the Laodician plains; he found means, with the assist-
ance of some Messenian exiles, who at that time resided in
the place, to enter the city privately by night. But when
day appeared, the inhabitants maintained their ground
with so much bravery, that he found himself in the greatest
danger, not only of being forced back again with loss, but
of suffering an entire defeat: ss it had happened to him
about three months before, when he made the same attempt,
and entered the city in the part that. was called Colanm.
At this time, however, as his forces were very numerous,
and had seized on'all the advantageous posts, he at last
accomplished his design; drove out the Megalopolitans;
and made himself master of the place : which he immedi-
ately ‘pillaged, and destroyed with so much bitterness of
rage and fury, as left no hope that it ever could again be
VOL. T. M

-

162 THE GENERAL HISTORY mook ir.

inhabited. This severe treatment seems to have flowed
from no other cause than the mere resentment of Cleo-
menes: who was enraged to find, that among all the
Megalopolitans and Stymphalians, not one could be pre-
vailed upon at this conjuncture to embrace his interests,
and betray the liberties of his fellow-citizens. Among the
Clitorians indeed, a generous people, and passionately fond
of freedom, there was found a single traitor, named
Thearces, whose baseness seemed to cast some infamy
upon his country. But the Clitorians upon that account
very reasonably deny that he derived his birth from them,
and declare him to have been the spurious and deserted
offspring of a soldier from Orchomenus. `

In composing this part of my history, as I have chiefly
followed Aratus for my guide, and drawn my materials from
him, and as many persons are inclined to prefer Phylarchus,
who gives a very different account of these transactions,
I think it necessary to bestow in this place some little ob-
servation upon the talents and capacity of this historian ;
that his relations, which indeed are fabulous and false, may
no longer possess that credit, which ought only to be paid
to those that are genuine and true.

This writer then, through every part of his performance,
has shewn abundant proofs of haste, inaccuracy, want of
judgment, and discernment. But it is not my design to
enter into a critical examination of them all. I shall, at
present, consider his accounts of those transactions only,
which fall within the period of the Cleomenic war. And
these, indeed, will be sufficient, not only to explain his
sentiments, and the temper with which he wrote, but to
shew also in what degree he was possessed of those abilities
that are requisite for ivo an undertaking.

In order to expose the cruelty of Antigonus and the
Macedonians, and of Aratus and the Achæans, he relates,
that the Mantineans, after they had been conquered by
them, were punished in a manner the most severe: and
that the largest and most ancient city of all Arcadia was

CHAP. IV. OF. POLYBIUS. 163

condemned to struggle with such calamities as filled the
Greeks with astonishment and horror, and melted them
into tears. Ie then endeavours to move his readers to
compassion, and force them even to feel the sufferings
which he relates: setting in view before them the companies
of unhappy women, joined together in embraces, striking
their bare bosoms and tearing their dishevelled hair, and
‘describing the lamentations and the tears of husbands and
their wives, who, together with their children and their
aged parents, were dragged away in promiscuous crowds to
slavery. ‘Thus it is that in every part of his work, his chief
pains and art are constantly employed in painting scenes of
misery and horror. But surely there is no need to use
many words, to explode a kind of writing. so mean and
womanish. Let us consider rather, what is the genuine
and proper character, and what the peculiar use, of
history.

A historian then, instead of endeavouring, like the
writers of tragedy, to strike the reader with admiration or
with terror, instead of dressing up probable speeches, and
enumerating all the circumstances that might possibly have
followed after every accident, should be satisfied with giving
a bare relation of such facts and discourses as really
happened, though perhaps they may contain nothing great
or elevated. For the nature and design of tragedy are
very different from those of history. "The business of the .
former is, to strike and captivate the minds of the hearers
for the present moment, by such representations as are
barely probable: whereas history professes to . give lessons
of improvement even to future times, by relating ‘such
discourses and events as are strictly true. In the one,
therefore, the probable, though false, may be sufficient. to
conduct us to the end in view, which is amusement and
delight; but the other, whose proper work is to convey in-
struction, must be always built on truth.

In recounting all these dismal accidents, Phylarchus is
for the most part silent also with respect to the cause and

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--

164 THE GENERAL HISTORY - Boox i.

motives by which they were occasioned. And yet, unless
we are previously informed of these, it is not possible to
know whether the case can reasonably lay claim either to
our indignation or our pity. It is, for instance, a lament-
able spectacle, to sce a free man whipped with rods.. But
when this is the proper punishment of his crimes, it must
be allowed to have happened justly to him; and whenever
it is done for the sake of discipline and reformation, we
even applaud those persons who inflict it. To take away
the life of a citizen, is considered as a most horrid crime,
and such as calls:‘for the severest vengeance. Yet a man
may openly destroy an adulterer or a robber, without any
fear of being punished for. it. And those who rescue their
country from a traitor'or a tyrant, are even thought worthy
of the greatest honours. It is manifest, therefore, that in
order to pass a perfect judgment on any action, instead “of
barely contemplating the act itself, we should examine the
causes that ‘produced’ it, together with the intention and
the views of those by whom it was done::. for, agreeably to
the differenée that is found in these, the action will be
likewise different.

"With regard to the fact which occasioned these reflec-
tions, the truth is as follows. The Mantineans, without
any provocation or excuse, had deserted: the Achaan con-
federacy, and delivered up their country and themselves,

first to the 7Etolians, and afterwards to Cleomenes, and

were ‘joined: by him to the Lacedzemonian state. In these
circumstances, about four years before the arrival of Anti-
gonus, they were conquered by the Achzans, with the
assistance of a. party that Aratus had gained within the
city. But‘so far were they from being exposed at this
time to any severe or cruel treatment in resentment of their
offence, that, on the contrary, all Greece talked loudly ‘of

the sudden change which ‘seemed ‘to have been effected in

the disposition of these people towards each other. For
when ‘Aratus had made himself master of the city, he
strictly forbade his soldiers to touch any of. the goods of

b

CHAP.1V. — OF POLYBIUS. 165

the inhabitants.’ And having afterwards called the people
together, he exhorted them.to resume their courage, and
remain satisfied in their present state: for that as long as
they would consider themselves as a part of the Achæan
government, they might live in perfect freedom and se-
curity. An indulgence so uriexpected, and which so far
exceeded all their hopes, changed at once the inclinations
of the Mantineans. They no longer remembered the
friends whom they had lost in battle, or the dangers to
Which tliemselves had been exposed; but embraced. the
Acheans, who so lately were their enemies; admitted
them to their houses and their feasts; and strove to express
their joy by every act of hospitality and kindness. And
this indeed was highly reasonable. For certainly no people
ever fell into the hands of a more merciful or more gene-
rous enemy; or escaped with so little difficulty from those
calamities that are esteemed the greatest in human life.
A happiness which they entirely owed to the humanity of
Aratus and the Achzans.

Some time afterwards this people, being disturbed by
some intestine tumults, and apprehensive also of some
danger from the Lacedemonians and ZEtolians, requested
from the Achzans a garrison for their security. The
Ach:zeans chose by lot three hundred of their own citizens;
who all left their country and their fortunes, and went and
resided in Mantinea, to watch over the liberties and safety
of that city. They added also to them a body of two
hundred mercenaries. But the Mantineans not long
afterwards, taking occasion from some new dissensions
which broke out among them, called in the Lacedzemonians,
delivered their city to them, and killed all the Achzans that
were in the place. A perfidy, more horrible and impious
than can be well expresséd. For though they had resolved
to disclaim the friendship of the Achzeans, and forget all the
favours which they had received: from their republic, yet
they ought at least to have sent home unhurt those troops
which they had before admitted as allies; since by the laws

M 3

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: 166 THE GENERAL HISTORY .»xook u.

of nations this indulgence is always granted even to an
enemy. But the Mantineans resolved to violate these
laws; insult the common rights of mankind; and perpe-
trate an inexpiable crime; that by such a conduct, they
might ‘be able more strongly to assure Cleomenes of their
zeal and close attachment to his cause. ‘This action surely
might, in.justice, draw after it.the heaviest resentment.
To imbrue their hands -in the blood of those by whom
themselves, when they had fallen into their power notlong
before, were dismissed with pardon ; and who at this very
moment were employed in. defending the liberties and
safety of their city : what, let me ask, would have been the
proper punishment for such a crime?-It will, perhaps, be
said, that as soon as they were conquered, they should liave
been sold for slaves, together with their wives and children.
But this is no more than what is usually permitted by the
laws of war, even against those who have not been guilty of
any uncommon wickedness. The Mantineans, therefore,
deserved to be treated in some more rigorous manner.
And if they had even been involved in all that wretchedness
which is described at large by Phylarchus, it would have
been so far from exciting the Greeks to sympathy and
compassion, that on the contrary they must have applauded
those who took care not to leave so great a crime unpu-
nished. But in truth the whole which they suffered was,
that their goods were pillaged, and the citizens exposed to
sale. It is clear, therefore, that Phylarchus, in order to
surprise and strike the reader, has invented not only a mere’
heap of falsehoods, but such falsehoods too as bear not any
shew of probability ; while, through an excess of ignorance,
he makes no mention of a fact that was coincident with
that which he relates, and which might very properly have
been connected with it. For when-the Achzans, at this
very time. had taken the town of Tegea by storm, they
used none of the same severity towards the inhabitants.
Yet if the sufferings of the Mantineans had been the bare
effect of a cruel disposition in their enemies, it seems

CHAP, Iv. OF POLYBIUS. 167

reasonable to suppose, that the people of Tegea would
have been treated also with equal rigour. But as the
Mantineans alone were punished with severity, it is manifest
beyond all doubt that the conduct of the Achzans must,
of necessity, be ascribed to some other cause.

In another place he relates, that Aristomachus, a man
of an illustrious family, descended from a line of tyrants,
and who was himself tyrant of Argos, having fallen alive
into the hands of Antigonus and the Achzans, was con-
ducted to Cenchreze, and there put to death in tortures
the most merciless and cruel that ever were inflicted upon
man. And then, after his usual manner, he goes on to
describe the loud and moving lamentations of the unhappy
sufferer, which were heard at midnight through all the
neighbourhood; that some were struck with horror, while
some doubted of the fact; and that others, inflamed with
indignation, ran in crowds towards the house from whence
the cries proceeded. But let us pass over these scenes of
terror and. amazement, which have already been sufficiently
exposed.: In my judgment then, though Aristomachus
had been guilty of no offence against the Achzans, the
whole tenour of his life, and the wicked tyranny which he
had-exercised upon his country, might very deservedly
have drawn upon him the severest punishment. Yet Phy-
larchus, with design to throw a greater splendour on his
character, and more effectually to raise the indignation of
the reader; declares, not only that he was himself a tyrant,
but that he was descended also from a race of tyrants; an
accusation in itself the heaviest that can be well conceived.
For the very name of tyrant includes the full extent of
wickedness, and implies the commission of every kind of
crime which man can perpetrate. But in truth if he had
been forced to suffer the most cruel punishment, as this
historian relates, he never could have made by it a.due
atonement for the transactions of one single day ; the day
when Aratus entered Argos with a body of Achzans, and
gloriously exerted all his efforts to restore liberty to the

M 4

168 THE GENERAL HISTORY sook 11

city; but was forced at last to retire, because his party
within the walls were restrained from joining him, through
apprehension of the tyrant. For Aristomachus, on pre-
tence that the inhabitants were secretly engaged in the
design, and had favoured the entrance of the Acheeans,
seized eighty of the chief among the citizens, and caused
them to be put to death in torture, even before the eyes of
their friends and families.

I. forbear to relate the whole of his ; flagitious life, with
the crimes which his ancestors before him had committed.
The task would be too tedious. If at last then he was
forced to suffer in some degree that crucl treatment which
he had practised against others, this surely cannot be
esteemed too severe or shocking. It should rather raise
our indignation if such a man had died, without being first
exposed to any kind of vengeance or calamity. Nor ought
it to be censured as an instance of injustice in Antigonus
and Aratus, that when they had fairly taken him in war,
they put him to death in torture; since if they had treated
him with the same severity. even during the time of peaee,
the action must have been applauded by all men of sense.’

` But if, besides his other crimes, he was guilty likewise
„of the worst ingratitude and perfidy towards the Achecans,
what punishment will he then be thought to have de-
served? Yet this was in truth the fact. For when the
death of Demctrius had left him naked and defenceless, so
that he was constrained to lay down his sovereignty, he
found, beyond all his hopes, a safe and honourable refuge
in the generous clemency of the Achzeans; who not only
‘covered him from the punishment that was due to his past
tyranny, but received him into their republic, and even
yielded to him the greatest honours of the state; for he
was raised to be their general and preetor. But no sooner
had he conceived some hopes of recovering again his
former fortune by the assistance of Cleomenes, than he
forgot at once all the kindness that had been shewn
towards him; separated his country from the confederacy ;

CHAP, 1V. OF POLYBIUS. 169

and joined himself to. the enemy, at the very time when
the Achæanş -were in greatest want of his assistance.
After such a baseness, instead of being put to a cruel
death by night at Cenchres, as Phylarchus relates, he
should rather have been led through all the towns of
Peloponnesus, exposed to every kind of torture and indig-
nity, and. afterwards have been deprived of life. But, in
truth, this man, after all his wickedness, was only thrown
into the sea, for some crimes that he committed during his
stay at. Cenchree.

This histerian seems to have been persuaded, that acts
of violence or injustice were those which chiefly merited
his attention, Hence it is that he exaggerates, and relates
in the fullest and most pathetic manner, the sufferings of
the Mantineans, but makes no mention of that glorious
firmness which appeared in the conduct of the Megalopoli-
tans at this conjuncture. As if history should rather be
employed in describing bad actions than those that are
laudable and virtuous, or that the reader would find less
matter of instruction in such examples as deserve to be
admired and imitated, than in those which are fit only to
be detested and avoided. In his account of the taking of
Megalopolis he relates, that Cleomenes not only preserved
the town from being pillaged, but sent letters also to the
Megalopolitans, who had retired to Messene, and offered
tọ: restore their city to them on condition only that they
would embrace his interests, And this is done with design
to extol the magnanimity of Cleomenes, and his modera-
tion towards his enemies. He then adds, that the Me-
galopolitans refused to hear the letters to the end, and
were hardly restrained from stoning the messengers who
brought them. But here his relation is concluded. With
respect to all that should afterwards have followed,,he is
entirely silent; neglecting the most fair occasion of pex-
forming that which is, indeed, the peculiar work of history :
I mean, the task of recording a great and noble instance
of uncommon constancy and resolution, and of recom-

—

170 THE GENERAL HISTORY zoox rr.

mending it to our praise and imitation. For if every:
publie testimony, by which we declare our affection and
steady zeal for the interests of our allies, be esteemed a
thing highly laudable and virtuous; if those who can see
their country wasted, or choose to sustain the miseries of
a siege rather than desert their friends, be thought worthy
not only of applause, but. of the greatest rewards and
honours, what then must be our opinion of the Megalo-
politans? how admirable their conduct, and how great
their character! 'They saw their lands laid waste and pil-
laged by Cleomenes, and themselves constrained to abandon
all their territory, for their attachment to the interests of
the Achzans. Yet-when beyond all hope they might have
been again restored to their city and former fortunes, they
chose still to be deprived of their estates, their sepulchres,
temples, country; the dearest and most valuable posses-
sions of all that belonged to man;: rather than betray that
faith by which they had bound themselves to their allies.
Can any thing be conceived more great and generous than
such a resolution? Or could any action better have de-
served the attention of a historian; or have been more
proper and effectual to excite his readers punctually to
observe all treaties, and to concur with their allies in all
things that may strengthen their confederacy, and fix their
government upon solid grounds? But-Phylarchus passes
over the whole in silence; blind to merit the most illus-
trious; and through want of judgment unable to discern
what actions best deserve his notice.

In another place he affirms, that the Lacedsemonians
gained a booty of six thousand talents from the spoils of
Megalopolis; and that two thousand of them were, by the
customary distribution, allotted to Cleomenes. It must
surely seem a matter of surprise that this writer should
thus be found to want even that common . knowledge, con-
cerning the wealth and abilities of the Greeks, with which
every historian should especially.be acquainted. | For, not
to speak of those calamitous times in which the fortunes of

cute m. IOP POLFHUTOS: 171

this people were continually wasted by their wars against
the kings of Macedon, and by civil wars among themselves,
I may venture to declare, that, even in the present age,
when they live together in perfect peace and union, and
possess all things in the greatest plenty, the sale of all the
effects and riches of the whole province of Peloponnesus,
the inhabitants alone excepted, would by no means be
sufficient to produce so large a sum. ‘That this is no vain
surmise, but an opinion founded upon truth and reason,
will most evidently appear, if we consider only the fol-
lowing fact, which is well established in history, and
sufficiently known to all. When the Athenians, in con- ‘
junction with the Thebans, designed to attack the Lace-
daemonians, and had raised an army of ten thousand men,
with a fleet of a hundred triremes, in order to defray the
expences of the war, it was resolved to impose a tribute,
proportioned to the estate of every citizen. For this
purpose, when an estimate had been made of all the wealth
and goods, the houses and lands of Attica, the whole was
found to amount to no more than five thousand seven
hundred and fifty talents. From hence then we may very
reasonably collect the truth of what I have affirmed con-
cerning the people of Peloponnesus.

But with regard to' the spoils of Megalopolis, we never
can suppose with any shew of probability that they
exceeded, even at the highest valuation, three hundred
talents; since it is acknowledged, that the greater part, as
well of the slaves as free citizens, escaped to Messene.
With respect to this opinion likewise, the following
instance must be allowed to be decisive. The Mantineans,
both in wealth and nunibers; are confessed even by Phy-
larchus himself to be inferior to none of the people of
Arcadia. Yet when their. city was surrendered after a
siege, so that not a single.person could escape, nor any
part of their effects be easily concealed, the whole value of
the plunder, with the inhabitants themselves included,

172 THE GENERAL HISTORY BOOK ll.

amounted to no greater sum than that which I have
mentioned.

. What he afterwards relates is still more wonderful.
That ten days before the action, a messenger came from
Ptolemy, to acquaint, Cleomenes that the king would no
longer furnish money for the war, but advised him to make
peace with Antigonus; and that Cleomencs, when he had
received this message, resolved immediately to force the
enemy to a battle, before the troops should be informed of
what had happened, because he was by no means able
from his own revenues to support and pay the army. «Yet
if Cleomenes had so lately gained six thousand talents, he
surpassed even Ptolemy himself in wealth. And if he had
possessed three hundred only, he might still have sustained
the war against Antigonus, without any difficulty or dis-
tress. To affirm, therefore, that Cleomenes was master of
so great riches, and at the same time to declare, that he
depended entirely on king Ptolemy for the necessary
charges of the war, is a fault so gross, that it betrays the
greatest want of judgment and capacity. Absurdities of
the same kind with those that have been mentioned, are
every where to be found in this historian; not in his ac-
counts of these times only, but in every part of his per-
formance. But these, which I have here examined, will
be sufficient for the present purpose.

CHAP. V.

AFTER the reduction of Megalopolis, and while Anti-
gonus lay in winter quarters in the city of Argos, Cleo-
menes, having drawn his troops together in the beginning
of the.spring, and encouraged them as the occasion re-
quired, immediately began his march, and threw himself
into the midst of the Argian territory, with design to Jay
waste and plunder it. This step was thought by many to

CHAP. V. OF POLYBIUS. 178

/

be much too bold and hazardous; because the entrance to
the country lay through passes that were very strong and
difficult. But others, of a better judgment, were per-
suaded that the attempt was both wise and safe. For
Cleomenes was, in the first place, well assured, that as the
Macedonian forces were now dismissed, his march into the
| province would be perfectly secure from danger. He con-
sidered also, that when the inhabitants of Argos should
behold the country wasted to their very walls, they would
not fail to express their discontent by loud clamours against
Antigonus; that if this prince, unable to withstand the
reproaches of the multitude, should draw out his troops
and venture on a battle, the Lacedzemonians might be sure
to gain an easy victory; and, on the other hand, if Anti-
gonus should remain unmoved, and still keep himself be-
hind the walls, he hoped at least that the attempt itself
would serve to check the spirits of the enemy, and raise
the courage of his own troops; and that afterwards he
might retreat with safety. The event fully answered all
his expectations. The people, enraged to see their country
ruined, ran together in crowds, and threw out bitter in-
vectives against the king. But Antigonus supported all
their insults with such steadiness as was worthy of a general
and. a prince; and being determined not to suffer any
motives to prevail against the dictates of sense and reason,
he remained quiet within the city. Cleomenes, therefore,
pursuing his design, wasted all the country; and having
struck the enemy with no small terror, and greatly ani-
mated his own troops against the future dangers of the war,
he returned back to Sparta without any loss.

On the approach of summer, when the Macedonians
and Achzeans had again taken the field, Antigonus began
his march with all the forces, and directed his route to-
wards Laconia. His army was composed of a phalanx of
Macedonians, which consisted: of ten thousand men; of
three thousand Macedonian peltaste, and three hundred
horse; one thousand Agrianians; as many Gauls; of

174 THE GENERAL HISTORY JEook 11.

other. mercenaries, three thousand foot and three hundred
horse; the same number of Achæans, all select men;
. With a thousand Megalopolitans, armed after the Macedo-
nian manner, and commanded by Cercidas, a citizen of
. Megalopolis. -Among the allies, the Beotians sent two
thousand foot, and two hundred horse; the Epirots one
thousand foot, and. fifty horse; and the Acarnanians the
same number. Besides these, there were sixteen hundred
Illyrians, under the command of Demetrius of Pharos.
So that the whole army consisted of about ewent scis
thousand foot, and twelve hundred horse.

Cleomenes, in. expectation that the enemy would ad-
vance towards him, secured the other. passages, by placing
guards, cutting down trees, and casting up intrenchments,
and then went and encamped near the place called Selasia

: with all his forces, which amounted to twenty thousand
men. Jor he had rightly judged, that this was the side by
which Antigonus would .attempt to force his entrance.
This pass is formed by two mountains, Eva and Olympus.
Between .them .runs the river Oenus; along the banks of
which lies the road to Sparta. Cleomenes, having thrown
up an intrenchment before these mountains, stationed’ the
allies upon the mount Eva, under the command of his
brother Euclidas; while himself took his post upon Olym-
pus, with the Lacedzemonians, and one part of the mer-
cenaries. The rest of the mercenaries, together with the
cavalry, were disposed in the plain alae on both sides cf
the road, along the river.

When Antigonus arrived, and had seen the strength of
the posts in mh the enemy were lodged, and that Cleo-
menes had assigned to every part of his army the station
that was most commodious for it, with so true a skill and
judgment, that the whole, being equally prepared both for
attack and for defence, seemed not unlike to a company of
gladiators, all standing in their proper attitudes, and ready
to engage; in a word, when he had seen not only that the
troops were disposed’ in-the most advantageous manner, to

CHAP..V. OF POLYBIUS. 175

receive an enemy, but that the camp also was so strong on
every side that it could not be attacked without great dan-
ger; he resolved to remain for some time quiet, and not
yet attempt to draw the enemy to a battle. He fixed his
camp, tlierefore, at a moderate distance from them; having
the river Gorgylus in his front.

. In this situation he remained for some days; examining
with great attention the nature and the situation of the
several posts, as well as the strength, temper, and condition
of the armies. Sometimes, by making a shew of having
some design, he alarmed the expectations of the enemy,
and made them attentive to his motions. But he soon
found, that all his arts and stratagems were useless. For
such: was the care and vigilance of Cleomenes, who was
still upon his guard wherever the danger seemed to threaten,
that every part of the camp was'secure from insult. * At
last, these generals, whom nature seemed to have formed
alike both in sentiments and courage, agreed by joint con-
sent to.make the experiment of a decisive action. :

To the forces that were stationed upon mount Eva,
Antigonus opposed the Macedonians, who were armed
with brazen bucklers, and the Illyrians, ranged together in
alternate cohorts, and cominanded by Alexander, the. son
of Acmetus, and by Demetrius of Pharos. The second
line was composed of the Acarnanians and Cretans; who
were followed by two thousand Achzans, as a body of re-
serve. The cavalry, under the command of Alexander,
was ranged along the river, opposite to the cavalry of the
enemy; and was supported by a thousand Achzean foot,
and the same number of Megalopolitans. The king him-
self, with the Macedonians and the mercenaries, conducted
the attack against Cleomenes upon mount Olympus. The
mercenaries composed the first line; and after them fol-
lowed the Macedonians, formed in the double phalanx,
one part of which was ranged behind the other, for the
narrowness of the ground would admit no other disposition.
The Illyrians, who had passed the river in the night, and

é

176 THE GENERAL HISTORY BOOK II.

stood in order, covered from the sight of the enemy, at
the foot of mount Eva, were commanded to march up the
mountain, and begin the attack as soon as they should see
an ensign of linen raised upon mount Olympus; and tlie
signal for the cavalry and the Megalopolitans was 0 be a
vest of purple hoisted near the king.

When thé time of the attack was come, the necessary
orders distributed among the troops, and the signal given
to the Illyrians, they immediately all shewed themselves,
and marched up the mountain to charge the enemy. But
the light-armed forces, that were placed among the cavalry
of Cleomenes, having observed that the Achseans, as they
were labouring to gain the summit of the hill, were not
covered or supported from behind, advanced and fell sud-
denly upon their rear. And thus these troops, having Eu-
clidas above them, ready to attack their front, and being
at the same time pressed by the mercenaries behind, who
ran forwards to the charge with great force and fury, were
thrown into extreme danger. Philopcemen of Megalopolis,
perceiving what had happened, and being well aware of the
consequences of it, communicated his apprehensions to the
generals. ' And when these paid no regard to his advice,
because he was at that time extremely young, and had
borne no command in the army, he.called aloud to his
` countrymen to follow him, and threw himself briskly upon
the cavalry of the enemy. The mercenaries, that were
engaged with the rear, hearing the noise, and’ seeing what
had happened, immediately left the charge, and hastened
back again to their former post, to support and assist their
cavalry. By this means the Illyrians, Macédonians, and
the rest of the troops that were marching up the mountain,
being freed from the obstacle that had embarrassed and
retarded them, advanced, boldly against the enemy; so
that the success, which afterwards was gained on this side
against Euclidas, was entirely to be ascribed to the discern- ,
ment and wise conduct of Philopoemen. And it is reported,
that when the battle was ended, Antigonus, dissembling

CHAP. V. ». OF POLYBIUS. 171

his knowledge of the truth, demanded of Alexander, who
commanded the cavalry, why he had begun the combat
before the signal was made for it; and that when Alexan-
der denied that he had done it, and said that a young man,
a Megalopolitan, had given the charge in opposition to his
orders, the king replied, ** That young man then, by seiz-
ing the proper time for action, performed the part of a
prudent and experienced general, and you, the general, the
part of an ignorant young man."

With regard to Euclidas, he totally neglected the ad-
vantages which his situation gave him. For when he saw
the enemy ascending the hill towards him, he should, in
prudence, have advanced, and met them on the way;
should have fallen upon them, and disturbed their ranks;
and afterwards have retired again to the.top of the hill.
And thus, when he had first spread disorder through the
ranks, and taken.from them that superiority which was
peculiar to their arms, and to the manner in which they
were ranged in battle, he might then, with the advantage
of his.post, have gained an easy victory against them.
But so far was he from pursuing any of these measures,
that, on the contrary, his troops stood still in their first
station, as if assured of conquest; and seemed to have
been persuaded, that if the enemy were permitted to gain
the summit, this would only serve to render their flight
back again more precipitate and fatal. But the event
proved different from their expectations. For as the
enemy advanced against them in close order, their ranks
being all entire, Euclidas, for want of sufficient. room
behind for his army to retire or change their place, was
thrown into the greatest difficulties, and forced to main-
tain the fight upon the very edge of the hill. In this situ-
ation, his troops could not long stand against the heavy
arms and unbroken disposition of the enemy; but, as the
Illyrians still pressed forwards, they still gave ground
before them, and were at last constrained to take their
flight along the steep and craggy sides of the mountain.

VOL. I. N

178 THE GENERAL HISTORY BOOK IH.

Their disorder was then complete, and a general route
ensued,

During this time the cavalry on both sides were engaged.
The Acheans, whose liberty was especially the subject of
the contest, all exerted their bravest efforts. But Philo-
poemen signalized himself above the rest; and when his
horse was killed under him in the action, he continued to
fight on foot, till he had received a wound which passed
through both his thighs.

The two kings began the combat upon mount Olympus
with the light-armed troops and mercenaries, which
amounted on either side to about five thousand men. The
action, which was sometimes general, and sometimes main-
tained in parties, was remarkably warm and vigorous. For
as the troops remembered that they stood beneath tlie eyes
of their respective sovereigns, and in full sight of both the
armies, rank with rank, and man with man, all sustained
the fight with the utmost bravery and spirit. But when
Cleomenes perceived that his brother was entirely routed,
and that the cavalry in the plain began to give ground
likewise, being apprehensive that the enemy would soon
attack him froin every quarter, he resolved to level all his
works, and draw out his forces in front on one side of the
camp. The trumpets on both sides gave the signal for the .
light-armed troops to retire from the space that was be-
tween the armies.. The phalanxes come forward with loud
cries, turn their spears, and advance to the charge. The
dispute was long and,obstinate. Sometimes the Macedo-
nians were repulsed by the bravery and vigour of the La-
cedeemonians: and sometimes these gave ground, unable
to stand against the shock of the Macedonian phalanx.
At last the troops of Antigonus, crowding close together
the points of all their spears, and advancing against the
enemy with all that weight and violence which are peculiar
to the double phalanx, forced them out of their intrench-
ments. The whole army fled in disorder, and a general
slaughter ensued. But Cleomenes, with a few horsemen

CHAP. V. 4 OF POLYBIUS. 179

that attended him, escaped to Sparta, and from thence, as
soon as night came on, went down to Gythium; and find-
ing there some vessels, which by his orders had been long
kept in readiness against all accidents, he presently em-
barked, together with his friends, and sailed away te
oec iniirin. l
* Antigonus made himself master of Sparta upon his first
approach. He treated the inhabitants with the greatest
generosity and clemency, and restored to them their an-
‘cient government. But some days afterwards, having re-
ceived information that the Illyrians had entered Macedon,
and were plundering the country, he left the city, and
directed his march back again with all his forces. .So
contrary are the events of things to all human foresight,
even in affairs of the greatest moment. For if Cleomenes
had declined a battle but for a few days only, or if after
his retreat he had remained at Sparta, in expectation of
some favourable accident, he might still have held posses-
sion of his kingdom.
"Antigonus, arriving at Tegea, restored the city to its
former state. Two days afterwards, he came to Argos,
and. was present at the Nemean games. And when he
had. there received, both from the Achæan republic in
general, and from every particular city, such applause and
honours as might serve to render his name illustrious to all
posterity, lie continued his march in haste towards Mace-
don; surprised the Illyrians in the country; engaged them
in battle; and gave them an entire defeat. But the cries
and shouts which he made with more than usual vehemence,
to animate his soldiers during the time of the action, were
followed by a great discharge of blood, which threw him
into a disorder, that was fatal to him in a short time after.
Thus were the Greeks deprived of a prince, upon whom
they had built the highest expectations; not so much on
account of his skill in war, as because he had shewn him-
self, in all his conduct, to be a man of strict integrity, and
N 2

180 THE GENERAL HISTORY BOOK II.

a true friend to virtue. At his death he left the kingdom
to Philip the son of Demetrius.

As these transactions are connected with the period from
whence I am to begin my History, I judged it to be proper,
or rather necessary, in pursuing my first design, to relate
them copiously and distinctly, that it might be from thence
discerned, what was at that time the condition of the
Macedonians and the Greeks. About the same time,
Ptolemy also died of some disease, and Ptolemy Philopa-
tor succeeded to his kingdom. Seleucus, the son of
Seleucus Callinicus who was also surnamed Pogon, being
likewise dead, his brother Antiochus reigned in Syria. For
it is remarkable, that as those who first obtained these
kingdoms after Alexander, I mean Seleucus, Ptolemy, and
Lysimachus, all left the world in the hundred and twenty-

` - fourth Olympiad, so the princes just now mentioned died

all together likewise in the hundred and thirty-ninth.

Thus, then, have we finished the foundation of our
history, and shewn in the course of this introduction at
what time, in what manner, and upon what pretences, the
Romans, after they had subdued the several parts of Italy,
began first to extend their views abroad, and even con-
tended with the Carthaginians for the empire of the sea;
and have also fully explained the condition and former
fortunes of the Greeks, Macedonians, and Carthaginians.
As we are now, therefore, arrived at the point which we
had first in view, the commencement of the social war in
Greece, of the war of Annibal against the Romans, and of
that between the kings of Asia for the sovereignty of Cocle-
Syria, we shall here close this book, having brought to their
conclusion the transactions which immediately preceded
these wars, and seen the deaths of all the princes who con-
ducted them. .

CHAP. I. OF POLYBIUS. s 181

BOOK THE THIRD.

CHAP. I.

AT was mentioned in the first of the two preceding books,
that we had fixed the beginning of our history at the com-
mencement of the social war; the war of Annibal; and
that between Antiochus and Ptolemy, for the sovereignty
of Coele-Syria. In the same book, we took occasion also
to explain the reasons that inclined us to look back to an
earlier age, and to relate, in the way of introduction, the
chief of those transactions which preceded this period.
We now go on to give a clear and distinct description of
these wars, together with the causes to which they owed
both their rise and greatness; but shall first premise a
short account of the design and subject of our work.

The chief intention then of this history is to shew, at
what time, in what manner, and from what causes, the
whole known world became subject to the Roman power.
And since this great event had a known beginning, and is
allowed to have been completed likewise in a determinate
course of time, it will be useful first to recapitulate all the
chief transactions which passed between the commencement
of it and its completion. From this method, the reader
will be able to acquire at once a right conception of all that
we have undertaken to describe. For in the study of his-
tory, as in every other kind of science, as a general view of
the whole enables the mind to form a truer judgment on
the several parts, so, on the other hand, a distinct survey of
all the parts is also no less necessary for the right compre-
hension of the whole. We have already sufficiently ex-
plained the general form and purpose of our work, and

f N 3

182 THE GENERAL HISTORY BOOK III.

shewn the bounds of its extent. With regard to the seyeral
parts, the first in order are the wars just mentioned; the
last, the subversion of the, Macedonian empire; and these
together include a period of fifty-three years; which, in the
number of great and wonderful events that were then pro-
duced, far surpasses any equal portion of time before it.
In relating these transactions, we shall observe the follow-
ing order, beginning at the hundred and fortieth Olympiad.

Having first explained the causes of the war between
the Carthaginians and the Romans, which is most fre-
quently called the war of Annibal, we shall shew in what
manner this general entered Italy, and gave so great a
shock to the empire of the Romans, that they began to fear
that they should soon be dispossessed even of their proper
country and seat of government: while their enemies, elate
with a success which had exceeded all their hopes, were
persuaded that Rome itself must fall, as soon as they
should once appear before it. We shall then speak of the
alliance that was made by Philip with the Carthaginians,
as soon as he had ended his war with the ZEtolians, and
settled the affairs of Greece. Next will follow the disputes
between Antiochus and Ptolemy Philopator, and the war

` that ensued between them for the sovereignty of Cocle-

Syria: together with the war, which Prusias and the Rho-
dians made upon the people of Byzantium ; with design. to
force them to desist from exacting certain duties, which
they were accustomed to demand fron all vessels that sailed
into the Pontus. In this place we shall pause awhile, to
take a view of the form and constitution of the Roman
government: and in the course of our enquiry shall endea-
vour to demonstrate, that the peculiar temperament and
spirit of their republic supplied the chief and most effectual
means, by which this people were enabled not only to
acquire the sovereignty of Italy and Sicily, and to reduce
the Gauls and Spaniards to their yoke, but to subdue the
Carthaginians also, and when they had completed this
great conquest, to form the project of obtaining universal

CHAP. I. OF POLYBIUS. 183

empire. We shall add, likewise, a | short digression, con-
cerning the fate of Hiero' S kingdom i in Sicily; and after-
wards go on to speak of those commotions that were raised
in Egypt, after the death of Ptolemy, by Philip and An-
tiochus: the wicked arts by which those princes attempted
to share between themselves the dominions of the infant
king; and the manner, in which the former of them in-
vaded Egypt, Samos, and Caria; and the latter, Coele-
Syria and Phoenice. We then shall make a general reca-
pitulation of all that was transacted by the Carthaginians
and the Romans, in Spain, Sicily, and Afric; and from
thence shall again remove the history to Greece, which
now became the scene of new disorders. And having first
run through the naval battles of Attalus and the Rhodians
against king Philip, we shall next describe the war that
followed between the Romans and this prince; together
with the causes, circumstances, and conclusion of it. After
these events, we shall relate in what manner the JEtolians,
urged by their resentment, called Antiochus from Asia, and
gave occasion to the war between the Achæans and the
Romans. And having explained the causes of that war,
and seen the entrance of Antiochus into Europe, we shall
then shew the manner in which he fled back .again from
Greece; and afterwards, when he had suffered an entire
defeat, was forced to abandon all the country on this side
of mount Taurus. Next will follow the victories, by which
the Romans gave an effectual check to the insolence of the
Gauls; secured to themselves the sovereignty of the citerior
Asia; and delivered the people of that country from the
dread of being again exposed to the violence and savage
fury of those barbarians. We shall then give some ac-
count -of the misfortunes, in which the ZEtolians and
Cephallenians were involved, and of the war which Eu-
menes sustained against Prusias and the Gauls of Greece ;
together with that of Ariarathes against Pharnaces. . And
after some discourse concerning the union, and form of
government, of the confederate cities of Peloponnesus,
N4

184 THE GENERAL HISTORY BOOK III.

which will be attendéd also with some remarks upon the
growth and flourishing conditions of the republic of the
Rhodians, we shall, in the last place, take a short review
of all that has been before related; and conclude the whole
with the expedition of Antiochus Epiphanes into Egypt,
and the war with Perseus, which was followed by the
entire subversion of the Macedonian empire.

In the course of these events, we shall be able clearly to
discern by what kind of conduct the Romans gradually
enlarged the limits of their power, till they had gained the
sovereignty of the world. Now, if the bare contemplation
of good and ill success could of itself enable us to form a
right judgment on the conduct either of states or private
men, we should here close our history, agreeably to our
first design. For the period of fifty-three years, which
contains the whole’ progress and advancement of the
Roman greatness, is here concluded; and from this time,
as all were ready to acknowledge, nothing more remained,
than to receive laws from this republic, and yield an
absolute submission to its sway. But the view only of the
manner in which wars are terminated can never lead us
into a complete and perfect knowledge, either of the
conquerors, or the conquered nations: since, in’ many
instances, the most eminent and signal victories, through
an injudicious use and application of them, have proved
fatal and. pernicious; as, on the other hand, the heaviest
ills of fortune, when supported with constancy and courage,
are frequently converted into great advantage. On this
account, it will be useful likewise to review the policy,
which the Romans afterwards observed, in governing the
countries that were thus subdued: and to consider also,
what were the sentiments of the conquered states, with
respect to the conduct of their masters: at the same time
describing the various characters and inclinations of par-
ticular men, and laying open their tempers and designs, as
‘well in private life, as in the affairs of government. From
these enquiries, the people of the present times will be

CHAP. I. OF POLYBIUS. 185

enabled to discern, how far their interest requires them to
continue still in their dependence on the Romans; and
posterity may also fully understand the whole civil policy
of this great republic, and pass a right judgment on its
defects and excellencies. And from hence, indeed, will
arise the chief advantages that are to be expected from
this history, with regard both to the present and to future
times. For it ought never to be supposed, either by those
who preside in states, or those who are willing to decide
with truth concerning the manner in which they are
administered, that the sole end of making war is victory.
No wise man ever attacked his neighbours for the sake
only of returning superior from the field. ‘The design of
navigation is not barely to be transported from place to
place. Nor is any art or science practised with a view
simply to acquire a knowledge in it. In all human actions,
there is still some end proposed, either of pleasure, honour,
or advantage, consequent to our pains and labour. To
render therefore this history complete and perfect, it will
be necessary to lay open and explain the circumstances
and condition of each several people, from the time when
the contest was decided which gave to the Romans the
sovereignty of the world, to the rise of new commotions
and disorders. And as these too were of great importance,
and attended with many uncommon incidents; and as I
was myself engaged in the execution of some of them, in
the conduct and contrivance of others, and was an eye-
witness of almost all; I shall undertake the task of relating
them at large, and begin as it were another history. The
chief of these transactions were the expeditions of the
Romans against the Celtiberians and Vacceans: the war
which the Carthaginians made against Massanissa, a
sovereign prince of Afric; and that between Attalus and
Prusias in Asia. We shall also see the manner in which
Ariarathes, king of Cappadocia, was driven from his
dominions by Orofernes, assisted by Demetrius, and again
by his own address recovered his paternal rights. We

186 THE GENERAL HISTORY BOOK III.

shall see Demetrius, the son of Seleucus, after he had
reigned twelve years in Syria, deprived of his kingdom
and his life, by the conspiracy of the other kings. About
the same time, the Romans absolved those Greeks, -that
were accused of having secretly excited the war of Per-
seus, and permitted them to return to their own country.
Aud ‘not long afterwards the same Romans made. war
again upon the Carthaginians: at first intending to force
them to remove the seat of their republic; but afterwards
with design to exterminate both their name and govern-
ment, for reasons which I shall there endeavour to explain.
And lastly, when the Macedonians had about this time
broken their alliance with the Romans, and the Lacede-
monians were also: separated from the Peloponnesian
league, theill fate of Greece received at once. both its
beginning and full accomplishment, in the loss of the
common liberty.

Such is the design of this work: which, with the
favourable aid of fortune, I hope to carry to its destined
end. But if my expectation should be frustrated, either
through the shortness of my life, or the infirmities that are
incident to mankind, yet I am persuaded that a subject so
curious and important cannot fail to excite the attention of
many able writets, who will esteem it a task well worthy
of their pains, to finish what I shall leave imperfect.

As we have thus enumerated all the chief events of
which we: intend to treat, and given the reader a just
conception both of the general plan of our work, and of

A its several parts, it is now time to remember what we have
= |= proposed, and to enter upon the beginning of our subject.

S /

nu ow AMONG the writers that have transinitted to us the
eal a“ history of Annibal, there are some who assign two causes
rh Wy of the second war between the Carthaginians and the
A Romans. The first, they sa | the siege of Saguntum ;
and the other, the passage of the Carthaginians over the

river Iberus, in direct breach of treaties. Now, that these

CHAP. I. OF POLYBIUS. 187

two incidents were the beginning of the war, I shall readily
allow; but by no means that they were the causes of it.
It might with equal reason be affirmed, that the first

5 y : K a A
irruption of Alexander into Asia, was the cause of: his wary He

9 des

against the Persians; and the arrival of Antiochus with an os

army at Demetrius, the cause of that war which followed
with the Romans. Yet nothing can be more absurd or
false. For it is certain that Alexander, and indeed his
father Philip, had long before this time formed the.project
of an expedition into Persia, and made great preparations
for it: and the!ZEtolians likewise were no less fixed in
their design to-excite a war against the Romans, before
Antiochus came into Greece. Such mistakes arise from
not remembering, that a distinction should be always made
between the cause and pretext, and the beginning, of a
war; and that the first of these are in order always ante-
cedent to the latter. ‘To speak justly, the beginning is the
first step towards the execution of any project, after it
has been determined. ‘The cause is previous to all de-
termination. It is something that first suggests the project
to the mind, that inclines us to examine it; to deliberate,
determine, and at last to carry it into execution. I will
endeavour more clearly to explain my meaning by the
following examples. ‘The causes-of the war against the
Persians are obvious, and easy to be understood.. The
first was the retreat of tbe Greeks under the command of
Xenophon ; who, in their return from the upper provinces
of Asia, traversed the whole country of their enemies,
without being encountered by any force that was able to
stand before them. The other was, the irruption of Age-
silaus, king of Sparta, into Asia; where he found no
strength sufficient to obstruct his progress; though, indeed,
the troubles that were then raised in Greece constrained
him to abandon his designs, and return back again without
performing any action of importance. For Philip, having
revolved these things in his mind, and compared the soft-
ness and effeminacy of the Asiatics with his own skill in

We

aj

:

TA

188 THE GENERAL HISTORY soox mr.

war, and with the bravery of the Macedonian soldiers, and
being invited also by the richness of the prize that was
before him, had no sooner fully gained the favour of the
states of Greece, than he resolved to turn his arms against
the Persians, and began, with eagerness, to make all the
preparations that were necessary for this design: at the
same time declaring, that his purpose was, to avenge the
injuries which the Greeks had received from Persia. It is
clear, therefore, that the things first mentioned were the
causes of the Persian war, as the last was the pretext; and
that the first entrance of Alexander into Asia was the
beginning of it. In the same manner also, the resentment
of the /Etolians must be considered as the cause of the war
between Antiochus and the Romans. For this people,
as we have already mentioned, being persuaded that the
Romans, at the time of the conclusion of their war with
Philip, had treated them in many points with great con-
tempt and scorn, invited Antiochus into Greece, and
resolved to attempt and suffer every thing, rather than
leave their indignation unappeased. The pretext by
which Antiochus and the 7Etolians endeavoured to engage
the several cities into their design, and which indeed was
founded neither on truth nor reason, was to restore liberty
to Greece. And the beginning of the war was the ue.
of Antiochus at Demetrias.

In making these reflections, it is not so much my inten-
tion to pass a censure upon those historians, as to instruct
the political reader in a point which ought at all times to
be viewed with great attention. For a statesman, that
knows not how to trace the origin of events, aud discern
the different sources from whence they take their rise, may
be compared with a physician, who neglects to inform
himself of the causes of those distempers which he is called
in to cure. The services of both are alike useless and con-
temptible. And as the latter must be wholly unacquainted
with the proper means of restoring the body to its lost
health and vigour, so neither can it be supposed, that the

CHAP. I. OF POLYBIUS. j 189

former should ever be able to have recourse to the neces-

sary remedies, in the disorders that are incident to states.

Our pains, therefore, can never better be employed than

in searching out the causes of events. For the most tri- ~
fling incidents frequently give birth to matters of the
greatest moment and importance; and it is easier likewise,

upon all occasions, to check or remedy an evil in its com-
mencement, than when it has made some progress.

Aardig to the Roman historian Fabius, it was haii in- gaws S
satiable ambition of Asdrubal, and his, love of power, ASDA
which, together with the injury that was done to the pact dete L
Saguntines, were the causes of the war. For Asdrubal,~\2s¢<*>'
says this writer, when he had first spread his conquests
over a considerable part of Spain, returned to Carthage,
and there formed the project of subverting the laws and
liberty of his country, and of changing the government
into a monarchy. But when the chief among the citizens
had penetrated into his design, and were beginning to con-
cert the proper measures to oppose it, he went back again
to Spain, and, during the remainder of his life, governed the
country by his own single will; and paid no regard to the
senate of Carthage. He then adds; that Annibal, who from
his infancy had been instructed in all oem of this
general, and had carefully observed his conduct as a
right pattern for himself, was no sooner invested with the
supreme command in Spain, than he resolved to pursue in
all things the same scheme of government; that, agreeably
to this determination, he made war upon the Romans;
consulting in it his own inclinations only, and not the
interests of his country; .that the Carthaginians . were
averse to the. war; and that not one citizen of rank in the
whole republic approved of his attacking the Saguntines.

In the last place he relates, that as soon as Saguntum. was
destroyed, the Romans sent some deputies to Carthage, to
require that Annibal.should be surrendered into their
hands, and to declare war, in case that this demand should
be refused. Let us then ask this writer, could the Cartha-

}

190 THE GENERAL HISTORY mook m.

ginians, if they were in truth dissatisfied with that which
Annibal had done, ever hope to find an occasion more fa-
vourable to all their sentiments, or any expedient more
just and advantageous, than what was now proposed; since
by‘yielding to the demands of the Romans, and delivering
up the author of the injury, they might at once have re-
moved, in a specious manner, the man who was known to
be an enemy to their state; secured their country from
invasion ; turned aside the dangers of the war that threat-
encd them; and, in a word, by a single decree only of the
senate, might have taken an effectual and sufficient venge-
ance for all that had been now transacted? This is a
question to which the Roman historian can make no reply.
For so far were the Carthaginians from pursuing any of
these measures, that, on the contrary, they maintained the
war under the sole direction and care of Annibal, during
the course of seventeen years; nor ever were inclined to
bring it to a conclusion, till all hopes of success were lost,
and the safety of their country rendered almost desperate.’
-With regard to my design in passing this censure on
Fabius and his writings, I was not led to it by any appre-
hension that his accounts would otherwise gain credit with
the reader. For his inaccuracy and want of judgment are
every where so discernible, that they need not be particu-
larly pointed out. But I was willing just to caution those
who take his works into their hands, that they should con-
sider always the facts themselves rather than the character
of the writer. For there are some whose prejudices so
strongly favour him, because he was a senator of Rome;
and lived in the times of. which he writes, that they admit,

‘without any kind of doubt or hesitation, every thing which

he relates. For my own part, as I do not think that his
authority should be entirely disregarded, so neither ‘can I
allow it. to have sufficient weight to decide in any point,
unless it be supported also by the credibility of the facts.
But it is time to finish this digression.

Among the true causes then of the second war betweeri

——MH— € — ase ————
x ^ -A MÀ e

m
— OF POLYBIUS. 6^7 191

the Carthaginians and the Romans, the resentment and ,/

indignation of Amilcar Barcas, the father of Annibal, may% (D

agp elena as one Notwithstanding the ill
success of this general in Sicily, his spirit remained uncon-
quered; when he reflected that he had preserved the forces
that were under his command at Eryx still entire, and that
all of them were animated by the same disposition as him-
self. After the last defeat of the Carthaginians by. sea,
— which obliged them to sue for peace, he yielded indeed to
the necessity of the times; but retained a strong desire of
revenge, and only waited for an occasion to declare it. And
in all probability his management would very suddenly
have produced another war, if the disorders in which his
coüntry was then involved by the rebellion of the merce-
naries, had not engaged his whole attention.
No sooner were these troubles ended, than the Romans
again declared war; and the Carthaginians, emboldened
by the justice of their cause, seemed at first determined to
accept it, as we mentioned in the former books; which the
reader will find to be so necessary an introduction to this
work, that, without their assistance, he will scarcely be able
fully to comprehend either what I now write, or what here-
after may come to be related. But as their enemies paid
no regard to this justice, the Carthaginians. were forced to
comply with what the times demanded; and, rather then
submit to any hazard in their present circumstances, con- | (One equ
sented, though with great reluctance, to yield up Sardinia y, x. es ino
to the Romans, and to pay twelve hundred talents above an "NT

anco to pas vuelve’ Auwerec taney!
the sum that had been before exacted from them. — N a td
These concessions are to be looked upon as the second, A^ ji &

and indeed the principal cause of the war that followed E

For Amilcar, observing that his own resentment “was now Ua n 1
sitengihaiel-by an equal -degror of Indigniiio [p Ws fü, P6 nete
low-citizens, had no sooner: finished the destruction of the D the

mercenaries, and secured the tranquillity of Cartha han. to pey
he applied all his thoughts to Spain as the place from_

whence he might best procure the necessary supplies for an

"omo hu ia pe aii
- -—

192 THE GENERAL HISTORY mook rir.

expedition against the Romans. And the great success

which he met with in that country may be considered as
the third cause of the war; because nothing but the strength
and the resources which the Carthaginians drew from
thence could have inspired them with confidence to under-
take it. i

. It might be shewn bys many mary that Amilcar
was the first author and contriver of the second. Punic war,
though he died ten years before the commencement of it;
but what I am going to relate will sufficiently prove it be-
yond all doubt. At the time when Annibal, after his defeat
in Afric, and departure from his country, was entertained
at the court of. Antiochus, the Romans, having discovered
the designs of the AXtolians, sent ambassadors to that
prince, to sound his disposition and intentions. The am-
bassadors, perceiving that he inclined to the Ætolians,
and was disposed to enter heartily into the war, endea-
voured to inspire him with a jealousy of Annibal; and, to
that end, shewed a more than common respect to the Car-
thaginian. Their design succeeded: the king became
doubtful of his truth ;.and his doubts grew stronger every
day. At.last, when they had one day found an oppor-
tunity of explaining their mutual discontent, Annibal, after
he had in vain employed many arguments and protestations
of his sincerity, went on to acquaint him, that when his

father was offering sacrifice to Jupiter, just before his de-

parture into Spain, he stood near him at the altar, being
then but nine years old; and that when the libations and
other rites were ended, Amilcar, having commanded the
rest that were about the altar to retire, called him to him,
caressed, and asked him if he would attend him to the army;
to which, when he cheerfully consented, and. even requested
that he might go, with that sort of eagerness which belongs
to children; his father led him to the altar, and commanded
him to touch the victims, and to swear that he never would
be a friend to the. Romans. You may, therefore, continued _

he, rest assured, that when you are forming any í y designs - J

———QÀ ——————————— (€ 53

CHAP, I. ` OF POLYBIUS. : 193

against the Romans, I shall encourage and assist you with
sincerity and zeal; but whenever you incline to terms of

treaty or alliance with them, from that time let me advise
you, not.to seek for the evidence of information, but to
mistrust me, and watch me carefully; for I shall still look
out for every occasion of workin mischief to that people.
This discourse, which was delivered with that kind of
passion which truth inspires, effectually removed all sus-
picion from the mind of Antiochus. :

This, it must be acknowledged, is a manifest instance of
Amilcar's hatred of the-Romans, and of the projects which
he at that time meditated ; but the events that followed are ©
a'still clearer confirmation of both. For what can more
strongly: denote the violence as well as certainty of this
disposition in Amilcar, than the conduct of his son-in-law
Asdrubal, and Annibal his son; whom: he had incited by
his counsels and example to the most inveterate enmity
against the same people that can be well conceived? The
first, indeed, died, before he was able fully to discover his in-
tentions to the world; but the other found the times more
favourable to his purpose; .and gave abundant proofs of his
hereditary hatred in the strongest and most public manner.
From hence we may learn how necessary it is, that those
who are entrusted with the administration of government;
should make it one of the first objects of their care, to be
well acquainted with the secret disposition and designs of
any people with whom they conclude a peace, or make a
new alliance; and observe whether their consent be yielded
to the circumstances of the times, or whether it proceed
from a perfect and sincere submission, that they may be
always upon their guard against those who are influenced
by the first motive, as men that wait only for a more sea-
sonable opportunity of acting; and on the other hand, that
they may repose an entire confidence in the others, esteem
them their true friends and subjects, and employ them in
any service that shall occur. v.d

VOL. I. o

194 THE GENERAL HISTORY Book trit.

Such were the causes of the war of Annibal: let us now
attend to the beginning of it.

It was not without great reluctance and concern that the
Carthaginians had been forced to abandon Sicily. [But the
loss of Sardinia afterwards, together with the payment of
a new and heavier tribute, added a still sharper sting to
their resentment. No sooner, therefore, had they reduced
beneath their power the most considerable part of Spain,
than they listened with the utmost eagerness to every
matter of complaint against the Romans. When Asdrubal
was dead, who had governed the affairs of Spain after

eec ta Amilcar, they for some time delayed to appoint his suc-

po

me)

pve

cessor, till they could know the sentiments of the army.
But when the news arrived, that the troops had with one
consent made choice of Annibal for their general, they
called together an assembly of the people, and with one
voice also confirmed the election. As soon as Annibal was
invested with this dignity, he began his, march to subdue
the Olcades. And having encamped before Althza, the
strongest of their cities, he pressed the siege with so much
vigour, that he soon inade himself master of the place. The
neighbouring towns were struck with tcrror, and submitted.
Annibal ransomed them all for money; and having, by
that means, gained great stores of wealth, he returned to
take his winter quarters at New Carthage. His treatment
of those that were under his command was in every instance
great and generous; and by the punctual payment of the
military stipends, as well as by the promise also of large
rewards for the time to come, he obtained the favour and
esteem of all the troops, and filled them with the warmest
hopes. é j

When the summer returned, having led his forces into
the territory of the Vacczeans, he made himself master of
Elmantica in the first assault. He took also the city of
Arbucale by storm, but not till it.had first sustained a siege,
in which he often was reduced to great extremity; for the

?

CHAP, I. OF POLYBIUS. 195

place was of large extent, and the inhabitants likewise, who
were very numerous, defended themselves with the greatest
braverv. After this success he was surprised at once, when
he least expected it, by a danger that seemed likely to prove
fatal to him. The .Carpesians, the strongest and most Cats
powerful people of the country, had drawn together all their uw 652^
forces, to intercept him in his return. ‘They were joined UNT
by many also of the neighbouring nations; who had been gat
animated to this attempt by the Elmanticans and Olcades, - ]
that had saved themselves by flight after the destruction of
their cities. If the Carthaginians had been forced to en-
gage in set battle against so great a force, their defeat must
have. been inevitable and complete. But Annibal, like a `
prudent and experienced general, retreated behind the
Tagus; and having the river in his front, resolved to Tep
expect the barbarians there, and to dispute their passage. X
By the help of this advantage, and with the assistance also
of his elephants, which were about forty in number, the
success was such as exceeded even his hopes. The enemy
came down. with the greatest eagerness and haste, and
plunged into the river in many parts at once. But no
sooner had they gained the other side, than they were met
and trodden down in heaps by the elephants that were
ranged along the bank. Great numbers of them also were
destroyed in.the passage over by the Carthaginian cavalry:
who were able more effectually to contend with the violence
of the stream; and who fought also with no small advan-
tage against.the foot, that Ps below them. Annibal NES
ili passed the river, charged the enemy, and gave them
an entire defeat, though their numbers amounted.to more
than a hundred thousand men. After this signal victory
there was not any people left on that side of the Iberus,
except only the Saguutines, that was able to oppose the vC a
rogress of the Carthaginians, or to appear against them in Ši
the field. But Annibal, remembering carefully the_counsels
and the plan of conduct which his father Amilcar had re-
commended to him, delayed for some time longer to attack
02

196 THE GENERAL HISTORY BOOK III.

Saguntum; being determined not to_give the Romans any
plausible pretence fur declaring war, till he had first secured
his other conquests, and settled the country in such a state

as was most proper for his design.
During this time the Saguntines, in apprehension of
what soon afterwards ensued, sent frequent messengers to
Rome, to inform the senate of the rapid progress and
success of Annibal. The Romans had | long neglected
Au^ ; these advices; at last, ast, however, ‘they resolved: to send some
" députiesi into ito Spain, to to inspect the t truth. Annibal, , having
reduced the several nations à against “whom he had at that
A time turned his arms, was again come. back, to take his
d winter quarters at New Carthage, which was the capital
city, and seat of government, of the Carthaginians, in that
part of Spain which was subject to their power. He there
found" t! ie Roman deputies, and . admitted. them to an

p^

TUA rem.

Lodi f any, violence t 10 ) the. Saguntines, th the. allies of Ro pe and to
( remain on. that side of the. Iberus,. agreeably to. to the > treaty
Exo made: with. Asdrubal. Annibal, who was at this time
young and eager in his appetite for war, animated by his

late success, and incited also by a long and habitual hatred

of the Romans, replied, as if he had been a friend to the
Saguntines; and complained to the ambassadors, that the

Romans, taking occasion from’ some disorders that. had

A] el , happened in the place not long before, and which were

submitted to their decision, had by an arbitrary sentence
^o-P. P^ ondethned some of the magistrates to die, This injustice

XA . ealled:aloud, he said, for his resentment; since the Car-
thaginians always had considered it as one of the most
sacred customs of their country, to redress and avenge the
injured. At the same time he sent to Carthage to know
what measures he should take with respect to the Sagun-

A peus tines; who, through confidence in their alliance with the
Sb to Jiomans, had offered violence, as he said, to some of the of the

{h's sab neighbouring people, that were under the protection : protection of
pi. Petert the republic. It is easy to remark, that in the whole of

t WON:

1

CHAP. I. OF POLYBIUS. 197

this proceeding he was hurried headlong by his passions,
and not led by reason. Instead, therefore, of acknow-
ledging the true motives of his conduct, he was forced to
have recourse to absurd pretences, as it usually happens to
men who are prevented by their prejudices from giving a
fair attention to what is just and right. How much better
would it have been, to have demanded of the Romans,
that they should restore Sardinia, and yield back the
tribute which, without any shew of.justice they had
extorted from the Carthaginians in the times of their dis-
tress? But now, by being wholly silent concerning that
which might have been considered as a reasonable pretence
for taking arms, and urging only those false and frivolous
motives which respected the Saguntines, he seemed in the
opinion of every one to enter into the war, not only in
opposition to sound sense and reason, but in —
violation also of all the laws of justice. - an
he ambassadors, perceiving clearly that a war must 3
follow, sailed away immediately to Carthage, i in order to pon
repeat again, before the senate, the same Temonstrances, s. &

which they had now made to Annibal. al. But they had rio no Cx

kind of apprehension that Italy would become the seat of
the war, but expected rather, that all hostilities would be.

' confined to Spain; and designed to use Saguntum as their

place of arms. Under this persuasion the Roman senate, , X
conceiving that the war would be long and difficult, and
far removed from their own country, resolved in the first .— ow €
place to re those disorders that had now happened in
Illyria. Á b tease s

. For mendi of Pharos, forgetting all the favours j
kiish had been heaped upan him by are Romans, and bhin E
even.beginning to think meanly of their power, when he Ues% -~
observed the consternation into which the Gauls had lately
thrown them, and which was now renewed again by the
preparations that were made by Annibal, from this time
resolved to place all his hopes in the royal housé of
Macedon ; to whose alliance and protection he had some

o3

WA Why Fen

T mm

198 THE GENERAL HISTORY mnookx itt.

kind of claim, because he had joined his forces with Anti-
gonus, in the war against Cleomenes. Fixed ‘in this
design, he began to plunder and destroy the Roman cities
in Illyria; and sailing with fifty armed frigates beyond

É Lissus in contempt of treaties, ravaged many of the Cy-

oS puxdeglade islands. As the house of Macedon was at this time

fte

us TK na

strong and flóurishing, the Romans conceived it to be
highly necessary, that they should secure against all danger
those provinces that were situated to the east of Italy; and
were persuaded, that it would then be early enough to
oppose the motions of the Carthaginians, when they had
first recovered the Illyrians from their folly, and chastised
the ingratitude and rashness of Demetrius. But the event
proved contrary to their hopes. For Annibal prevented
them by his diligence; and having made himself master of
Saguntum, he removed the scene of the war into the very
heart of Italy, and brought it even to the gates of Rome. :
t 4

CHAP. II. ^

f

IN the beginning ‘of the spring, in the first year of the
hundred and’ fortieth Olympiad, the Romans, pursuing
the design that has now been mentioned, sent’ L. Æmilius
with an army into Illyria. At the same time- Annibal
began his march from New Carthage: towards Saguntum.
This city is situated at tbe distance of about seven stadia
from the sea; upon the foot of those mountains which
form the frontiers of Iberia and Celtiberia. The country
round it is distinguished by its richness and fertility, above
all the other parts of Spain. Annibal, having encamped
before'the place, began to push the siege: with the closest
vigour. He saw, that from this conquest many àdvantages
would arise of the greatest moment with:respect to the
future execution of his designs. For first, as the’ Romans

J would then lose all hope of making Spain the theatre of

the war, so by this success he was sure to strike a general

=

CHAP. II. OF POLYBIUS. 199

terror into all the country, which would both render those
that had submitted to the power of Carthage more tractable
and steady in their duty, and make the rest, who were
yet unconquered, more cautious of attempting any thing
against him. He considered, likewise that ‘there would
then be no enemy left behind him, to harass or retard: his
march that the treasures of the city would procure, in
the greatest plenty, such supplies as were necessary for
the war; that the troops, by the taste of plunder, would
be animated to a higher degree of. Ardour and alacrity ;
and in the last place, that the spoils Which he designed to
send to Carthage, would secure to him the favour of his
fellow-citizens at home. Urged by the hope of these
advantages, he employed his utmost efforts in the siege ;
making himself an example to the army, and sharing with
them in every labour and in every duty: sometimes
encouraging the troops by words; and sometimes throwing
himself the first into the greatest dangers. At last, when
for eight months’ continuance he had experienced every
kind of fatigue and hardship, he took the place by storm,
and gained an immense booty in money, slaves, and
valuable goods. He reserved the money, as he had at
first proposed, to assist him in the execution of his designs;
distributed the slaves among his soldiers, in such propor-
tion as was suited to each man's services, and sent the rest
of the spoil to Carthage. The consequence was such as
he had foreseen, and fully answered all his expectations.
The soldiers encountered danger with greater eagerness
than before; the Carthaginians readily complied with
every thing that was demanded of them; and from the
treasure which he had gained, he drew many great ad-
vantages in the progress of the war. i

As soon as Demetrius was informed of the preparations ob e

ofthe Romans, he placed a strong garrison in Dimalus,
and furnished it with all the necessary stores. In the rest
of the cities, he caused all the chief inhabitants that were
averse to his interests to be put to death; and placed the

o4

e LAS

200 THE GENERAL: HISTORY zmrook nr.

government iu others, of whose fidelity he was well assured.
Aud having selected, from the bravest of. all his subjects, a
body of six thousand men, -he stationed them, under his
own command, in Pharos When the Roman consul,
arriving in the country, perceived that the Illyrians had
reposed their greatest confidence in the strength of Dima-
lus, and in the stores with which it was supplied, and that
“they esteemed it to be even impregnable, he resolved, in
order to'strike the enemy with terror, to make his first
attempt upon that city. Having called together, there-
fore, all the officers, and exhorted each .man severally to
be strenuous in his duty, he advanced his works against
the place in many parts at once, and pressed the siege with
so great vigour, that after six days he took the town by
storm. The rest of the cities on every side were filled
with consternation, and sent in haste, and submitted. to
the Romans. The consul received them all, upon such
conditions as he judged convenient; and immediately sailed
away, to attack Demetrius in Pharos. But when he heard
that the city was strongly fortified, and defended also by a
numerous garrison, who were all chosen troops; ànd that
large supplies had been laid up in it, as well of provisions,
as of all the necessary stores of war, he began to appre-
hend, that a regular siege might engage him in a work of
long continuance, and be attended with no small difficulty.
He resolved, therefore, while the occasion favoured him,
to employ the following stratagem. Having landed the
greatest part of his troops by night upon the island,
with orders to conceal themselves in the woods and other
covered places,.as soon as day appeared, he came sailing,
in open view, with only twenty ships, into the harbour
that lay nearest to the city, Demetrius saw their ap-
proach, and despising the smallness of their numbers, led
out some troops towards the harbour, to oppose their
landing. As the fight by degrees grew warm and ob-
stinate, fresh forces still arrived from the city to. support
the former, till at last the whole garrison was engaged.

CHAP. Il. i OF POLYBIUS. 201

At this time the Romans, that had landed in the night,
having advanced through secret roads, appeared in sight;
and seizing a strong eminence that stood between the city
and the harbour, they posted themselves ‘upon it, and cut
off the return of the Illyrians to the city. Demetrius,
perceiving’ what had. happened, no longer endeavoured to
prevent the enemy from landing; but having collected all
his troops together, and exhorted them to perform their
"duty, he marched towards the eminence in order of battle.
When the Romans saw that the Illyrians moved towards
them with great alacrity, and in perfect order, they ad-
vanced on their part likewise, and charged them with
unusual fury.^ At the same time, the troops also, that had
just now landed; fell upon the rear. The Illyrians, being
thus attacked on every side, were soon thrown into disorder
and confusion, so that a general rout ensned. A small
number of them fled towards the city: but the rest escaped
through private roads, and concealed themselves in dif-
ferent parts.of the island. Demetrius, having retreated to
some vessels that had been provided by, him against all
accidents, and which -láy at anchor in a private place,
sailed away by night, and by a surprising kind of fortune
arrived, without any accident, at the court of Philip, and
there passed the remainder of his life. He was a man of
a brave and daring spirit: but his courage was fierce and
violent, and never conducted by the rule of reason. The
manner therefore of his death was perfectly agreeable to
this character, and to his former life. For'in endeavouring
to take Messene, by the cominand of Philip, he was hur-
_ried on so far by his impetuosity and want of temper, that
he perished i in the action, as we shall relate more fully in
its proper place.: E l
The consul, after this success, entered Pharos without
resistance, and razed it to the ground. - And having made
himself master of the other parts of Illyria, and settled ‘the
state of all the province agreeably to his first design, the
summer being now ended, he returned to Rome, entered

209 - ^ THE GENERAL HISTORY Joox mi.

-the city in triumph, and was received with all the acclama-

tions and applause, that were due to the great skill and
courage which he.had shewn iu the discharge of his com-
mission.

CHAP. III.

W HEN the Romans received the news that Saguntum
was taken, they by no means made it any part of their
deliberations, whether they should enter into.a war with.
Carthage; though some writers affirm the contrary : and
have even eoim to-us the speeches that, were made,
on either side, in the course of the debate. But nothing
can be more absurd and groundless than this conceit.
For,the Romans.had, in fact, declared war a year before |
against the Carthaginians, in case that any violence shonld
be offered to the Saguntines. How then can they, at this
time, be supposed, wlien Saguntum was actually taken and
destroyed, to have been at all divided in their sentiments,
with respect to war or peace? What those historians after-
wards relate, is no less destitute of all support from truth
or probability: ** That the Romans were struck with the
greatest consternation; and brought their sons of twelve
years old into the senate, and ciani to them all
the public counsels: and that these children observed the
strictest secrecy with regard to what had passed, and
concealed it even from, their nearest friends.” As if this
people, besides the other, peculiar benefits which they have
received from, fortune, were possessed also of the privilege
of becoming. wise from the very moment of their birth:
But there is no need to employ many words to refute thesc
idle stories of Chaereas and Sosilus: stories, suited only to
the taste and judgment of the vulgar, among whom they
first took their rise, and which disgrace the name of
history.

As soon, then, as the Romans, were informed of the

CHAP. III. OF POLYBIUS. : 208:

destruction of Saguntum, they admitted no delay, but sent gt Delze
away their ambassadors, to propose two things to the 4s Ges De
Carthaginians; the first of which earried with it a dimi-

nution of their honour, as well:as some injury to their

state; and the other involved them at once in an affair of

the greatest difficulty and ‘danger. For their orders were,

to demand that Annibal, and the rest of the chief com-

manders, should be delivered to the Romans; and, in case

that this should be refused, instantly to declare war.

When the ambassadors arrived at Carthage, they addressed

the “senate ‘agreeably to these instructions. The Car-

thaginians received the alternative with no small pain: ôS ‘S
and appointed the ablest member of their body to defend hasan
.the late transactions. This person, in discharging his
commission, passed over in silence the treaty that was sep. nme
made with Asdrubal; as if no such treaty had. been ever `
made: or if there had, that it by no means could be

thought to bind the senate, because it never had réceived

their approbation or consent." Upon this head, he ap-| 9 meedoen]
pealed to the example of the Romans themselves, and re-| Z Loe na
minded them, that in the time of the Sicilian war, a treaty, 3454 42
which Lutatius had concludéd. with the Carthaginians,) 7,, o) n
was afterwards declared by the Roman people to be void,
as having been made without their knowledge and autho-
rity. But that which was chiefly urged, was the treaty,
that was fully settled between the two republics, at the end
of the war in Sicily; in which no mention was made of
Spain. It was indeed declared, that no injury should be
offered to the allies of either people; but the Cartha- |
ginians shewed, that the Saguntines were not at that time =
in alliance with the Roniaus. : On this point therefore c- & c^
they ‘rested their whole defence; and recurred again and tety ^
again to thé words of the treaty. : But the Romans alto-

gether refused to enter into this: debate. They said, that

if Saguntum had still remained entire, such discussions

might perhaps have been admitted, and the contest cleared

by words. But as that city lhad been stormed and pillaged

nok ot

204 THE GENERAL HISTORY sook mı,

a »
in contempt of treaties, it was now incumbent on them,
either to remove the charge, of having directed, or con-
nived at this injustice, by delivering up to punishment the
authors of it; or, on the other hand, by refusing to comply
: with this demand, to avow without reserve’ that they were
sharers i in the guilt, and. dp to await the consequences
of it.

It may perhaps. be useful to those who are at any time

engaged in deliberations of a like nature and importance,
to take a closer view of the true state aud merits of this
contest. With this design, and in order to free the reader _
also from those perplexities, in which the mistakes and pre-
judices of other historians will be likely to entangle him,
we shall here set, before his view the several treaties that
had ever been concluded between the two republics, isi
the earliest times.

‘The first was of the age of Lucius Junius Brutus, and
"P Horatius: who were created the first consuls, after
the expulsion of the kings; and who consecrated the tem-
ple of Jupiter Capitolinus. "This was twenty-eight years
before Xerxes invaded Greece. Ihave given the sense of
it, with all the skill and accuracy of which I am master:
for the language that was used in those times is so different
from that which is now spoken among the Romans, that
frequently the best interpreters, even after the closest appli-
cation, are unable to explain it.

, ** Between the Romans and ‘their allies ga the Cartha-
ginians and their allies, there shall be peace and alliance
upon these conditions. Neither the Romans nor their
allies shall sail beyond the Fair Promontory, unless com-
pelled by bad weather or an enemy. ‘And in case that
they are’ forced beyond it, they shall not be allowed to take
or purchase any thing, except what is barely necessary for
refitting their vessels, or for sacrifice; and they shall depart
within five days. The merchants, that shall offer any
goods to sale in Sardinia, or any part of Afric, shall pay no
customs, but only the usual fees to the scribe and crier;

N

CHAP, III. : OF POLYBIUS. 205

and the public faith shall be a security to the merchant, for
whatever he shall sell in the presence of these officers. If
any of the Romans land in that part of Sicily which
belongs to the Carthaginians, they shall suffer no wrong or
violence in any thing. ‘The Carthaginians shall not offer
any injury to the Ardeates, Antiates, Laurentines, Cir-
ceans, Tarracinians, or any other people of the Latins,
that have submitted to the Roman jurisdiction. Nor shall
they possess themselves of any city of the Latins that is
not subject to the Romans. If any one of these be taken,
it shall be delivered to the Romans in its entire state. The
Carthaginians shall not build any fortress in the Latin ter-
ritory: and if they land there in a hostile manner they
shall depart before night."

This Fair Promontory stands on the north side of Car-
thage: and their design, as I imagine, in not permitting
the Romans to sail forwards to the southward of it, was,
that: they might conceal from them the knowledge of the
country that lay round Byzacium and the Little Syrtis ;
which, on account of its uncommon richness and fertility,
was called, the Markers. But in case that they are forced
beyond it by rough weather, or an enemy, they then
engage, indeed, to supply them with whatever may be
wanted for refitting their vessels, or for sacrifice; but allow
nothing to be taken ‘beyond what is barely necessary: and
enjoin them to depart within five days. But. Carthage,
and the other parts of Afric that stand on this side of the
Fair Promontory, together with, Sardinia likewise, and as
much of Sicily as belonged to the Carthaginians, are left
open to the Roman merchants: and the public faith is
pledged for their security, and equitable treatment.

It is to be observed, that the Carthaginians here speak
of Afric and Sardinia, as being entirely subject to their
jurisdiction. But with regard to Sicily, the conditions of
. the treaty are expressly limited to those parts of the island
only which are said to belong to Carthage. The Ronians
observe, on their part also, the same manner of expression;

206 THE GENERAL HISTORY: Book rir.

in speaking of the Latin territory : and no mention is made
of the rest of Italy, which they had not at that time sub-
ducd.

There was afterwards another treaty, in whieh the Car-
thaginians included the Tyrians and the Uticeans: and to
the. Fair Promontory before, mentioned, they now added
Mastia and Tarseium ; beyond which, it was not permitted
to the Romans to sail in search of plunder, or to build any
city. -These are the words of the treaty.

« Between the Romans and their allies, and the Cave
ginians, Tyrians, Uticeans, and their allies, there shall be
peace and alliance upon. these conditions. The Romans
shall not sail in search of plunder, nor carry.on any traffic,
nor build any city, beyond the Fair Promontory, Mastia,
and Tarseium. , If the Carthaginians take any city of .the
Latins, not belonging to the Roman jurisdiction, they may
reserve to ran the -prisoners, .with the rest of the
booty, but shall restore the city. If any of the Carthagi-
nians gain any captives, from a people that is allied, by a
written treaty, with the Romans, though they are not the
subjects of their empire, they shall not bririg tbem into the
Roman ports: in case they do so, the Romans shall be
allowed to claim,:and set them free. ‘The same condition
shall be observed also by the Romans: and when. they
land, in search of water or provisions, upon any country
that is subject to the Carthaginians, they shall be supplied
with, what is necessary, and’ then depart, without offering
auy violence to the allies and friends of Carthage.. ‘The
breach of these conditions shall not be resented as à private
injury, but be prosecuted as the public cause. of either peo-
ple. The Romans shall not carry on any trade, or build
any city.in Sardinia: or in Afric: nor shall they even visit
those countries, unless for the sake of getting provisioris, or
refitting their. ships. If they are driven upon them by a
storm, they shall depart. within five days.. In those parts
of Sicily which belong to.the Carthaginians, and in the
city of Carthage, the Romans -may expose their goods to

CHAP. III. OF POLYBIUS. - 907

sale, and do every thing that is permitted to the citizens of
the republic. The same indulgence shall be yielded to the
Carthaginians at Rome.” -

In the second treaty, as in the former, the Carthaginians
assert their entire right to Afric and Sardinia, and forbid
the entrance of the Romans there, on any pretence: But
in speaking of Sicily, they mention only so much of the
island as had submitted to the power of Carthage... The
Romans use also the same manner of expression, in that
part of the treaty which regards the country of the Latins:
where they stipulate, that the Carthaginians shall offer no
injury to the Antiates, Ardeates, Tarracinians, and Circz-
ans. These were the people who inhabited the maritime
towns of Latium.

About the time when Pyrrhus invaded Italy, before the
Carthaginians were engaged in the war of Sicily, a third
treaty was concluded: in which, the conditions of the for-
mer two were all confirmed, together with this condition.

* [f the Carthaginians or the Romans enter into any
treaty with king Pyrrhus, this condition shall be inserted :
that it shall be allowed to either people to send assistance
to the other, if their country be invaded. "That to whom-
soever such assistance shall be sent, the Carthaginians shall
be obliged to furnish vessels, both for the passage and
return: butthe pay of the troops shall be discharged by
those, in whose service they are employed. The Cartha-
giniatis shall assist the Romans by sea, if it be necessary ;
but the naval forces shall not be compelled to disembark
against their own consent."

The first of these treaties was confirmed by oath, in the
following manner. ‘The Carthaginians swore by the Gods
of their country; and the Romans by a-stone, agreeably
to an ancient custom; and by Mars Enyalius. ‘The cere-
mony of swearing by a stone was thus performed. The
person, that was appointed to this office, having first
solemnly attested the public faith-for the due observance

208 THE GENERAL HISTORY BOOK II.

of the treaty, took in his hands a stone, and pronounced
the following words. ** If I swear truly, may the Gods be
propitious to me. But if I think, or act, any thing that is
contrary to my oath, then let the rest enjoy in safety their
country, laws, possessions, houschold-gods, and sepulchres;
and let me alone be cast out from the society, as this stone
is now cast away." At the same time he threw away the
stone.

These treaties are still preserved on tables of brass, in
the apartment of the 7Ediles in the capitol. That Philinus
never saw them, is not much to be wondered at: since,
even in our times, many of the oldest men, both Carthagi+
nians and Romans, who are thought to^have made .the
closest search into the antiquities and history of their seve-
ral countries, are ignorant that any such treaties now exist.
But it seems a matter of just surprise, that this historian
should venture to assert a fact, which is so clearly falsified
and refuted by these genuine records: nor is it easy to
conceive, upon what grounds he has done it. For in the
second book of his work, he affirms, that the Romans were,
by an express convention, excluded from every part of
Sicily, as the Carthaginians were from Italy; and that the
first descent of the Romans upon the island was made in
violation of their oaths, and in direct breach of what had
thus been stipulated. Yet it is certain, that no traces of
any such convention can any where. be found. ‘These
mistakes were slightly mentioned in our preliminary books.
But it was necessary, in this place, to enter into a more
minute examination of them, because they have hitherto
derived great weight from the authority of the writer, and
misled many from the truth. If we reflect, indeed, on the
design and purpose of that first expedition into Sicily; that
it was to take the Mamertines under their protectión; to
defend a people, who, in seizing Rhegium and Messana,
had been guilty of an act of flagrant perfidy; it must be
acknowledged, that it will not altogether be an easy task

z

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CHAP. III. OF POLYBIUS. 209

to excuse or justify the Romans. But to affirm, that this
descent was made in violation of any treaty, is an instance
of the greatest ignorance.

When the war of Sicily was ended, another treaty was
concluded, in the following terms.

« The Carthaginians shall abandon Sicily, with all the
islands that lie between Sicily and Italy. The allies of
both republics shall be safe from violence. It shall not be
permitted to either people, to exercise any act of power,
build any fortress, or levy soldiers, in the territory of the
other; nor shall the allies of the one be received into any
alliance with the other. "The Carthaginians shall pay im-
mediately one thousand talents, and two thousand two
hundred more-in the course of ten years; and they shall
restore the Roman prisoners without ransom.”

At the end of the African war, when the Romans had
again declared war against Carthage, some new conditions
were added to this treaty; by which the Carthaginians con-
sented * to give up Sardinia, and to pay another sum of
twelve hundred talents."

'The last treaty, or convention, was that made with
Asdrubal in Spain: by which it was stipulated, ** that the
Carthaginians should not pass the Iberus with an army."

These are the several treaties that ever were concluded
between the Carthaginians and the Romans, to the time
of Annibal. It is easy to remark from these, that the first
invasion of Sicily by the Romans was by no means made
in violation of those engagements which they had sworn to
observe. But on the other hand, when they declared war
a second time against the Carthaginians, and forced them
to yield up Sardinia, and to pay a heavier tribute; it must
be owned, that they had no cause at all, nor any colour of

Justice for such proceeding: but basely took advantage of .

the distresses in which the republic was then involved.

For with regard to that which is sometimes urged in their

defence, that, in the time of the African war, some Roman

merchants were injuriously treated by the Carthaginians ;
VOL. I. P

>

210 THE GENERAL HISTORY BOOK TIT.

we have seen particularly in the former book, that the
Carthaginians, upon the first complaint, released all those
that had been detained in their ports: and that the Ro-
mans, in acknowledgment of the favour that had been
shewn them by this compliance, immediately sent home,
without any ransom, all the Carthaginian prisoners.

Since this, then, is the true state of things on both sides,

a a -it remains that we last enquire, whether the war must in

yt

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porn case, something of this kind would have been added ;
ps

justice be imputed to the Carthaginians or the Romans.

We have already seen the reasons which the former urged
in vindication of their conduct. Let us now consider those
that have been advanced in opposition to them: not indeed
by the Romans of that age, who were so greatly enraged
at the destruction of Saguntum, that they could not even
attend to any reasons, but by those of later times. It is
said then, that the treaty made with Asdrubal was by no
means to be disregarded, as the Carthaginians had the
boldness to affirm; since it did not rest upon any such re-
served condition as was found in the treaty of Lutatius,
which ended with these express terms; ‘ These conditions
shall be firm and binding, in case that they be ratified by
the Roman people;” but was fully and finally concluded
by the authority of Asdrubal. And by this treaty it was
stipulated, ** that the Carthaginians should not. pass the
Iberus with an army." It is also urged, that by the trgaty
which put an end to the war of Sicily, it was provided,
* that no injury should be offered to the allies of either
people :” that this was not to be understood, as the Cartha-
ginians laboured to explain it, concerning those alone who
were present at that time in alliance with them; for in
** No new alliance should be made by either people;" or,
* The allies, which either people may hereafter make, shall
not be included in the terms of the present treaty:” but
that, as no such caution was inserted, it was manifest, that
the security thus mentioned in the treaty related not to
those alone who were at that time in the alliance'of either

CHAP. HH. . OF POLYBIUS. 211

people, but to all that should afterwards be admitted to it.
And in truth, this way of reasoning seems to be perfectly
just and solid. For it is not to be conceived that these
two republics would have conseuted to any treaty tbat
should deprive them of the power of receiving into their
alliance such nations as occasions might present, or of de-
fending them, when received, from every kind of injury.
In a word, their whole intention may be thus explained.
With respect to the people that were then -in alliance with
them, it is provided, that they shall be secure from violence,
and that those who had embraced the protection of either
state should not be admitted as allies of the other. And
with regard to the allies that might afterwards be received,
they seem to hàve been clearly enough designed in the fol-

lowing caution: “ It shall not be permitted to either peo-
ple to levy soldiers, or to exercise any act of power in the
territories, or the allied provinces, of the other. On botlr

sides, all shall be safe and free from injury."

Now the people of Saguntum, many years before the
time of Annibal, had placed their city under the protection
of the Romans. Of this there is undoubted evidence, in a
fact that was acknowledged even by the Carthaginians
themselves. For when their government was disturbed by

some intestine tumults, the Saguntines, instead of having -

recourse to the. Carthaginians, who were at that time settled
in their neighbourhood, aud had obtained great power in
Spain, referred all their contests to the sole decision of the
Romans, and with the help of their authority restored
order to their state.

On the whole, then, it may fairly be concluded, that if

the destruction of Saguntum was the cause of the war, it
was unjustly entered into by the Carthaginians; that it was

contrary to the treaty of Lutatius; which provided, that
no injury should be offered to the allies of either people;

and a manifest violation also of the convention made with

Asdrubal; in which it was stipulated, that the Carthagini-

ans should not pass the Iberus with an army. But on the
PIZ

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219 THE GENERAL HISTORY Book rit.

other hand, if the Carthaginians engaged in the war,
because they had been forced to yield up Sardinia, and pay
a second tribute; if they only seized the first favourable
occasion of avenging all the insults and the losses which
their enemies, taking advantage also of the times, had
brought upon them; it must then be owned, that their
conduct may well be vindicated, upon the principles of
reason and of justice. : ,
Among the undiscerning part of my eniti) many-per-
haps sil, think, that I am too minute and tedious in these
inquiries. It is true, indeed, that a distinct and close sur-
vey of past events, though it might yield some entertain-
ment to the curious, would, however, be of little use, if '
mankind were able of themselves, without the assistance of
example, to repel effectually every stroke of fortune, and
obviate the evils that are incident to life. But such is
human nature, that this can by no means be affirmed,
either of public societies, or of single men; since the most
fair and flourishing condition is so subject to decay and
change, that we can build no lasting expectations on it.
And it is on this account, that the knowledge of past trans-
actions ought to be esteemed not a mere amusement only,
but rather an instructive and a necessary study. For un-
less we have made due reflection upon the conduct of men
in former times, how shall we learn the arts of gaining
allies and friends, when any danger threatens our country,
or ourselves? If we meditate any conquest, or forin .any
project of importance, how shall we be ‘able, without this
knowledge, to make choice of proper instruments for the
execution of our designs? Or, in case that we are satisfied
with our present states and fortunes, how shall we support
ourselves by such lasting strength and credit, as may at all
times guard our interests from every thing that would un-
dermine and shake them? For those among whom we
live, like actors on a stage, appear before us under such a
dress, as best may suit with the present times; and with tlie
characters which they assume. ^ To these their words and

CHAP. III. OF POLYBIUS. 218

actions are all accommodated ; so that it is hardly possible
to penetrate into their real sentiments, or draw out the
truth to light, from the darkness under which it is industri-
ously concealed. But in the accounts of former ages, the
facts themselves disclose to us the real views, and genuine
disposition of the actors. And from hence we are enabled
to discern, in various circumstances, from whom we reason-
ably may expect good offices, favour, assistance, or the
contrary; and to know with perfect certainty, what kind of
persons may be induced to compassionate our distresses,
defend our cause with zeal, and join us in avenging any
injuries, to which we may have been exposed. A know-
ledge surely of the greatest use and benefit, both in the ad-
ministration of public affairs, and in the conduct also of
private life. But in order to gain this end, it will be ne-
cessary, that both the author and the reader, instead of
being satisfied with a bare relation of events, should care-
fully consider all that passed both before and after, as well
as at the time of each transaction. For if we take from
history the motives to which every action owed its birth,
the manner in which it was carried into execution, the end
that was proposed, and whether the event was answerable
or not to the first design; what remains is a mere exercise
fit for schools, and not a work of science; and though it
may afford perhaps some transient amusement to the mind,
is not capable of yielding any sound instruction, or lasting
service.

If any one should think, that few persons will be inclined
either to buy, or read, this history, on account of the num-
ber and the bulk of the books which it contains, let him
consider, that it is much less difficult, both to purchase
and to read through forty books, which give a close and
uninterrupted relation of the affairs of Italy, Sicily, and
Afric, from the time of Pyrrhus, at which the history of
Timeus is concluded, to the destruction of Carthage; and
of all the great events that happened in the other parts of
the world, from the flight of Cleomenes the Spartan, to

P3

AN

p end

214 THE GENERAL HISTORY BooK in.

the battle between tlie Acheeans and tlie Romans near the
Isthmus; than either to procure, or read, all the separate
and particular histories of these transactions. For besides
that they exceed in bulk the size of this work, it is certain
also, that no real knowledge or improvement can be ex-
pected from them. For they not only differ from each
other in their accounts of facts, but in general take no
notice of many great events that were coincident with those
which they relate; and from which, if all of them were
ranged together, and comprehended under one single view,
the mind would be enabled to form a far more perfect
judgment of the trutb, than it can ever gain from a distinct
and separate survey of each. We may also add, that by
the very nature of their works these writers are debarred
from those enquiries, which are of the first and chief im-
portance. For the most useful part of history, as we have
already mentioned, is the knowledge of what passed before
and after every great event; aud especially of the causes
that produced it. Thus for instance, the war of Philip
gave occasion to that of Antiochus; that of Annibal, to
the war with Philip; and the war of Sicily to that of An-
nibal: and between these wars, a great variety of incidents
intervened, which, though different perhaps in their first
aim and purpose, were at last all inclined together towards
the same single end. Now this may all be fully understood
from general history ; but by no means from the accounts
of single wars, as that of Perseus, for instance, or of Philip.
It might with equal reason be supposed, that the bare de-
scription of particular battles, as they are found in these
historians, would be sufficient to convey a perfect know-
ledge of the disposition and entire economy of a whole
war, But as this can never be expected from them, it is
manifest, that a work like mine must be judged in all
points to excel particular histories, as much as solid instruc-

{Ton is to be preferred to an empty tale. We now return

from this digression.

CHAP. Iv. OF POLYBIUS: B 215

CHAP. IV.

WHEN the Carthaginians had ended their discourse,
the Romans made no reply to the arguments which they
had urged in their defence. But the oldest of the ambas-
sadors, folding his garment round him, and shewing it to
the senate, told them, that therein were contained. both
peace and war; and they might choose whichever of the
two best pleased "them. The kiug of the Carthaginians
answered, that he might throw out that which was most
agreeable to himself. And when the ambassador repliec
that it should be war, the senate, with almost one voice
cried out, that they accepted it; after which the assembl
separated.

Annibal was at this time in winter quarters at New
Carthage. He first sent home the Spaniards to their
several cities; in the hope, that by this indulgence he should
fix them in his interests, and oblige them to his service for
the time to come. He afterwards gave instructions to his
brother Asdrubal, for governing the country in his absence,
and defending it against the Romans. His last care was,
in what manner he might most effectually provide for the
quiet and security of Afric. For this purpose he put in
practice a very sensible and wise expedient: making a body
of African troops pass over into Spain, and another body
of Spaniards into Afrie; and thus connecting both those
countries in the bonds of a reciprocal fidelity. The troops
of Spain that were sent into Afric, were the Thersite,
Mastians, some Spaniards of the mountains, and the Ol-
cades. Their numbers amounted in the whole to twelve
hundred horse, and thirteen thousand, eight hundred, and
fifty foot. ‘To these were added also Aan hundred and
seventy Baleares; a people whose name, as well as that of
the island which they inhabit, is derived from their custom
of using a sling in battle. These troops were all distri-
buted through the parts of Afric called Metagonia; a small
number only excepted, who were sent to Carthage. Four

p 4

GA o SN

216 THE GENERAL HISTORY uook n.
thousand -Metagonians were stationed also in that city; as
well to serve as hostages as to assist in the deines of. the
place,

With Asdrubal in Spain, he left fifty quinqueremes, two
quadriremes, and five triremes. Thirty-two of the quin-
queremes, and the five triremes, were completely equipped.
‘To these he added likewise a body of forces, both horse
and foot. | The cavalry consisted of four hundred and fifty
Libypheenicians and Africans, three hundred Lorgite;
and a mixed body of eighteen hundred, composed of Nu-
midians, Massylians, Macians, Massgesylians, and Mauru-
sians, whose country lay towards the ocean. The infantry
` was composed of eleven thousand, eight hundred, and fifty
Africans; three hundred Ligurians ; and five hundred Ba-
leares; together with twenty-one elephants. If I have
given here a more precise and accurate detail of all that
was now transacted by Annibal in Spain, than could
perhaps have been expected even from one who himself
had borne some part in the conduct of those affairs, I must
desire the reader not to think it strange; nor to rank me
among those writers who cover their own fictions under
such a dress, as may seem most nearly to resemble the form
of truth. For I found at-Lacinium a table of brass, on:
which all these circumstances were engraved, by the orders
of Annibal himself, when he was in Italy. And as this
seemed to be a monument of the first authority, I have
closely copied it in my relation.

Annibal, having thus provided in the fullest manner for’
the security both of Spain and Afric, now waited only for
the arrival of those messengers that were expected to re-:
turn to him from the Gauls. For he had endeavoured to
inform himself, with all the exactness that was possible, of
the fertility of the country that lay beneath the Alps, and
along the Po; of the numbers and courage of: the people;
and above all, whether they still retained any resentment
against the Romans, from their former wars;: of which we
have already given some account, that the reader might.

CHAP. 1V. OF POLYBIUS. 21g

nore fully comprehend the things which we are now going
to relate. His chief expectations of success in his intended
enterprise were built indeed upon the assistance which he
.hoped to find among the Gauls. For it seemed scarcely
possible to maintain the war in ltaly against the Romans,
unless these nations could be engaged to join him with their
forces, after he had first surmounted the difficulties of the
country that lay between. He sent therefore, with the
greatest care, to all the chiefs that lived among the Alps,
and to those likewise who possessed the country on this side
of them; and endeavoured by every kind of promise to
tempt their hopes, and draw them to his party. At last,
when his messengers were returned, and had informed him,
that the Gauls were perfectly disposed to favour his design,
and even expected his approach with eagerness; and that
the passage across the Alps, though likely to be attended
with great pains and difficulty, was such, however, as in the
end might be surmounted; as the spring advanced, he
drew out all his forces from their winter quarters. The
news also, which he had just before received from Carthage,
had greatly raised his hopes, and given him full assurance
of the approbation of his fellow-citizens. He now, there-
fore, openly declared his intentions to the army, and ex-
horted them to make war against the Romans. . He
informed them of the manner in which this people had
demanded, that’ himself, together with the other chiefs,
should be delivered into their hands. He described the
richness of the country through which they were to pass;
and acquainted them with the favourable disposition of the
Gauls, and the promise, which they had made to join him
with their forces. When the multitude cried out, that:
they would cheerfully attend him, he applauded their
alacrity, fixed the day for their departure, and dismissed’.
the assembly.
- These things then being all thus regulated during the
time of winter, and the necessary measures taken for.the
security of both Spain and Afric, on the day appointed.

218 THE GENERAL HISTORY _ soox ii.

Annibal began his march, with ninety thousand foot, and
twelve thousand horse. He passed the Iberus, and with
incredible rapidity, though not without many obstinate
battles, and a great loss of men, reduced all the nations that
inhabited between that river and the Pyrenzean mountains;
the Ilurgetes, Bargusians, /Erenosians, and Andosinians.
He gave to Hanno the care of the conquered countries,
with a power to exercise an entire and absolute sovereignty
over the Bargusians, because these especially were sus-
pected of favouring the interests of the Romans. He left
also with him a detachment from his army, of ten thousand
foot, and a thousand horse; together with all the baggage
of the troops that were designed to attend him into Italy.
He sent back, likewise, an equal number of the Spauish
forces to their several cities; being desirous not only to
secure to himself, by this indulgence, the favour of the
people that were now dismissed; but to encourage also, by
the hope of returning again to their native country, both
the troops that were engaged to follow him in the present
expedition, and those likewise that were left behind him in
Spain, in case that he should want their service in any
' future exigency.

The army thus disincumbered of the heavy baggage, and
consisting in the whole of fifty thousand foot and nine
thousand horse, continued their march forwards, by the
way of the Pyrenzan mountains, in order to pass the |
Rhone; being not so considerable in their numbers, as
from the goodness of their troops. For they were all tried
soldiers; men well disciplined, and inured to action, by
the continual engagements which they had sustained in
Spain.

But in order to clear this part of our history from all
obscurity, it will be necessary to trace out distinctly the
country from whence Annibal began his march, the places
through which he passed, and the way by which he first
entered Italy. Nor will it be sufficient, barely to insert the
names of rivers and of cities, as some historiaus have done ;

CHAP. IV. OF POLYBIUS. 219

imagining, that the recital of their names alone must at
once convey a full conception of the places. With regard
to those places indeed, with which we have been before ac-
quainted, the mention of their names, as it recalls them to
the memory, perhaps may be sufficient for the end that is
proposed. But witli respect to those, of which we have no
previous knowledge, it must be allowed, that no greater
advantage can arise from the bare recital of their names,
than from the repetition of any other sounds that are void
of sense and meaning, which only strike the ear, but make
no impression on the understanding. For unless the mind
has something to which it can apply and fix itself; some-
thing already conceived and understood, to which that
which is heard may be referred; it must of necessity be.
lost in doubt and ignorance. Since, therefore, we are to
speak of things unknown, we shall endeavour to lead the
reader to a right apprehension of tliem, by connecting
them with those that are already known and familiar to
him. l

The. first and most general notion then, in which all
mankind agree, and which even the vulgar apprehend, is
that by which we conceive the heavens round us to be
divided into tbe four quarters of East, West, North, and
South. The next step is, to consider the several parts of
the earth as lying beneath the one or other of these divi-
sions; and thus we are able to refer, even the places which
we have never seen or kuown, to some settled and deter-
minate conception. This being done with regard to the
whole earth, it remains that we observe the same method
of division in speaking of that portion of it which we know
to be inhabited. Now this consists of three separate parts;
the first of which is called Asia, the second Afric, and the
last Europe; and these are bounded by the Tanais, the
Nile, and the straits of the Pillars of Hercules. Between
the Tanais and the Nile, lies Asia: and its situation with
respect to the heavens is beneath that space which is con-

990 THE GENERAL HISTORY szmook m.

` tained between the north-east and the south. Afric lies
between the Nile and the Pillars of Hercules; under that
part of the heavens which extends from the south to the
south-west, and from thence forwards to the west, which
coincides with the Pillars of Hercules. So that these two
countries, taken together in a general, view, possess all the
'space from east to west, on the southern side of the Medi-
terranean sea. Opposite to these, on the north side of the
same sea, lies Europe; being extended also, without any in-
terruption, from east to west. The greatest and the most
considerable part of it is that which falls beneath the north,
and possesses all the, space between the river Tanais and
Narbo; which last place is situated towards the west, at a
small distance only from Massilia, and those mouths by
which the Rhone discharges itself into the Sardinian sea.

The Gauls are the people who possess the country from
Narbo to the Pyrenzean mountains; which extend in one
continued chain from the. Mediterranean sea to the ocean.
The rest of Europe, from these mountains westward to the
Pillars of Hercules, is bounded partly by the. Mediterra-
nean, and partly by the. ocean, or exterior sea. The
country which lies along the former, as far as to the Pillars
of Hercules, is called Spain. But that which is washed by
the exterior, or great sea, having been but lately discovered,

has not yet obtained any settled name. It is possessed by
a race of barbarous people, who are very numerous; and
of whom. we shall take occasion to speak more particularly
in another place. But as it has never yet been known with
any certainty, whether Ethiopia, which is the place where
Asia and Afric meet together, be a continent extending for-
wardsto the south, or whether it besurrounded by the sea ; so
those parts of Europe likewise, that lie between Narbo and
the Tanais towards the north, have hitherto been quite
. concealed from our discoveries. In some future time, per-

haps, our. pains. may Jead. us to a. knowledge of those
. eountries, . But all that has hitherto been written or re-

`

CHAP. IV. OF: POLYBIUS. 221

‘ported of them must be considered as mere fable and in-
vention, and not the fruit of any real search or r genuine in-
formation.

This, I think, will be sufficient to give the — some
conception even of those places to which he is' a stranger ;
as he may now be able always to refer them to the one or
other of these general divisions marked out and ascertained
by the position of the heavens; and may turn-his mind
towards them as often as they are named in the course of
this work, in the same manner as the eye directs its view to
any object that is pointed out to its observance. We now
resume our narration, .

The Carthaginians were at this time possessed of all that
part of Afric which lies along the Mediterranean sea, from
the Philenean Altars, which are opposite to the' greater
Syrtis, to the Pillars of Hercules. "This coast, in its full
extent, includes a space of more than sixteen thousand
stadia.. They had also passed the Straits, and subdued all
Spain as far as to those rocks, which, on the side towards
the Mediterranean sea, form the extreme point of the Pyre-
nean mountains;: the boundary that divides Spain from
Gaul. These rocks are distant from the Pillars of Hire

cules about eight thousand stadia.

The distance from the same Pillars to New Cien
from whence Annibal began his march. towards Italy, is
three ihousand stadia; from that city to the Iberus, two
thousand six hundred ; and from thence to Emporium, six-
teen hundred; and the'same number afterwards to the
passage of the Rhone. For the whole of this route has
been accurately measured by the Romans; and distin-
guished by- distances, each of eight stadia. From the
passage of the Rhone, if we také our course up the river,
to the beginning of the Alps, we may count the distance to
be fourteen hundred stadia; and the road across those
mountains, till we arrive in the plains that are watered by
the Po, twelve hundred more. Thus the route which
Annibal now designed to take, from New Carthage into

222 THE GENERAL HISTORY Book 111.

Ttaly, contained in its whole length about nine thousand
stadia. E
He had already surmounted almost one half of this long
march; but the most dangerous and difficult part was yet
to come. He was now preparing to lead his army through
the passes of the Pyreneean mountains, not without some
apprehension that the Gauls might take advantage of the
strength of those defiles, and fall upon him in his march.
When the. Romans were informed by their ambassadors of
all that had been debated and determined in the senate of
Carthage, and at the same time heard with great surprise,
that Annibal was already advanced beyond the Iberus.
They resolved, therefore, that an army should immediately
be raised and sent to Spain, under the.command of Publius
Cornelius; and another, with Tiberius Sempronius, into
Afric. And while the consuls were employed in perfecting
the levies, and making all the necessary preparations, they
used their utmost diligence to complete the settlement of
those colonies, which they had some time before resolved
to send into Gaul. They made haste to enclose the towns
with walls; and ordered the citizens that were to inhabit
them, of whom six thousand were allotted to each colony,
to be all present on the place within thirty days. The one
of these new cities was built on this side of the Po, and
called Placentia; the other on the other side, and was named
Cremona. I

But scarcely were the inhabitants arrived, when the
Boian Gauls, who had long watched in secret for some fa-
vourable occasion to shake off their alliance with the Ro-
mans, béing now encouraged by the near approach of the
Carthaginian army, resolved openly to revolt; shewing no
regard to the safety of their countrymen, whom they had
given as ‘hostages at the conclusion of their last war against
the Romans, which we described in the former book. And
having prevailed with the Insubrians likewise, whose old
resentment against ‘the Romans was not yet extinguished,
‘to assist them with their forces, they wasted all the lands

CHAP. IV. OF POLYBIUS. 298

that were allotted to these new colonies; pursued the Ro-
mans, who fled before them, as far as Mutinal, another of
their colonies, and invested them closely in the place. There
were among them three Romans of distinguished rank, who
had been sent to inspect the distribution of the lands. One
of them, Caius Lutatius, was of consular, and the other two
of prztorian dignity, ‘These desired to have an interview
with the enemy, to which the Boians readily consented.
But as they were returning from the conference, the Gauls
treacherously seized and kept them prisoners; imagining
that, through their means, they should recover their own
hostages from the Romans. The.pretor L. Manlius, who
was posted with some troops upon the frontiers of the
country, no sooner was informed of what had happened,
than he advanced in haste towards the enemy. But the
Boians, having placed their army in ambuscade in a certain
forest, through which the Romans were to pass, as soon as
they appeared, fell suddenly upon them from every quarter,
and killed many of'them. The rest fled at first with great
precipitation; but having gained the neighbouring hills,
they rallied again their broken forces, and retreated with
some kind of order, but in a manner that was scarcely
honourable. The Gaulsfollowed close behind, and blocked
up these troops likewise in a village that was-called Tanes,
into which they had retired. As soon:as it was Known at
Rome that their army was thus closely invested by the
enemy, and the siege pressed with vigour, they sent away
immediately to their relief, under the conduct of a pretor,
the legions that had been raised for Publius; and gave
orders, that the consul should make new levies among the
allies. Such then in general, as we have described it both
here and in the former partsof this work, was the state and
condition of the Gauls, from -their first settlement in the
country to the time of Annibal’s arrival in it.

The Roman consuls, having severally compléted-all:the
necessary preparations, sailed out to sea in the beginning
of the spring: Publius with sixty vessels, to go into Spain;

224 THE GENERAL HISTORY sook.a.

and Tiberius, with a fleet of a hundred and sixty quinque-
remes, to prosecute the war in Afric. The zeal and eager- .
ness that appeared in the conduct of the last of these, and
the preparations which he made at Lilybeeum, drawing to--
gether troops and stores of every kind, and from every,
quarter, were all so great and formidable, that it seemed as
if he meditated nothing less, than to lay siege to Carthage
itself upon his first arrival. Publius, steering his course
along the.Ligurian coast, arrived on íhe fifth day in the
neighbourhood of Massilia; and having anchored in
the first mouth of the Rhone, which was called the Massi--
lian mouth, he landed his forces there. He had heard,
that Annibal had already passed the Pyrzenean mountains,
but was persuaded. that he must still be at a considerable
distance from him; as the country through which he was to
march was extremely difficult, and the Gauls around him
very numerous. But Annibal having, with wonderful
success, gained some of the Gauls with presents, and re--
duced the rest by force, continued his route forwards,
keeping the sea of Sardinia on his right, and was- now ar-
rived upon the banks of the Rhone. When the news came
‘that the enemy was so near, Publius, being .in part sur-
prised'at this celerity, which seeined indeed to exceed all
belief, and partly desirous also to be informed exactly of
the truth, sent away three hundred of the bravest of his
horse to make discoveries, together with a: body of Gallic
mercenaries that belonged to'the Massilians; who were to
serve as guides, and to support tlie cavalry also, if: there
should be occasion for it; while. himself, in the mean time,
employed his care to recover the troops from the fatigue
which they had suffered in the voyage; and consulted with
. the tribunes concerning the posts that were ‘most proper to
be taken, and the place in which they: might with best ad-
vantage meet and offer battle to the enemy.
Annibal, having now fixed his camp upon the TN
at the distance ofa about four days' journey from the sea,
resolved to make his passage in that place, because the

CHAP, Iv. OF POLYBIUS. 298

stream was narrow there, and confined within the proper
channel of the river. By his gentle treatment of those
that lived along the banks, he prevailed upon them to sell
to him all their canoes and boats, the number of which
was very great; for almost all the people that dwell near
the Rhone are employed in constant commerce upon the
sea, They supplied him also with the wood that was
proper for making the canoes; and in two days' time an
incredible quantity of those vessels was finished by the
army. For the soldiers all attended to their task with
the greatest earnestness, as if each man had resolved to be
indebted to no labour but his own for his passage across
the river. But about this time a very great army of
barbarians appeared on the other side, ready to oppose
the Carthaginians in their landing. Annibal having seen
their numbers, and considered with himself that as it was
by no means possible to pass the river in defiance of so
great a force, so on the other hand, in case that he should
long remain in his present post, he must soon be inclosed
on every side by enemies, as soon as the third night came
on, sent away a part of his army under the care of Hanno,
the son of king Bomilcar,: with. some of the natives of the
country to serve as guides. ‘These troops, when they had
marched about two hundred stadia up the stream, at last
rested in a place where a small island divided the river
into two. And having cut down trees from a neighbouring
forest, some of which they joined, and bound some toge-
ther with cords in a hasty manner, in a short time they
completed a number of floats sufficient for the present
necessity, and passed the river upon them without any
resistance from the enemy. And having seized a strong
and advantageous post, they remained upon it during that
whole day; reposing themselves after the fatigue of their
march, and making all things ready for the ensuing com-
bat, agreeably to the orders which they had received.
The rest of the troops that were left with Annibal were in.
like: manner employed in taking such refreshment as was
VOL. I. Q

296 THE GENERAL HISTORY Book mi.

necessary,: and completing all- their preparations. But
the point of greatest difficulty was, to contrive a method
for the safe passage of the elephants, which were thirty-
seven: in number; and this indeed occasioned no small
embarrassment and pain. i

On the fifth night after the arrival of the Carthaginians
upon the Rhone, the detachment that had already passed
it began their march before break of day, and advanced
along the banks of the river towards the enemy. At the
same time Annibal, having all his troops in readiness,
disposed: every thing for their immediate passage. The
larger boats were filled with the heavy-armed horse, and
the infantry embarked in the canoes. -The first were
stationed higher up the stream, while the latter took their
place below them; that when the strength and violence of
the current had first been broken by the heavier vessels,
the passage of the rest might be more secure -and ‘easy.
The horses were made to swim across, being towed along
behind the larger boats. And as three or four were in
this manner conducted together by a single ‘soldier, who
was placed for that purpose upon either side of the stern
of every vessel, a considerable number of them were landed
on the other. side, in the very first passage over.

The barbarians, as soon as they perceived the disposi-
tion that was made, ran down from their camp in crowds,
without observing any order; and were persuaded that
they should be able, with the greatest ease, to prevent the
Carthaginians from landing. But Annibal, having now
discerned the smoke on the other side, which the detach-
ment from his army had been directed to make, as the
signal of their near approach, ordered all the troops to get
immediately on board; and that those, who were in the
larger vessels, should direct their course against the
stream, in such a manner as might most effectually break
its violence. His orders were executed in an instant.
'The troops, as they embarked, pursued their work with
loud and eager emulation: animating cach other by their

`

CHAP. Iv. OF POLYBIUS. 227

cries, and struggling with all their strength, to surmount
the violence of the stream: while the view of both the
armies, with which the banks on either side were covered;
the cries of the Carthaginians from the shore, calling after
their companions, and seeming as it were to divide their
labour with them; the noise of the barbarians on the other
side, who demanded the combat with loud screams and
shouts; formed all together a scene of great astonishment
and horror. At this time, the troops that were led by
Hanno appeared suddenly on the other side. And while
one part of them set fire to the camp of the enemy, which
was left without defence, the rest and greater part made
haste to fall upon the rear of those that were defending the
passage of the river. The barbarians were struck with
terror at an event so strange and unexpected. Some ran
in haste towards the camp, to stop the progress of the
flames; while others were constrained to turn, and defend
themselves against the enemy. When Annibal perceived
that all things had conspired most favourably with his
designs, as fast. as the forces landed, he drew them up in
order, and led them to the charge. The barbarians, who
had begun the combat in disorder, and whose conster-
nation was now completed by the sudden attack that was
made upon them from behind, were in a short time routed,
and forced to fly. The Carthaginian general, being thus
in the same instant master of his passage, and victorious
against the enemy, gave immediate orders for passing the
rest of the army over. And having in a short time
brought all the troops to land, he encamped that night
along the border of the river. -

‘On the following day, Annibal, having received the
news that the Roman fleet had cast anchor near the mouth
of the Rhone, sent away a body of five hundred Numidian
horse, to take a view of the situation of the enemy, and to
discover their numbers and designs. He gave directions
also for the passage of the elephants across the river. And
having afterwards called together the troops, he introduced

02

à

298 THE GENERAL HISTORY dmsook im-

among them Magilus, a petty king, who had come to him
from’ the country near the Po; and who now, with the
help of an interpreter, informed the assembly of all the
resolutions which the Gauls had taken in their favour.
This expedient was such, indeed, as could scarcely fail to
raise the spirits of the army, and inspire them with con-
fidence and courage. For, in the first place, as the bare
sight alone and presence of the Gauls, exhorting them to |
proceed in their designs, and promising that they would
bear an equal part in all the fortune of the war, was itself
a circumstance of great force and moment: so the assur- -
ance likewise, that was now repeated by his people, that
they would lead the army into Italy, by a way that was
both short and safe, and through places that would yield a
full supply to all their wants, seemed highly probable, and
such as well deserved their credit. They spoke with great
advantage also of the extent and richness of the country,
into which they were going to enter; and of the zeal and
prompt alacrity of the people, upon whose assistance they
designed chiefly to rely, for maintaining the war against
the Romans. |

The Gauls, after this discourse, retired: and Annibal
himself came into the assembly. He began with reminding
the soldiers of their past exploits. He desired them to
remember, that though they had often been engaged in
designs of the greatest difficulty as well as danger, they had
never yet failed in any enterprise, because they had been
always careful to repose a perfect confidence in the wisdom
of their general, and paid an entire submission to his will.
He exhorted them, to be still assured of the same success:
and to be persuaded, that they had already accomplished
the most important part of their intended labour; since ~-
they had happily passed the Rhone, and seen with their
own eyes the friendly disposition of their allies towards
them, and their zeal for the war. With regard, therefore,
to the particular measures that were now to be pursued,
he conjured them to throw away all concern, and to rest

-

CHAP. 1V. OF POLYBIUS. 229

.securely upon his care and conduct, for the entire manage-
ment of the whole. That they should be ready only to
receive and execute his orders; to acquit themselves at all
times like men of courage; and maintain the glory of their
former actions. The multitude testified their applause
by shouts; and shewed the greatest ardour and alacrity.
Annibal praised their zeal: and having recommended
them all to the favour and protection of the gods, and
directed them to make all things ready for their march on
the following day, he dismissed the assembly.

About this time, the Numidian horse, that had been
sent to make discoveries, returned to the camp. A great
part of the detachment had been killed; and the rest were
forced to fly. For no sooner had they gained a moderate
distance from the camp, than they were met by the de-
tachment of the Roman cavalry, which Publius had sent
away upon the same design. The engagement that ensued
between them was so sharp and obstinate, that a hundred
and forty Gauls and Romans fell on one side, and more
than two hundred Numidians on the other. The Romans,
in pursuit of those that fled, advanced even close to the
intrenchments of the Carthaginians: and having taken an
exact and thorough view of all the camp, they returned
again in haste, and informed the consul of the arrival of
the enemy. Publius, having first sent the baggage to the
ships, immediately decamped, and advanced with all the
army along the banks of the river, with design to overtake
the Carthaginians, and to force them to a battle without
delay.

But early in the morning of the pnaiäg day, Annibal,
having posted his cavalry as a reserve on the side towards
the sea, commanded the infantry to begin their march;
while himself waited to receive the elephants, and the men
that were left with them on thè other side of the river.
' The passage of the elephants was performed in the fol-
lowing manner. When they had made a sufficient number
of floats, they joined two together, and fastened them

Q3

230 THE GENERAL HISTORY BOOK III.

strongly to the ground, upon the bank of the river. The
breadth of both together was about fifty feet. To the
extremity of these they fixed two more, which were
extended over into the water: and to prevent the whole
from being loosened and carried down the river by the
rapidity of the current, they secured the side, that was
turned against the stream, by strong cables fastened to the
trees along the bank. Having, in this manner, finished
a kind of bridge, which was extended to the length of
about two hundred feet, they then added to it two other
floats of a much larger size, which were very firmly joined
together, but were fastened in so slight a manner to the
rest, that they might at any time be separated from them
with little difficulty. A great number of ropes were fixed
to these last floats; by the help of which, the boats, that
were designed to tow them over, might hold them firm
against the violence of the stream, and carry them in safety
with the elephants to the other side. They then spread a
quantity of earth over all the floats, that their colour and
appearance might, as nearly as was possible, resemble the
ground on shore. The elephants were usually very tract-
able upon land, and easy to be governed by their con-
ductors, but were at all times under the greatest appre-
hensions whenever they approached the water. Upon this
occasion, therefore, they took two female elephants, and
led them first along the floats. The rest readily followed.
But no sooner were they arrived upon the farthest floats,
than, the ropes being cut which bound them to the rest,
they were immediately towed away by the boats towards
the other side. The elephants were seized with extreme
dread, and moved from side to side in great fury and
disorder. But when they saw that they were every way
surrounded by the water, their very fears at last con-
strained them to remain quiet in their place. In this
manner, two other floats being from time to time prepared
and fitted to the rest, the greater part of the elephants
were carried safely over. There were some indeed, that

CHAP. IV. OF POLYBIUS. 231

were so much disordered by their fears, that they threw
themselves into the river in the midst of their passage.
This accident was fatal to their conductors, who perished
in the stream. But the beasts themselves, exerting all
their strength, and raising their large trunks above the
surface of the river, were by that means enabled not only
to breathe freely, but to discharge the waters also, as fast
as they received them: and having by long struggling
surmounted likewise the rapidity of the stream, they at
last all gained the opposite bank in safety.

As soon as this work was finished, Annibal, making his
rear guard of the elephants and cavalry, continued his
march along the river; directing his route from the sea
towards the east, as if he had designed to pass into the
middle parts of Europe.

The Rhone has its sources above the Adriatic gulf in
those: parts of the Alps that stand towards the north, and
at first flows westward. But afterwards it bends its stream
towards the south-west, and discharges itself into the Sar-
dinian sea. This river runs chiefly through a valley, the
northern side of which is inhabited by the Ardyan Gauls;
the southern parts being all bounded by the Alps, which
look towards the north. The plains around the Po, which
we have already described at large, are’ separated ‘also
from this valley by the Alps; which beginning near
Massilià, are from thence extended even to the inmost
extremity of the Adriatic gulf. And these were the moun-
tains which Annibal was to pass, as he came forwards
from the Rhone to enter Italy. AS

There are some historians, who, in the description which |
they have given us of these mountains, and of the march >
of Annibal across them, while their design is to strike the
reader with a view of something wonderful and strange,
are unwarily betrayed into two faults, the most contrary of
any to the true character of history. For they relate such
things as are manifestly false; and, on many occasions also,
are forced even to refute their own accounts. "They speak

Q 4

232 THE GENERAL HISTORY BOOK III.

of Annibal, as a general, whose prudence and whose

courage were such as never could be equalled; and yet at

the same time they plainly prove him to have been of all

men the most irrational and senseless. As often, too, as

they find it difficult to bring the fables which they have

feigned to any probable conclusion, they introduce the

gods and demi-gods into a history, whose proper business is

to treat of real facts. Thus they represent the Alps to be

in every part so steep and broken, that not only the cavalry,

the heavy infantry, and the elephants, but even the light-

armed foot, must in vain have attempted to surmount them.

They describe them likewise to have been entirely destitute

of all inhabitants; so that unless some god or hero bad

appeared, and pointed out the road to Annibal, he might '
still have wandered, iguorant of his way, till the whole

army had been lost.

-~ Now this account of things is both inconsistent with

itself, and false. For must not Annibal have been esteemed

the most imprudent and most rash of all commanders, if

he had set out upon his march, at the head of so great an

army, upon which he had also built the noblest expectations,

without being first informed of the direction of his route,

and the places through which he was to pass; in a word,

without knowing into what kind of country he was going

to enter, and what people lie was likely to encounter in the

way ? and must it not be thought a still more high degree

of folly, to have engaged thus blindly in an attempt, which

was so far from yielding any reasonable prospect of success,

that, on the contrar y» it was noteven in its nature practica-

ble? Yet these writers, while they lead him through a

country, of which he had received no previous knowledge,

ascribe to him such a conduct, at a time when his army

was entire, and his hopes all fair and flourishing, as no

other general would ever have pursued, even in the most

weak and desperate state. With regard also to that which `
they relate, concerning the desert condition and insuper-
able roughness of the Alps; it must appear at once to be

CHAP. Iv. OF POLYBIUS. 233

a most direct and notorious falsehood. For the Gauls,
that lived along the Rhone, had often passed these moun-
tains. And even not long before the time of Annibal, they
had led a very numerous army over them, to join the Cis-
alpine Gauls in their wars against the Romans, as we
shewed particularly in the former book. The Alps them-
selves are inhabited also by a numerous people. But these
historians, through the want of being acquainted with all
these circumstances, are obliged to feign the appearance of
some demi-god, to direct the Carthaginians in their march;
following in this the example of the tragic writers. For
as these are forced to introduce a deity in the catastrophe
of their pieces, because their fables are founded neither on
truth nor sense: so these historians likewise, when they
have filled their first relations with circumstances that are
both improbable and false, must of necessity have recourse
to the gods and demi-gods, to clear the difficulties in which
they have involved their story. For if the beginning be
contrary to truth and nature, the end also must be the
same. But, notwithstanding all which these writers may
pretend, it is certain that Annibal, in the conduct of this
enterprise, had taken all his measures with the best judg- `
ment and precaution. For he had informed himself with
great exactness of the nature of the country through which
he was to pass: he was well assured of the goodness of it;
and of the inveterate hatred, which the people bore against
the Romans. And that he might be able also to surmount
the difficulties of the way, he chose for guides the natives
of the country; men, engaged with him in the same designs,
and actuated by the same common hopes. With regard
to myself, I may be allowed to speak of these things with
some confidence. For I not only received my accounts
from persons that lived in the times of which I am writing,
but have also passed the Alps, for the sake of gaining a
more full and accurate knowledge of the truth.

234 THE GENERAL HISTORY BOOK II.

oneal CHAP. V.

ON the third day after the Carthaginians had begun’
their march, the Roman consul Publius arrived at the place
where they had passed the river. When he found that the
enemy was gone, his surprise was very great, and not in-
deed without good reason. For he had persuaded himself,
that they would by no ineans venture to pass that way into
Italy, amidst so many barbarous nations, noted for their
fraud and perfidy. But as he saw, however, that they had
made the attempt, he returned in haste to his ships, and
ordered all the forces immediately to embark.: And having
sent away his brother into Spain, he steered his course
back again to Italy; designing to march with the greatest
diligence through Tyrrhenia; and so to reach the Alps,
before the Carthaginians should be able to have passed
those mountains. The latter, continuing their route for-
wards, arrived, after four days’ march from the passage of
the Rhone, at a place that was very fertile in corn, and
possessed by a numerous people. It was called the Island;
because the Rhone and Isara, running on both sides of it,
* fall together below, and’ sharpen the land into a point.
‘This place, both in its size and figure, resembles that part
of Egypt which is called the Delta: with this difference
only, that one of the sides of the latter is washed by the
sea, which receives the rivers that inclose the other two,
whereas the third side of the island is defended by a chain
of very rough and lofty mountains, which indeed are al-
most inaccessible. It happened that at this time there
were two brothers in arms against each other, contending
for the sovereignty of the place. The eldest of them im-
mediately had recourse to the Carthaginians, and implored
their aid to secure him the possession of his rights. Anni-
.bal embraced the occasion with no small joy, being well
aware of the advantages that would result from it to him-
self. Having joined his forces therefore with this prince,
he defeated and drove out the younger brother, and was

CHAP. V. OF POLYBIUS. 235

well rewarded by the conqueror for the assistance which
he had given him. For he not only supplied the troops
with corn and other necessaries in large abundance, but
exchanged likewise all their arms, that were impaired and
worn by use, for others that were sound and new. He
furnished a great part of the soldiers also with new habits,
and especially with shoes, which were of singular service `
to them in their march afterwards across the mountains.
But the chief advantage was, that he attended with all his
forces upon the rear of the Carthaginian army, through
the whole country of the Allobroges, which they could
not otherwise have passed without great fear and caution,
and secured their march from insult, till they arrived at
the foot of the Alps.

When the army, after they had marched ten days ve
the Rhone, and had reached the distance of about eight
hundred stadia ‘from the place where they passed the river,
were jüst now preparing to ascend the Alps, they found
themselves in a situation that seemed likely to prove fatal
tothem. The chiefs of the Allobroges had suffered them
to pass the plains, without any interruption or disturbance,
being restrained in part by their apprehensions of the Car- `
thaginian cavalry, and partly also by the dread of those
barbarians that followed in the rear. But when the latter
had returned back again to their country, and Annibal
with the foremost of his troops was now beginning to enter
the difficult passes of the mountains, they drew together
their forces in great numbers, and possessed themselves of
all the posts that commanded the defiles through which
the Carthaginians were obliged to pass. If this design
had been conducted with due secrecy and caution, the
whole army must have been destroyed without resource.
But as they employed no pains to cover their intentions,
the attempt, though it brought great loss upon the Car-
thaginians, proved no less pernicious to themselves.

For when Annibal perceived that the enemy had thus
seized on all the advantageous posts, he encamped at the

236 THE GENERAL HISTORY mook ni.

foot of the mountains, and sent away some of the Gauls
that served as guides in his army, to discover their dispo-
sition, conduct, and designs. When these returned, they
acquainted him, that, during the time of day, the barba-
riáns remained constant in their stations, and kept a care-
ful guard upon them, but retired, as soon as night came
on, to a neighbouring town. The general, having formed
his measures upon this intelligence, continued his march
in open view, as far as the entrance of the defiles, and en-
camped very near the enemy. And when night came on,
he ordered fires to be lighted, and the greater part of the
army to remain in the camp: while himself, having selected
some of the bravest of the troops, and disencumbered them
of every thing that might retard their march, advanced
through the passes, and seized the posts which the enemy
had now deserted. When day appeared, and the barba-
rians:saw what had happened, they were forced to desist
from their first. design. But having afterwards observed,
that the cavalry, and the beasts that conveyed the baggage,
being crowded and pressed close together by the narrow-
ness of the way, advanced very slowly forwards, and not
without the greatest difficulty, they seized the occasion
that appeared so favourable, and fell upon them as they
‘marched in many parts at once. The destruction that
ensued was very great; especially of the horses and beasts
‘of burden. But the.loss of these was rather owing to
the badness of the ground on which they stood, than to
any efforts of the enemy. For as the way was not only.
‘very rough and narrow, but was bounded also-on every
side by steep and craggy rocks, the beasts, that were loaded
with the baggage, were overturned by every shock, ‘and
hurried headlong with their burdens down the precipices.
This disorder was occasioned chiefly by the horses that
were wounded. For these, being rendered senseless and
ungovernable, not only fell against the beasts of burden
that were near them, but forcing their way also through
the ranks as they were labouring to advance, filled every

CHAP. V. ; OF POLYBIUS. 237

thing with tumult, and bore down all that was within their
reach.

But. Annibal, perceiving this disorder, and reflecting
with himself that the loss of the baggage alone must prove
fatal to his army, though all the troops should escape with
safety, advanced now in haste to their assistance, with the
forces that had gained the hills in the night before; and rush-
ing down with violence upon the enemy from those emi-
nences, he killed great numbers of them; but not without an
equal loss. For the cries and conflict of these new combatants
greatly increased the former. tumult of the march. At last,
however, the greater part of the Allobroges were slain, and
the rest forced to fly. Annibal then conducted through the
passes, though not without the greatest pains and difficulty,
what remained of the cavalry and beasts of burden. And
having afterwards assembled as many of the troops as
he was able to draw together after the disorder of the late
action, he advanced against the town, from whence the
enemy had made their attack upon him. As the place
was in a manner quite deserted by the people, who had all
gone out in search of booty, he became master of it upon
his first approach; and from thence drew many great ad-
vantages, with respect both to the present and to future
use. For besides the horses, beasts of burden, and pri-
soners which he gained, he found likewise in it so large a
quantity both of corn and cattle, that it proved sufficient to
support the army during two or three days’ march. By
this conquest also, the people that lived along the sides of
the mountains were struck with terror, and feared to en-
gage in any new attempt against him.

Annibal, having rested in this place during « one whole,
day, again decamped, and continued his march to some
distance forwards, without any accident. But on the fourth
day he fell, a second time, into a danger from which it was .
not easy to escape. The inhabitants of those parts of the
mountains, having formed the design of surprising him by
treachery, advanced to meet him with green branches in

238 THE GENERAL HISTORY BOOK III.

their. hands, and crowns upon their heads; which is the
signal of peace among the barbarous nations, as the cadu-
ceus is among the Greeks. Annibal, being unwilling to
trust too hastily to these appearances, questioned them with
great exactness, concerning their intentions, and the pur-
pose of their coming. They answered, that having been
informed that he had taken a neighbouring town, and
destroyed all those that had appeared in arms against him,
they were come to assure him, that they had no intention
to do him any injury, and to request that he would offer.
none to them. They promised also, that they would leave
some hostages in his hands, as a pledge of their sincerity.
Annibal still was doubtful and irresolute, and apprehended
some ill design. But when he had reflected with himself,
that his compliance with the terms which this people now
proposed might serve perhaps to render them more mild
and cautious; and, on the other hand, that, in case he
should reject them, they would not fail to act against him
as open enemies; he at last resolved to embrace their offers,
and, in appearance at least, to consider them as friends.
The barbarians brought their hostages; supplied the army
liberally with cattle; and gave themselves up to the Car-
thaginians with so little reserve or caution, that Annibal
was in a great degree induced to throw away all suspicion;
and even entrusted them with the charge of leading the
army through the rest of the defiles. But when the Car-
thaginians, after two days’ march under the conduct of
these guides, were now engaged in passing through a valley,
that was surrounded on every side by steep and insuperable
precipices, suddenly this treacherous people appeared be-
-hind them in great numbers, and fell with fury upon the
rear, In this situation the whole army must inevitably
have been destroyed, if Annibal, who still retained some
little doubt of their sincerity, had not placed, by a: wise
precaution, the baggage with the cavalry at the head of all
the march, and the heavy infantry behind. "These troops
sustained the attack, and in part repelled the impending

D

CHAP. V. OF POLYBIUS. 239

ruin. The loss, however, was very great, both of men and
horses, and beasts of burden. For the barbarians, advanc-
ing still along the summit of the mountains, as the Cartha-
ginians continued their march through the valley, both by
slinging stones, and rolling down fragments of the rocks
upon them, spread so great terror and disorder through
the army, that Annibal, with one half of the troops, was
forced to take his station for the night upon a naked and
desert rock; to secure the cavalry and baggage, till they
had. all passed the valley. And this was at last accom-
plished. But such was the roughness and the difficulty of
these defiles, that the whole night. was scarcely sufficient for
the work.’

On the following day, the enemy being now retired, the
Carthaginian general joined the cavalry, and continued his
march ‘towards the summit of the Alps. From this time
the barbarians never came to attack him in any very nu-
merous body. But some straggling parties of them, .ap-
pearing from time to time in different places, and falling,
as occasion served, sometimes upon the foremost troops,
and sometimes on the rear, gave frequent interruption to
his march, and carried away a part of the baggage. The
elephants were chiefly serviceable upon these occasions;
for on which side soever they advanced, the enemy were
struck with terror at the sight, and never ventured
to approach. On the ninth day, having gained at last
the summit of the mountains, he there fixed his camp,
and rested during two whole days, that he might give
some ease and refreshment to the troops that had per-
formed their march with safety; and that the others might
also join him, who were not yet arrived. During this time
many of the wounded ‘horses, and of the beasts that had
‘thrown their burdens in the late disorders of the march,
having followed the traces of the army, arrived unex-
pectedly in the camp. '

— Tt was now near the time of winter. The mountains
were already covered deep with snow, and the whole army

240 THE GENERAL HISTORY BOOK Ili.

seemed to be under the greatest dejection and dismay;
being not only exhausted’ by the miseries. which they had
suffered, but disheartened also by the view of those that
were yet to come. Annibal, therefore, had recourse to the
only expedient that remained to raise their drooping cou-
rage. He assembled the troops together, and from the
summit of the Alps, which, when considered with regard to
Italy, appear to stand as the citadel of all the country,
pointed to their view the plains beneath that were watered
by the Po, and reminded them of the favourable disposition
of the Gauls towards them. He shewed them also the very
ground upon which Rome itself was situated. By this
prospect they were in some degree recovered from their
fears. On the morrow, therefore, they decamped, and
began to descend the mountains. There was now no
enemy that opposed their passage, except some lurking
parties only, which sometimes fell upon them by surprise,
for the sake of plunder... But by reason of the snows, and
the badness of the ground, their loss was not much inferior
to that which they had suffered in the ascent. For the way
was not only very steep and narrow, but so entirely covered
also by the snow, that the feet knew not where to tread with
safety; and as often as they turned aside from the proper
track.they were instantly hurried down some precipice.
Yet the soldiers, to whom such accidents were now become
familiar, sustained all this misery with an amazing firmness.
At last they came to a place which neither the elephants
nor the beasts of burden could in any manner pass; for
the ground, which was before extremely steep and broken,
to the length of a stadium and a half, had again very lately
fallen away, and left the road so narrow, that it was quite
impracticable. : At this sight the troops again were seized
with consternation; and even began to lose all the hopes of
safety. Annibal at first endeavoured to avoid this route;
by changing the direction of his march, and making a
circuit round it, but he soon was forced to desist from that
design; for the way on every side was utterly insuperable,

CHAP, V. OF POLYBIUS. 241

through an accident of a singular kind which is peculiar to
the Alps. The snows of the former year, having remained
unmelted upon the mountains, were now covered over by
those that -had fallen in the present.winter. "The latter
being soft, and of no great depth, gave an easy admission
to the feet. But when these were trodden through, and
the soldiers began to touch the snows that lay beneath,
which were now become so firm that they would yield to no
impression, their feet both fell at once from under them, as
if they had been walking upon the edge.of some high and
slippery precipice; and this mischance drew after it a still
worse accident. For when they struggled with their hands
and knees to recover themselves from their fall, as the
ground was every where extremely steep, they were then
sure to slide away with greater violence and rapidity than
before; carrying likewise. with them whatever they had
grasped for their support. 'The beasts also that were
loaded with the baggage, having, by their endeavours to rise
again when they had fallen, broken the surface of the lower
snow, remained closely wedged in the pits which they had
made, and. by the weight of the burdens under which they
lay, as. well.as from the unyielding firmness of the snows
around them, were fixed immoveably in the place.

. When this attempt was thus found to be impracticable,
Annibal returned again to the narrow road which he had
quitted; and having removed the snow, he encamped at
the entrance of. it, and ordered the soldiers-to make a firm
and level way along. the precipice itself. And this, with
the.expence of. vast pains and labour, was at last effected ,
so that, in one day's time, there was sufficient room for the
horses and beasts of burden to descend.. These were im-
mediately conducted down; and having gained the plains,
were sent away to pasture, in_places-where no snow had
fallen. The Numidians were then commanded to enlarge
the road, that the elephants might also pass. But so labo-
rious was the task, that, though fresh men still succeeded to
those that were fatigued, it was not. without great difficulty

VOL. I. R

t»

49 THE GENERAL HISTORY Book nr.

that they completed it in three days’ continued toil; after
which, these ‘beasts came down the mountains, being almost
exhausted and spent with famine. For the tops of the Alps,
which. are covered through all seasons with perpetual -
snows, produce neither tree nor pasture; though the
middle parts,on both sides of them abound with woods
and forests, and are proper to be.cultivated. Annibal
then descended last, with all the ármy, and thus on the
third day gained the plains; having lost great numbers of
his soldiers in the march, as well in passing rivers, as in
the engagements which he was forced to sustain. Many of
his men had also perished among the precipices of the
Alps, and a far greater number of the horses, and beasts of
burden. And having thus at last completed his journey
from New Carthage, i in five months’ time; fifteen days of
which were employed in passing over the Alps; he now
boldly entered the territory of the Insubrians, and the.
plains that are watered by the Po; though the whole of his .
infantry that was left amounted to no more than.twelve
thousand Africans, and eight thousand Spaniards ; and his
cavalry to six thousand only; as we learn from an account
that was engraven by his orders on a column near Laci-
nium.

About the same time the Roman consul Publius, having
sent away his brother, as we before related, with the greater
part of the army into Spain, exhorting Bin to prosecute
the war with vigour against Asdrubal in that country;
landed at Pise, with a small body of forces only.. But
having taken his route through Tyrrhenia, and increased
his army with the legions that were then in action, under
the conduct of the prætors, upon the frontiers of the Boian .
Gauls, he came and encamped also near the Po, with
design to press the enemy, and force them to an engage- .
ment without delay.

"Thus then have we brought these generals together, and -
fixed the scene of the war in Italy. But before we go on
to recount-the battles that ensued, it may be proper and

CHAP. V. OF POLYBIUS. 248

just to speak of certain matters, which may be thought
perhaps to deserve a placein this part of our history. For
as we have often taken occasion, in the course of this work,
to ‘give a full description of various places that: occurred,
both in Spain and Afric, many will be ready to enquire,
from whence it happens, that we have made no mention of
the straits that are formed by the Pillars of Hercules, and
of the sea beyond; together with the properties and acci-
dents that are peculiar to them; of the British islands;
with the manner of making tin: and of the gold and silver
mines that are found in Spain: especially since other writers,
who have treated of these subjects in a very copious
manner, differ greatly from each other in all that they
report. | - ii . Í

It must indeed be acknowlėdged, that these things are
by no means foreign to the design of history. But I con-
sidered with myself, that a separate discussion of every one,
as they occurred, would too much break the course of the
Narration, and divert the reader from those transactions
which are the proper subject of this work: and, in the next
place, that it would be fat more useful likewise, to take a
view of all of them together, in some time and place reserved
expressly for that purpose; in which we might be able to
explain at large whatever has been known with truth con-
cerning them.’ Let no one therefore think it strange, if,
whenever any other subjects of the same kind present them-
selves in the progress of our history, we should forbear to
enter into a particular examination of them. To expect
that a historian should crowd his work in every part with
these descriptions, is indeed a proof of a very vicious and
uninformed .judgment. Such readers may very properly
be-compared with those men of liquorish palates, who
taste eagerly of every dish that is set before them; and,
amidst so great a variety of meats, not only lose the present
relish of what they eat, but make their whole food perni-
cious: to the body, which it was designed to strengthen and
sustain. In the same manner also, these mixed histories,

EUN.

x:

244 THE GENERAL HISTORY ook mi,

as they afford no pure or genuine entertainment. in -the
reading, so neither are they able to convey any sound ‘and
lasting nourishment to the mind. , E
With regard to the reasons that induced me to reserve
the full consideration of:all these subjects for a professed
‘and’ separate ‘enquiry, there:are many that might now be
mentioned. But the chief and most considerable of them
is, that by much the greater part of those historians, who
have ever treated of the situation and the properties of ‘the
extreme parts of the habitable world, have fallen into :num-
berless mistakes, in almost all which they relate. It will be
necessary: therefore to refute and rectify their accounts, not
by some slight and cursory remarks, but in a full and deli-
berate examination of them. We must be careful however
to ‘remember, ‘that their labours deserve upon the whole
rather praise than censure; and that their errors are al-
ways to be corrected in the gentlest: manner: ‘since it is
certain, that they would themselves retract and alter many
passages in their works, if they were now alive. For, in
former times, there were but few among the Greeks, that
made any attempt to extend their search into those places
which we call the boundary of the earth. The difficulties
in their way were indeed almost insuperable. Many
dangers were to be encountered by.sea; and more and
greater upon land.’ And when any, either .by choice or
accident, had gained an entrance into those countries, yet
because some parts were destitute. of ‘all inhabitants, and
others: possessed: by. a race of men, whose manners were
uncultivated and wholly barbarous, it was scarcely. ‘possible
that they should’ be able:to examine with their own proper
eyes even into a small part only-of the things that deserved
their notice." Nor could. they, on the other hand, as they
were strangers to the language of the natives, ever gain the
information that was requisite, in those which: they had op-
portunity of seeing. “And even’ those few, that ‘were ‘able
in some degree to surmount these difficulties, were all dis-
posed to enlarge their. descriptions far. beyond ‘the bounds

CHAP; V. OF POLYBIUS. 245

of probability: and liaving neither sense nor candour to be
satisfied with the plain and simple truth, invented strange
and incredible fictions of prodigies and monsters; reporting
many things, which they had never seen, and many also that
had no existence. Since, therefore, all these circumstances
concurred to render it not only difficult, but utterly im-
possible to gain any accurate ànd certain knowledge of those
countries we ought by no means to.pass too severe a
censure upon the old historians, for their mistakes or
omissions in these matters: but, on the contrary, should
rather be.persuaded, that they deserve our acknowledg-
ments and thanks, on account even of the little information
which they have left behind them; and that, amidst those
numerous difficulties, they were able as it were to lay the
foundation of more genuine discoveries. But in these
times, since all Asia has been opened to us by the arms of
Alexander; and the other parts of the world by the Roman
victories, so that every place and every country is now be-
come accessible either by sea or land; and since men of
eminence in the world have shewn great eagerness and
zeal in making these researches; employing in them all
that leisure which they now enjoy from the business of war
and the care of public affairs; it may with reason be ex-
pected, that, by the help of these advantages, we should at
last be able to remove the obscurity, in which these
enquiries have hitherto been involved. And this is the
task which I shall undertake in its proper place, and shall
endeavour to give those readers, whose taste is gratified by
such descriptions, a clear and perfect insight into all these
subjects. For I have exposed myself, without reserve, both
to great fatigue, and many dangers, in traversing all Afric,
Spain, and Gaul; and in voyaging also upon the exterior
sea, by which these parts of the world are bounded: that
I miglit be able to correct with some assurance the mistakes
of former writers, and lay open the knowledge of these
countries to the Greeks. But we shall now leave this di-
R 3

Yy

246 THE GENERAL HISTORY | BooK in.

l gression: ind go on to the recital of the battles that were

fought in Italy. 3

, CHAP. VI.
Tur Carthaginian general, having now entered Italy,

‘with the forces which we have already particularly ‘men-

tioned, at first encamped at the bottom of the Alps, that
he might give some ease and refreshment to his troops.
Indeed the present condition of his army was miserable
almost beyond expression. For, besides the hardships
which they had sustained/from the difficulties of the way,
both in ascending and descending the mountains, the want
of such provisions as were necessary, and the diseases also
which their bodies had contracted from neglect and nasti-
ness, had changed them into spectacles of horror: while
the greater part seemed voluntarily to sink beneath their
sufferings, and even to reject all thoughts both of life and
safety. For in a march so long and difficult, it was. utterly
impossible to bring with them such supplies, as might fully
satisfy the wants of so numerous an army: and even those,
which they had brought were almost all lost among the
precipices, with the beasts that carried them. This army
therefore, which, when it passed the Rhone, consisted of
thirty-eight thousand foot and eight thousand horse, was
now reduced to less than half that number. -The rest had
perished among the mountains. And those that were left
alive, were so much worn and altered by continued .suf-
ferings, that their appearance was scarcely human.. .
"The first care, therefore, to which Annibal now. gave
his whole attention, was to raise the drooping spirits.of the
troops, and by proper refreshment to restore both the men
and horses to their: former state. When this was done,
he invited the ‘Taurinians, who lived near the foot of the
Alps, and were at this time engaged in war.with the Insu-

-

CHAP. VI. OF POLYBIUS. 247

brians, to enter into an alliance with him, and to assist
him with their forces. And when his offers were rejected
by them, he marched and encamped before the strongest
of their cities; and having taken it after three days' siege,
killed all that were found in arms against him in the place.
By this severity, the neighbouring barbarians were all
struck with terror, and submitted at discretion. : The rest
` of the Gauls, that inhabited these plains, were impatient to
take arms in favour of the Carthaginians, as they had at
first designed. But because the legions, that were sent
from Rome, had passed through many of their states, and
had avoided all the ambuscades that were prepared to in-
tercept them, they were forced to remain quiet for the pre-
sent, and some were even compelled to join the Romans:
Annibal therefore, wisely judging that no time was to be
lost, resolved to continue his march forwards without
delay; and, by some action of importance, to fix the con-
fidence of those that were disposed to embrace his party,
and encourage them to act without restraint, for ihe ad-
vancement of their common hopes. i
' But while he was preparing all things for the execution
of this design, the report arrived, that Publius, with his
army, had already passed the Po, and was now at no great
distance from him. At first, Annibal could scarcely give
credit to the news. Not many days were past, since he
had left the Romans upon the banks of the Rhone. And
asthe passage by sea from Massilia to the Tyrrhenian
coast was both long and difficult, so the distance also from
thence through Italy, to the bottom of the Alps, was very
great, and the way by no means easy or commodious for
an army.. Butas the fact received fuller confirmation, he
was beyond measure surprised, both at the boldness of the
attempt, and at the success likewise with which the consul:
had carried it into execution. Publius, on his part also,.
was not less astonished. For he had persuaded himself,
either that Annibal would never venture to take his route
across the Alps, with an army that was all composed of
R4

248 THE GENERAL HISTORY BOOK III.

forcign troops, or if he did, that he must inevitably be lost
in the attempt. But when he heard, that he had not only
passed the mountains, but was already laying siege to somé
of the towns of Italy, he was struck with admiration at the
daring and’ undaunted spirit of this general. At Rome
also, the surprise was not at all more moderate. For while
the report, that Saguntum was taken by the Carthaginians,
still sounded in their ears, and.all their measures were
suited to that event ; when they. had sent away the consuls
but just before, the one to make a diversion of the war in
Afric, and the other to oppose the progress of the enemy
in Spain; on a sudden they are informed, that Annibal is
already arrived in Italy with his army. . This wonderful
celerity, as it almost. exceeded all belief, so it filled them
also with the greatest apprehensions. They immediately
send notice to Tiberius, who still lay at Lilybeum, that
the enemy had entered Italy. ‘They direct him to desist
from his first design,’ and return-again to defend his
country. The consul, having received these orders, sent
back the fleet to Rome, and commanded the tribunes to
draw together all the legionary forces with the greatest
diligence; and that, on a day which he prescribed, they
should meet him at Ariminum, a town situated near the
Adriatic coast, in the southern extremity of those plains
that are watered by the Po. In a word, so contrary ; were
the present accidents to all that had been expected or
foreseen, that the consternation. soon became general
among the people, and held their minds in'anxious sus-.
pense for the event.

But Annibal and Publius, as they 1 now approached. each
' other, endeavoured severally to animate their troops, by
all the motives which the present conjuncture suggested to
them. Upon this occasion, Annibal contrived the fol-
lowing expedient. Having assembled together all the.
forces, he brought them before the young prisoners, whom:
he had taken among those barbarians that had disturbed
bis march across the Alps. With a view to the design

CHAP. Vis "OF POLYBIUS. ` 249

which he now put in practice; he had before given orders,
that these wretches should be treated with the last severity.
They were loaded with heavy chains:: their bodies were
emaciated with hunger, and mangled by blows and stripes.
In this condition, he now placed them in the midst of the
assembly, and threw before them some suits of Gallic
armour, such as their kings are accustomed to wear, when
they engaged in single combat. He ordered some horses
also to be set before them, and military habits, that- were
very rich and splendid. : He then demanded of the young
men, which of them were willing to try their fate in arms
against each other, on condition that the conqueror should
possess those spoils: that were before their eyes, while the
vanquished would be released by death from all his
miseries. The captives with one voice cried out, and
testified the utmost eagerness to engage. Annibal then
commanded, that lots should be cast among them, and
that those two, upon whom. the lot should fall, should
take the arms that were before them, and begin the com-
bat. When the prisoners heard these orders, they ex-
tended. their. hands towards the heavens, and every one
most, fervently: implored the gods that the lot to fight ©
might be bis own.: And no sooner was their chance de-
cided, than those whose fortune it was to engage appeared
filled with joy, while the rest were mournful and dejected.
When the combat also was determined, the captives, that
were by lot excluded from the trial, pronounced him who
had lost his life in the engagement to be in their sight not
less happy than the conqueror; since, by dying, he was
released from'all that. wretchedness which they were still
condemned to suffer. The same reflections arose also in
the minds of the Carthaginian soldiers: who, from com-
paring the condition of the dead. with the ill fate of those
that were led back again to chains and torture, declared
the former to be happy, and gave their pity to the suf-
ferings of the latter.

When Annibal perceived, that this contrivance had

250 THE GENERAL HISTORY soox nir.

produced in the minds of all the army the effect that was
intended. from it, he came forwards in the assembly, and
told the soldiers, ‘ That he had offered that spectacle to
their view, that, when they had discerned their own con-
dition in the fate of those unhappy captives, they might
more clearly judge what resolutions were most proper to
be taken, and in what manner they might best form their
conduct in the present circumstances. "That, in the com-
bat which they had seen, and the prize proposed 'to the
conqueror, was displayed a perfect image of that state, into
which they were themselves now brought by fortune.
That such was their situation, that they must either con-
quer or be slain in battle, or else fall alive into the power
of their enemies. "That by conquest they would obtain a
prize, not of horses and. military habits, but the whole
wealth and riches of the Roman empire; and would thus
become the happiest of mankind. That if they were to
fall in battle, they could then only die, without being first
exposed to any kind of misery ; and contending, to their
latest breath, for the most glorious of all victories. But,
on the other hánd, in case that they were conquered, and
the love of life should flatter them with any hopes of being
able to escape by flight, or should they even consent upon
any terms to live after their defeat, it was manifest beyond
all doubt, that nothing but the extremity of wretchedness
could await them. For surely there were none among
them, who, when they had considered how vast a length _
of country they had traversed, what enemies had opposed
them in their way, and what large and rapid rivers they
were forced to pass, could be so wholly destitute of all
sense and judgment as ever to be persuaded that it was
possible to regain their several countries. He conjured
them, therefore, to throw away all such hopes; and in
judging of their own state and fortune, to retain those
sentiments which they had just now shewn with regard to
the condition of the captives. That, as in that’ case ‘they
declared both the man that conquered, and him who fel]

CHAP, VI. OF POLYBIUS. ` 251

in the combat, to be happy, and pitied those who were
reserved alive; so their business now ‘was, to conquer if it
were possible; and if not, to die; and on no account to
entertain even the smallest. expectation or thought of life,
in case that they were conquered. That if they would
heartily embrace these: sentiments, and carry this reso-
lution with them into action, there was indeed no room.to
doubt, but that they would both live and conquer. That
no troops were ever known to be defeated, who had once
been fixed in this determination, either by necessity' or
choice. But that, on the other hand, au army which, like
the Romans, saw their country open to tbem on every side,
and ready to receive all those that could escape by flight,
must necessarily fall beneath the 'efforts of men, whose
only hopes were placed in victory.” This harangue,
together with the spectacle that had passed before their
eyes, fully inflamed the courage of the soldiers, and raised
them into such a temper as Annibal had designed. -He
therefore applauded their disposition, and dismissed the
assembly, with orders that they should make all things
ready for their march by break of day.

Upon the same day likewise, the consul Publius, who
had already advanced beyond the Po, and designed to con-
tinue his march forwards, and to pass the Ticinus, sent
away a sufficient number of his’ troops to lay a bridge
across that river; and having in the mean time called
together the rest of the army, he harangued them in D
following manner.

In dd first part of his: discourse, he displayed in many
words the dignity and splendour of the Roman empire,
and recalled to their minds the glorious actions of their
ancestors. Speaking afterwards on the subject of the pre-
sent war, he told the soldiers, that, even though they had
never yet made any trial of the strength of those that were
in arms against them, they might however be assured of
victory, if they would remember only, that their enemies
were the Cartbaginians: those very Carthaginians, who

252 THE GENERAL HISTORY Book 111.

had: been so often vanquished by the Roman legions, and
had submitted to the imposition of repeated. tributes : and
who now, by an attempt not less absurd than insolent,
had dared to appear in arms:against a people, to whom
they had paid such subjection as; was not far removed from -
slavery. :** But since in fact,” continued he, ‘ we so lately
have experienced, that these enemies want the courage
even to stand before us in -the field, what must be our sen-
timents, if we judge with reason, concerning the issue.of
the war? For when their cavalry was engaged with ours
upon the Rhone, they not only lost great numbers of their
men, but the rest, that were left alive, fled before us in a
manner the most dishonourable, even: to their very camp.
Their general also, and all his army, no sooner were in-
formed of our approach, than. they retired with such pre-
cipitation, that their retreat was rather to be called a flight.
It was this fear alone, and not their: choice or inclination,
that hurried them across the Alps. Behold then, (added
he,) Annibal is indeed arrived in Italy, but his army is lost
among the mountains. And even the few that have
escaped are so much wasted with fatigue, so worn and ex-
hausted by the length and difficulties of their march, that
both men and horses are alike disabled, and become unfit:
for all the services of war. To conquer.such an enemy, it
must surely ‘be sufficient to shew yourselves but once be-
fore them. But if any thing should still be wanting to fix
your confidence, let my presence here among you be con-
sidered as a certain pledge of your success. For it never
can be thought that I should thus have left the fleet, with
the affairs of Spain that were entrusted to my care, and
have run with so much diligence to join the army in this
country, unless I had been first assured by the most solid
reasons, not only that this measure was.both wise and.ne-
cessary in the present circumstances, but that I was hasten-
ing also to reap the fruits of an’ easy and undoubted vic-
pa
The authority of the speaker, as well as the truth that

CHAP, VI. OF -POLYBIUS. 253

was contained in this discourse, raised in all the tr oops an
impatience to.be led against. the enemy. Publius com-
mended their alacrity : ded exhorting them to hold them-
selves in readiness for.action upon the earliest warning, he
dismissed the assembly. i

- °On the following.day, both armies yar to ijerec
ion the.'l'icinus.on that side.of it which is nearest to
the Alps; the. Romans, having the river on their left; and
the.Carthaginians, upon their right. But on the second
day, having received notice from. their foragers, that they
were now at no great.distance from each other, they en-
camped severally in the place where they then were.. On
the third day, Annibal, having drawn out all his cavalry,
marched through the plain, to view the situation of the
enemy. Publius also, with his .cavalry. and. light-armed
troops, was advancing on the same design. . As soon. as
they approached so near as to discern the dust .that was
raised on either side, they immediately.ranged their forces
in order of battle. The consul, having placed his light-
armed troops in front, together with the Gallic horse, drew
up the.rest in a line behind, and moved slowly towards the
enemy. Annibal advanced. to meet .him,. having. thrown
into his centre all the bridled and heavy cavalry, : and
placed the-Numidians on the wings, that they might be
ready to surround the. Rómans. As the cavalry.on both
sides, as well as-the generals themselves, shewed the great-
est impatience.to engage, the -light-armed’ troops, . being
apprehensive that, as these.bodies met, they should be
borne down instantly.in the. shock, had: scarcely. thrown
their first javelins, when:.they: retired. with: great precipi-
tation through the intervals of. their. own squadrons that
were behind them..-The two bodies then advanced to
action. . The. battle was fierce:on both sides, and the suc-
cess for some time doubtful... For many of the combatants
left.their horses, and: maintained the fight on foot with the
greatest obstinacy.” But after some time, the Numidian
cavalry, having taken a circuit round, and falling suddenly.

254. THE GENERAL HISTORY mook nr.

oe

upon the light-armed forces that had saved themselves in
the rear, trampled them down in heaps, and from thence
advanced to charge the hindmost of the squadrons: that
were engaged. The Romans, who had hithérto sustained.
the fight with such success, that, though they lost many of
their.men, they had yet destroyed a far greater number of
the enemy, being thus attacked by the Numidians in their
rear, were thrown at once ‘into disorder, so that. a general
route ensued. "The greater part fled different ways. But
a small. number of them, having formed themselves into a
body round the person of the consul, retreated with him.
Publius immediately decamped, and marched in haste
through the plains, in order to repass the Po. For as
the country round him was all flat and open, and the Car-.
thaginians superior in their cavalry; and because himself
also had received a dangerous. wound in the late engage-
ment; he thought it necessary to remove the troops with-:
out delay into a-place of safety on the other side of the.
river. Annibal for some time stood in expectation, that
the Romans would draw out their infantry, and engage in.
a general battle. But when he found that they had left
their camp, he immediately pursued, as far as to the bridge
upon the Po. The bridge had been broken by the Ro-
mans, and the greater part of the planks removed. ; But
a body of six hundred men, that bad been left to secure
that post, and who still remained upon the banks of the
river, fell into the hands of the Carthaginians. . Annibal,
being informed by these, that the Romans had already
gained a great distance from him, immediately gave a stop
to the. pursuit; and, directing his march up the stream,
advanced. along the river, in search of a part that might:
commodiously admit a bridge to.be.thrown across dite
After: two. days’. march, having. found a place .that was.
proper.for.this design, he made. a bridge of boats, and.
ordered :Asdrubal to conduct. the army. over the river:
while himself, who.first had passed it, gave audience to the
ambassadors, . that now . came to. meet :him froni all. the:

CHAP. VI. ^J. OF. POLYBIUS. 255

neighbouring country. For the Gauls on every side no
sooner had received the news of the late victory, than
they immediately threw away all restraint; and pursuing
their first design, entered into an alliance with the Cartha-
ginians, and supplied their army both with men and stores.
Annibal received all that came to join him with great
marks of favour: and when the army had all passed the
river, he advanced in haste along the banks, but by a way
that was contrary to his former course; for he now directed
his march down the stream, with design to overtake =
engage the enemy without delay.

For Publius, after he had repassed the. Ce, è went and
encamped near Placentia, a colony of the Romans. .. And
being persuaded that he had now placed the troops in
safety from all insult, he lay quiet in his post; and attended
carefully to the cure both of himself, and of those that
were wounded with him in the late engagement. After
two days’ march from the place where they had passed the
Po, the Carthaginians arrived near the énemy: and on
the third day, they advanced in order, and offered. battle
tothe Romans. But as the consul still remained close in
his.intrenchments, they again retired, and —— at
the distance of about fifty stadia from him.

At this time, the Gauls that had joined the Roman Songs
being persuaded that the Carthaginians had now the fairest
prospect of success, resolved to attack the Romans by sur-
prise: and having secretly concerted their design, they
waited in their tents for the time to carry it into execution.
Supper was now ended in the camp, and the army. all
retired to their repose; when these men, having suffered
the first :part of the night to pass without any disturbance
or commotion, at break of day took arms, being in num-
ber about two thousand foot and two hundred horse; and
falling suddenly upon the legions that were nearest, killed
and wounded: great numbers.of them: and having cut off
the. heads of those that were slain, they .carried. them to
the Carthaginian camp. On their arrival there, they were

256 THE GENERAL HISTORY BOOK III.

received by Annibal with great acknowledgments, He
applauded their zeal and courage; and having promised
them also -such .rewards as. were due to their -important
service, he dismissed them to their several cities, to inform
their countrymen of all that had been .transacted, and to
invite them to join their forces with the Carthaginians.
He knew, indeed, that, after this flagrant. act -of perfidy
against the Romans, they must of necessity be forced to
embrace -his party.. They came accordingly. in a short
time .afterwards, and brought also with them the Boian
Gauls, who delivered to him the three. Romans that had
been sent to inspect the division of the lands,.whom -they
had treacherously seized in the beginning of the war, as
we have. before related. . Annibal received. them all in the
most favourable manner ; concluded an alliance with them;
and made them his associates in the war. But he returned
the prisoners again into their hands; advising them to keep
them carefully, as the means whereby they might recover
their own hostages from the Romans, as —-: at first de-
et

. The consul Publius was teli" by aliis transaction into
no small anxiety and concern. And not doubting but that
all the neighbouring Gauls, who before were very ill dis-
posed towards the Romans, would immediately join the
enemy, he thought it most prudent.to retire, and avoid the
danger that must arise.from. so general. a revolt. . With
this design, about three hours after midnight he decamped,
and marched towards the river Trebia, and the mountains
that were near.it: being persuaded that the troops might
there lie secure against all attacks, as the posts were. very
strong..and. advantageous, and the country also on every
side possessed by their allies.. As soon as Annibal was in-
formed of this retreat, he.immediately sent after them the
Numidian horse, and afterwards the other cavalry; and
himself in a.short.time followed with the rest of the army.
The Numidians, having entered the intrenchments, and
finding them quite deserted, stayed to set fire to the camp.

CHAP. VII. OF POLYBIUS. . 257

This delay was highly advantageous to the Romans. For
if these troops had followed the pursuit with diligence, as
the march of the enemy lay through a flat and open
country, great numbers of them must have been destroyed.
But now they had almost all safely passed the Trebia,
before the cavalry were come up. <A small part only of
the rear, that still remained upon the banks, were either
killed or taken prisoners by the Carthaginians.

The consul, when he had passed the river, posted his
troops upon the nearest hills. And having thrown up an
intrenchment round his camp, he resolved to wait for the
arrival of Tiberius with the other army; and, in the mean
time, carefully to attend to the cure of his wound, that he
might be able to bear a part in the engagement, whenever
it should happen. Annibal also fixed his camp at the
distance of about forty stadia from the Romans: while the
Gauls who inhabited the neighbouring plains, being now
bound firmly to his interests, and animated by the past
success, supplied his troops with all the necessary stores
in the ‘greatest plenty, and shewed the utmost eagerness to
share in all the labours, and in all the dangers of the war.

CHAP. VII.

WHEN the people were informed at Rome of ‘the action
that had happened between the cavalry, they were at first
surprised at an event that was so contrary to all their ex-
pectations. "They found, however, many reasons which
served to flatter them in the opinion, that this accident was
by no means to be considered as an actual defeat. For
some ascribed the blame to the rash precipitation of the
consul. Others imputed the whole mischance to the wilful
cowardice and ill conduct of the Gauls: being led to this
persuasion by the treachery which that people had just
now cominitted in the camp. And even though the worst
should be admitted, yet since their infantry remained
VOL, I. S

258 THE GENERAL HISTORY BOOK 1I.

entire, it seemed reasonable that their hopes also should be
still the same, with regard to the issue of the whole.
When Tiberius, therefore, with his legions, passed through
Rome, they made no doubt, but that the sight alone of so
brave .an army must at once strike the enemy with terror,
and give a speedy determination to the war.
_ When the troops were all met together at Ariminum
on the appointed day, agreeably to the oath which they
had taken, the consul immediately pursued his march in
haste, with design to join his colleague. Having fixed
his camp near him, he gave orders for the refreshment of
the army, which had suffered no small fatigue in their
route of forty days’ continuance from Lilybzeum to Ari-
minum, and made all the necessary preparations for a
battle; and, in the mean time, held frequent conferences
with Publius; as well to inform himself of all that had
already been transacted, as to deliberate also with him
concerning the measures that were now to be pursued.
About this time Annibal became master of Clastidium,
which was surrendered to him by the treachery of the
governor, a native of Brundusium, who had been placed
there by the Romans: and having gotten into his hands
the garrison and all the stores, he distributed the latter
among his troops for their present use, and joined the
prisoners to his army withont offering them any injury.
By this instance of his clemency, he hoped ‘that all the
neighbouring people might be induced to lay aside their
fears; since they would now perceive, that they had no
cause to despair of safety, in case that they should here-
after fall into the hands of the Carthaginians. He re-
warded the traitor also with ample presents; that the go-
vernors of other cities might be led to embrace his party.
Not long afterwards, having received information, that
some of the Gauls that lived between the river Trebia and
the Po, who had before concluded an alliance with him,
had now entered also into terms of treaty with the. Romans,
he sent away two thousand foot, and a thousand Numidian `

e E OF POLYBIUS. ` 259

and Gallic horse, to plunder and lay waste their country.
These orders soon were executed: and the detachment
was now returning with their booty, when the Gauls came
running to the Roman camp, and implored assistance.
Tiberius, who for some time had been impatient to be in
action, seized the occasion, and immediately sent away the
greatest part of his cavalry, together with a thousand light-
armed foot. These troops, having passed the river,
charged the Numidians and the Gauls that were loaded
with the plunder, and forced them to retreat in haste to
their intrenchments. But when the guards, that were
_ posted before the Carthaginian camp, advanced to the
assistance of those that fled, the Romans were in their
turn routed, and constrained to return back towards their
camp. ‘Tiberius then commanded all the cavalry to ad-
vance, together with the light-armed troops, and the enemy
was again forced to fly. Annibal, who was at this time
wholly unprepared for a general engagement, and who
knew it to be the part of a wise and prudent general, not
to hazard a decisive action without mature deliberation aud
design, forced the troops to stand, as they fled towards the
camp, and to turn their faces to the enemy; but, at the
same time, ordered the trumpets to sound the signal of re-
treat, and forbade the soldiers either to pursue, or renew
the combat. The Romans, when they had for some time
waited in the field, returned back again to their camp;
having lost but a very inconsiderable part of their forces
in the action, though they had destroyed great numbers of
the enemy.

Tiberius, being beyond measure elated by this success,
was impatient to try the fortune of a general engagement.
But though he had already resolved to embrace the ad-
vantage, which the slow recovery of Publius gave him,
and to govern all things by his own single authority and
will; yet being desirous also to gain, if it were possible,
the approbation of his colleague, he communicated his
intention to him. But Publius was fixed in different sen-

BE.

260 THE GENERAL HISTORY Book itt.

timents.: For he had considered with himself, that when
the troops had first been trained and exercised during the
time of winter, they would be able to perform much
greater service in the following season, than any tbat could
now be expected from them. He was persuaded likewise,
that the natural levity and perfidious disposition of the
Gauls would soon lead them to revolt from their new allies,
in case that the Carthaginians should be forced to remain
long inactive.. And in the last place, he was willing also
to believe, that when his own recovery should be completed,
he might himself be able to perform some service in the
conduct of a general action. He pressed his colleague, -
therefore, with the greatest earnestness, that things might
still continue in their present state. ‘Tiberius clearly
understood the wisdom of these sentiments. But being
burried headlong by ambition, confident of victory, and
heated also with the vain and flattering expectations of
being able to finish the war alone, before Publius should
be in a condition to assist him, or the new consuls, the
time of whose election now drew near, arrive from Rome,
to take upon them the command, he resolved, in opposi-
tion to all sense and prudence, to.risk a general battle.
And as he thus made choice of his own time for action, -
instead of that which the condition of affairs required, his
conduct in all that followed was by consequence absurd,
and such as could not fail to disappoint him in the end
that was proposed. !
Annibal, on the other hand, having formed the same
reflections in his mind as Publius had made, with regard
to all the present circumstances, was led to just the opposite
determination, and resolved to engage the enemy without
delay. ‘He saw the advantages that would arise, from em-
ploying the Gauls in action, before their first ardour was
abated. He judged it also to be a point of no small im-
portance in his favour, that. the Roman troops were: all
new-raised levies, not yet inured to war; and that Publius
was disabled by his wound from appearing in the field.

CHAP, VII. OF POLYBIUS.- 261

But his chief and ‘strongest reason was, that he might not
suffer any moment of his time to be wasted in inaction.
For when a general has once brought his army into a
foreign country, and engaged them in designs that are
beyond measure great and difficult, he must very shortly
meet his ruin, unless he is able from time to time to renew
the confidence and hopes of his allies, by a continual suc-
cession of exploits. Not doubting, therefore, but that the
eager and impatient spirit of Tiberius would soon afford
the opportunity that was desired, he: now began to make
the necessary preparations for a battle.

He had before this time carefully observed the ground-
that lay between the camps. It was a smooth and naked
plain: but the-banks of the river that ran through it,
which were of considerable height, and covered also with
close shrubs and bushes, suggested to him the design of |
placing an ambuscade to surprise the enemy. ‘This stra-
tagem was such, indeed, as might well be carried into
execution, without any fear of a discovery. For though
the Romans always were prepared to expect this kind of
fraud in woods and covered places, because the Gauls were
accustomed to hide themselves in these, they had never
any apprehension of it in a flat and open country. And
yet, in fact, it is both more safe and easy to place an
ambuscade in a plain, than in a wood. For as the troops
are able to discern from their concealment every thing
around them to a greater distance, so there are always
to be found some little eminences that will cover them
effectually from the observation of the enemy. Any in-
considerable river, whose banks rise only to a moderate
height, and sometimes even flags and rushes, or any kind.
of bushes, will serve to hide not only a body of foot, but
even cavalry. The only caution to be observed is, to place
their arms, whose brightness might betray them, upon the
ground, and their helmets under them.

Annibal then, when he had first communicated . his
intentions to his brother Mago and the rest of the officers

s3

,

262 THE GENERAL HISTORY Book 111.

in council, who all applauded the design, ordered Mago
to attend him at the hour of supper, and gave to him the
command of a hundred foot, and as many horse, directing
him to choose them, while it was yet day, from the bravest
of the troops, and to bring them after supper to his tent.
Mago was at this time young, but full of martial ardour,
aig. had been trained in war from his very infancy.
When he appeared with his men before the general’s tent,
Annibal, having first exhorted them to be strenuous in
their duty, commanded each man to select, from his own
proper company, nine of the bravest soldiers; and that
afterwards they should attend his orders, in a certain part
of the camp. ‘Thus the whole number now amounted to
one thousand foot, and as many horse. As soon as they
were all assembled, Annibal, having furnished them with
proper guides, and instructed Mago in the-time in
which he should appear and charge the enemy, sent them
away by night to the place of the ambuscade.

On the morrow, at break of day, he assembled the
Numidian cavalry; who, of all the army, were best able to
sustain fatigue and hardship. And having promised great
rewards to all that should perform any signal service in the
battle, he ordered them to pass the river without delay;
to approach the camp of the Romans; and endeavour, by
skirmishing, to draw their army into motion. His inten-
tion was, to surprise the enemy, when they were wholly
unprepared for an engagement; and before they had taken
their first repast. He then called together all the officers,
harangued them as the occasion required, and directed
them to give orders, that the troops should take their
usual meal, and prepare their arms and horses for the
combat. j

When Tiberius saw that the Numidians were advancing
towards the camp, he immediately sent against them all
his cavalry; and after these, his light-armed foot, in num-
ber about six thousand men; and at last drew out the
legions likewise from both the camps. Confident in the

CHAP. VII. OF POLYBIUS. -263

number of his troops, and elated also by the advantage
which his cavalry had gained the day before, he seemed to
be persuaded, that, in order to obtain the victory, it would
be sufficient only to appear before the enemy. It was now
deep winter: the snow fell fast: the cold was uncommonly
severe: and the Romans, both men and horses, had almost
all left the camp, before they had taken any repast. The `
soldiers, however, began their march with the greatest
ardour and alacrity. But when they came to pass the
Trebia, whose stream was now so swelled, by the torrents
that had descended in the night from the neighbouring
hills, that the waters reached even to their breasts, it was
not without the greatest pains and difficulty that they
gained the other side. As the day also was now far ad-
vanced, they began to faint through cold and hunger.
The Carthaginians, on the contrary, had taken the usual
meal at leisure in their tents; had prepared their horses
for the combat; had all rubbed their limbs with oil, and
put on their armour before a fire.

Annibal, who stood waiting till the Romans should have
passed the river, no sooner saw that they had gained the
other side, than he immediately sent away the Balearic
slingers and the light-armed foot, in number about eight
thousand, to support the Numidian cavalry; and himself
then followed with all the army. At the distance of eight
stadia from the camp, he ranged in one single line his
infantry, which was composed of Spaniards, Africans, and
Gauls, and amounted in the whole to about twenty thou-
sand men. His cavalry, whose numbers with the Gauls
included were above ten thousand, was placed, in two
bodies, on the wings. And the elephants, divided also
into equal numbers, were posted, at some distance, before
either wing.

Tiberius, perceiving that his cavalry could gain no
advantage against the Numidian horse, who, as their cus-
tom was, fled in one moment from the charge, and in the
next, returned again with the same force and vigour as

s 4

264 THE GENERAL HISTORY xaook ut.

before, gave tlie signal for their retreat. His infantry was -
composed of sixteen thousand Romans, and twenty thou-
saud of their allies; which is the just amount of that which
they esteem a perfect army, in the case of a general engage-
ment, when both consuls are together in the field. He
ranged them after the usual manner of the Romans; and
Wiving placed his cavalry, which were about four thousand,
on the wings, he advanced with a slow and haughty pace
towards the euemy. | t

The armies now approached each other, and the light-
armed forces began the combat. But even in this first
onset, the Romans manifestly laboured under many. dis-
advantages, while every circumstance was favourable to -
the enemy. For the troops of the former tliat were now
engaged not only were exhausted by the cold and hunger
which they had suffered ever since the morning, but had
discharged the greatest part of their weapons also in their
combat against the Numidian horse. And even those —
javelins that were left were now, from the continual rain
that had fallen upon them, become unfit for any service.
The cavalry also, and indeed all the army, were alike
feeble and disheartened; while the Carthaginians, on the —
contrary, fresh and vigorous, and prepared for action, flew
briskly to the charge, and maintained the fight in every
part with courage and success.

As soon therefore as the light-armed troops had retired
on’ either side through the intervals of their respective
armies, and the heavy forces advanced to action, the Car-'
thaginian cavalry, which was far superior to the Roman
both iu numbers and in streugth, advancing together from
the wings, pressed the enemy eth so me: vidit that
they forced them instantly to retreat before them. When
the infantry was thus uncovered, the Numidians and the
light-armed forces of the Carthaginians, returning back
againifrom the rear, and passing beyond the front of their
“own army, fell suddenly upon both flanks of the Romans,
and spread among them so great tumult and disorder,

CHAP. Vii. OF POLYBIUS. - 265

that they were no longer able to defend themselves against
those that were attacking them in front. In the centre of.
the armies, the foremost ranks, on either side, remained
for a long time firm; and maintained the fight with equal
courage and success. But when Mago and his troops,
now rising from their ambuscade, fell furiously upon the
rear of those legions that were fighting in the centre, then
were the Romans every way distressed, and the disorder
such as could receive no remedy. ‘Their two wings,
pressed by the elephants in front, and charged in flank by
the light-armed foot, were in a short time turned to flight,
pursued, and pushed together in crowds into the river.
In their centre also, the hindmost of the legions, unable to
sustain the fury of those troops that rose against them
from the ambuscade, were in like manner’ broken: and
destroyed. The foremost ranks alone, urged by necessity
to conquer, forced their way beyond the Gauls, and a part
also of the Africans that opposed them; and, with great
slaughter, opened for themselves a passage through the
midst of the Carthaginian army. But when they saw
that.both their wings were irrecoverably routed; and that
the numbers of the Carthaginian cavalry, the river, and
the rains which now fell strong and heavily, all combined '
together to render their own return back again to their
.camp impracticable; they formed themselves into close
order, and continued their march with safety to Placentia.
The number of them was about ten thousand. The rest
were trampled down in heaps, upon the banks of the
Trebia, under the feet of the horses and the elephants. A
small part only that were able to escape, among whom
were many of the routed cavalry, joined those legions
which we have just now mentioned, and retreated with
them to Placentia." The Carthaginians, when they had:
pursued the enemy as far as to the river, were then forced
to yield to the rigour of the season, and return back again
to their camp. Their victory afforded no small joy. For
though many of the Gauls were slain in the action, the

266. THE GENERAL HISTORY Book nm.

. loss of the Africans and Spaniards was very inconsiderable.
But the rains and snows, which had fallen continually
during that whole day, were so severe and fatal, that, of
all the elephants, one only was preserved alive: and great
numbers also, both of men and horses, perished through
the extremity of the cold.

Tiberius, after this misfortune, being willing, as far as
he was able, to conceal the knowledge of it from the
people in Rome, sent word only, that he had fought a
battle, and that the badness of the season had robbed him
of the victory. The Romans at first gave credit to this
account. But not long afterwards, they were fully in-
formed of all that had happened in the action, with the
consequences also that had followed their defeat: That
the Carthaginians had gained possession of their camp,
and drawn all the Gauls to embrace their party; that the
Roman legions had abandoned their intrenchments after
the battle, and fled for safety to the neighbouring cities;
and that they were deprived of all supplies, except those
that were sent to them from the sea, up the river Po.
An event, so contrary to all their expectations, filled:them
with no small amazement. They immediately renewed
their preparations for the war with greater vigour than
before; and used their utmost diligence to secure those
parts of their dominions that were most exposed; sending
troops into Sicily and Sardinia, and placing a garrison in
Tarentum, and in every other post that needed such
defence. "They also equipped a fleet of sixty quinque-
remes. The consuls, Cn. Servilius and C. Flaminius, who
were just now elected to their office, raised new levies
among the allies; enrolled the Roman legions; and having
collected stores from every quarter, sent one part to Ari-
minum, and the rest towards Tyrrhenia; the places into
which they had resolved to lead their armies. They de-
manded succours also from king Hiero; who sent to their
assistance five hundred Cretans, with a thousand heavy-
armed foot. In a word, every effort was exerted, and

CHAP. VII. . OF POLYBIUS. 267

every measure practised, which zeal and extreme diligence
could suggest. For such is the disposition and temper of
the Romans, as well in public affairs as also in their
private conduct, that whenever they have any real cause of
fear, they are at that time themselves most greatly to be
dreaded.

During this time Cnzeus Cornelius, who was left A his
brother with the fleet, as we before related, steered away
from the mouth of the Rhone; and having landed his
troops in Spain near Emporium, advanced along the
coast, and reduced by force all the cities that refused to
surrender to him, as far as to the Iberus. But those that
voluntarily submitted were treated by him with the greatest
gentleness, and protected from every kind ofinjury. Having
secured his conquests by sufficient garrisons, and received
among his troops a great number of the Spaniards that had
come to join him, he continued his march from thence into
the inland parts of the country, and in his way gained
many towns, some by persuasion and some ky force.
When he arrived near Cissa, a body of Carthaginians,
that were posted in that province under the command
of Hanno, came and encamped before him, with design
to stop his progress. But Cornelius, having immediately
ranged his troops in -battle, gave them an entire defeat,
and gained an immense booty by his victory. For the
army, that had marched with Annibal into Italy, had
left all their baggage behind them in this place. He
obtained the alliance also of ail the people that lived
on that side of the Iberus; and took prisoner the Car-
thaginian general, Hanno; together with Andobalis, who
was a sovereign prince in that part of Spain, and had
always strenuously supported the interests of the Car-
thaginians.

As. soon as Asdrubal was informed of these transactions,
he made. haste to pass the Iberus with his army. And
having received notice that the naval forces of the Romans,
grown confident from the success which the legions had

268 THE GENERAL HISTORY BOOK III.

now gained by land, had relaxed their usual discipline,’
and neglected all precaution, he sent away a body of
eight thousand foot, and a thousand hórse; who, falling
suddenly upon them, when they were dispersed on every
side through all the country, killed great numbers of them,
and forced the rest to fly precipitately to their ships.
He then retired again, aud repassed the Iberus; -and
having fixed his quarters for the winter in New Carthage,
he employed all his care to secure’ the posts that were
on that side of the river, and to complete all the necessary
preparations for the war. Cornelius also, when he had
first returned to the fleet, and punished, as the military
laws required, all those whose negligence had been the
cause of the late misfortune, sent away to Tarraco both
the naval forces and the legions, to take their winter
quarters together in that city. And having made an
equal distribution also ‘of the plunder among all the
troops, he gained to himself the favour of the army, and
inspired them with the warmest hopes. Such was the
condition of affairs in Spain.

CHAP. VIII.

AS the spring now came on, the consul Flaminius with’
the forces that were under his command, directing his
march through Tyrrhenia, passed beyond Arretium, and
there encamped; while Servilius, on the other hand,
advanced towards Ariminum, to oppose the entrance of
the enemy on that side. s
Annibal had fixed his winter quarters in the Cisalpine
Gaul. During his continuance there, the Romans that-
had fallen into his hands were all confined in prisons;
and scarcely received the food that ‘was necessary for life.
But their allies were treated by him with the greatest
gentleness. — After some «time, having assembled these
together, he told them, *that:his intention was: not to

CHAP. VIII. ` '" OF POLYBIUS. 269

make war upon any of them; but on the contrary, to
engage in their defence against the Romans; that their
interest, therefore, if they would judge with reason, must
lead them to embrace his friendship; since the sole pur-
pose of his coming was, in the first place, to restore
to all the inhabitants of Italy their ancient freedom; and
to assist likewise each particular state to recover again
those towns and territories of which the Romans had
deprived them." After this discourse he dismissed them
all to their several countries, without demanding any
ransom; imagining, that by this conduct he should gain
them to his party, and inspire their minds with an aversion
to the Roman government; or that those especially might
be excited to revolt, whose ports and cities had been taken
from them by the Romans.

At the.same time he practised also another artifice,
which was truly Carthaginian. Having reflected with
himself, that his connexion with the Gauls was fresh and
recent, and fearing, lest a people so noted for their fickle-
ness and fraud, should on a sudden change their senti-
ments, and form designs against his life, he procured some
artificial suits of hair, adapted. to the looks of persons
of every age, and different sorts of habits, that corre-
sponded with them; and varying his dress continually,
he lay so well concealed .under this disguise, that not
those alone who had seen him only in a transient view,
but even his intimate acquaintance could scarcely know
him. .

But the Gauls, not willing that the war should any
longer be protracted in their country, began to grow im-
portunate and clamorous, and demanded to be led against
the enemy. This zeal, as they pretended, all arose from
the resentment which they: had conceived against the
-Romans. But the.real motive was no other than the hope
of plunder. Annibal, however, resolved to gratify their
impatience, and. to begin -his march without delay. - As
soon, therefore, as the spring advanced, having enquired

270 THE GENERAL HISTORY mook t1.

of those that were best acquainted with the country, he
was informed, that all the common roads were not only of
considerable length, but well known also to the Romans;
but that, if he would venture to conduct the army over
certain marshes which would lead directly to Tyrrhenia,
his march, though difficult indeed, would yet be short;
and such also as must fully disappoint the expectation of
the enemy. As the difficulty only served to flatter the
disposition of this general, he resolved that he would take
his route that way.

As soon as this design was known among the army,
the soldiers were all seized with consternation; and formed
in their minds the most dreadful image of the pits and
pools into which they seemed ready to be plunged. But
Annibal, being well assured that the bottom of the marshes
was firm and solid, began his march; placing in van the
Africans and Spaniards, with the most serviceable part of
all his army; and mixing among them as much of thé
baggage only, as might serve for their supply in the
present journey. For with regard to future use, he
considered, that if they should prove victorious, and hold
the open country against. the enemy, their necessities
would-all' be fully satisfied ; dnd in case that they were
conquered, that they would then be in want of nothing.
After these marched the Gauls, and last of all the cavalry.
The care of the rear was left by Annibal to his brother
Mago; chiefly on account of the effeminacy of the Gauls,
and their known impatience of toil and hardship. .For
the orders given to Mago were, that he should press them
closely from behind, and as often as they appeared dis-
heartened by the difficulties of the way, or shewed any
inclination to return, should fall upon them with his
cavalry, and by force constrain them to advance.

The Africans and Spaniards pursued their way withoutany
immoderate pain or difficulty. For besides that the ground
was fresh and not yet broken, they were all men that. were
inured to toil, and by long use becomefamiliar with such kind

CHAP. VIll. OF POLYBIUS. j 271

of hardship. But when the soil had been disturbed by the
passage of the foremost troops, and trodden through to a
considerable depth, the Gauls that followed were unable to
advance a step, without extreme fatigue and labour; which
were the heavier also, and more severely felt, because they
had never been accustomed to such sufferings. Nor was
it possible for them to return, while the cavalry still pressed
upon them from behind, and forced them to advance.
Indeed all the army suffered much; chiefly through want
of sleep. For during four whole days, and three nights
successively, they marched continually through water:
But the Gauls were harassed beyond all the rest; and
even quite exhausted by their miseries. The greater part
of the beasts that were loaded with the baggage stuck fast
in the mud,.and perished there. But their mischance
afforded some convenience to the troops, who threw them-
selves down in heaps together upon the bales that lay above
the water; and thus, during some part of the night at
least, obtained a little sleep. Many of the horses also left
their hoofs behind them in this dreadful journey. Even
Annibal himself, who was carried upon the only elephant
that remained alive, was saved with the greatest difficulty ;
having suffered, during all the march, great pains and
anguish from a disorder that had settled in his eyes. And
as the time afforded neither leisure nor convenience for a
cure, he was at last deprived by it of the sight of one of
them.

Having now gained, however, almost beyond all expec-
tation, the end of this dangerous march, and hearing that
Flaminius was still posted near Arretium, he at first en-
camped upon the edge of the marshes, that he might give
some ease and refreshment to his troops; and, at the same
time, employed all his pains in searching into the designs
and disposition of the enemy, as well as the condition of
the country that was before him. He was soon informed,
that the country was rich and fertile, and such as would
afford a noble booty: and that Flaminius was a man who

272 THE GENERAL HISTORY . soox 111.

was singularly formed by nature for gaining popular ap-
plause, and was immoderately ambitious of it; that he was
filled with a high conceit of his own abilities, but in reality
was destitute of all those talents that were requisite in the
affairs of war and real service. Annibal therefore was
_ persuaded, that if he could once advance beyond the camp
of the Romans, and waste the country before their eyes,
Flaminius, provoked beyond all patience, and dreading the
reproaches of the multitude, would run with haste to re-
venge the insult; would pursue all the motions of the Car-
thaginian army; would flatter himself with’ the hope of
finishing the war alone, before his colleague could arrive;
and, in a word, that he would thus afford to his enemies
the opportunities that were desired, of attacking him with
some advantage. .

It is certain that these reflections were perfectly. the
result of wisdom and sound experience.. For. all men,
even of moderate discernment, must acknowledge that
nothing is more useful, or of greater importance, in the
conduct of a general, than to examine with the nicest care
into the character and natural disposition of the opposite
commander. For as in engagements of single men, or of
rank with rank, the several combatants carefully survey
the bodies of their adversaries, in order to discern some
part that may be open to their stroke; in the same manner
also it is necessary that a general in the field should
endeavour to discover in the chief that is sent against him,
not what parts of his body are most vulnerable, but whether
there be any weakness in his; mind and character, through
which he may be attacked with some advantage. For
among those that are placed at the head of armies, there
are some who are so deeply immersed in sloth and indo-
lence, that they lose all attention both to the safety of their
country, and their. own. Others are immederately fond
of wine; so that their senses are always disordered by it
before they sleep. Others abandon themselves to the love
of women; a passion so infatnating, that those whom it

CHAP, VIII. OF POLYBIUS. : 273

has once possessed will often sacrifice whole cities, and:
even their honour and their lives, to the indulgence of it.
Some again are cowards; which is esteemed no slight dis-:
grace, even among private men. But in a general, this
disposition is a public evil; and- draws after it the most
fatal consequences. For the troops under his command
not only waste the time without attempting any thing, but,
by their confidence in such a leader, are frequently betrayed
into the greatest dangers. On the other hand, a precipitate
rashness, a violence that rejects the rule of reason, pride,
and vanity, and self-conceit, are all qualities, not more per-’
nicious to the friends of those who possess them, than ad-
vantageous to the enemy. For men of this character are
always ready to be taken in every snare. Every bait is:
sure to catch, and every artifice to delude them.

If a general, therefore, could be informed of all the
weakness of his enemy, and would so regulate his designs, :
as always to attack the opposite commander in the part in
which he is most open to surprise, no power would long:
be able to withstand his efforts. For as a vessel that has
lost its pilot soon becomes an easy conquest, together with
all the crew; so likewise in the field, if the chief can once
be taken by his foible, and led artfully to the snare that is
most proper to entrap him, both himself and all his army
must, in a short time, fall together into the power of the
enemy. ‘This, therefore, was the address which . Annibal
now exerted against Flaminius; and the success was such:
as fully answer xs even his strongest hopes.

For no sooner had he decamped from the neighbourhood
of Fesula, and advancing beyond the Roman camp, began
to plunder and lay waste khe country, than Flaminius, $55
considered this proceeding: as a designed contempt and
insult, swelled with fury and resentment. And when the:
destrapion began to spread, and the smoke was seen to
ascend from every quarter, he no longer could restrain his:
passion, but gave vent to it in bitter exclamations. In
vain his officers represented to him that it was by no means

VOL. I. T

274 THE GENERAL HISTORY nook m.

seasonable to pursue or engage the enemy; that the
strength and numbers of their cavalry required that he
should act with the greatest reserve and caution; and that
on all accounts it would be far more prudent to wait the
arrival of the other consul, and employ together the united
forces of both armies. Flaminius -was deaf to these re-
monstrances; and even offended with those that made
them. ** What,” said he, ** must be the sentiments of all
our fellow-citizens at home, when they see the country
wasted even to the very walls of Rome, while we still keep
our post behind the enemy, and remain idle in our camp?"
With these words he immediately began his march; dis-
daining to employ even the least care or foresight, with
regard either to the time or place of action; and solicitous
` for nothing but to overtake the enemy; as if the victory
had been already in his hands. And indeed so strong was
the assurance with which he had inspired the multitude,
that those wlio followed the army for the sake of booty,
exceeded even the troops in number, and carried with them
chains and fetters, and other implements of the same kind,
in very great quantity.

In the mean while Annibal still advanced towards
Rome, through Tyrrhenia; having on his left Cortona
and the neighbouring mountains, and the lake of Thrasy-
mene upon his right; burning and destroying every thing
in his way, that he might the more provoke the impatience
and resentment of the enemy. But when he saw that
Flaminius now drew near, and that the ground before him
was very proper also for his design, he made all things
ready for a battle.

In the road through which the armies were to pass,
there was a level valley, inclosed on either side by a chain
of lofty mountains. At the farthest end of it stood a hil]
that was rough and difficult of approach. Near the en-
trance was a lake; and between the lake and the foot of
the mountains a very narrow pass, which led into the
valley. Annibal, entering along this defile, marched

CHAP, VIII. OF POLYBIUS. 275

through the valley ;. and having gained the hill that was at
the farthest end, he posted himself upon it with the Afri-
cans and Spaniards, . He then ordered the Baleares aud
the light-armed troops, who had marched in the van of all
the army, to take a cireuit round, and range themselves
along the back of the mountains that stood upon the right
hand of the valley. The Gauls and cavalry were disposed
in like manner, behind those that were on the opposite
side. And these latter were extended to so great a length,
that the farthest troops reached even to the narrow pass
that was between the foot of the mountains and the lake,
and which gave entrance into the valley. He posted some
troops also in ambuscade, in different places through the
valley; and having completed his whole disposition in the
night, he then lay quiet, and expected the approach of the
enemy.

Flaminius was following fast behind, being impatient to
overtake the Carthaginians. Arriving late in the evening
upon the lake, he encamped there for the night, and early
on the following day began his march into the valley. It
happened that the morning was unusually dark and misty,
When the greatest part of the Roman army had now
entered along the valley, and the foremost troops had
almost reached the hill upon which Annibal was posted;
this general then gave the signal to engage; sent notice to
the troops that were in ambuscade, and fell with fury upon
the Romans from every side. ‘The suddenness of the
attack, the darkness in which all objects were concealed
from view, the vigour and rapidity of the enemy, who
came pouring down in many parts at once from the hills
above them, struck Flaminius and his officers with extreme
amazement, and made even all defence impracticable. For
so far were they from being able to give the necessary
orders, that they neither knew nor comprehended any
thing that passed. _ In the same single instant they were
charged at once in front, in flank, and in the rear. - The
greatest part, therefore, of the troops were destroyed in

T?

276 THE GENERAL HISTORY BOOK Ill.

heaps, in the very order in which they marched; deprived
even of the power of resisting; and betrayed as it were to
death by. the folly of their general. For while they yet
stood deliberating on the measures that were fit to be pur-
sued, they fell beneath: the strokes. of their adversaries,
without any notice or warning of their fate. In the midst
of this disorder, Flaminius himself, vexed and tortured
with despair and rage, was surrounded by certain Gauls,
who put an end to his life. Fifteen thousand Romans
were destroyed in this valley, without being able' either to
fight or to escape; for they esteemed it. the most sacred of
all their institutions, on no account to fly, or ever to de-
sert their ranks.in battle. "The rest, thát were inclosed in
the narrow pass between the mountains and the:lake, lost
their lives in a manner: that was still more wretched and
deplorable. Hurried by despair, and pushed along in
crowds before the enemy, they hoped to find their safety
in the.lake. But some, attempting to swim across it with
their armour, were soon sunk and d rowned. The rest and
greatest part, having waded forwards till they were able to
advance no farther, stood with their: heads only above the
water; and when the cavalry followed closely after them,
and their destruction seemed inevitable, they raised. their
hands, and with every suppliant voice and gesture begged
for mercy ; but all their prayers were vain, and disregarded.
One part were slaughtered by the enemy; and the rest;
baving urged each other to the attempt, with their own
hands deprived themselves of life. About six thousand.
only of all the army, who had marched the first along the.
valley, gave an entire-defeat to the body that attacked their,
front. „If these troops had returned again, and endeavoured.
to surround the Carthaginians, a relief so seasonable might
have changed perhaps the. whole fortune of the battle;
but being ignorant of all that was transacted, they still.
continued to advance, expecting to be met by some new.
party, till at last they had gained insensibly the summit of
the hills. From thence, as the mist was now .dispersed,.

CHAP. VIII. OF POLYBIUS. 277

they saw the entire ruin of their army, and that the Car-
thaginians were completely masters of the field. Perceiv-
ing, therefore, that it was quite impracticable to send any
assistance to their routed forces, or in any manner to re-
new the fight, they formed themselves into close order, and
retreated to a certain village in Tyrrhenia. But when the
battle was ended, Maharbal, having received orders from
the general to pursue them with the Spaniards and the
light-armed troops, invested them closely in the place.
‘The Romans, being thus beset with various difficulties, and
seeing no way left to escape, consented to deliver up their
arms, and yield themselves prisoners, on condition only
that they should be dismissed with safety.

: .Such were the circumstances of the battle in Tyrrhenia,
between the Carthaginians and the Romans, As soon as
the prisoners were conducted to the camp, Annibal,:baving
ordered them to.be brought before him, as well those that
had surrendered to Maharbal as the rest also that were
taken in the action, whose numbers amounted altogether
to more than fifteen thousand men, told. the former that
Maharbal had no power to give any promise-of' safety
without his ‘authority and consent. He then ‘began to
accuse:and reproach the Romans; ‘and at last commanded,
that:they should be all distributed among the ranks of his
army, and be guarded carefully. But he dismissed the
allies to their respective cities, without demanding any ran-
som; having first repeated to them the same discourse
which: he before had made, * that his intention was not to
make war upon ‘the people of Italy, but, on the contrary,
to restore them to their liberty, of which they had been
deprived by the Romans.” He then gave the necessary
orders for the refreshment of the troops, and paid the last
honours to the chief among his officers that had fallen in
the battle. These were about thirty in number; and in
the whole engagement he had lost. no more than fifteen
hundred men, the greater part of whom were Gauls. He
afterwards deliberated with his brother and the rest of his

T 3

278 THE GENERAL HISTORY BOOK’ HII.

friends, concerning the measures that were next to be pur-
sued. His past successes had already filled him with the
strongest confidence, and flattered him with the hope of
every thing that was great and prosperous, with regard to
the final issue of the war.

CHAP. IX.
Wau EN the news of this defeat arrived at Rome, as the

misfortune was much too great to be either softened or sup-
pressed, the magistrates were forced to call together an
assembly of the people, and to acquaint them with the
whole transaction. But scarcely had the pretor from the
rostra spoken these few words, ** We have been defeated
in a great battle," than such was the consternation which
immediately ensued, that those among the hearers, who
had been present in the action, were in a manner forced to
be persuaded, that the calamity was far more dreadful than
it had appeared to be even in the time of the engagement:
For it was now so long a time since the Romans had
either suffered a defeat, or heard any mention of a battle
lost, that even the sound itself was new, and full of horror;
nor could they hear their loss so publicly avowed, without
deploring the misfortune with a grief that was beyond all
bounds. But the senate still retained their firmness; and,
as their post required, deliberated with great attention on
the measures that were’ necessary to be taken, and in what
manner they might best avert tle consequences of this
fatal accident.

About the time of the late engagement, Servilius, the
other consul, who was posted near Ariminum, which stands
towards the Adriatic sea, upon the confines which divide
Gaul from the rest of Italy, at no great distance from the
mouths of the Po, having heard that Annibal had entered
Tyrrhenia, and encamped near Flaminius, at first resolved
to march immediately with all his army to support his

CHAP. IX. OF POLYBIUS. 279

colleague. But because the legions were too heavy to
perform the march with such expedition as was necessary,
he sent away before four thousand of his cavalry, under
the command of Caius Centenius; that they might be
ready to assist the consul, in case that there should be
occasion for it, before himself was able to arrive. But
Annibal, being informed of their approach, ordered Ma-
harbal to advance against thém with the liglit-armed
troops, and apart also of the cavalry; who, falling upon
them in their march, killed almost one half of the detach-
ment in the very fiat onset. The rest fled in haste to a
neighbouring hill, but were pursued and taken prisoners
on the following day. The news of this misfortune arrived
at Rome within three days only after the account of the
former battle; while the city was still inflamed, and every
mind strongly filled with the sense of their first calamity.
And now, not the people only, but the senate themselves,
were struck with consternation and amazement. ‘The
usual business of the year was all neglected; the magi-
strates were no longer chosen as before; every one turned
his thoughts to find some remedy against the impending
evils; and the result of their deliberations was, that in
times so pressing, a dictator only could protect the state
from the dangers which so nearly threatened it.

In the mean while Annibal, though he was now per-
suaded that the issue of the war would fully answer all his
hopes, thought it not yet seasonable to advance nearer
towards Rome; but continued his route through Umbria
and Picenum, wasting the country without resistance, and
after ten days arrived in the neighbourhood of Adria;
having gained so immense a booty by the way, that the
army could neither carry nor remove it. He had de-
stroyed great numbers of people also in his march. For
so unalterable was his hatred of the Romans, and so deeply
rooted in his mind, that he gave orders to his troops, that
they should slay, without distinction, all those that were

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280 THE GENERAL HISTORY BOOK iil.

found of age to carry arms, in the same manner as when
towns are taken by storm.

Having fixed his camp near Adria, in a country which
produced all necessaries in the greatest plenty, he first
employed his care, to provide such refreshment for the
army, as might recover them from their present miserable
state. For partly through the cold and nastiness, to which
they had been exposed while they lay encamped in Gaul
during the winter, and partly also from the fatigue which
they had suffered in their march afterwards through the
marshes, both the men and horses were now covered with
a kind of leprous scurf; a disease, which is usually the
consequence of famine and continued hardships. But
these rich and fertile plains soon supplied both the oppor-
tunity and the means, of recovering the horses to their
former vigour, and of restoring also the strength and
raising the spirits of the troops. He armed also his
Africans after the Roman manner, from the spoils that
had been taken: and now for the first time sent some
messengers to Carthage, with an account of his success;
for he had never before approached uear the sea, from the
time of his first entrance into Italy. The Carthaginians
received the news with the greatest joy. They began to
fix their whole attention upon the affairs of Spain and
Italy; and resolved to employ every effort to support the
war with vigour in those countries.

The Romans named for dictator, Quintus Fabius: a
man of noble birth, and great abilities: who gained, by
his exploits, the surname of Maximus; which his de-
scendants likewise have derived from him, and still enjoy.
The office of dictator is different, both in dignity and
power, from that of consul. Each of the consuls is at-
tended only by twelve lictors; the dictator. by twenty-four.
The consuls are in many things restrained from acting,
unless they have first obtained the approbation and con-
currence of the senate. But the authority of the dictator

CHAP. IX. OF POLYBIUS. 281

„is absolute and uncontrolled; and from the time of his
appointment, except only that the tribunes still retain their
office, all the magistracies in the state are instantly dis-
solved. But we shall treat more fully of these subjects in
another place. At the same time also, Minucius was
declared master of the horse. This officer is entirely sub-
‘ject to the dictator: but, in the absence of the, latter, he
succeeds as it were to his place, and becomes the delegate
of all his power.

Annibal changed his camp from time to time, but con-
tinued still to move along the Adriatic coast. He ordered
the horses to be bathed with old wine, which was found
in great abundance in the country, and soon healed the
ulcerous humours which had rendered them’ unfit for
service. He recovered the soldiers also from their wounds;
and employed every care and remedy to restore to all the
troops their full strength and vigour. When this was
done, he began his march; passed through the districts of
Adria and Pretetia; traversed all the country of the Ma-
rucinians and Frentanians; and from thence advanced into
Apulia; plundering and destroying every thing in his way.

. Apulia is divided into three separate districts, the names
of which are Daunia, Peucetia, and Messapia. Annibal,
having entered the first of these, wasted the lands of
Luceria, which was a Roman colony: and afterwards,
having fixed his camp near Hipponium, in the territory of
the Argyripians, he from thence spread his troops over all
the country, and ravaged it without resistance.

About this time Fabius, when he had first offered sacri-
fice to the gods, set out from Rome, attended by Minucius,

‘and carrying with him four legions that were newly raised.
When he arrived upon the confines of Daunia, and had
joined the army that had marched into that province from
Ariminum, he dismissed Servilius from his command, and
sent him well attended back to Rome; with orders, that if
the Carthaginians should make any attempt upon the sea,
he should be ready to observe their motions, and to act as

~

282 THE GENERAL HISTORY ook 111.

occasion might require. He then advanced with all the
forces, and encamped near a place called Mca, at the
distance of about fifty stadia from the enemy.

As soon as Annibal was informed of their approach, he
drew out all his army, and, in order to strike a terror into
these new troops upon their first arrival, advanced near to
the Roman camp, and stood .for some time in order of
battle. But when the Romans remained still close in their
intrenchments, he returned back again to his camp. For
Fabius was fixed in his determination, not to hazard any
rash attempt, or on any account to try the fortune of a
general battle: but, on the contrary, to employ his: chief
and only care to secure his troops from danger. At first,
indeed, this conduct drew upon him no small reproach
and censure; while every one considered him as a man
that was cold and cowardly, and who feared to engage the
enemy. But after some short time, the wisdom of his
sentiments was clearly proved by the event: and all men
then were ready to acknowledge, that the measures, which
he now pursued, were by far the best and most judicious
that could be taken in the present circumstances. For
the Carthaginian troops had all been exercised in one
continued course of war, even from their earliest age. A
Their general also, from his infancy, was trained in camps,
among those very troops which he now- commanded.
They had gained many signal victories in Spain; and had
defeated the Romans and their allies in two successive
battles. But the point of greatest moment was, that they
-had no resource or hope in any thing but victory. On
the part of the Romans, all circumstances were contrary
to these: so that their defeat must have been inevitable, if
they had now risked a general battle. .But Fabius. wisely
chose to have recourse to that one advantage, which be-
longed confessedly to the Romans; and to regulate the
whole conduct of the war upon it. This advantage was,
that they might still receive into their camp supplies both
of men and stores, without any apprehension that the

CHAP. IX. OF POLYBIUS. 283

source from whence —-— were derived could ever be
exhausted.

From this time, wario, he attended ‘edly to the
motions of the Carthaginian army; following still at a
moderate distance; and taking care to secure, before the
enemy, all those posts which, from his acquaintance with
the country, he knew to be most proper for his design.
And as he still received supplies in the greatest plenty, he
never sent his troops abroad to forage, or suffered them
to straggle from the camp, but kept them always close
together, and united in a body; attending carefully to
every advantage, which time and place suggested; and by
that means intercepted and destroyed many parties of the
Carthaginian foragers, whom their contempt of the Ro-
mans frequently led away to too great a distance from
their own intrenchments. Thus, while he diminished by
degrees the numbers of the enemy, he at the same time
exercised the strength of his own forces, and raised again
their courage, which had been much depressed by the late
defeats. But no persuasions could prevail upon him to
try the fortune of a general battle. This conduct was in
all points very uppleasing to Minucius, who mixed his
sentiments with those of the discontented multitude;
charging the dictator with sloth and cowardice; and pro-
claiming, on his own part, the utmost impatience to seek
and engage the enemy.

The Carthaginians, when they had ravaged all the
places that have now been mentioned, passed the Apen-
nine, and came into the country of the Samnites; which,
as it naturally was very rich and fertile, and had now for
a long time flourished in continual peace, afforded every
kind of necessaries in so great abundance, that not all the
waste and consumption which they made were sufficient to
exhaust it. They made incursions likewise upon.the lands
of Beneventum, a Roman colony, and took Telesia, a city
that was strongly fortified with walls, and which yielded
also a very great booty. The Romans still followed close '

'

284 THE GENERAL HISTORY BOOK III.

behind, at the distance of one or two days’ march, but
never approached so near as to afford the opportunity of a
battle.

When Annibal perceived that Fabius thus persisted to
decline:a general action, and yet refused to leave the field,
he formed a very bold and hardy project, and resolved to
throw himself at once with all his army into the plains of
Capua, near the place that was called Falernus: being
persuaded, either that the Romans must. then be forced to
venture on a battle; or that all mankind would see that he
was confessedly the master of the open country ; „and that
the neighbouring towns would from thence be struck with
terror, and hasten to embrace his party. For though the
Romans had been now defeated.in two successive battles,
not one single city had revolted from them to. join the
Carthaginians. But all remained unshaken in their duty ;
though many .of them, on that account, had been exposed
to the severest sufferings. Such was the dignity of the
Roman republic, and so great the awe and veneration in
which it was held by the allies. :

It.must be acknowledged, that this design was very
wise and reasonable. For the plains of Capua are dis-
tinguished, not only by their natural beauty and fertility,
above the rest of Italy, but by their happy situation also
near the sea, which fills their markets with the commerce
of almost every part of the habitable world. Their cities,
likewise, are more celebrated for their beauty, than any
that are besides in Italy. Along the coast stand Sinuessa,
Cumse, Diczearchia, Neapolis, and Nuceria: in the inland
parts, towards the north, Calenum and Teanum; to the
south and east, Daunium and Nola; and near the middle
of the country, Capua, the noblest and most splendid -of
them all. In a word, so delicious are these plains, that
the mythologists may ‘seem, perhaps, to be not altogether
removed from truth, in that which they relate concerning
them. For these are called also the Phlegreean fields; as
well.as some other parts of the earth, that are distinguished

CHAP. IX. OF POLYBIUS. - 285

by their beauty and fertility: and even the gods themselves
are reported to have contended: together in former times
for the sovereignty and possession of them. But, besides
these great advantages, this country also is by nature very
strongly. fortified, and difficult of all access. For as one
part of it is bounded by the sea, the rest stands covered by
a chain ‘of lofty mountains, which admit no entrance,
except only by the way of three very narrow passes; of
which one lies:towards the country of the Samnites, another:
along mount Eribanus, and the third on the side of the
Hirpinians. The Carthaginians, therefore, by encamping
in the very middle of these plains, were going as it were to
stand upon:a public and conspicuous theatre; from whence’
they were sure to astonish all mankind by tle uncommon
boldness: of the attempt, and, if the Romans should stil
decline a battle, to make it manifest, that they had driven
them. from: the stage, and remained without dispute the’
masters of the open country. j i
With this design, Annibal; leaving now the territory
of the Samnites, entered Campania by the pass of mount’
Eribanus: and having continued his march as far as’
to the river Athurnus, which flows through: the middle’
of the plains, and divides them into two nearly equal’
parts, he encamped on that side of it which was nearest.
towards Rome; and from thence sent out his foragers,'
and wasted -all the country without resistance. A design
so bold and hazardous filled the dictator with surprise;
but, at the same time, fixed. him still more strongly in his
first determination. But Minucius, and the rest of the
Roman officers, being all now persuaded; that the enemy
were at last ensnared in a place in which they might be’
attacked with great advantage, advised, that no moment
should be lost; that they should hasten to pursue the
Carthaginians; should offer battle to them in these plains;
and save the' noblest part of Italy from’ ruin. Fabius,
therefore, was forced to yield to their impatience; and,
covering his real sentiments, began his march with the-

286 THE GENERAL HISTORY © sBoox m.

greatest haste, as if he had concurred with them in the
same design. But when he arrived in the neighbourhood
of Falernus, he only shewed his army upon the bottom of
the hills, marching still on one side of the enemy as they
advanced, that he might not be thought by tle allies to
have entirely left the field, but refused to descend into the
plain, or risk the fortune of a general engagement; as well
froin the other reasons that have before been mentioned,
as most especially, because the Carthaginians were far su-
perior to him in their cavalry.

But Annibal, having now wasted all the country, and in
vain endeavoured to draw the Romans to a battle, was
again preparing to decamp, that he might be able to re-
move the booty, before it was consumed, into some place
of safety, and there fix his quarters for the winter. For
his intention was, that the troops not only should enjoy a
present plenty, but be supplied continually with all kinds
of necessaries in great abundance for the time to come.
' When Fabius perceived, that the Carthaginians designed

to take their route back again, by the same way along
which they had entered, and that the narrowness and
difficulty of the road afforded the most favourable oppor-
tunity to fall upon them in their retreat, he sent away a
body of four thousand men, with orders that they should
possess themselves of the defiles through which the enemy
were to pass; should attend, with the greatest care, to the
proper time of action, and lose none of those advantages
which their situation could scarcely fail to throw into their
power: while himself at the same time took his post, with
_the greatest part of all the army, upon a neighbouring hill,
which commanded the defiles. ,

The Carthaginians, continuing their march forwards,
came and encamped at the very foot of the hills. The
Romans were persuaded, that they should. with ease re-
cover all the booty, and even began to hope, that, with the
‘advantage of the place, they might perhaps be able to give
a full determination to the war. In this confidence, the

CHAP. IX. OF POLYBIUS. 287

dictator was now employing all his thoughts and care, in
examining into the nature of the several posts, and in
making such a disposition as was requisite, with regard
both to the time and manner of the attack. The ne-
cessary measures. were all fully regulated, and were to
have been carried into execution on the following day.

. But Annibal, having conjectured from all circumstances
what it was that the Romans, upon this occasion, would
most probably attempt, contrived to defeat all their pro-
jects, and gave them neither time nor opportunity to
accomplish any part of that which had been thus con-
certed. Having assembled together all the pioneers and
labourers of the army, who were under the command of
Asdrubal, he ordered them to provide as much dry wood,
and other combustible matter, as they were able to pro-
cure; to bind it together in bundles fit for torches; and to
choose out of all the plunder two thousand of the strongest
oxen, and conduct them to a little distance without the
camp. At the same time, he shewed to them a certain
hill, which stood between the camp and those defiles
through which he was to pass; and instructed them, that,
as soon as they should have received his orders, they
should drive the oxen up the sides of the hill with great
speed and force, till they had gained the top. He then
dismissed them, that they might all take their supper, and -
afterwards a little sleep. But about three hours after
midnight, having called them again together, he ordered
them to bind the torches to the slap rite of the oxen, to set
them on fire, and drive the beasts by violence before them
towards the summit of the hill. The light-armed troops `
were posted also behind the pioneers, to assist at first in
driving the oxen forwards. But as soon as the beasts
should be engaged in a proper course of running, they
were then commanded to spread themselves upon the
right and left on both sides of them; to push their way
with speed, and with loud shouts and noise; to possess
themselves of all the eminences; and be prepared to attack

288 THE GENERAL HISTORY Book in.

the enemy, if any of them should. be found upon the
summit of the hill. At the same time Annibal himself
with all his army advanced towards the passes, having in
his van the heavy infantry, the cavalry, followed by the
booty, in the centre, and the Gauls and Spaniards in his
rear.

As soon as the Romans, who were .posted in the en-
trance of the defiles, saw the light of ‘the torches, imagin-
ing that Annibal was taking his route that way, they left
immediately their first station, ‘and hastened to ascend the ^
hill. But when they approached the oxen, the sight of
those strange fires filled them with doubt and conster-
nation, and raised dreadful apprehensions in their minds,
of some danger far more terrible than the truth. The
light-armed troops, as they met together upon the.summit
of the hill, were engaged in some slight skirmishing; but
the oxen falling in among them, soon separated the com-
batants, and forced them to remain quiet in their place;
expecting with impatience the appearance of the day, that
they might then be able to discern the real state of things
around them. The dictator, likewise, being in part sur-
prised by what had happened, and suspecting that it
covered some deceit, and partly also because he still per-
sisted in his first determination, not rashly to engage in a
general battle, remained quiet in his intrenchments, and
waited for the day. In the mean while Annibal, perceiving
that all things favoured his design, and that the Romans,
who were appointed to guard the passes, had left their
post, conducted his army through them, together with the
booty, without any loss. And when day appeared, ob-
serving that his light-armed forces were exposed to' some
danger from the Romans that had gained the summit of
the hill, he sent a body of Spaniards to their assistance; `
who engaged the enemy, killed about a thousand of them,
and descended again in safety with the rest of the troops.

The Carthaginian general, having thus happily led his
army back again from the plains of Capua, encamped with- `

`

CHAP. x. OF POLYBIUS. | 989

out fear of any insult, and had now no other care, than to
consider, in what place he should fix his quarters for the
winter. This retreat spread a very great and general con-.
sternation through all the towns of Italy. The dictator
also was loaded with the severest censure and reproach, as
if nothing, but the basest cowardice, could have suffered
the enemy to escape, when he had such advantages in his
hand against them. But Fabius still remained unshaken
in his purpose. Being forced, within some days after-
wards, to return to Rome, in order to assist in celebrating
certain sacrifices, he delivered up the army to Minucius:
and, at the same time, pressed him with the greatest ear-
nestness to be much less solicitous to gain any advantage
against the enemy, than to cover his own troops from
danger. But Minucius was so far from paying even the least
attention to these entreaties, that, on the contrary, while
the dictator was still speaking, his mind was wholly fixed
on the design of fighting. Such was the state of the war in
Italy.

CHAP. X.

ABOUT the same time Asdrubal, who governed the
affairs of Spain, having ordered the thirty vessels that were
left with him by his brother to be refitted during the
winter, and added to them ten more also completely
furnished and equipped, as soon as the spring came on,
ordered all the fleet, which consisted now of forty ships,
to sail from New Carthage under the conduct of Amilcar,
and to steer their course along the coast; while himself,
having drawn the forces from their winter quarters, began
his march, keeping his route likewise close along the shore,
that thus both armies might meet, and act together, near
the Iberus. Cnzeus, having $onjectured, without great
difficulty, that this was the intention of the Carthaginians,
at first resolved to begin his march by land, and to offer
VOL. I. U

290 THE GENERAL HISTORY Book 111.

battle to ‘their army. But when he had afterwards re-
ceived a more exact account of the number of their troops,
and the preparations which they had made, he desisted
from that design: and having equipped a fleet of thirty-
five ships, and filled them with a body of select forces from
the legions, he sailed from Tarraco, and arriving on the
second day near the mouth of the Iberus, cast anchor at
the distance of eighty stadia from the enemy, and sent away
two light frigates, that belonged to the Massilians, tomake
discoveries. For this people were at all times ready to
meet every difficulty, and to throw themselves the foremost
into danger. And as their zeal and generous attachment
to the interests of the Romans have often been shewn in
later times, so were they most especially conspicuous in the
great services which they performed during the course of ©
the present war. As soon as these vessels were returned,
with an account that the Carthaginian fleet was stationed
near the mouth of the river, Cnæus immediately sailed
away in haste, hoping to fall upon them by surprise,
before they could receive any notice of his approach. But
Asdrubal had long before sent his scouts abroad; and
being now informed that the enemy were advancing fast
towards him, he ranged his army in battle upon the shore, .
and ordered all the naval forces to get immediately on
board: and when the Romans appeared in sight, he sailed
out to meet them, and raised the signal to engage.. But.
the Carthaginians, though .they began the fight with
vigour, sustained it but for a short time only. For
the troops, that stood in view along the shore, were so
far from animating them to any higher degrec of alacrity
and .confidence, that, on the contrary, they only served to
check their courage, and restrain their efforts, by affording
the prospect of an easy and secure retreat, As soon,
therefore, as two of their ships were taken, with their men,
and four more disabled, thgir oars being broken and their
soldiers killed, the rest all fled with great precipitation ;
and having forced their vessels close into land, saved

cmap. x. OF POLYBIUS. | 291

themselves among the troops that stood upon the shore.
-The Romans pursued boldly after them to the very shore.
And having bound fast behind the stern of their own ves-
sels as many of. the Carthaginian ships as could be set in
‘motion, which were cte in number, they sailed
back again in triumph, and with no small joy: having thus
in the very first onset gained a victory, which rendered
them the entire masters of the sea, and by that means
wholly changed the face of affairs in Spain.

As soon as the news of this defeat arrived at Carthage,

they immediately equipped another fleet of seventy ships.
‘For they judged it to be a point of the last importance,
with regard to the prosecution of the war, that they should
‘still preserve their sovereignty upon the sea. This fleet,
having first steered their course towards Sardinia, sailed
from thence to Pise; in the hope, that they should there
join Annibal, and be able to act in concert with him. But
being informed that the Romans had sent against them a
fleet of a hundred and twenty quinqueremes, they returned
back again to Sardinia, and from thence to Carthage.
Servilius for some time followed after them with the
Roman fleet: but when he found that they had gainéd a
very great distance from him, he desisted from the pursuit,
and anchored in the port of Lilybeum. From thence
‘having steered his course towards Cercina, which stands
‘upon the coast of Afric, he forced the inhabitants to pay a
sum of money, to save their country from being plundered.
-In his return, he made himself master also of the island Cos-
-syrus; and having placed a garrison in the little town that
was in it, he then sailed back again to Lilybaeum, laid up
‘the fleet in harbour, and returned not long afterwards to
the army. :

When the news arrived at Rome of the victory that had
been gained by Cnæus against the Carthaginians, the senate
began now to think, that it not only was expedient, but
absolutely necessary, that they from this time should attend
more closely to the affairs of Spain, and support the war in

u 2

292 THE GENERAL HISTORY Book ii.

that country with greater application and vigour than before.
They resolved, therefore, that Publius Scipio, to whom this
province was at first allotted, should sail away immediately
with twenty ships to join his brother Cnæus, and to act in
concert with him. For they were under no small appre-
hensions, that the Carthaginians, in case that they could
once obtain the conquest of this country, with all the
wealth that might be drawn in great abundance from it,
would in a short time become superior also upon the sea,
and from thence be enabled more strongly to support the
war in Italy, and to furnish Annibal from time to time
with continual supplies both of men and stores. In order
to avoid this danger, which indeed demanded their most
serious care, they now sent Publius into Spain. This
general, even upon his first arrival, pursued such measures,
as greatly advanced the interests and enlarged the power
of the republic. For before this time, the Romans never
had attempted to extend their views beyond the Iberus,
but were fully satisfied with having gained the alliance of
the people that lived on this side of it. But Publius now
passed the river, and resolved to maintain the war on the
other side. An accident at the same time happened, which
greatly favoured this design. ‘The Romans, when they
had passed the lberus without any resistance from the
neighbouring people, who were struck with terror at their
approach, encamped near a temple that was consecrated to
Venus, at the distance of about forty stadia from Sagun-
tum; in a post in which they not only were secure against
all danger from the enemy, but were able also to receive
supplies continually from their fleet; which, as the army
advanced, had still sailed along the coast. In this place
the adventure happened to them which I am going to
relate. ,

At the time when Annibal was preparing to march into
Italy, he had.taken hostages from all the towns in Spain,
of whose fidelity he had any doubt, and ordered them to be
kept together at Saguntum; both because this city was a

CHAP. X. OF POLYBIUS. 293

place of strength, and because the -government also of it:
was left by him in the hands of men in whom he had an
entire and perfect confidence. The hostages were all of
them the children of the most distinguished families, in the
several cities from whence they had been sent. There was
a certain Spaniard, whose name was Abilyx; of high rank
and character in his country, and one who had always
seemed to be attached more strongly even than any of his
nation to all the interests of the Carthaginians. 'This man,
having carefully weighed all circumstances, and judging
that the Romans had now the fairest prospect of success,
formed the design of betraying his faith to his allies, and
delivering up these hostages to the enemy; a project truly
worthy of a Spaniard and barbarian. But he had per-
suaded himself that this declaration of his zeal in favour of
the Romans could not fail to raise him to a very high de-
gree of credit and esteem among them; especially when
joined to a service of so great importance, and rendered in
so critical a season. .

He went, therefore, to Bostar, the Carthaginian general,
who had been sent by Asdrubal to oppose the passage of
the Romans over the Iberus, but not daring to risk a
battle, had retired and fixed his camp near Saguntum, on
the side towards the sea. He was a man of a mild and
harmless disposition; easy and tractable in his nature, and
not forward to suspect any ill designs. Abilyx, beginning
his discourse with the subject of the hostages, represented
to him, “that as the Romans had now passed the river, the
Carthaginians no longer would be able by ‘the means of
terror to keep the Spaniards under due restraint; that the
times required, that they rather should employ their pains
to win the affections of the people, and fix them in their
interest by favour; that as Saguntum might, perhaps, in a
short time fall into the power of the Romans, who were
now encamped before it, if Bostar, seizing the occasion,
would send back the hostages to their parents and re-
spective cities, he would not only disappoint the expecta-

U $3

294 THE GENERAL HISTORY BOOK Ill.

tions of the enemy, who were earnestly solicitous to become
masters of them, for this very purpose; but by his wise and:
timely care, in thus providing for the safety of these young
men, would secure also the affections of the Spaniards to
the Carthaginians; that if he would trust to him the con-
duct of this business, he would take care abundantly to
magnify the merit of the kindness; and, as he led the:
hostages to the several cities, would raise, not only in the
parents, but in all the people of the country likewise, the
warmest sentiments of esteem and favour, by painting in
the strongest colours the generosity of this proceeding. In
the last place he reminded him, that himself might also
expect to be rewarded in the amplest manner; and that
every parent, when he had thus, beyond all hope, recovered
what was dearest to him, would strive to exceed the rest in
his acknowledgments, at load with favours the com-
mander to whose power he was indebted for so great a:
happiness." By these, and many other arguments of the
same kind, he prevailed on Bostar to approve of all that
was proposed. And having fixed the day on which he was
to be in readiness, with some attendants, to receive the
hostages, he then retired.

As soon as night was come, he went privately to the
Roman camp, joined some Spaniards that were at that
time in the army, and was carried by them to the generals.
And having, in a long discourse, represented to them the
great alacrity and zeal with which the Spaniards would all
concur to promote the interest of the Romans, if through
their means the hostages should be restored, he at last en-
gaged to deliver the young men into their hands. Publius
received this offer with the greatest eagerness and joy, and
dismissed him with the assurance of immense rewards;
having first appointed the time and place in which he
would himself attend his coming. Abilyx then returned
again to Bostar with some friends whom he had chosen for
the occasion, received the hostages, and leaving Saguntum
in the night, on pretence of concealing his motions from

I

CHAP, XI. OF POLYBIUS. 295

the enemy, passed beyond the Roman camp, and delivered

them to the generals at the appointed place. He was re-

ceived by Publius with all possible marks of honour; and

was charged with the care of conducting back the hostages

to their respective cities. Some Romans also, that were

most proper for the trust, were ordered to attend him. In

every place through which they passed, the dismission of
these young’ men was highly magnified by Abilyx, as a

signal instance of the clemency and generous spirit of the

Romans. On the other hand, he displayed in the strongest :
colour the jealous diffidence of the Carthaginians, and the

severity with which they had always treated their allies.

He urged his own example likewise, as an encouragement

to them to revolt. By these persuasions many of the
Spaniards were led to embrace the friendship of the Ro-

mans. With regard to Bostar, he was thought to have
acted with such weakness, as was by no means to be ex-

cused in a person of his age; and was afterwards involved,
on that account, in very great misfortunes. The Romans,

on the contrary, derived many advantages from this acci-
dent, in the prosecution of the war. But as the time for

action was already past, both armies now retired to their
quarters for the winter. In this state we shall here leave
the affairs of Spain, and return again to Italy.

CHAP. XI.

ANNIBAL, being informed by those whom le had sent
to view the country, that the lands round Luceria and
Gerunium afforded great quantities of corn, and that the
last of these two cities was a commodious place for laying
up his stores, resolved to fix his quarters for the winter’
there. Passing, therefore, beyond the mountain called
Liburnus, he led his army to Gerunium, which was distant
from Luceria about two hundred stadia. On his first
approach, he endeavoured by gentle means to draw the
U 4

296 THE GENERAL HISTORY _ Book 1r.

citizens to his party; and even offered such engagements as
might secure to them the full performance of his promises.
But when this proposal was rejected, he Jaid siege to the
place; and, having in a short time made himself master of
it, ordered all the inhabitants to be destroyed. But he
reserved the walls, together with the greater part of the

houses, still entire; designing to convert them into grana- .
ries for the winter. He then ordered the army to encamp

before the town, and threw up an intrenchment round his
camp. From this post he sent away two parts of all the
forces, to gather in the corn ; with orders, that each soldier
should be obliged to bring a stated measure of it every
day to the officers of his own company that were appointed
to receive it. The remaining third part of the troops were
left to guard the camp; or disposed, as occasion required,

in proper posts to support the foragers. As the country,

was plain and open, the number of the foragers almost in-
finite, and the season likewise proper for the work, vast
quantities of corn were collected every day.

The Roman general, Marcus, to whom Fabius had left the

army when he returned to Rome, for some time shifted his -

post from hill to hill, attending to the motions of the Cartha-
ginians, and flattering himself with the hope that he should
at last find some occasion to fall upon them with advantage
from those eminences. But when he heard that they were
masters of Gerunium, had fortified their camp before the
town, and were employed in gathering stores from all the
country, he immediately left the mountains, and descending
along the promontory that gave entrance to the plain,

encamped near the foot of a hill that was called Callene, in

the district of Larinum; and resolved, without more delay,
to bring the enemy toa battle. When Annibal was in-

formed that the Romans were so near, he sent one third |
part only of his troops to gather in the corn; and advanc- |

ing with the rest towards the enemy, fixed his camp upon:
a hill, at a distance of about sixteen stadia from Gerunium,

that lié might restrain in some degree. the ardour of the.

-

CHAP. XI. _ OF. POLYBIUS. i 297,

Romans, and be able also to support his foragers as occa-
sion should require; and when night came on he ordered:
likewise a detachment of two thousand light-armed forces.
to march and possess themselves of another neighbouring
hill, which stood between the camps, and commanded that
of the Romans. But as soon as day appeared, Minucius
drew out also all his light-armed troops, and sent them to
dislodge the Carthaginians from their post. The dispute
was sharp and obstinate; but the Romans, having at last
prevailed, remained masters of the hill, and came soon
afterwards, with-all their army, and encamped upon it.

As the distance between the two camps was now so in-
considerable, Annibal at first kept together in a body the
greatest part of all the army. But after some days he was.
forced to send abroad his detachments, as before, to lead
the cattle to their pasture, and to gather in the corn;.
having resolved, agreeably to his first design, not only to
preserve entire the stores which he had already gained, but
to draw together also as large a quantity of. corn as he
might yet be able to procure; that thus the troops, the
beasts, of burden, and especially the horses, might be
supplied with all provisions in the greatest plenty during .
the time of winter. For his chief and strongest hopes
were founded on the cavalry. When Minucius saw that
the greater part of the Carthaginian army was -busied in
this work, and dispersed on every side through all the.
country, he chose the time that was most proper for his
purpose, and leading out all his forces, approached close
to the intrenchments of the enemy with the legionary
troops, drawn up in order of battle; and, at the same
time, sent away, in separate divisions, his cavalry and. the.
light-armed forces to fall upon the foragers; with orders,
that they should take.none alive. Annibal was in no small
degree embarrassed by.this sudden accident. For as.the
forces that remained with him in the camp were too few to
be drawn out in battle against the legions, so neither, on
the other hand, was he, able to send any assistance to the

298 THE GENERAL HISTORY Book rir.

rest that were dispersed about the country. Great num-
bers, therefore, of the foragers were destroyed by the de-
tachments that were sent against them; while the rest of
the Roman forces, that were ranged in order of battle,
arrived at last at such a height of insult, that they even
began to tear away the palisade of the intrenchments, and
almost besieged the Carthaginians in their camp. Annibal,

though thus ‘reduced to a condition that seemed indeed to
be next to desperate, struggled with all his force against
the storm; drove back the enemy as they advanced, and
kept possession of his camp, though not without the great--
est difficulty. But after some time, when Asdrubal was
come to his assistance, with four thousand of the foragers
who had fled together to the camp before Gerunium, he
then resumed his courage, marched out of his intrench-
ments, and, having ranged his forces in order of battle at
a little distance from the camp, at last repelled the ruin
that so nearly threatened him. The Romans returned
back again to their camp, elate with their success, and
filled with the strongest hopes for the time to come. For
many of the Carthaginians had fallen before the intrench-
ments; and a much greater number of those that were
spread through the country were destroyed by the parties
that were sent against them. On the following day, Minu-
cius went and took possession of the camp which the Car-
thaginians now had quitted. For Annibal, as soon as the
fight was ended, had resolved to return again to his first.
camp before Gerunium; being apprehensive that if the
Romans should march thither in the night, and, finding the
camp deserted, should take possession of it, they would by
that mean become masters of his baggage and all his stores.
After this action the Carthaginians used great precaution
when they went away to forage; while the Romans, on the
contrary, were bold and confident, and exposed themselves
to danger without any caution or reserve.

When the news of this success arrived at Rome, and
was enlarged in the relation far beyond the bounds of truth,

CHAP. XI. OF POLYBIUS. 299

the people all were filled with the greatest joy. For first,
as the despair into which they had lately fallen, with respect.
to the final issue of the war, seemed now to have given
place to better hopes; so the terror likewise that had
hitherto been spread among the. legions, and the inaction
in which they had still remained, were judged clearly to
have sprung, not from any want of courage in the troops,
but from the cold and cautious disposition of the general.
From this time, therefore, Fabius was openly reproached
by all; as a man who, through timidity, had suffered even
the fairest occasions to escape him; while Minucius, on
the other hand, was raised so high in the opinion of the
citizens by this exploit, that a resolution was taken in his
favour, of which there was no example. For they declared
him dictator likewise; being persuaded that the war would
thus be brought to a quick decision. "Thus there were at
one time two dictators, entrusted jointly with the conduct.
of a single war; a thing never known before among the
Romans.

As soon as Minucius was informed of the high applause
and favour which his conduct had gained for him among
the citizens, and of the dignity to which the people now
had raised him, he became much more eager and impetuous
than before; and resolved to attempt every thing against
the enemy. But Fabius was not to be moved by any of.
these accidents; but, on the contrary, persisted even with.
greater firmness in his first determination. When he.
returned, therefore, to the army, and saw that Minucius
was elated beyond all bounds; that he haughtily opposed
him in every sentiment, and was urging him perpetually to
venture on a battle; he offered to his choice, that he should.
either take in turn the single and supreme command of all
the army, or remove with one half of the troops to a se-
parate camp, and there pursue such measures as he should
judge convenient. Minucius eagerly embraced the last.
proposal. The forces, therefore, were divided into two

300 THE GENERAL HISTORY moox rir.

equal bodies; and encamped apart, having the distance of
about twelve stadia between their camps.

When Annibal was informed, as well by this division of
the forces, as from the prisoners also that were taken, that
some contention had been raised between the generals ;
and that it solely sprung from the ungovernable heat and
ambition of Minucius; he was so far from apprehending
that this accident would in any manner prove pernicious
to his interests, that, on the contrary, he conceived the-
hope of being able to draw great advantage from it. He
resolved, therefore, from this time to observe, with the
greatest care, the motions of Minucius; to meet and re-
strain his ardour; and to prevent him in all his efforts.
Between this camp-and that of Marcus there stood an
eminence, from whence those that should first gain pos-
session of it might be able greatly to distress the enemy.
Annibal resolved to seize this post: and not doubting but
that the Romans, confident from their late success, would
hasten to dislodge him from it, he employed the following
stratagem. The country that was round the hill was a flat
and naked plain; but the ground in many parts was broken
and unequal, and abounded with various kinds of pits.
He sent away, therefore, in the night, a body of five
hundred horse, and about five thousand foot; which were:
distributed in small divisions, of two and three hundred
each, among the several cavities in which they best might -
lie concealed.. And that they might not be discovered in
the morning by the Roman foragers, he ordered his light-
armed troops to take possession of the eminence before
break of day. Minucius, perceiving what had. happened,
applauded his good fortune, and immediately sent away
the light-armed troops, with orders that they should charge
the Carthaginians with the greatest vigour, and exert all
their efforts to drive them from their post. In a short :
time afterwards, he commanded the cavalry also to advance; .
and himself thén followed with the legions. His disposi-

CHAP. XI. : OF POLYBIUS. 301

tion was the same as in the former battle. It was now
clear day. But as the Romans directed their eyes, and
whole attention, towards the combatants upon the hill, the
Carthaginian troops, that were placed in ambuscade, re-
‘mained secure and unsuspected. "Annibal sent fresh troops
continually to the hill: and himself, in a short time, fol-
lowed with the cavalry, and all the army. "The cavalry
on both sides were soon engaged. But as the Carthagi-
nians were far superior in their numbers, the light-armed
forces of the Romans, being also pressed in this first con-
flict, fled back precipitately towards their own legions, and
threw them into great disorder. In this moment the signal
was given by Annibal to the troops that were in ambuscade,
who appeared on every side, and vigorously charged the
Romans. And now not the light-armed forces only, but
the whole army was in danger of being irrecoverably lost.
But Fabius, having from his camp observed the progress
of the ‘action, and perceiving that a general and entire
defeat must soon ensue, drew out all his forces, and ad-
vanced in haste to the assistance of his colleague. The
Romans, though their ranks all were broken, now resumed
their courage; and as these troops approached, formed
themselves again in order, and retired towards them for
protection. But many of their light-armed forces had
fallen in the action; and a much greater number of the
legionaries and bravest soldiers. Annibal, not daring to
renew the fight against troops that were fresh, and dis-
posed in perfect order, desisted from the pursuit and re-
turned back again to his camp.

The Romabo being thus rescued from destruction, were
at last fully sensible, that the rashness of Minucius had
engaged them in such measures as proved almost fatal to
them; and that they owed their safety, not at this time
only, but on former occasions likewise, to the cautious
management of Fabius. The people also at Reme were
now forced to acknowledge, that a wise and steady conduct,
regulated by sound skill and judgment in the art of war,

L4

302 THE GENERAL HISTORY soort

is far to be preferred to all those rash and impetuous
sallies, which result from mere personal bravery, and a
vain desire of popular applause. From this time there-
fore, the troops, made wise by their misfortunes, encamped
once more together, and resolved to leave to Fabius the
whole conduct of the war, and punctually to receive and
execute his orders. "The Cartliaginians drew a line be-
tween the eminence and their camp; and having thrown
up an intrenchment also round the top of the hill, and
posted some troops upon it, they had now leisure to com-
plete, in full security, the preparations that were necessary
for the winter.

CHAP. XII.

WHEN the time was come, in which the Romans usually
elected their chief magistrates, the people chose for con-
suls, Lucius /Emilius and Caius Terentius; and the dic-
tators resigned their office. Aimilius, having ordered the
former consuls, Cn. Servilius and M. Regulus, who had
succeeded to that dignity after the death of Flaminius, to
take upon them the entire command of the army in the
field, in quality of his lieutenants, remained still at Rome,
to deliberate with the senate on the measures that were fit
to be pursued, and to raise new levies. And when he had
enrolled the numbers that were necessary to complete the
legions, he sent them to the army; with an express order
to Servilius, that he should by no nieans venture on a ge-
neral action; but should from time to time engage the
Carthaginians in such sharp and frequent skirmishes, as
might serve to exercise the strength and raise the courage
of his troops, and by degrees prepare them for a decisive
battle. For it was now judged to have been the chief and
only cause of all the losses which hitherto the Romans had
sustained, that their battles had been fought by new-raised
levies, undisciplined, and without experience. At the same

CHAP. XII. OF POLYBIUS. 303

time also the pretor L. Posthumius was sent with a legion
into Gaul, to make a diversion there, and force the Gauls
that were with Annibal to return and defend their country.
The fleet, that had remained during the winter in the port
of Lilybaeum, was brought back to Rome. The generals
that were in Spain were supplied with every kind of stores.
And in a word, whatever preparations were judged neces-
sary for the war, were all completed with the greatest dili-
gence and care. l

Servilius punctually observed the orders of the consul,
and engaged only in some slight and separate skirmishes,
which we shall not now particularly describe. . For though
many of these little combats: were very sharp as well as
frequent, and were conducted by the Roman generals with
great skill and courage, yet both by reason of these orders
and from the circumstances also of the times, no action
happened that was of great importance, or in any manner
general or decisive.

In these camps, opposite, and in sight of each other,
both armies thus remained, during "e whole winter and
the following spring. But when the time of harvest drew
near, Annibal, having left his camp before Gerunium,
went and possessed himself of the citadel of Canne;
hoping, that by this mean, he should at last be able to
force the enemy to a battle. For the Romans had brought
together to this place all the corn and other stores, which
they had collected in the district of Canusium: and from
hence their army constantly was supplied with necessaries.
The town had been destroyed some time before. But as
the citadel remained, and fell now into the hands of the
Carthaginians with all the stores, the Romans were thrown
at once into the greatest difficulties. For they not only
were deprived of their supplies; but such also was the
situation of this post, that it commanded all the neigh-
bouring country. The generals, therefore, sent messenger
after messenger to Rome, desiring earnestly to.be in-
^x formed, in what manner they. should act in this conjunc-

-

304 THE GENERAL HISTORY mBÓook ım.

ture; since it was now no’ longer possible to decline a
battle, in case that they should approach any nearer to the
enemy. For the country was all wasted and consumed;
and.the allies were fixed in expectation, and waited with
impatience for the event. The opinion of the senate was,
that they should venture on a battle. But they advised
Servilius to delay it yet for some time longer, and: gave
orders that the consuls should leave the city, and hasten
to the camp. For all men now had turned their eyes
towards /Emilius; who, as well by reason of the constant
probity of his life and manners, as on account also of the
great services which his country had received, some time
before, from his brave and skilful management of the war
against the Illyrians, was judged most capable to satisfy
their fullest expectations, in this dangerous and critical
conjuncture. It was ordered likewise, that’ the army’
should consist of eight legions, a thing never known before
in any of their wars, and that each legion should contain '
five thousand men, besides the allies. For the constant
custom-of the Romans, as we have already mentioned, was
to raise four legions only, and to allow to each four thou- `
sand foot and two hundred horse. In case that they
were pressed by any great and unusual danger, they then
increased the number to five thousand foot and three hun-
dred horse. The infantry of the allies was the same in
number with that of the legions; but their cavalry three
times as many. Of these forces, one half of the allies and
two legions were allotted separately to each consul; who
was then sent to prosecute the war apart, in his own proper
province. "Thus their battles had been always fought by a
single consul, with two legions only, and an equal pro-
portion of the allies. For it had very rarely happened,
that all the forces were employed together in any ‘single
expedition. - But now their apprehensions were so gréat,
that they resolved to send not four, but eight legions at
once into the field. They represented also to ZEmilius,
in the strongest terms, the happy consequences that must

CHAP. X11. OF POLYBIUS. 305

attend-a victory, and, on the other hand, the ruin that
could scarcely fail to follow his defeat; and exhorted him
to choose his time for action with such skill and judgment,
as might give at once a final issue to the war, in a manner
worthy of his own great character, and of the dignity of
the Roman name.

As soon as the consuls arrived in the camp, they called
the troops together; informed them of the resolutions of
the senate; and employed all the exhortations that were
suited to the present circumstances. ZEmilius chiefly, who
was himself very deeply affected with the distresses of his
country, addressed the soldiers in the most earnest and
pathetic manner. He explained to them the causes of the
late defeats; and endeavoured to dissipate the fears, which
the remembrance of them had impressed upon the minds
of all the army. He told them, that it was easy to assign,
not one, but many causes of the ill success, that had
attended them in all their former combats; but that, at
this time, nothing but the want of resolution could deprive
them ofthe victory. "That hitherto they had never been
engaged with both consuls together at their head. "That
the soldiers likewise were all new-raised levies; unused to
the sight of danger, and unpractised in the art of war:
and, which was still a circumstance of greater moment,
that they were so far from being acquainted with the
condition of the forces that opposed them, that, on the
contrary, they were hurried to the fight before they had
even so much as seen the enemy. For the troops that
were defeated near the river Trebia, arrived one day from
Sicily, and early on the next were drawn out in battle.
And those that fell afterwards in the sight .of 'Thrasy-
mene, had not only never seen their enemies before the
combat, but were prevented also, by the mist, from seeing
them even in the time of the engagement. ‘ But now,
,Romans," continued he, ** you see that all things bear a
different face. You have now both consuls together. at
your head, ready to divide all danger with, you. : And

VOL. I. x

306 THE GENERAL HISTORY Book ur.

even the consuls also of the former year have consented to
remain, and to bear their part in the approaching battle.
You are now acquainted with the numbers of the enemy ;
the manner in which their troops are armed; and their
disposition in the field. And during the course of two
whole. years, scarce a single day has passed, in which you
have not tried your strength against them. Since, there-
fore, every circumstance is so different" from those that
were found in all your past engagements, the event must
be also different. For how improbable, or rather how
impossible a thing must it be thought, that troops, which
have returned so often with success from little combats
against equal forces, should now fail, with more than
double numbers, to obtain the victory in a general battle?
Since then, Romans, all things afford such strong as-
surances of success, nothing now is wanting, but that
yourselves in earnest resolve to conquer. But this surely
is a point on which there is no need that I should much
enlarge. If I were speaking indeed to mercenary soldiers,
or to an army of allies, engaged in the defence of some
neighbouring state, this kind of exhortation might perhaps
be necessary. For the worst that can befall such troops, is
the danger to which they are exposed during the time of
action: since they have scarcely any thing either to ap-
prehend, or hope, from the issue of it. But with you,
who are prepared to fight, not for the defence of others,
but for the safety of yourselves, your country, wives and
children, the consequences of the battle will be of far
greater moment than all the dangers that are now before
you. Reflect but for a moinent only on those conse-
quences; and sucli reflection, if I judge aright, will fully
supply the place of the most pathetic exhortations. For
who is there among you, that is not fixed already in his
choice, to conquer if it be possible; and if not, to die,
rather than behold the things that are dearest to him
exposed to insult and destruction? Turn your views for-
ward therefore to the event; and consider, on the one

CHAP. XII. OF POLYBIUS. 307

hand, the advantages, and on the other, the dreadful ruin,
that may possibly ensue. Remember, Romans, that the
battle is not to decide upon the fortune of these legions
only, but on that of the whole republic. For in case that
you are now defeated, Rome can no longer stand against
the enemy. Her whole strength and spirit, the fruits of
all her pains, and the grounds of all her hopes, are now
bound together and collected in your single army. Let
your efforts then be such, as may fully answer all her
expectations. Shew yourselves the grateful children of
your country: and make it manifest to all mankind, that
the losses which the Romans have hitherto sustained, are
by no means to be ascribed to any superior force or cou-
rage in their enemies; but to the circumstances only of the
times, and the want of experience in the troops that were
engaged." After this harangue, ZIEmilius dismissed the
assembly.

On the following day the consuls began their march,
and advanced towards tlie enemy; and on the second day
they encamped at the distance of about fifty stadia only
from the Carthaginians. But as the country was all plain
and open, and the enemy superior in their cavalry, ZEmi-
lius was persuaded that it would be still more prudent to
decline a battle till they had drawn the Carthaginians to
some other ground, in which the infantry might bear the
chief part in the engagement. But Varro, ignorant and
unskiled in war, was fixed in different sentiments; and
from hence arose ill humour and dissension between the
generals; a thing the most pernicious that can happen in
an army. The Roman custom was, that when both con-
suls were together in the field, they should command
alternately, day by day. On the next day, therefore,
when Varro commanded in his turn, he ordered the army
to decamp; and, unmoved by all the entreaties of his col-
league, resolved to approach yet nearer to fhe enemy,
Annibal, informed of his design, advanced to meet him
with his cavalry and the light-armed forces; and, falling

x2

808 THE GENERAL HISTORY BOOK IMI.

suddenly upon the Romans as they marched, threw them
into great disorder. But the consul, having placed some
of the heavy troops in front, to sustain the fury of the first
attack, led afterwards to the charge his cavalry and light-
armed foot; and inserted among them also some cohorts
of the legions. This precaution turned the -victory en-
tirely to his side against the enemy, who were destitute of
the like support. But the night, which now came on,
forced the combatants on both sides to retire; when the
issue of the action had proved in all points contrary to that
which the Carthaginians had expected from it. j

On the following day ZEmilius, who still was earnest
‘to decline a battle, but saw that it was now impossible’to
retreat with safety, encamped with’ two-thirds of all the
forces along the Aufidus; the only river that flows through
the Apennine. For this chain of mountains separates all
the other streams of Italy; of which one part are dis-
charged into the Adriatic, and the rest into the Tyr-
rhenian sea. But the Aufidus takes its sources on the side
of the Tyrrhenian sea, passes through the Apennine, and
falls at last into the Adriatic Gulf. The remaining third
part of the army were ordered by /Emilius to pass the
river, to advance up the stream, and there to lie in-
'trenched, at the distance of about ten stadia from his own
camp, and not much farther from that of the enemy.
His intention was to employ these forces, as well:to cover
and support his own = as to harass those of the
Carthaginians.

But Annibal, perceiving that all things tended fast
towards a general battle, thought it necessary. that he
should first endeavour to raise again the courage of his
‘army, which seemed to have been in some degree de-
pressed by the loss which they had sustained in the late
engagement, He therefore assembled all the troops to-
gether; and having commanded them' to cast their eyes
‘upon the country round, ** Tell me, soldiers,” said he, ** if
‘the gods had left it to your choice, could you have formed

CHAP. XII. . OF POLYBIUS. 309

any greater wish, superior as you are in cavalry to the
enemy, than to contend with them upon such a ground for
a victory that must decide the war?” The army all cried
out, and the thing indeed was manifest, that they could
not have desired any greater advantage. ‘ Pay your
thanks then," continued he, “in the first place to the
gods, who have secured the victory in your hands, by
leading your enemies into such a country; and afterwards
to me, your general, who have forced them to the neces-
sity of fighting. For how great soever our advantages are
against them, they liave now no means left to decline a
battle. For your part, there is surely little need that I
should now exhort you to perform your duty with bravery
and spirit; Before you had ever tried your strength
against the Romans, such discourses might perhaps be
seasonable; and in that persuasion I endeavoured fre-
quently to raise and animate your hopes, not by exhorta-
tion only, but. by examples likewise. But now, since you
have gained against them the inost perfect victory in three
successive battles, what words can I employ to excite any
greatér confidence than that which the remembrance of
your own actions must inspire? By your former combats
you gained possession of the open country; for such was
the assurance which I had given you, and the event con-
firmed my promise. But now I offer to your hopes the
towns and cities of your enemies, with all the treasures
that they contain. Be victorious only in this single battle,
and all Italy will be ready to receive your laws. Your
labours and your toils will then all be ended. The wealth
and power of the Romans will become your own, and
render you the undisputed sovereigns of the world. Let
us hasten then to action; and, with the assistance of the
gods, I will again make good my promise to you.” This
harangue was received by all the army with the loudest
acclamations. Annibal, having applauded their good dis-
position, dismissed the assembly; and went soon after-
wards and encamped very near to the enemy, on that side
x 3

310 THE GENERAL HISTORY zook ui.

of the river upon which the greater camp of the Romans
lay. `

On the following day he gave orders that the troops
should take the necessary refreshment and repose, and
make all things ready for the combat. And on the third
day he drew out all his forces, and ranged them in order
of battle in sight of the enemy, along the bank of the river.
But Æmilius, sensible of the disadvantage of the ground,
and knowing also that the want of provisions would soon
force the Carthaginians to decamp, resolved not to move
from his intrenchments; and made only such a disposition
of his forces, as was necessary to secure both camps from
insult. Annibal, therefore, when he had for some time
kept the field, led the rest of his army back again to their
intrenchments, but sent, away the Numidian horse to fall
upon the Romans of the little camp, who were employed
in fetching water from the river. The boldness of these
troops, who advanced even close to the intrenchments,
raised Varro's indignation beyond all bounds. The soldiers
also shewed the greatest eagerness and impatience to en-
gage; and could scarcely bear that the battle should any
longer be deferred. For when men are once firmly fixed
in their determination to force their way through the
greatest dangers to the end which they have in view, every
moment of delay is a burden that can hardly be supported.

When it was known. at Rome that the armies were en-
camped in sight, and that frequent skirmishes happened
every day between them, the whole city was filled with
agitation and concern. For the people were still so much
dejected by the remembrance of the former losses, .that
they seemed now to apprehend the worst that could befall
them, and to anticipate in their minds all the fatal conse-
quences of an entire defeat. The oracles of their sacred
books were repeated in every mouth. Every temple, and
, every house, was filled with prodigies and portents; which
gave occasion to innumerable vows, and prayers, and sup-
plicatory sacrifices. For in times of danger’ or distress,

CHAP, XII. OF POLYBIUS. 311

the Romans take unwearied pains to appease the wrath of
gods and men; and think nothing sordid or dishonourable
that is employed in that design.
On the following day, when the command had fallen
in turn to Varro, this general put all the troops in motion
by break of day.’ He ordered those of the greater camp
to pass the river; and, as they gained the other side, drew
them up in order of battle; joining also to them, in the
same line, the troops of the little camp. Their faces were
all/turned towards the south. He placed the Roman
cavalry on the right wing, close upon the river; and next
to’ these the infemiy; extended in one single line. But
the cohorts were drawn up behind each other in much
closer order than was usual among the Romans; and their
files so doubled as to give to the whole line a greater depth.
The cavalry of the allies closed the line upon the left.
And at some distance, in the front of all the army, stood
the light-armed troops. The whole number of the forces,
with the allies included, were eighty thousand foot, and
somewhat more than six thousand horse.
^ At the same time Annibal, having first sent over the
Balearic slingers' and the light-armed troops, to take their
post in front, passed the river in two places with the rest
of the army, and ranged them in order of battle. The
Spanish and Gallic horse were posted on the left, close
upon the bank of the river, and opposite to the Roman
cavalry. Next to these, upon the same line, he placed
first one half of the heavy-armed Africans; then the Gauls
and Spaniards; after these, the rest of the Africans; and
closed his whole line upon the right with the Numidian
cavalry. When he had thus ranged all his forces in one
single line, he advanced towards the enemy, being followed
only by the Gauls and Spaniards of the centre. ‘Thus he
detached these troops from the line in which they had
stood together with the rest; and, as he advanced, he
formed them also into the figure of a crescent; at the same
time spreading wide their ranks, and inim to this figure
x4

312 THE GENERAL HISTORY .xaoox.1r

but a very inconsiderable depth. His intention was, to
begin the action with the Gauls and Spaniards, and to
support it afterwards by the Africans. ‘The Africans were
armed after the Roman manner, from the spoils that had
been taken in the former battles. ‘The Gauls and Spaniards
wore the same kind of buckler; but. their swords were
different. ' For those of the latter were formed as well to
push with as to strike; whereas the Gauls could only use
their swords to make a falling stroke, and at a certain dis-
tance. These troops were ranged together in alternate
cohorts; and as the Gauls were naked, and the Spaniards
all clothed with vests of linen bordered with purple, after
the fashion of their country,’ their appearance was both
strange and terrible. The Carthaginian cavalry amounted
in the whole to about ten thousand; and the number of
their ‘infantry was somewhat more than forty. thousand,
with the Gauls included. The right of the Roman army
was conducted by JEmilius, the left by Varro, and the
centre by Regulus arid Servilius, the consuls of the former
year. On the side of the Carthaginians, Asdrubal had the
care of the left, Hanno of the right, and Annibal himself,
with his brother Mago, commanded in the centre. Both
armies were alike secure from being incommoded by the
rising sun; for the one was turned towards the south, as
we have already mentioned, and the other towards the
north.

The action was begun by the light-armed troops that
were posted before the armies. In this first conflict the
success was on both sides equal. But when the Spanish
and Gallic cavalry, advancing from the left wing of the
Carthaginians, approached near the Romans, the ‘contest
that ensued between them was then indeed most warm and
vehement, and such as resembled rather the combats of
barbarians than a battle fought by disciplined and experi-
enced’ “troops: for, instead of falling back, and returning
again often to the charge, as the custom was in such en-
gagements, they were now scarcely joined, when, leaping

CHAP, XH. - -OF POLYBIUS. 313

from their horses, each man seized his enemy. But ‘after
some time the victory turned wholly to the side of ‘the
Carthaginians. The greater part of the Romans were
destroyed in the place, after a most brave and obstinate
contention; and the rest, being closely followed as they fled
along the river, were all slaughtered likewise, without sigs
able to obtain any mercy.

- About the time when this combat was decided, the light-
armed troops on both sides retired back again to their re-
spective armies, and the heavy infantry advanced to action.
The Gauls and Spaniards stood for some time firm against
the enemy; but being at last forced to yield to the weight
of the Roman legions, they retreated backwards, and thus
opened the figure of the crescent in which they had been
formed. The Romans followed with alacrity and eager-
ness; and without much difficulty forced their way through
the ranks of the enemy, which were loose and thin;
whereas themselves, on the contrary, had drawn away many
cohorts from the wings to strengthen their centre, in which,
at this time, all the stress of the battle lay. For the action
was not begun by the whole line at once, but singly by
the centre; because the Gauls and Spaniards, as they
formed themselves into the figure of a crescent, had ad-
vanced far beyond the wings of their own army, and offered
only the convex of the crescent to the enemy. The Ro-.
mans, therefore, still pushing forwards through the middle
of these ranks, which still gave way before them, were at
last so far advanced within the centre, that they saw on
either side the heavy-armed Africans stand ready to inclose
them. Nor did these troops long neglect the occasion,
which of itself most clearly pointed out the measures that
were now proper to be taken. : For turning suddenly, the
one part of them from-the right to the left, and the other
from the left to the right, they fell with fury upon both
flanks of the Romans. And thus. the event happened
which Annibal chiefly had in view. For this general had
foreseen that the Romans, in pursuing the Gauls and

814 THE GENERAL HISTORY soox nr.

Spaniards, must at last inevitably be inclosed between the
Africans. By this means they were now forced to break
the phalanx, and to defend themselves, cither singly or in
separate parties, against the enemies that were attacking
them in flank. i

. Æmilius, who at first was posted on the right, and had
escaped from the general slaughter of the Roman cavalry,
percciving that the fortune of the battle was now to be de-
cided by the infantry alone, and being earnestly solicitous
that his actions should, in no respect, fall short of those
assurances. which he had given when he harangued the
army, drove his horse into the very middle of the combat-
ants; killing and dispersing every thing in his way, and
employing all his efforts to animate the : soldiers that were
near him. Annibal did the same on his part, for he had
remained still in the centre from the beginning of the en-
gagement.

The Numidians of the right wing had charged the
cavalry of the allies upon the left; and though, by reason
of their peculiar way of fighting, no great loat was sus-
tained on either side, yet as they still, from time to time,
returned again to the attack, they by that means held those
troops so constantly employed, that they had no leisure to
assist the rest. But when the cavalry of the left, that was
led by Asdrubal, and which now had finished the destruc-
tion of almost all the Roman cavalry that fled along the
river, came round and joined the Numidians, the cavalry
of the allies were at once seized with terror, and, not wait-
ing to receive the charge, immediately turned their backs
and fled. -Upon this occasion Asdrubal bethought himself
of an expedient which indeed denoted his great prudence,
and his skill in war. Observing that the Numidians were
considerable in their numbers, and knowing also that these
troops were then most terrible whenever they were engaged
against a flying enemy, he ordered them to pursue those
. that fled; and, at the same time, led his own cavalry to
. the assistance of the African infantry. He fell upon the

CHAP, XIL .. OF POLYBIUS. 315

Roman legions in their rear; and, having divided his
cavalry into little. troops, sent them into the midst of the
action, in. many different parts at once. By this wise mea-
sure he gave new strength and courage to the Africans;
while the Romans, on the contrary, began to lose all hope.
It: was at this time that Æmilius fell, oppressed with
wounds; and that life which had on all occasions been de-
voted to the service of his country, was now lost in its de-
fence. The Romans, though surrounded thus on every
side, turned their faces to the enemy, and resisted yet for
some time longer. But.as the troops on the outside fell,
their body by degrees was more and more diminished ;, till
at last they were pressed together within a very narrow
space, and were there all destroyed. Among them fell
Regulus and Servilius, the consuls of the former year;
both eminent for their virtue, and whose behaviour in the
action was such as shewed them to be worthy of the name
of Romans. "ac"

, During the time of all this slaughter the Numidians,
pursuing the, cavalry of the left, who fled before them,
killed the greatest part, and threw many from their horses.
A small number only escaped safe to Venusia; among
whom was Varro, that base and worthless consul, whose
government proved so pernicious to his country.

Such was the battle of Cannze; in which both sides long
contended for the victory with the greatest bravery. Of
this the action itself affords the clearest proof. For of
six thousand horse, which was the whole cavalry of the
Roman army, seventy only fled with Varro to Venusia;
and three hundred more of the allies escaped to different
cities. Of the infantry, ten thousand men indeed were
taken prisoners; but these had no part in theaction. And
about three thousand also found means to escape to some
of the cities that were near, But the rest, to the amount
. of seventy thousand men, all died with honour in the field
of battle.

The Carthaginians upon this occasion, as in all the

816 THE GENERAL HISTORY _ spook nr.

former battles, were indebted chiefly for their victory to
the numbers of their cavalry. And from hence succeeding
ages may be able clearly to perceive, that, in time of war,
it is far more advantageous to have a great superiority of
cavalry,-with no more than half the infantry, than an ‘army
that is in all parts equal tothe enemy. On the side of
Annibal were slain four thousand Gauls, fifteen hundred
Africans and Spaniards, with about two hundred horse.
. The Romans that were taken prisoners had no part in
the action, as we have just now mentioned. For Aimilius
had left behind him in the camp ten thousand of the in-
fantry; having considered with himself, that if the Car-
thaginians should draw out all their forces to the battle,
_ these:troops might fall upon their camp during the time of
the engagement, and make themselves masters of the bag-
gage; and, on the other hand, if Annibal, in apprehension
of this danger, should send a detachment from his army
to guard the camp, that the numbers of the enemy would
then be lessened in the field. They were taken prisoners
in the following manner. As soon as the action was
begun, they advanced to force the intrenchments; which
Annibal; ‘however, had left strongly guarded. The Car-
thaginians stood for some time firm, and repelled the efforts
of the enemy; but were at last so.pressed, that they were
scarcely able any longer to maintain their post. But when
the battle was now in every part completely ended, Anni-
bal, having brought ‘some troops to their assistance, drove
back the Romans, and invested them in their own camp.
Two thousand: of them were killed, and the rest made
prisoners. About two hundred also of the routed cavalry,
who had saved themselves in some of the fortresses of the
country, were invested by the Numidians in the posts into
which they had: retired, and were brought away pris
to the camp. -

The ieee consequences of this victory were such

as both sides had expected from it. The Carthaginians -

became at once the masters of the whole sea coast, and of

CHAP. XII. OF POLYBIUS. 317

` that part of Italy which was called Great Greece. The
-Tarentines surrendered without delay. The Argyripians,
with some of the cities also of Campania, sent offers of
submission. And, in a word, all the neighbouring people
began now to turn their eyes towards the Carthaginians ;
"who, on their part, were persuaded that they should take
even Rome itself upon their first approach. The Romans,
on the other hand, not only renounced all hopes of being
able any longer to retain the sovereignty of Italy, but
were filled also with the greatest apprehensions with regard
even to the safety of themselves and their own proper
country; expecting that the Carthaginians instantly would
arrive to finish their destruction. And as if fate itself had
taken unusual pains to fill up the measure of their misfor-
tunes, and had joined with their enemies against them, it
happened that not many days after this defeat, while tlie
consternation still was fresh, the news came to Rome that
the prætor that was sent into Gaul had fallen into an am-
buscade, and was destroyed with all his army.

In the midst, however, of these calamities, the senate
had recourse to every measure that was practicable in
order to preserve their country. They harangued the
people, and raised their drooping courage; they provided
all things that were necessary for the security of the city ;
and pursued their deliberations with the greatest firmness,
as it appeared indeed not long afterwards in the event.
For though the Romans were now plainly conquered and
depressed, and forced to yield to their enemies the whole
honour of the war; yet, through the prudence of their
counsels, and the inherent excellence of their government,
they not only drove the Carthaginians out of Italy, and
again recovered the sovereignty of that country, but,
within a short time afterwards, reduced beneath,their yoke
even the whole habitable world. Upon this account, ——
having now finished the relation of all that passed in Italy
and Spain during the hundred and fortieth Olympiad, as
soon as I shall have gone through the affairs of Greece

A

318 THE GENERAL HISTORY BOOK III.

that were transacted likewise within the course of the same
period, I shall then treat expressly of the form and consti-
tution of the Roman republic. For as the subject is itself
by no means forcign to'the nature or design of history, so
I am persuaded also that those especially who are em-
ployed in the affairs of government, will-find in it many
things that may be highly useful, both in establishing and
reforming states.

T" OF POLYBIUS. 319

\
BOOK THE FOURTH.

CHAP. I.

WE shewed, in the preceding book, what were the causes
of the second war between the Carthaginians and Romans,
and what the manner in which Annibal entered Italy; and
recounted also the several combats that ensued, to the
battle that was fought at last near the city of Canna, upon
the river Aufidus. We now go on to describe the affairs
of Greece that were transacted during the same period, and
in the course of the hundred and fortieth Olympiad; but
shall first, in few words, remind the reader of the things
that were mentioned by us on the subject of this country in
the second of our introductory books, and more especially
of that which we there related concerning the fortunes and
condition of the Achzan republic ; because this state, within
the compass of our own times, and of those which immedi-
ately preceded, has grown to a very amazing height of
strength and greatness.

Beginning then from Tisamenes, one of the children of
Orestes, we remarked, that the descendants of that prince
reigned after him in Achaia, in direct succession down to
Ogyges. That afterwards, the Achæans changed their
government to a democracy, which was instituted with great
skill and wisdom; and that this establishment was broken
by the arts of the kings of Macedon, and the people all
dispersed into separate and independent towns and villages.
We then shewed the time and manner in which they began
again to unite together; and what were the cities which -
associated themselves the first into the new confederacy.
We also explained at large the measures that were em-

320 THE GENERAL HISTORY ROOK iv.

ployed, and the motives that were used, to draw the other
cities to this union; and to engage by degrees the whole
people of Peloponnesus to embrace the same common ap-
pellation, the same laws, and the same single government.
After this-general view of the design, we then related in
their order, though in few words, the chief transactions that
succeeded, to the final-overthrow and flight of Cleomenes,
king of Lacedzemon. And having thus given a summary ac-
count, in the way of an introduction to our history, of the
events that happened in the world to the time in which
Antigonus, Ptolemy, and Seleucus, all died together, we
then . promised to go on to the commencement of our
history, and to begin with those transactions that were the
next. in order to the deaths of those three princes, and to
the events which we had last related.

This period seemed to be, on many accounts, dae dvi
‘that I could choose for the beginning of my work. | For
first, as the memoirs. of Aratus are here concluded, that
which I shall now relate concerning the affairs of Greece,
may be considered as a regular and close continuation of
his history. - In the next place, the times which now suc-
ceed, and which fall within the limits of this work, are in
part the very times in which we ourselves have lived, and
partly those of our immediate ancestors. And from hence
it happens that the things which I have undertaken to
describe are either those which I myself have seen, or such
as I have received from men that were eye-witnesses of
them. For in case that I bad gone back to a more early
period, and borrowed my accounts from the report of
persons who themselves had only heard them before from
others; as it would scarcely have been possible tbat 1 should
myself be able to discern the true state of the things that
were then transacted, so neither, could I have written any
thing concerning them with sufficient confidence. Another,
and indeed the strongest motive, by which I was inclined
to choose this æra, was, that, about this time, fortune had
entirely changed the face of things in all the countries of

CHAP. I. OF POLYBIUS. ' $21

the world at once. For it was now that Philip, the son of
Demetrius, before he had arrived at perfect age, took
possession of the Macedonian kingdom ; and that "Achzeus,
who was sent to govern the country on this side of mount
Taurus, assumed the rank and power of a sovereign prince.
At the same time.it happened that Antiochus, surnamed
the Great, who was also extremely young, was raised to

the throne of Syria, in,the place of his brother Seleucus,

who had died not long before; that Ariarathes obtained
the sovereignty of Cappadocia; and Ptolemy- Philopator
that of Egypt; that Lycurgus was elected king of Lacedæ-

mon; and lastly, that Annibal was invested by the Cartha-

. ginians with the command of their armies, and the govern-
. ment of the affairs of Spain, as we have before related.

EN.

Thus, then, as the supreme dominion had fallen, i in every
state, into the, hands of new kings and masters, it. was
reasonable to expect that a change so general must give
birth to new commotions. Fo or this naturally happens in
such circumstances; nor did it. fail now to happen. The

Carthaginians and the, Romans were soon ‘engaged i in ‘the
War which we have already i in part described. At the sume

time. Antiochus and. Ptolemy contended together for the
sovereignty of Coele-Syria. And Philip also, in conjunc-

tion with the Achzans, turned his arms against the Lace-

dæmonians and ZEtolians. The causes of this last war were

„those; which I am now going to relate.
The Ætolians had been long dissatisfied, that they were ™

forced to live in peace, and at their own expence ; accus-

_tomed, as they had always been, to subsist upon ‘the
_ plunder of their neighbours, and slaves „by ‘nature to an

uncontrolled and, restless appetite, - which both multiplied
their wants, and urged. them on to „rapine, as the only

means by which they. could be gratified ; ; so that they lived

the life of wild beasts of prey, invading every thing within

their reach, and making no distinction between friends and

„enemies. l During, the lifetime, however, of Antigonus,

their apprehension of the. Macedonians kept. them Js
VOL, I. ¥

UJ

322 THE GENERAL HISTORY BOOK Iv,

But no sooner was this prince dead, than, despising the
tender age of Philip who succeeded, they began earnestly
to seek for spme pretence upon which they might enter Pe-
loponnesus with an army. For as this province had, in
former times, been the usual scene of all their violence and
rapine, so they were persuaded that their strength in arms
was far superior also to that of the Achzans. While they-
were revolving this project in their minds, chance itself

conspired with their design, and supplied the following

M

means to carry it into execution.

A certain young man, named Dorimachus, full of the
fire and eager spirit of his country, a native of Trichonion,
and the son of that Nicostratus who, in defiance of the
laws of nations, attacked the Boeotians by surprise, when:
they were met together in their general assembly, was about
this time sent in the name of the republic to Phigalea, a
city of Peloponnesus, which stood upon the confines of
Messenia, and was associated to the Ætolian government ;
to secure, as it was then pretended, the city and the neigh-
bouring district. But the true design of his commission
was, that he should carefully attend to all that passed in
Peloponnesus. During the time of his continuance in this
city, being pressed by the importunity of some pirates who
resorted to him, and not able to supply them with the
means of any lawful plunder, because the general peace was
still subsisting, which Antigonus had established through-
out all Greece, he at last permitted them to steal away the
cattle of the Messenians, who were at that time the allies
and friends of his own republic. ‘These men at first con--
fined their robberies to the extreme borders of the province,
and to the herds of cattle that were found in pasture there.
But, in a short time afterwards, their insolence was raised
to so great a height, that they advanced far within the
country, and forced their entrance into the houses like-
wise; making their attack by night, when the people were
under no suspicion, or fear of danger. Thc Messenians,
incensed by these proceedings, deputed some persons to:

CHAP. L OF POLYBIUS. 323

_Dorimachus, to demand redress. Dorimachus, who was by

no means willing to condemn a practice which not only
enriched the men that were acting under his authority, but
brought great advantage also to himself, who received a due
proportion of all the booty that was taken, for some time
paid no regard to these remonstrances. But when the
outrages were still continued, and the deputations also be-
came more frequent than before, he at last declared that he
would go in person to Messene, and there render public
justice to those that had any cause of complaint against the
JEtolians. But when he arrived in that city, and the men
that had been injured appeared before him, he treated
some of them with the sharpest scorn; others with rough
disdain and haughtiness; and some with threatenings and
reproaches. And even in the very time of his continuance
there, the same band of robbers, approaching close to the
neighbourhood of the city, forced their way, with the help
of ladders, into a house that was called the Farm of. Chi-
ron; killed all those that opposed their entrance, and having
bound the rest in chains, carried them away, together with
the cattle and the goods.

The ephori of Messene, who before were very greatly
incensed, not only by the robberies that had been com-
mitted in their country, but still more also by the presence
of Dorimachus, being now persuaded that the grossest
insult had been added to their wrongs, summoned him to
appear before the magistrates. In this assembly it was
urged by Sciron, a man whose probity had placed him in
high esteem among the citizens, and who was one of the
ephori of the present year, that Dorimachus should not be
permitted to leave the city till the plunder had been first
restored, and the authors likewise of all the murders that
had been committed delivered up to public punishment.
The whole assembly seemed ready to assent to the justice
of this proposal; when Dorimachus, rising full of rage,
declared, ** that they were fools to think that this affront
was offered to himself alone, and not rather to the whole

y 2

324 THE GENERAL HISTORY BOOK IV.

republic of the Ætolians; that what they had now at-
tempted was a thing so monstrous, that they could not, in
reason, but expect that it must soon be followed by
such heavy vengeance, as would be felt through all their
country.”

There was, at this time, in Messene, a man of base
condition, named Babyrtas, who was strongly attached to
all the interests of Dorimachus, and who so perfectly re-
sembled him both in voice and features, that, if he had at
any time been dressed in his cap and habit, he might easily
have been mistaken for him; and this Dorimachus well
knew. As he continued, therefore, to insult the assembly
with the same haughty language, Sciron, being unable to
restrain his passion, at last cried out, ** Thinkest thou then,
Babyrtas, that we shall pay the least regard either to thee
or thy insolent threatenings?" Dorimachus then was silent;
and, being forced to yield to the necessity that pressed him,
suffered the Messenians to exact full reparation for all their
wrongs. But he returned back again to Ætolia so deeply
wounded by this abuse, that, without any other kind of
cause or pretext, he immediately employed all his pains to
excite the war which afterwards was made against the
. Messenians.

. Ariston was, at this time, praetor of the ZEtolians. But
because he was unable, through some bodily infirmities, to
support the fatigue of arms, and was also very nearly allied
in blood to Dorimachus and Scopas, he left chiefly to the
careofthelastofthesethe whole administration ofthegovern-
ment. Dorimachus would not venture to propose in public to
the ZEtolians that war should be declared against the Messe-
nians. For as there was no pretext for it that was worthy to
be mentioned, it was manifest that all men would consider
such proceeding as the mere effect of his own resentment, on
account of the affront which he had received from Sciron.
Resolving therefore to pursue a different method, he'en-
deavoured secretly to prevail on Scopas to’ approve of his
design, and to concert measures with him for attacking the

CHAP. I.- OF POLYBIUS. 325

Messenians. He represented to him that, by reason of the
tender age of Philip, who was now no more than seventeen
years old, they were perfectly secure on the side of Mace-
don; that the Lacedzemonians, in their sentiments, were
far from being inclined to favour the Messenians; and
that, as the Eleans were bound by friendship and alliance
to the /Etolians, their entrance into the Messenian territory
would, on that account, be both safe and easy. He set also
before his view, what was likely indeed to be of the greatest
weight in the mind of an Z7Etolian, the rich and valuable
booty which they could scarcely fail to acquire from this
invasion; since the country was wholly unprepared to
receive an enemy, and was also the only part of Pelopon-
nesus that had remained unpillaged during the time of the
Cleomenic war. He added likewise, that such an expedi-
tion would raise them high in the esteem and favour of the
JEtolians; that, if the Achzeans should attempt to oppose
their passage through their territory, they could have no
reason to complain if force should be repelled by force;
and if, on the other hand, they remained inactive, there
would then be nothing that could obstruct their progress;
and, in the last place, that even with regard to the Messe-
nians, some pretence migbt be also found for taking arms
against them, since they had long ago embraced such
measures as were repugnant to the interests of the 7Etolian
government, when they engaged themselves by treaty to
assist the Macedonians and Achzans.

These arguments and motives, with others of the same
kind and purpose, made so deep and forcible an impression
on the minds of Scopas and his friends, that, not waiting
to consult the general assembly of the ZEtolians, not com-
muuicating their intentions to the apocleti, or paying the
least regard to auy other of the forms which their govern-
ment, upon such occasions, required to be observed, fol-
lowing only the dictates of an impetuous passion, and
guided by their own private judgment, they resolved to
make war at once upon the Messenians, the Epirots,

Y 3

£

326 THE GENERAL HISTORY »oox iv.

Achzeans, Acarnanians, and the Macedonians. "They im-
mediately sent out some pirates upon the sea, who forced a
vessel which they met near the island Cythera, and which
belonged to the king of Macedon, to return back with
them to ZItolia, and there exposed to sale the ship, the
passengers, and all the crew. After this exploit they
equipped some Cephallenian barks, and, sailing along the
shore of Epirus, pillaged all the coast. They attempted
also to take Thyreum, a town of Acarnania, by surprise.
And having, at the same time, sent some troops, through
private roads, into Peloponnesus, they made themselves
masters of a fortress called Clarium, which stood in the
very middle of the Megalopolitan territory. In this place
they exposed their plunder to public sale; designing also
to use the fortress as their citadel, from whence they might
make incursions into all the neighbouring country. But
within some days afterwards it was attacked and stormed
by Timoxenus, the prætor of the Achzans, assisted by
Taurion, the Macedonian general, who was left by Anti-
gonus in Peloponnesus to watch over the interests of the
kings of Macedon in that country. For though Antigonus
was possessed of Corinth, which was yielded to him in the
beginning of the Cleomenic war, yet afterwards, when he
had taken Orchomenus by storm, instead of restoring it
again to the Acheeans, he chose to retain that town likewise
as his own; being willing, as I suppose, not only tojbe
master of the entrance into Peloponnesus, but to be able
also to control the inland parts of the province as occasion
should require. With this design he had placed a garrison
in Orchomenus, and supplied it with all the necessary stores
for war. |
Dorimachus and Scopas, having waited till the time was
come in which 'Timoxenus, the prætor of the Achzans,
was just ready to resign his office, and when Aratus, who
was appointed preetor of the following year, had not yet
entered upon the duties of his post, assembled all the
A&tolians together at Rhium; and having provided the

CHAP. 1I. OF POLYBIUS. 327

transports that were necessary, and equipped also the
vessels of the Cephallenians, they embarked their forces,
and passing over into Peloponnesus, began their march
towards Messenia, through the territory of the Patrzans,
the Pharzans, and Triteeans; pretending still as they ad-
vanced, that they had no design to commit hostilities
against any of the Achzan states. But the troops, unable
to restrain their natural appetite, plundered and destroyed
every thing within their reach. And when they arrived at
last near Phigalea, they from thence fell suddenly, and
without reserve, upon the lands of the Messenians; un-
moved by the alliance which had so long subsisted between
this people and their own republic, and regardless also of
all the common rights of men. For so strong was their
rapaciousness, that every other consideration was forced to
fall before it. They wasted the country therefore at their
leisure, and found no resistance; for the Messenians dared
not to appear in arms against them.

CHAP. II,

IT was now the time, in which the Acheeans usually held
a general council of the states, according to their laws. As
soon therefore as they were assembled together at /Egium,
the Patrzeans and Pharzans recounted all the wrongs and
violence which they had received from the /Etolians as they
passed through their territories. ‘There were present also
some deputies from the Messenians, who implored the as-
sistance of the republic against an enemy tbat had thus
attacked them in contempt of the most sacred treaties. The
injuries which the former had sustained did not fail to
excite a proper indignation in the whole assembly, as the
sufferings of the latter raised their pity. But that which
appeared most insolent and monstrous was, that the 7Eto--
lians, in violation of the treaties which even then subsisted
between the two republics, had dared to take their passage
Y4

328 THE GENERAL HISTORY zook1*.

through Achaia with an army, without any leave obtained,
without deigning even in any manner to excuse or justify
the action, Incensed therefore by all these circumstances,
they resolved, that some assistance should be sent to the
Messenians : that the praetor should assemble the Achzeans
together in arms: and that the measures which should
afterwards. be directed, when.the troops were thus assem-
bled, should all be ratified and legal.

‘Timoxenus, whose pretorship was not yet fully expired,
and who had no great confidence in the Achzans, because
they had lately much neglected all their military exercise,
resolved that he would bear no part in this intended expe-
dition, and refused to draw together the troops. For, from
the time when Cleomenes received his last defeat, the
people of Peloponnesus, exhausted by past miseries, and
persuaded also, that the peace which they now enjoyed
would be of long continuance, had by degrees lost all at-
, tention to the affairs of war. But Aratus, being enraged
to see the daring insolence of the ZEtolians, and sharpened
likewise by the old resentment which he long had enter-
tained against that people, entered upon the business with
much greater warmth ; resolved to arm the Achzans with-
out delay; and was impatient to begin his march against
the enemy. Having received, therefore, from Timoxenus
the public seal, five days before his own administration was
legally to begin, he sent orders to the citiés, that those who
were of proper age should immediately appear in arms at
Megalopolis.

But before we proceed, it may perhaps bé useful to in-
form the reader in few words, what was the peculiar cha-
racter of this magistrate: especially because there was a
certain singularity i in his disposition, which well deserves
tobe remarked. -

“In | general, then; Arátus was possessed of all those talents,
which are required to make a consummate leader of a state.

is eloquence was persuasive ; his reasoning and discern-
ment just; and his measures conducted always with due

CHAP, 1I. OF POLYBIUS. 429.

secrecy and caution. In the art'of'softening civil tumults
and dissensions, in'all the methods of' gaining friends, and
of fixing’ the affections of allies; he- was excelled by none.
Nor was he less to be admired, both on account of his
déxtérity in'contriving snares’ and stratagems, to deceive’
and surprise the enemy, and for the boldness likewise and
unwearied pains with which he carried them into execu-
tion. His abilities, indeed, in. this respect, though shewn
in many other signal instances, cannot fail to appear in the
most’ illustrious light, to those that will examine with
attention the manner in which he made himself master of
Sicyon and Mantinea; the measures which he employed to
drive the ZEtolians from Pellene; and, above all, the secret-
management, by which he gained Acrocorinthus by sur-
prise. But this same Aratus, when placed at the head of.
an army in the field, had neither capacity to form, nor —
courage to carry into execution, any projects; nor was he
able to support the sight of danger. From henceit hap-
pened, that every part of Peloponnesus was filled with
trophies, to record the battles that were gained against him;
for at these times, he afforded always a most easy conquest
to his enemies. Thus that variety, which is found from
nature in the bodies of mankind, appears to be still greater
in their minds. Nor is it in those things alone, which are
different from each other, that men are seen to possess
abilities very proper for the one, and ill adapted to the
other; but even in those of similar kind, the same man
shall in some discover great wisdom and discernment, and
be found to want the talents that are requisite for others;
on some occasions shall be brave and enterprising, but cold
and cowardly upon others. "These things are not para-
doxes; but, on the contrary, are known to happen every -
day; and are clearly understood by those, who view the
affairs of men with due attention. There are some, who,
in following the diversions of the field, encounter boldly
with the fiercest beast, but basely lose all spirit when they
stand against an enemy in arms. Some again in battle,

380 THE GENERAL HISTORY ook iv.

acquit themselves with vigour and dexterity, in the way. of
single combat: but when they are formed together into
ranks with others, they are found to possess neither force
nor courage. The shock of the Thessalian cavalry, ad-
vancing in close order to the charge, is such as can scarcely
be sustained. Yet these same troops, as often as they are
forced to break their ranks, and engage man with man as
place and circumstances may require, lose all their spirit
and activity. ‘The Ætolians are in both respects just con-
trary to these. The Cretans have at all times shewn no
small dexterity and skill, both upon land and sea, in
forming ambuscades; in pursuing all the little arts of rob-.
bery and pillage; in concerting an attack by night; and,
in & word, in all things that are conducted by surprise,
and in separate parties. But when they are drawn up in
battle, and constrained to face the enemy in a set engage-
ment, their hearts shrink back at once at the sight of dan-
ger. "The Achzans, on the contrary, and the Macedonian
troops,.are serviceable only in regular and stated combats.
But these examples are sufficient for my present purpose,
and may serve as a caution to the reader not to call in
question my veracity or judgment, if at any time I should
be found hereafter ascribing to the same men opposite
qualities, even in things of a like nature and resemblance.
When the Achzeans, in obedience to the decree that,
had been made, were all met in arms at Megalopolis, for
from thence we began this last digression, the Messenian
deputies appeared again before the assembly, and conjured
them to revenge the wrongs which they had sustained.
They desired likewise, and with no small earnestness, that
they might be received into the general alliance, and be
enrolled among the other states. But the chiefs of the
Achzans refused to yield to this request: declaring, that
they had no power to admit any new confederates, without
the consent of Philip, and the rest of the allies. For that
joint confederacy was still subsisting, which had been
solemnly made and ratified in the time of the Cleomenic

CHAP. II. OF POLYBIUS. 331

war, between the Acheans, and Epirots, the Phoczans,
Macedonians, Beeotians, Acarnanians, and Thessalians.
They engaged, however, to assist them with their forces,
on condition that those Messenians, who then were pre-
sent, would leave their sons as hostages in Lacedzemon;
that no peace might be concluded with the Ætolians,
without the knowledge and consent of the Achzans. The
Lacedzemonians, who had also raised some forces, as being
included iu the general confederacy, advanced as far as
to the borders of the Megalopolitan territory, and there
encamped; designing rather to expect the event, and
observe the motions of the rest that were in arms, than to
discharge their office as allies.

Aratus, having thus far accomplished his designs in
favour of the Messenians, sent some messengers to the
JEtolians, to inform them of the decree that had been
made, and to command them instantly to leave the Mes-
senian territory, and not to enter Achaia, on pain of being
opposed as enemies. "When Scopas and Dorimachus had
received the message, and heard likewise that the Achzans
were already met together in arms, they judged that, in
the present circumstances, it would be far most prudent
to yield obedience to this order. Having therefore dis-
patched some couriers to Cyllene, and to Ariston the
ZEtolian prætor, requesting him to order all the transports
that were then upon the coast to sail away in haste to the
island Phlias, in two days afterwards they began their
march, carrying with them all the booty, and directed
their route towards Elea. For the /Etolians had been
always careful to preserve a close alliance with the Eleans;
that through their means they might obtain a secure and
easy passage into Peloponnesüs, as often as they were
inclined to invade that province. Aratus, having re-
mained two days at Megalopolis, and suffering himself too
easily to be persuaded, that the Ætolians had in earnest
resolved to leave the country, dismissed the Laceda-
monians, and the greater part of the Achzans also, to

332 THE GENERAL HISTORY . sook iv.

their respective cities: and keeping only three thousand
foot, and three hundred horse, together with the forces
that were under the command of Taurion, he began his
march towards Patre, with design to follow the ZEtolians
at a moderate distance, during their retreat. When Dori-
machus, was informed that Aratus was marching close
behind, and attending to his motions, being partly appre-
hensive that. the Achzeans might fall upon him when he
was just ready to. embark, and take advantage of the dis-
order which would then be spread among the troops, and
partly desirous also to obtain some fair occasion to excite
a war, he gave orders that the plunder should immediately
be conveyed under a sufficient guard to Rhium, as if he
had designed to embatk from thence; and himself at first
followed with all the forces, to support the convoy. But
after some time, he suddenly turned about, and directed
his march back again towards Olympia. And being in--
formed that 'Taurion and Aratus, with the forces just now
mentioned, were at this time in the neighbourheod of
Clitor, and judging also, that it would be scarcely possible
to embark his troops at Rhium without the hazard of a
battle, he resolved to meet and engage the Achzeans, while
their forces not only were so inconsiderable in their num-
bers, but were void of all apprehension likewise of any
such attempt. For he had considered with himself, that
in case heshould be able to defeat and disperse these troops,
he might then waste the country at his leisure, and embark
in full security, before: Aratus could take the measures
that were necessary for assembling the Acheseans again
together: or on the other hand, if this magistrate should
be struck with terror, and refuse to venture on a battle,
that his retreat would then be both safe and easy, and
might be made also at the time which himself should judge
to be the most convenient. With these sentiments, he
continued his march forwards, and encamped near Methy-
drium, in the Megalopolitan territory.

The Achzan generals, when they — the news

CHAP. II. OF POLYBIUS. 333

‘that the Ætolians were advancing fast towards them, shewed
in all their conduct sé entire a want of skill and judgment,
that no folly ever could exceed it. Leaving the neigh-
bourhood of Clitor, they: went and encamped near Ca-
phye. And when the /Etolians, marching from Methy-
drium, had passed just beyond Orchomenus, they led out
their forces, and ranged them in order of battle in the
plain of Caphyee, having in their front the river which ran
through the plain. Before the river there were many
trenches also of considerable depth, and not easy to be
passed. The /Étolians, when they had viewed these ob-
stacles which'lay between them and the enemy, and saw
likewise that the Achzeans shewed no small alacrity and
impatience to engage, not daring to attack them in their
post, as they had at first designed, marched away in close
order towards the hills; designing to retreat to Oligyrtus ;
and thinking it sufficient, if they could now be able to
retire, without being forced to risk a battle. The fore-
most of their troops were already arrived upon the emi-
nences, and the cavalry also, which closed the rear of all
the army as they marched through the plain, had almost
gained the hill called Propus, when Aratus sent away his
cavalry and light-armed forces under the conduct of Epi-
stratus, with orders that they should attack the rear, and
endeavour to draw the enemy into action. But if this
general had resolved to venture on a battle, instead of
' falling .upon the rear of the Ætolians, when the whole
army had already passed the plain, he rather should have

charged the foremost of their troops, as soon as they
| began to enter it. For then, as the action would have
passed upon a flat and level ground, the Ætolians must
have laboured under many difficulties, on account both of
their arms, and of the disposition also of their troops:
while the Achzeans, on the contrary, who were armed, and
ranged in battle, after a different. manner, might have
exerted all the force that was peculiar to them, and: have
fought with manifest advantage. But now, having first

834 THE GENERAL HISTORY BOOK Iv.

neglected both the place and time of action that were
most suitable and proper for themselves, they resolved to
begin the fight, when both were favourable to the enemy.
The issue therefore of the battle was such as might be well
expected to result from so absurd a conduct. As soon as
the light-armed forces had begun to skirmish with the
rear, the Ætolian cavalry, keeping still their ranks, pushed
on their way towards the hill that was before them, in
order to join their infantry. Aratus, not discerning the
true intention of this sudden haste, nor considering what
it was that was likely now to follow, but being persuaded
that these troops already fled before him, sent away some
of his heavy infantry, to support the light-armed forces:
and then turning all the army upon one of the wings,
he advanced with the greatest speed towards the enemy.
The Aitolian cavalry, having gained the extremity of the
plain, took their post close upon the foot of the hills, and
drew together the infantry on both sides round them;
recalling also those that were upon their march, who ran
back with great alacrity to their assistance. And when
their numbers were sufficient for the combat, they ad-
vanced with fury, and in the closest order, against the
foremost ranks of Achzan cavalry, and light-armed troops.
The action was for some time warm and obstinate. But
as the /Etolians were superior in their numbers, and had
begun the attack from higher ground, the Acheeans were
at last compelled to fly. The heavy forces, that had been
sent to support these troops, and who now arrived, in the
same loose and broken order in which they had marched,
being in part unable to discern the truth of what had
happened, and partly because they were pressed. by those
that were retreating, were themselves also forced to turn
their backs, and accompany the others in their flight,
And from hence it happened, that though five hundred
only of the Achzans were at first defeated in the action,
yet those that now fled together were above two thousand.
The /Etolians seized the advantage, and pursued the enemy

n

CHAP. II. OF POLYBIUS. $35

with the greatest ardour, and with loud shouts and cries.
The Achzans, imagining that the main body of their
infantry still kept the advantageous ground in which they
had left them in the beginning of the action, at first retired
towards that place; so that their flight for some time ap-
peared to be no dishonourable means of safety. But when
they saw that these troops also, having left their post,
were advancing fast towards them, but in a long and
broken train; one part immediately fled different ways
towards the neighbouring cities; while the rest, disordered
and confused, fell against this very infantry as they ap-
proached, and spread such consternation among all the
troops, that the rout then became complete, without any
efforts of the enemy. The cities, as we have said, afforded
to many of them a secure retreat; especially Orchomenus
and Caphyz, which were near. Without this advantage,
the whole army would have been in the utmost danger
of being all shamefully destroyed upon the place.

Such was the end of the battle that was fought near
Caphyz. ‘The Megalopolitans, who had called together
all their forces by sound of trumpet, as soon as they heard
that the /Etolians were encamped near Methydrium, ar-
rived in the plain, on the very day following the action.
But instead of finding their friends alive, and joining their
forces with them against the enemy, they had now nothing
left but to pay the last solemn duties to their bodies.
Having collected together therefore the remains of these
unhappy men, they buried them in the plain, with all due
honours.

The /Etolians, when they had thus beyond all expecta-
tion gained the victory by their cavalry alone and light-
armed forces, continued their route through the very
middle of Peloponnesus. And having, in their march,
attempted to take by storm the city of Pellene, and plun-
dered likewise all the Sicyonian territory, they at last
retired along the way of the Isthmus. H

Such were the transactions, which afforded both the

AA

^

336 THE GENERAL HISTORY cook iv.

cause andthe pretext also of that which was called the
Social war: and the beginning of it may be fixed from

that decree, which was made.soon afterwards at Corinth,
upon the motion and advice:of Philip, in a general as-

sembly of the allies.

CHAP. III.

WHEN the Achzeans, within a short time after the late

action, were met together to hold the usual council of the
states, -all the people in general, and every one apart,
seemed greatly incensed against Aratus; whose conduct
was: considered as the only cause of.the misfortune that
had happened to. them. Those, therefore, who led
the faction ‘that opposed the interests of this, prætor,
seized the occasion, to inflame the multitude still more
against him; and charged him with such. heads of accusa-
tion, as were indeed too clear to be. refuted. , For first, it
was a manifest offence, that, before his own administration
was begun, and while the supreme command was vested in
another, he had forwardly engaged in such kind of enter-
prises, in which, as himself well knew, he had before so
often failed. A second, and a greater fault, was, that; he
had sent the Achzeans back again to their respective cities,
while the .ZEtolians still remained in the very.heart -of
Peloponnesus: though it was clear from every thing that
had been transacted,- that Dorimachus ‚and .Scopas had
resolved to employ their utmost power to create disorders,

..and excite a war. They reproached him, likewise, with

having ventured on a battle, when he was pressed by no

. necessity, and with forces that were so inconsiderable in

their numbers:- when, on the contrary, he might have
retired: with.safety to the neighbouring cities; and, when
he bad first drawn again together the troops that were
dismissed, might have marched to engage the enemy, if it
should then have:.been judged expedient. ., In. the last

CHAP. II. OF POLYBIUS. 997

place, it was urged against him, as a fault which merited
not the least indulgence, that. when he had resolved to risk
a general battle, he.shewed so entire a want of skill and
judgment in the conduct of it: and that, instead of taking
advantage of the plain, and making a proper use of his
heavy infantry, he on the contrary began the combat at
the very foot of the hills, and with his light-armed forces
only; though these were circumstances which of all others
were the most commodious for the enemy, and the best
adapted to their arms and disposition.

But notwithstanding all the weight and importance of
the charge, when Aratus stood up to speak, and reminded
the people of the many former services which his country
had received from his administration; when he began to
answer to the facts of which he was accused; affirming,
that he was not the cause of the defeat; and conjuring
them to excuse any omissions or mistakes, which had.per-

haps escaped him during the time of the action; and in :

general to survey things, not with sharpness and severity,
but.with candour and indulgence; the whole assembly
` made at once a generous effort in his favour, and, by a sud-
den change of sentiments, turned all their indignation upon
the leaders of the faction that had formed the charge

against him, and submitted to his sole advice and conduct .

the measures that were afterwards to be pursued.

These things all belong to the hundred and thirty-ninth i:

Olympiad. We now go on to the transactions of that
which followed.

In this assembly, the Achzans resolved that some depu-
ties should be sent without delay to the Epirots, Bceotians,
Phoczans, Acarnanians, and to Philip: to inform them of
the manner in which the Ætolians had twice entered Achaia
with an army, in direct breach of treaties; to demand the

succours, which, by the terms of the alliance, they were :

severally engaged to furnish; and to desire, that the Mes-

senians also might be admitted into the confederacy. They

ordered, likewise, that the praetor should draw together an
VOL. I. Z =

E

338 THE GENERAL HISTORY Book tv.

army of five thousand foot, and five hundred horse, and
march to the assistance of the Messenians, in case that
their country should be again invaded: and that he should
also regulate, with the Lacedaemonians and Messenians,
the number of the troops, both infantry and cavalry, which
they should severally be obliged to furnish, for the common
service. With such firmness did the Achzeans support
their loss: and resolved on no account to abandon the
Messenians, or relinquish their first design. ‘The deputies
made haste to discharge their commission to the several
states. The prætor levied troops among ‘the Achreans,
agreeably to the decree. And the Lacedemonians and
Messenians consented each to raise two thousand and five |
hundred foot, and two hundred and fifty horse. Thus the
whole army was to consist of ten m—— foot, and a
thousand horse. : i

The Ætolians on the other hand, as soon as they were
assembled in their general council, formed the project of
entering into a treaty of peace with the Lacedzemonians,
the Messenians, and the rest of the allies; designing,’ by
this wicked and pernicious measure, to separate them from
the Achzans. At the same time they also made the fol-
lowing decree. ** That they would remain in peace with
the Achzeans, on condition that they would depart from
their alliance with the Messenians; and, if this should be
refused, that they would immediately declare war against
them." A proceeding surely the most absurd that can be
well conceived. "To be at the same time the allies both of
the Messenians and Acheans, and yet to threaten the
Acheeans with a war, in case that they received the Messe-
nians into their alliance, and on the other hand, to engage
that they would remain in friendship with them, if they
would regard that people as their enemies. But from
hence it happened, that, by thus forming projects that
were in the highest degree both senseless and impracticable,

_ they left-to their injustice not the least colour or support
from reason. à

CHAP. HI. ^ OF POLYBIUS. 339

As soon as the Epirots and king Philip had received the :

deputation from the Achzans, they readily consented, that
the Messenians should be admitted into the confederacy.
But with regard to-the ZEtolians, though at first indeed
they were filled with some resentment on account of the
late transactions, yet, because such proceedings were per-
fectly consistent with the manners and habitual practice of
this people, as their surprise from what had happened was
of short continuance, so their indignation also soon sub-
sided, and they resolved that they would still remain in
peace. So much more easily are men disposed to pardon
a long and continued course of wickedness and violence,
than any new and unexpected instance of injustice. For
it was now grown to be the common custom of the /Etoli-
ans, to pillage continually all the parts of Greece, and to
make war upon every state, without any previous declara-
tion of it. Nor would they at any time submit to offer
the least excuse or vindication of their conduct; but even
laughed at those, who demanded from them any reasonable
account, either of their past transactions, or of their future
projects and designs. The Lacedaemonians, who so lately
had received their liberty from the generous efforts of the
Achezans and Antigonus, and who ought to have been re-
strained by that consideration from pursuing any measures
that were repugnant to the interests of the Macedonians
and of Philip, sent now in private to the /Etolians, and
concluded with them a secret treaty of friendship and alli-
ance.

While the Achzans were employed in drawing together
their forces, and in regulating all things that related to the
succours which the Lacedemonians and Messenians had
engaged to furnish, Scerdilaidas and Demetrius of Pharos,
departing from Illyria with a fleet of ninety frigates, sailed
beyond Lissus, in direct violation of the treaty which had
been concluded with the Romans. They first steered their
course together to Pylus, and endeavoured to take the city
by storm, but were repulsed in the attempt. Demetrius

Z2 i A

W BW
} `

340 THE GENERAL HISTORY Boox w.

then took with him fifty of the vessels; and sailing round
the Cyclade islands, he plundered some of them, and ex-
acted large sums of money from the rest: while Scerdilai-
das, with the forty frigates that were left, directing liis
course back again towards Illyria, cast anchor at Naupac-
tus; trusting to the friendship of Amynas, king of the
Jukotiidiens, to whom he was allied in blood. And
having, through the intervention of Agelaus, concluded a
treaty also with the ZEtolians, he engaged to join his forces
with them against the Achzeans, on condition that he should
receive an equal share of all the booty. Dorimachus,
Scopas, and Agelaus, consented to the terms that were
proposed: and having about the same time conceived some
hopes of gaining the city of Cynetha by surprise, they
drew together all the ZEtolian forces, and being joined
also by the Illyrians, began their march towards Achaia.
^] In the mean time Ariston, the prætor of the tolians,
(remained quiet at home; and as if he had been ignorant
of all that was transacted, declared aloud, that they had
no design to make war against the Acheans, but that the
peace still subsisted between the two republics; acting, in
this respect, a most weak and childish part. For what can
be more vain or senseless, than to hope to conceal the
truth under the disguise of words, when it is shewn in the
fullest light by the evidence of facts? í
Dorimachus, passing through the Achean territory,
appeared suddenly before Cynetha. This city, which was
situated in Arcadia, had for a long time been distracted
by intestine tumults; which were carried to so great excess,
that many of the citizens lost their lives in those disorders,
and many were driven into banishment. They seized in
turn upon the fortunes of each other, and made new divi-
sions of their lands. At last the faction that had embraced ,
the interests of the Achzeans, having prevailed against the
rest of the inhabitants, kept entire possession of the city,
and received some troops for their defence, together with
a governor also, from Achaia. While things were in this

CHAP. IIT. ^ OF POLYBIUS. 341

condition, and not long before the arrival of the Ætolians,
those that had been Swed to fly sent a deputation to the
rest who remained masters of the city, requesting them to
consent to terms of reconciliation with them, and to suffer
them to return. The citizens, moved by their entreaties,
sent some deputies to the Achæan states, that the agree-
ment might be made with the knowledge and consent of
that republic. The Achzans readily approved of the de-
sign; being persuaded that they should thus be able to re-
tain both parties in their interests for the time to come.
For as the inhabitants that were masters of the city were
already in all points devoted to them, so those likewise,
who were now to be restored, could scarcely fail of being
always sensible that they were indebted to the Achzans for
their safety and return. The Cynzetheans, therefore, dis-
missed the garrison and governor from the city, and
brought back the exiles, who were in number about three
hundred; having first exacted such assurances of their
fidelity as are esteemed the strongest and most sacred
among mankind. But no sooner were these men admitted,
than, without even waiting till some pretext or occasion
should arise, from whence they might renew the past con-
tentions, they at once engaged in the black design of betray-
ing their benefactors and their country. I am even in-
clined to think, that, in the very moment when they touched
the sacred victims, and made a mutual exchange of oaths
and solemn promises, they were then revolving in their
minds that impious project by which they had resolved so
soon to insult the gods, and abuse the confidence of their
fellow-citizens. For scarcely had they regained their for-
mer state, and were again associated in the government,
when they concerted measures with the /Etolians for deli-
vering the place into their hands; nor scrupled to involve
in one common ruin both those to whom themselves were
just before indebted for their safety, and that very city
also in whose lap they had been nourished. "This treason
Z3

^

342 THE GENERAL HISTORY Book tv.

was contrived and carried -into execution in the following.
manner.
fü, Among the exiles, there were some that were of the
number of those magistrates who were called polemarchs;
whose office it was to shut the gates of the city; to keep
the keys in their own custody till they were again set open,
and to guard the entrance also of the gates by day. The
/Etolians had prepared their ladders, and stood in readi-
ness to begin the attack. And when these polemarchs,
having killed all those that were stationed with them upon
the guard, had thrown the gate open to receive them, one
part entered that way into the city, while the rest, with the
assistance of their ladders, gained possession of the walls.
The inhabitants were all seized with consternation, and
knew not to what measures they should have recourse.
For as it was not possible to fix themselves in a body to
the gate, because the danger threatened equally from the
walls, so neither were they able, on the other hand, to em-
ploy their efforts against those that were entering along
the walls, while the rest advanced with no less ardour
through the gate. The /Etolians, therefore, were in a
short time masters.of the place. But amidst all the vio-
lence and disorder that ensued, they performed one act of
great and exemplary justice. For the traitors, by whose
assistance they had been received into the city, were the
first marked out for slaughter, and their goods first pil-
laged. The rest of the inhabitants were forced afterwards
to undergo the same cruel treatment. The /Etolians then
spread themselves through all the houses, and penetrated
even to the foundations of them in search of plunder ;
destroying also many of the citizens in torture, whom they
suspected to have concealed any portion of their wealth or
valuable goods.

Having thus fully satiated all their cruelty, they left a
garrison in the place, and directed their march towards
Lussi. And when they arrived at the temple of Diana,

CHAP, T. OF POLYBIUS. 343

which stood between Clitor and Cynetha, and was

esteemed inviolable among the Greeks, they began to force -

away the sacred. cattle, and to pillage every thing that was
within their reach. But the Lussiates, having wisely
offered to them a part of the sacred furniture, restrained
their. impious purpose, and engaged them to desist from
any greater violence. They continued their route, there-
fore, and came and encamped before Clitor. /7In the mean
while Aratus, having sent to Philip to solicit some assist-
ance, made haste to draw together all the Achzan forces;
and demanded also from the Lacedzemonians and Messe-
nians the troops which they had severally engaged to fur-
nish. ii

The /Etolians, when they had first in vain endeavoured
to prevail on the Clitorians to join their party, and re-
nounce the alliance of the Achzans, made their approaches
against the town, and attempted to scale the walls. But
the inhabitants maintained their ground with so much
bravery and firmness, that they soon were forced to aban-
don the.design, and retreated back again towards Cynetha;
plundering the country as they went, and carrying with
them also the sacred cattle which they before had left un-
touched. They at first designed to leave Cynztha to the
Eleans; and when this people refused the offer, they re-
solved that they would keep it in their own possession, and
appointed Euripides to be the governor. But, in a short
time afterwards, being alarmed by the report that some
troops were just ready to arrive from Macedon, they set
fire to the city and then retired, and directed their march
towards Rhium; designing to embark their forces there,
and to return back again to ZEtolia.

The Macedonian general Taurion, being informed of all
the motions of the /Mtolians, and of the outrages which
they had committed at Cynztha, and hearing also that
Demetrius of Pharos had now brought back his fleet from
the Cyclade islands to the port of Cenchreg, sent some
messengers to that prince, inviting him to join the Ache-

Z4

—

—

344 THE GENERAL HISTORY poox w.

ans; to transport his vessels across the Isthmus; and to
fall upon the Etolians in their return. "Demetrius, who `
had gained a very rich booty in his expedition, though he.
was forced at last to fly with some disgrace before the Rho-
dians, who had sent out a fleet against him, consented
readily to this proposal, on condition that Taurion should
defray the charge of transporting the vessels over, But
when he had passed the Isthmus, he found that the Æto-
lians had completed their return two days before. Having
pillaged, therefore, some few places that stood most
exposed along their coast, he then steered his course back
to Corinth. l

The Lacedæmonians perfidiously withheld the succours,
which, by the stated regulation, they were bound to fur-
nish, and sent only some inconsiderable troops of horse,
with a small body of infantry, that thus they might appear
not wholly to have slighted their engagements. Aratus
also, with the Achæan forces, displayed rather, upon this ©
occasion, the caution of a politician, than the courage of a
general. For so entirely was his mind possessed with the
remembrance of the late defeat, that he remained still
quiet, and attempted nothing. Scopas, therefore, ‘and
Dorimachus accomplished at their leisure all that they had
designed, and returned also back again with safety; though
their retreat was made through passes so strait and diffi-
cult, that a trumpet only might have been sufficient to gain
a victory against them.

With regard to the inhabitants of Cynzetha, whose mis-

fortunes we have just now mentioned, it is certain, that no

people ever were esteemed so justly to deserve that cruel
treatment to which they were exposed. || And since the
Arcadians in general have been always celebrated for their
virtue throughout all Greece; and have obtained the high-
est fame, as well by their humane and hospitable disposi-
tion, as from their piety also towards the gods, and their
veneration of all things sacred; it may perhaps be useful
to enquire, from whence it could arise, that the people of

b y
`

CHAP. HI. OF POLYBIUS.. 345

this single city, though confessed to be Arcadians, should
on the contrary be noted for the savage roughness of their.
lives and manners, and distinguished by their wickedness
and cruelty above all the Greeks. In my judgment, then,
this -difference has happened from no other cause, than
that the Cynzetheans were the first and only people among
the Arcadians, who threw away that institution, which
their ancestors had established with the greatest wisdom,
and with à nice regard to tlie natural genius and peculiar
disposition of the people of the country: I mean, the dis-
cipline and exercise of music:. of that genuine and perfect
music, which is useful indeed in every state, but absolutely
necessary to the people of Arcadia. For we ought by no
means to adopt the sentiment that is thrown out by Epho-
rus in the preface to his history, and which indeed is very
unworthy of that writer; ** that music was invented to de-
ceive and delude mankind." Nor can it be supposed,
that the Lacedzemonians, and the ancient Cretans, were
not-influenced by some good reason, when in the place of
trumpets, they introduced the sound of flutes, and harmony
of: verse, to animate their soldiers in the time of battle; or
that the first Arcadians acted without strong necessity,
who, though their lives and manners, in all other points,
were rigid and austere, incorporated this art into the very
essence of their government; and obliged not their chil-
dren only, but the young men likewise, till they had gained
the age of thirty years, to persist in the constant study and
practice of it. For all men know, that Arcadia is almost
the only country, in which the children, even from their
most tender age, are taught to sing in measure the songs
and hymns that are composed in honour of their gods and
heroes; and that afterwards, when they have learned the
music of Timotheus and Philoxenus, they assemble once
in every year in the public theatres, at the feast of Bacchus,
and there dance with emulation to the sound of flutes; and
celebrate, according to their proper age, the children
those that are called the puerile, and the: young men the

LS

+

$46 THE GENERAL HISTORY book i.

manly games. And even in their private feasts and meet-
ings, they are never known to employ any hired bands of
music for their entertainment; but each man is himself
obliged to sing inturn. For though they may, without shame
of censure, disown all knowledge of every other science,
they dare not on the one hand dissemble or deny that they
are skilled in music, since the laws require, that every one
should be instructed in it; nor can they, on the other
hand, refuse to give some proofs of their skill when asked,
because such refusal would be esteemed dishonourable.
They are taught also to perform in order all the military
steps and motions to the sound of instruments; and this is
likewise practised every year in the theatres, at the public
charge, and in sight of all the citizens.

Now to me it is clearly evident, that the ancients by no

! means introduced these customs to be the instruments of

luxury and idle pleasure; but because they had considered
with attention, both the painful and laborious course of life,
to which the Arcadians were accustomed, and the natural
austerity also of their manners, derived to them from that
cold and heavy air, which covered the greatest part of all
their province. For men will be always found to be in some
degree assimilated to the climate in which they live: nor
can it be ascribed to any other cause, that in the several
nations of the world, distinct and separated from each other,
we -behold so wide a difference in complexion, features,
manners, customs. The Arcadians, therefore, in order to
smooth and soften that disposition which was by nature so

rough and stubborn, besides the customs above described,

appointed frequent festivals and sacrifices, which both sexes
were required-to celebrate together; the men with women,
and the boys with virgins: and in general established every
institution that could serve to render their tugged minds
more gentle and compliant, and tame the fierceness of their
manners. But the people of Cynetha, having slighted all
these arts, though both their air and situation, the most
inclement and unfavourable of any in Arcadia, made some

CHAP. Ill. OF POLYBIUS. 347

such remedy more requisite to them than to the rest, were
afterwards engaged continually in intestine tumults and
contentions; till they became at last so fierce and savage,
that among all the cities of Greece, there was none in
which so many and so great enormities were ever known to
be committed. To how deplorable a state this conduct had
at last reduced them, and how much their manners were
detested by the Arcadians, may be fully understood from
that which happened to them, when they sent an embassy
to Lacedzemon, after the time of a dreadful slaughter which
had been made among them. For in every city of Arcadia,
through which their deputies were obliged to pass, they
were commanded by the public crier instantly to be gone.
The. Mantineans also expressed even still more strongly
their abhorrence of them. For as soon as they were
departed, they made a solemn purification of the place,
and carried victims in procession round the city and
through all their territory.

This then may be sufficient to exempt the general cus-
toms of Arcadia from all censure; and at the same time to
remind the people of that province, that music was at first
established in their government, not for the sake of vain
pleasure and amusement, but for such solid purposes as
should engage them never to desert the practice of it. The
Cynætheans also may perhaps draw some advantage from
these reflections; and, if the deity should hereafter bless
them with better sentiments, may turn their minds towards
such discipline, as may soften and improve their manners,
and especially to music; by which means alone they can
ever hope to be divested of that brutal fierceness, by which
they have been so long distinguished. But we shall here
leave this people, and return again to the place from whence
we began our digression.

ws he /Ktolians, after those exploits in Peloponnesus,
which have been described, were just now returned again .
in safety to their country, when Philip arrived at Corinth
with an army to assist the Achieans. Perceiving that the

348 THE GENERAL HISTORY _ soox iv.

enemy was gone, he dispatched his couriers to all the cities
of the alliance, desiring that some persons might be sent to.
Corinth, to deliberate with him on the measures that were,
proper to be taken for the common service; and himself in
the mean while began his march towards Tegea; having
received notice that the people of Lacedæmon were dis-
tracted by intestine tumults, and that much slaughter had
been committed in the city. For the Lacedsemonians, who
had been long accustomed to submit to kingly government,
and to pay an unrestrained obedience to their chiefs,
having now lately gained their. liberty by the favour of An-
tigonus, and finding no monarch at their head, were broken
into various factions, and all claimed alike an equal share
in the administration of the state. Among the ephori,
there were two, who made at first an open declaration of
their sentiments, and three, that entered without reserve
into all the interests of the ZEtolians; imagining that
Philip, on account of his tender age, would be yet unable
to control the affairs of Peloponnesus. But when these last
perceived, that the /Etolians had left the country much
sooner than their hopes had promised ; and that Philip also
was arrived from Macedon before they had expected his
approach, they began to apprehend, that Adimantus, one
of the former two, to whom they had opened their inten-
tions, and in vain endeavoured to draw him to their party,
would not fail to carry to the king a full discovery of all
that had been tyansacted. Having therefore secretly en-
gaged some young men in their design, they published a
decree, that all who were of sufficient age, should meet in
arms at the temple of Minerva, to defend the city against
the Macedonians. An order so strange and unexpected soon
drew the people together in crowds towards the temple.
Adimantus, being deeply grieved at these proceedings, hast-
ened to gain the head of all the assembly, and began to
address the people in the following manner. ** When the
/Etolians,” said he, * our declared and open enemies, had
drawn their forces to the very borders of our country, it

-

CHAP. III. OF POLYBIUS. 349

was then the time to publish these decrees, and to assemble
the youth in arms; and not when the Macedonians, our
allies and friends, to whom we owe our liberties and safety,
are advancing with their king towards us." But as he was
proceeding in this harangtie, some of the young men who
had been appointed to the task fell upon him with their
swords. They then killed also Sthenelaus, Alcamenes,
Thyestes, Bionidas, with many others of the citizens. But
Polyphontes, and some few besides, having in time foreseen
the danger, escaped safe to Philip.

After this transaction, the ephori, who were now sole
masters of the government, sent some deputies to Philip, to
accuse the citizens that were slain, as having been them-
selves the authors of the tumult: to request the king not
to advance any nearer to them, till the commotion that
remained from the late sedition had first subsided; and in
the last place to assure him, that, with regard to the Mace-
donians, they were ready in all points to perform their duty,
as justice or as friendship should require. "The deputies,
having met the king near the mountain called Parthenius,
discharged their commission to him, agreeably to these in-
structions. When they had ended, Philip ordered them
to return immediately back to Sparta, and acquaint the
ephori, that he designed to continue his march forwards,
and to encamp near Tegea; and that they should send to
him to that place, without delay, some persons of sufficient

weight, to deliberate with him on the measures that were .

proper to be pursued in this conjuncture. The ephori, as
soon as they had recéived these orders, deputed to the king
ten citizens, of whom Omias was the chief: who, when they
arrived at Tegea, and wereadmitted into the royal council,
began also with accusing Adimantus and his friends, as
having been the authors of the late disorders. "They pro-
mised that they would observe most faithfully the terms of
the alliance:: and that among all the states, that seemed

. most closely attached by friendship to the king, the Lace-

daemonians should yield to none in the sincerity and zeal

350 > THE GENERAL HISTORY BOOK IV.

with which they would at all times strive to advance his
interests. After these assurances, with others of the same
kind and purpose, the deputies retired.

The members of the council were divided in their senti-
ments. For some, who were well acquainted with the
secret of the late transactions, and who knew that Adi-

, mantus and the rest had lost their lives, on account only of
their attachment to the Macedonians, and that the Lacedae-
monians already had resolved to join the ZEtolians, advised
the king to have recourse to some exemplary vengeance;
and, in a word, to punish this people with the same seve-
rity, as that with which Alexander punished the inhabitants
of Thebes, soon after he had taken possession of his king-
dom. Others, who were of greater age, declared that
such treatment would too far exceed the offence. They
thought, however, that it was highly reasonable, that the
men, who had been the cause of the late disorders, should
be forced to bear some censure: that they should be
divested of their offices, and the government be left to
those, who were known to be well disposed towards the
king. l

/j ^ When they had all delivered their opinion, the king

“himself replied in the following manner; if, indeed, we can
at all suppose that such an answer was his own. For it is
scarcely credible that a youth of seventeen years should be
able to decide with such true judgment, in matters of so
great importance. But when we are writing history, we
are forced. always to ascribe every final decision that is
made in such debates, to those who are possessed of the
supreme administration and command: leaving it however
to the reader to suppose, that the reasons upon which such
decisions are supported, were at first suggested by the per-
sons that are near the prince; and especially by those who
are masters of his private confidence. In the present
instance, it seems most probable, that Aratus furnished the
opinion which was now delivered by the king. m

He said then, *that in the case of those disorders and

CHAP. JV. OF POLYBIUS. 351

acts of violence that were at any time committed by the
allies among themselves, his duty might perhaps require
him so far to interpose, as to acquaint them with his senti-
ments, and endeavour to compose their breaches, and
correct all that was amiss, by exhortations or by letters:
but that such offences only, as were crimes against the
general confederacy, required a general and a public
punishment; and that too from all the allies in common.
That as the Lacedzemonians had been guilty of no open
violation of the laws of this confederacy, but on the con-
trary had engaged by the most solemn promises, that they
would faithfully perform the conditions of it, it seemed to
be by no means just or reasonable, that any kind of severity
should be shewn towards them. He added likewise, that
it could scarcely fail to draw upon himself the censure of
mankind, if now, from so slight a cause, he should resolve
to act with rigour against this people, whom his father not
long before had treated with the manent Sanaa d even
after he had conquered them as enemies.’

As soon, then, as it was decided that no farther ec
should be made concerning the late transactions, the king
‘sent Petrzeus, one of his friends, together with Omias, to
“Lacedzemon, to exhort the people still to adhere to the in-
terest of the Macedonians, and to confirm anew the alliance
by a mutual exchange of oaths. He then decamped, and
returned again to Corinth; having shewn, in this generous
treatment of the Lacedzemonians, such a specimen of
his mind and inclinations, as filled the allies with the fairest
hopes.

25 CHAP. IV.

"THE king being now met at Corinth by the M—
from the confederate states, held a general council, to de-
liberate on the measures that were proper to be taken’

359 - THE GENERAL HISTORY Book m.

against the ZEtolians. The Boeotians accused them of
having plundered the temple of Itonian Minerva during
the time of peace. The Phoceeans, that they had armed
some forces, with design to possess themselves of Ambrysus
and Daulis. The Epirots, that they had wasted all their
province. And the Acarnanians, that they had attempted
to take T hyreuin by surprise. The Achæans also related
at large in what manner they had gained possession of
Clarium, in the Megalopolitan territory; wasted all the
lands of the Patrseans and Phareeans; sacked the city of
Cynzetha ; pillaged the temple of Diana at Lussi; laid
siege to Clitor; made an attack by sea upon Pylus; and
by land likewise, being assisted: by the Illyrians, had
, attempted to storm the city of Megalopolis, when it was
just now beginning to be filled again with people, in order
to reduce it to its late desolate state.

When the council had heard all these m it
was with one voice agreed, that war should be declared
against the ZEtolians. They made, therefore, a decree, in
which, having first recited the several accusations just now
mentioned, they declared, that they would immediately
employ all their force, in favour of the allies, to recover
every city and every province which the Aitolians had
usurped, from the time of the death of Demetrius, the
father of Philip. That those who had been compelled by
the necessity of times and circumstances to associate them-
selves with the ZEtolian republic, should be reinstated in
their own proper government; should possess their towns
and territories free from garrisons, and discharged from
tribute; should enjoy their liberty entire; and be governed
by the customs of their ancestors. And, in the last place,
that the power and laws of the Amphictyons should be
again restored, together with the temple likewise, and all

.( the jurisdiction of which.the Ætolians had deprived them."
) This decree was made in the first year of the hundred and
fortieth Olympiad, and from hence began the social war.

CHAP. Iv. OF POLYBIUS. . 353

A war founded altogether upon justice; and such as-was
indeed the fair and necessary consequence of the past
disorders. 7

The council then sent some deputies to all the allies,
that the decree might be confirmed in every state, in a
general assembly af the. people, and war be declared
against the Ætolians in every separate province. At the
same time Philip informed the Ætolians also by a letter,
that if there was any thing that could be urged in answer
to the accusations with which they had been charged, they
might now appear before the council, and enter upon their
defence; but that it was the very. height of folly to.per-
suade themselves, that, because they had robbed and pil-
laged all the parts of Greece before hostilities had been
declared by any decree of their republic, the states must,
therefore, quietly submit to the injustice; or, in:case that
they prepared to punish it, be considered as the authors of
the war.

The chiefs of the A&tolians, having — rat bei,
appointed at first a certain day upon which they promised
that they would meet the king at Rhium; imagining that
Philip would refuse to come. But when they heard that
he was arrived, they sent a courier to acquaint him, that as
the general council of the ZEtolians was not yet assembled,
they had no power of themselves to enter into any de-
liberations in things which concerned the whole republic.

The Achæans, as soon as they were met together:at
JEgium, at the usual time of holding their assemblies, with
one voice confirmed the decree, giu made public pro-
clamation of war against the.ZEtolians. The king, who
was present in the council, made a long discourse; which
the Achzans received with the greatest marks of favour,
and renewed with him all the. obligations of fidelity. and
friendship, which they had made in former times to any
of his ancestors. "

Quad posu this time also the Avalos, being BP r to

VOL. I. Aa

954 THE GENERAL HISTORY Book tv.

elect their magistrates, made choice of Scopas to be præ-
tor; the very man who was the. cause of all the late
disorders. What shall we say of this proceeding? Not to
declare war by any public decree, and yet to assemble the
people. together in arms, to. invade and pillage every
-neighbouring state; and, instead of punishing the authors
of this violence, to receive them with rewards and honours,
and to advance them to the highest magistracies. Sucha
conduct must surely be considered as a most consummate
piece of wickedness; and such as cannot be expressed in
any softer language. The following examples may.serve
more clearly to explain the nature of utis baseness. When
Phoebidas had, by treachery, seized the citadel of Thebes
that was called Cadmea, the Lacedemonians punished
indeed the author of that dishonourable action, but suf-
fered the garrison still to keep possession of the. citadel;
and pretended that they had made full satisfaction for the
injustice, by chastising him who had contrived the perfidy:
whereas it was clear to all that the Thebans could. be
neither safe nor free unless the garrison also was with-
drawn. The same people likewise, after the general peace
` had been concluded by Antalcidas, declared, by the voice
of the public crier, that they restored to liberty all ‘the
states of Greece, and left them to be governed by their
own proper laws; when, at the same time, they refused to
remove the magistrates who presided, under their ap-
pointment, in every city. And afterwards, when they had
subdued the Mantineans, their allies and friends, and
forced them to dissolve their government, they pretended
that they had done them no kind of wrong, since they had 7
only taken them from one city to’ settle hedi in many.
But surely it is no less a proof of folly than of wickedness
for any people to conceive that, because themselves: have
wilfully shut- their eyes, all mankind -besides must be
therefore blind. And indeed this conduct proved. the
source of such great calamities both to the Lacta ginis:

CHAP. IV. OF POLYBIUS. ‘ 355

and JEtolians, that those who are wise will on no account
be ever led to imitate it, either in their private affairs or in
the public government of states.

The king, when he had regulated all things with the
Achzans, retired back again to Macedon with his army,
and began to make the necessary preparations for the war.
The decree that had now been made had raised him high
in the esteem not only of the allies, but of all the people of
Greece, who were filled with the noblest expectations from
the proofs which he had already shewn of gentleness and
moderation, and of such true greatness as was worthy of a
king.

2 € These things were all transacted at the time in which
Annibal, having subdued the other parts of Spain that
were beyond the Iberus, was preparing to besiege Sagun-
tum. Now if the motions and first progress of this
general had, in any manner, been connected with the
affairs of Greece, we should have joined and interwoven
the history of the latter in its due place and order, with
the relation which we gave of the former in the preceding
book. But because the wars that now broke out in Italy,
in Greece, and ‘Asia, had each a beginning distinct and
peculiar to themselves, though they all were terminated in
one common end, it seemed most proper that we should
give also a distinct and separate account of each till we
arrived at the time in which they were blended first
together, and began to move in one direction towards the
same single point. By this method we shall be able to
explain with greater clearness not only the commence-
ments of these wars, but all the circumstances.also that
belonged to their first connexion; the time and manner of
which, together with the causes of it, have already been in
part remarked ; and shall afterwards unite them all in one
common history. "This connexion first was made in the
third year of the hundred and fortieth Olympiad, soon
after the conclusion of the social war. From the end of
this war, therefore, we shall include, as we have said, in

Aad /

356 THE GENERAL HISTORY _ soox rv.

one general history, all the events that followed; in-
termixing them together in their proper place and order,
But, before that period, we shall treat of every one dis-
tinctly; taking care, however, still to remind the reader
which, among those transactions that are described in the
preceding book, were coincident with the events which we
are now going to relate. For thus the whole narration

will be rendered easy and intelligible ; and the importance `

also of the subjects will appear with more advantage, and
will strike the mind with a greater force. '

'The king, during the time of winter, which he passed in

acedon, levied troops with the greatest diligence; and
made also the preparations that were necessary to secure
his kingdom against the attempts of those barbarians who
lived upon the borders of it. He afterwards went to
hold a private conference with Scerdilaidas. And having
trusted himself boldly in his hands, and pressed him to
join in the alliance, and become a confederate in the war,
he prevailed without much difficulty; partly by engaging
to assist him in reducing certain places in Illyria, and
partly also by enumerating all those subjects of complaint
which it was no hard task to find against the Z7Etolians.
For the wrongs and injuries that are committed by public
states differ in no respect from those that are done by
private men, except only in their number and importance,
It may also be remarked, that societies of thieves and

robbers are usually broken by no other means than be-
cause the persons of whom they are composed fail to.

render justice to each other, and are false to their own
mutual engagements. And this it was that happened now
to the 7Etolians. They had promised to allot to Scer-
dilaidas a certain part of all the plunder, if he would join
his forces with them to invade Achaia. But when this was
done, and they had sacked the city of Cynsetha, and car-
ried away great numbers both of slaves and cattle, they
excluded him even from the smallest share in the division
ofthe booty. As his mind, therefore, was already filled

CHAP. 1V. OF POLYBIUS. 357

with a sense of this injustice, no sooner had Philip slightly
mentioned the wrongs which he had received, than he
entered readily into all that was proposed, and consented
to join in the confederacy upon these conditions; that
twenty talents should be paid to him every year; and that,
on his part, he should arm thirty frigates, and carry on
the war by sea against the Ætolians.

20 While the Bec was thus employed, the deputies that
were sent to all the allies came first to Acarnania, and
discharged their commission there. "The Acarnanians
honest and ingenuous, confirmed immediately the decree,
and declared war against the Ætolians without any hesi-
tation or reserve. And yet of all the states of Greece this.
people might, most reasonably, have been excused, if they
had sought pretences for delay ; had been slow in making
any declaration of their sentiments; and, in a word, had
altogether feared to draw upon themselves the vengeance
of their neighbours. For, as they were closely joined to
the confines of the /Etolian territory, so their country
likewise was open and defenceless, and an easy prey to
every enemy. And, which was still of more considerable
moment, the hatred also which they had shewn against
the /Etolians, had involved them, not long before this
time, in very great calamities. But men that are brave
and generous will force all considerations to fall before
their duty. And so strongly was this virtue rooted in the
Acarnanians, that, though their state was extremely weak
and feeble, they had scarcely in any times been known to
swerve from the practice of it. In every conjuncture,
therefore, that is dangerous and difficult, an alliance with
this people ought by no means to be slighted, but should
rather be embraced with eagerness; since, among all the
Greeks, there are none who have shewn a warmer love
of liberty, or a more unalterable steadiness in all their
conduct.

The Epirots, on the contrary, when they had received
the deputies, confirmed indeed the decree, but refused to
Aa3

358 THE GENERAL HISTORY BOOK IV,

-

make any declaration of war against the ZEtolians till
Philip should have first declared it. At the same time
they assured the deputies that were then present from
ZEtolia, that they would still remain in peace. And thus
they acted both a double and dishonourable part. An
embassy was sent also to king Ptolemy, to request him not
to assist the /Etolians with any kind of supplies or money
for the war, in opposition to Philip and the allies.

\ But the Messenians, for whose sake chiefly’ the confe-
deracy was formed, refused to bear any part in the war,
unless the city of Phigalea, which stood upon the borders
of their province, should first be separated from the Æto-
lian government. This resolution, to which the ephori of
the Messenians, Oenis, and. Nicippus, with some others of
the oligarchical leaders, had forced the people to consent;
was, in my judgment, the most senseless and absurd’ that
could be taken in the present circumstances. It is true,
indeed, that the calamities of war are such as may well be
dreaded; but not in so great a degree as that, rather than
engage in it, we should submit with tameness to bear
every injury. For to what purpose do we so highly prize
an equality in government, the liberty of speaking all our
sentiments, and the glorious name of freedom, if nothing
is to be preferred to peace? Must we then approve of the
conduct of the Thebans, who, in the time of the wars
against the Medes, which threatened the destruction of all
the states of Greece, separated themselves from the com-
mon danger, and were led by their fears to embrace those
measures which proved afterwards so fatal to them? Or
can we applaud the sentiments of their poet, Pindar, who,
in flattery to the judgment of his country, advises all the
citizens to place their only hopes. of safety in repose, aad
to seek,as he expresses it, i

The radiant splendors of majestic Peace ?

For these sentiments that appeared so plausible and spe-
cious were found, in the event, to be not less pernitious

P

CHAP, IV. ^' OF POLYBIUS. 359

than dishonourable. \In a word,.as no acquisition is more
to be esteemed than peace, when it leaves us in possession
of our honour and lawful rights; so, on the other hand,
whenever it is joined with loss of freedom, or with infamy;
nothing can be. more detestable or fatal.

2, Z Now the Messenians, whose counsels all were governed
by a faction of a few, had always been misled by motives
which-respected only the private interests of the oligarchy,
and had courted peace with much too great an earnestness.
For though, in consequence of this attention to their ease,
they had escaped the storms that seemed to threaten them
in' many' difficult conjunctures, yet on the other hand,
while they persisted still unalterably in this conduct, the
danger, which they ought chiefly to have dreaded, gained
insensibly so great strength against them, that their country
was at last forced to struggle with the worst calamities;
which might, indeed, have all been obviated, if they had
been careful only to pursue the measures that were neces-
sary, with regard to the people that were situated nearest
to them, and who were the most powerful likewise of all
the states of Peloponnesus, or rather of all Greece; I
mean the Lacedemonians and Arcadians: the former of
whom had shewn an implacable enmity against them, even
from their first settlement in the country, without being
able to provoke them to any generous efforts of resent-
ment; while the latter guarded all their interests with care,
and treated them with favour and affection, which they
neglected to cherish or maintain. From hence it hap-
pened, that while these two states were engaged in war,
either against each other, or with any more distant ene-
mies, the Messenians, favoured by the times, passed their
lives in full security and repose. But when the Lacede-
monians were at last wholly disencumbered from all other
wars, and had leisure to employ their strength. against
them; being then unable of themselves to resist an enemy
whose force was far superior to their own, and having
neglected also to gain in time such firm. and’ honest

Aa4

360 THE GENERAL HISTORY BOOK 1V.

friends, as might have stood together with them under
every danger, they were forced either to submit to the
very vilest servitude, or to abandon their habitations and
their country, together with their wives and children.
And to this miserable alternative have they: often been
reduced; even within the times that are not far distant
from the present. For my own part, it is my earnest
wish, that the agreement which now subsists among the
states of: Peloponnesus may still continue to acquire new
strength; and that they may never want the advice, which
I am going to offer. But if the bonds of this confederacy
should ever be again dissolved, I am fully assured, that
there is no other way by which the Messenians and Arca-
dians can hope lóng to remain in the possession of their
country, than by embracing the sentiments of Epaminon-
das, and maintaining still, in every conjuncture, the closest
union both.of interests and counsels without dissimula-
tion or reserve. It may. add perhaps some weight to my
opinion, if we consider. what was in this respect the con-
duct of these two states in ancient times. Now, among
many other things that might be mentioned, it is reported
by Callisthenes, that the Messenians, in the time of Aristo-
menes, erected a column near the altar of Lycaean Jupiter,
and inseribed upon it the following verses:

, At last stern Justice seals the tyrant's doom,
Led by the gods, Messenia's injur'd land
Soon found the traitor through his dark disguise:
Vain was his hope, to shun Heav’n’s vengeful hand,
Or veil his perj'ry from Jove's piercing eyes.
All hail, the sov'reign king! the Lord of fate! `
Ever propitious prove, and bless Arcadia’s state. i -

From this inscription, in which they.thus implore the
gods to. protect Arcadia, we may judge that the Messenians
were willing to acknowledge, that they regarded this pro-
vince as their second country, after they had lost-their own.
And. indeed they had good reason so to regard it.. For
when they. were: driven from their. country, in the time of

CHAP. 1V. OF POLYBIUS. : 361

those wars in which they were engaged under the conduct
of Aristomenes, the Arcadians not only yielded to them
the ‘protection of their state, and admitted them to the
rights of citizens, but gave their daughters also, by a
public decree, to the young Messenians that were of age to
marry. And having made enquiry likewise into the guilt
of their own king Aristocrates, who had basely deserted
the Messenians in the combat that was called the Battle of
the Trenches, they destroyed the traitor, and extirpated
also all his race. But without looking back to an age so
far removed, that which happened about the time in which
Megalopolis and Messene began to be inhabited, may serve
fully to confirm the point which I am labouring to esta-
blish. After the battle of Mantinea, in which the death of
Epaminondas left the victory doubtful, the Lacedaemonians
employed all their efforts to exclude the people of Messenia
from the general treaty; having flattered themselves with
secret hopes, that they should soon become the masters of
that province. But the Megalopolitans, with all the states
that were confederates with the Arcadians, supported the
Messenians with so much steadiness and zeal, that they
were received by the allies, and included in the peace;
while the Lacedzemonians alone, of all the Greeks, were
themselves excluded from it. This then may be sufficient
to shew the truth of all that I have now advanced. And
from hence the Messenians and Arcadians may be taught
to remember always the misfortunes that have been brought
upon their country by the Lacedamonians, in former
times; and to remain so firmly joined together in the
bonds of mutual confidence and friendship, that they never
may be moved, either by the dread of an erfemy, or by any
unreasonable love of peace, to desert each other in the
time of danger. But we shall now return from this di-
gression. Á
^» The Lacedæmionians acted, upon this occasion, in a
manner not unsuitable to their usual conduct; for they
dismissed the deputies, that were sent to them from the

-

-

362 . THE GENERAL HISTORY BOOK IV.

allies, without any answer. Such was the consequence of
their late wicked and absurd proceedings; which had in-
volved them in so great doubt and difficulty, that they
knew not to. what measures they ought now to have re-
course.. So true it is, that rash and desperate projeets
most frequently reduce men in the end to an utter inca-
pacity either to think or act. :

:But not long afterwards, when new ópiioni were elected
in the city, the faction that had been the cause of the late
disorders, and. of the slaughter. that was then. committed;
sent. to the Aitolians, and desired that..some person might
be deputed to them in the. name of the.republic. The
Ætolians consented .readily.to this request. And when
their deputy, who was named Machatas, arrived soon after-
wards at Lacedsemon; the men, by whose advice he had
been sent, pressed the.cphori, that he might be allowed to
speak in an assembly of the people. They demanded
likewise, that some kings should be elected without delay,
as the laws required; and the empire of the Heraclidze no
longer lie dissolved. The ephori, who were in every point
displeased with the proceeding, but were too weak to resist
the violence of those that drove it on; and who appre-
hended also, that, in case they should refuse to comply with
these demands, the young man might be engaged in some
attempt against them; consented to allow an assembly of
the people to Machatas: but with regard to the proposal
for restoring kingly government, they said, that they would
deliberate.together concerning it at some future time.

When the people were assembled, Machatas pressed
them, in a long discourse, to join their arms with the
/Etolians. He boldly charged the Macedonians with many
accusations that were vain and groundless: and on the
other hand, bestowed such praises on his own republic, as
were not less absurd than false. As soon as he had ended,
the debates that followed were long and vehement. For
some supporting all that had been urged in favour of the
/Etolians, advised the "dg to accept the alliance that

CHAP. IV. © OF POLYBIUS. 363

was offered; while others laboured, not less warmly, to
dissuade. it. After. some time however, when the oldest
men rose up to speak, and reminded the people, on the one
hand, of the many favours that had been heaped upon
thêm by Antigonus and the Macedonians, and on the
other hand, recounted all the injuries which they had re-
ceived from Timzus and Charixenus; when the ZEtolians
with a numerous army wasted all their country, led their
people into slavery, and even attempted to take Sparta by
surprise and force, having brought back the exiles to assist
in the design; the whole assembly was at once prevailed
on to embrace the sentiments that were most contrary to
the-ZEtolians, and to remain firm in their alliance with
the Macedonians and with Philip. Machatas therefore
returned back again to his country, without having ob-
tained the end of his commission. ^»

But those who had been the authors of the former
tumult, resolved that things should not long remain in their
present state. ‘Having gained therefore some of the young
men of the city to their party, they formed a second at-
tempt, which was indeed most horrible and impious.
There was a certain sacrifice, of old institution in the
country, in honour of Minerva; at which the custom was,
that all'the youth of the city should appear in arms, and
walk in procession to the tetnple; while the ephori stood
waiting round the ‘shrine, ready to perform the sacred
offices. At the time then of this solemn festival, some of
the young men that were armed to attend the ceremony,
+ fell suddenly upon the magistrates, as they were busied in
the sacrifice, and slew them. Yet such was the sanctity of

this temple, that it had afforded always an inviolable refuge
even to men that were condemned to die. But so little
. was it now respected by these daring and inhuman wretches,
that they made no scruple to pollute the venerable place
with the blood of all the ephori; and to kill them even at
the very altar, and round the sacred table of the goddess.
Afterwards, that they might fully accomplish all their pur-

S

364 THE GENERAL HISTORY _ woox iv.

pose, they, killed also Gyridas, with others of the oldest
men.. And having forced the rest, that were averse to
their designs, to retire from the city, they chose new ephori
from their own faction, and immediately concluded an alli-
ance with the ZEtolians. The cause of all this violence
was partly their hatred of the Achseans; partly their in-
gratitude towards the Macedonians; and in part, likewise,
their senseless disregard of all mankind. ‘To which we
may also add, what indeed was of the greatest weight, the
affection which they still retained for Cleomenes, and the
constant expectation which they cherished, that this prince
would return to them again in safety. Thus it is that men
who are acquainted with the arts of life, and whose man-
ners are gentle and engaging, not only win the esteem and
affection of mankind when they are present with them,
but even in the time of long and distant absence, leave
behind them such strong sparks of inclination and desire,
as are not easily extinguished. For not to mention other
circumstances, during three whole years which now had
passed since Cleomenes was forced to desert his kingdom,
the Lacedzemouians, though in other points their state was
still administered according to the ancient laws, had shewn
not even the least desire to appoint other kings. But no
sooner had the news of his death arrived at Sparta, than
both the people and the ephori resolved that some should
be elected without delay. The ephori, therefore, who
belonged, as we have said, to the faction that had caused
the late disorders, and concluded an alliance with the
ZEtolians, made choice of one who had a clear and uncon-

tested right to bear the office. This was Agesipolis, who

had not yet arrived indeed at perfect age; but was the son
of Agesipolis, whose father Cleombrotus, when Leonidas
was driven from Sparta, had succeeded to the kingdom, as
being the next in blood to that prince. At the same time
they named; as tutor to the king, Cleomenes, who was the
son also of- Cleombrotus, and brother of Agesipolis. But
with regard: to: the other royal house, though there were

C—O

CHAP. IV. -OF POLYBIUS. n $65

now two sons remaining from a daughter of Hippomedon,
. by Archidamus the son of Eudamidas; and though Hip-
pomedon himself was still alive; who was the son of Agesi-
laus, and grandson of Eudamidas; and though there were
many others also, that were allied in a more remote degree
to the branches of this family; yet all their claims were
disregarded, and Lycurgus was advanced to be the other
king; among whose ancestors there was none that ever had
tei a the regal dignity. But by giving only a'single-
talent to each of the ephori, he became at once a descend-
ant from the race of Hercules, and a king of Sparta. So
easy oftentimes is the purchase even di the greatest ho-
nours. But from hence it happened, that not their chil-
dren or remote posterity, but themselves who had made
the choice, were the first that felt the dated unt Was
due to their imprudence.

. Machatas, being informed of abdo nd me "ae m

Sparta, returned back again to that city, and pressed the -
ephori and the kings to.begin the war without delay against
the Achzans. He represented to them, that this was the
only measure by which they could hope effectually to break
all contention, and defeat the attempts of those who, both
in Lacedæmon and in ZEtolia likewise, were still labouring
to.obstruct the alliance. And having thus, without great
difficulty, accomplished his design, .and engaged these
foolish magistrates to approve of all that was proposed, he
went back again to his own country. ' Lycurgus then drew
together a body of troops; and having added to them also
some of the forces of the city, he fell suddenly upon the
Argian territory, before the people, who were persuaded
that the peace still subsisted, had: taken any measures for
their security or defence. He made himself master, there-
fore, in the very first assault, of Polichna, Prasiz, Leucie,
and Cyphanta. He endeavoured also to take. by storm
Glympes and Zarax, but; was repulsed:in.the attempt. .
After these exploits the Lacedzemonians made public pro-
clamation of the war.’ The, Eleans also were prevailed on

866 THE GENERAL HISTORY BOOK IV;

by Machatas, who repeated to them the same discourse
which he had: made at Lacedemon, to turn their arms
against the Acheans. And thus the JEtolians, finding
that all things had conspired with their designs, entered
upon the war with alacrity and confidence; while the
Acheeans, on the contrary, were dejected and distressed.
For Philip, upon whom their chief strength and hopes
were founded, had: not yet completed all his preparations.
The Epirots still formed pretences for delay; the Messe-
nians remained inactive; and, lastly, the Z7Etolians, being
thus favoured by the senseless conduct of the Laced:emo-
nians and Eleans, had already, as it were, inclosed them
upon every side with war. | Í .
"The preetorship of Aratus was -just now ready to expire,
and his son Aratus was appointed to succeed him. The
JEtolian prætor, Scopas, had performed about half the
course of his administration. For the /Etolians were ac-
customed to elect their magistrates immediately after the
time of the autumnal equinox; and the Achzeans at the
rising of the Pleiades. As soon then as the younger Aratus
had entered upon the duties of his office, the spring being
now advanced, all things every. where began at once to
hasten into action. For it was now that Annibal was pre-
paring to besiege Saguntum, and that the Romans sent an
army into Illyria, to chastise Demetrius; that Antiochus,
having gained possession, by the treachery of Theodotus,
of Tyre and Ptolemais, resolved to usurp the sovereignty of
Cocle-Syria; and that Ptolemy, on the other hand, drew
together ‘all his forces to oppose him. At the same time
Lycurgus, following in-his conduct the example of Cleo-
menes, laid siege to, Atheneum in the Megalopolitan
territory. The Achzans collected a numerous body of
mercenary troops, both infantry and cavalry, to secure
their country from the war that was ready to surround
them; and Philip also began his march from Maeedon,
at the head of ten thousand Macedonians heavy-armed,
^ five thousand Peltastze, and eight hundred horse. And

ü > |

CHAP. V. OF POLYBIUS. 867

lastly, while all these great and important armaments were
thus ready to be carried into action, the Rhodians likewise
began their war upon the people of Byzantium, from the
causes which I am now going to relate.

z

xe.

p's, CHAP. V.

Byzantium, of all the cities in the world, is the most
happy in its situation with respect to the sea; being not
only secure on that side from all enemies, but possessed
also of the means of obtaining every kind of necessaries in
the greatest plenty. But with respect to the land, there is
scarcely any place that has so little claim to these advan-
tages. With regard to the sea, the Byzantines, standing
close upon the entrance of the Pontus, command so abso-
lutely all that passage, that it is not possible for any
merchant to sail through it, or return, without their. per-
mission; and from mm they are the masters of. all those
commodities which are drawn in various kinds from the
countries that lie round this sea, to satisfy the wants or the
conveniences: of other men. For among the things that
are necessary for use, they supply the Greeks with leather,
and with great numbers of very serviceable slaves. And
with regard to those that are esteemed conveniences, they
send honey and wax, with all kinds of seasoned and salted
meats; taking from us in exchange our own superfluous
commodities; oil, and every sort of wine. ‘They, some-
times also furnish us with corn, and sometimes receive it
from us, as the wants of either may require. Now it is
certain that the Greeks must either be excluded wholly
from this commerce, or be deprived at least of all its chief
advantages, if ever the Byzantines should engage in any ill
designs against them, and be joined in friendship with the
liveharous; people of Galatia, or rather with those of
Thrace; or even indeed if they should ever be disposed to
leave. the country. For as well by reason of the extreme

e

568 THE GENERAL HISTORY BOOK IV;

narrowness of the passage, as from the numbers nlso of
those barbarians that are settled round it, we never should
be able to gain an entrance through it into the Pontus.
Though the Byzantines, therefore, are themselves possessed
of the first and best advantages of this happy situation,
which enables them to make both an easy and a profitable
exchange of their superfluous commodities, and to procure
in return, without pain or danger, whatever their own
lands fail to furnish; yet since, through ‘their means
chiefly, other countries also are enabled, as we have said,
to obtain many things that are of the greatest use; it
seems reasonable that they should be regarded always by
the Greeks as common benefactors, and receive not only
favour and acknowledgments, but assistance likewise to
repel all attempts that may be made against them by -their
barbarous neighbours.

But as this city is placed a little beyond the limits of
those countries which are most usually frequented by us;
and because the nature and peculiar excellence of its
situation have hitherto, upon that account, remained almost
unknown; it may, perhaps, be useful to explain at large
the causes to which it is indebted for those great advantages
which it enjoys. For since all men are not able to obtain
the opportunity which is first to be desired, of viewing with
their eyes the things that are singular and worthy of their
observation in any distant country, I could wish, however,
that at least they might be taught to gain some right con-
ception of them, and even to form such an image of them
in their minds as should bear a near resemblance to the
truth.

( \ That then which is called the Pontus, contains in its
circumference almost twenty-two thousand stadia. It has
two mouths, diametrically opposite to each other; one,
which opens into the Propontis; and the other on the side
of the Palus "Maotis, whose circumference includes about
eight thousand stadia. These beds receive the waters of
many large rivers, which flow into them from Asia; and

Cnab. v. OF. POLYBIUS. 369

of others likewise, more in number, and more considerable
in their size, that come from Europe. The Mzotis, being
filled by these, discharges them again, through the mouth
last mentioned, into the Pontus, and from thence they still
pass forwards through the other mouth into the Propontis.
The mouth on the side of the Mezotis is called the
.Cimmerian Bosphorus. It contains about sixty stadia in
length, and about thirty in its breadth; and is, in every
part, of a very inconsiderable depth. The mouth of the
Pontus, on the opposite side, is called the Thracian Bos-
phorus: and includes in length a hundred and twenty
stadia; but the breadth of it is unequal: This mouth,
beginning on the side of the Propontis, at that space which
lies between Chalcedon and Byzantium, whose breadth is
about fourteen stadia, from thence extends towards the
Pontus, and is ended at a place called Hieron; in which
Jason, at his return from Colchis, is said first to have
offered sacrifice to the twelve gods. This place, though it
be situated in Asia, is not far removed from Europe; being
distant about twelve stadia only from the temple of
Sarapis, which stands opposite to it upon the coast of
Thrace.

There are two causes, to which it must be ascribed,
that the Mzotis and the Pontus discharge their waters in
continual flow from their respective beds. The first,
which is obvious and clear to all, is, that when many rivers
fall into a bed, whose limits are fixed and circumscribed, if
no opening should be found through which they may be
again discharged, the waters, as they are more and more
increased, must still rise to a greater height, till at last they
overflow their bounds, and run to fill a larger space than
that into which they were at first received; but, on the
other hand, if there be any free and open passage through
which they may be allowed to flow, then all that is
superfluous and reduiidant will, of necessity, be discharged
that way. The other cause is, the great quantity of earth
and various matter which the rivers bring down with

VOL, I. Bb

370 THE GENERAL HISTORY Book iv.

"them after heavy rains. For from hence large banks
are formed, which press and elevate. the waters, and force
them in like manner to direct their course forwards through
the mouths that are open to receive them. And as these
banks are formed continually, and.the rivers also continue
still to enter, in regular and constant flow, the efflux of the
waters must be constant likewise, without any stop or,in-
termission.

These then are the true causes, from whence up waters
of the Pontus are continually flowing from their beds:
causes, not derived from. the report of merchants; but
founded upon fact and: nature: which afford indeed, in all
enquiries, the surest and the most convincing evidence.

. But since we have advanced so far in. this. digression,

instead.of being satisfied with that -hasty negligence, with
which those who hitherto have treated of these subjects
must almost all be charged, let us endeavour rather not
only to describe with accuracy the effects that are pro-
duced, but to add such a demonstration also of the causes
from whence they severally arise, as may leave nothing
doubtful or obscure. For in the present times, in which all
parts of the earth are become accessible either by land or
sea, we ought by no means to have recourse, in things that
are unknown, to the fabulous reports of poets and: mytho-
logists, and thus vainly labour to establish dark and: dis-
putable points, by a kind of testimony, which, as Heraclitus
has remarked, deserves no credit; but should be careful
rather to rest the whole authority of that which we relate
upon such facts alone as are drawn from the actual view
and real knowledge of the places, which we at any time
may take occasion to.describe.

I say then, that both the Palus Meeotis and. the Pontus
have, for a long time past, received: continually great quan-
tities of earth and matter, which are still heaped together;
and by which, in the course-of time, their- beds. must be
entirely filled: unless some change should happen in the
places, or the rivers cease to bring down these impediments.

CHAP. V. OF POLYBIUS. $71

For since time is infinite; but the limits of these beds
circümscribed and fixed; it is manifest, that any such ac-
éession, how small soever, if it be constant only and never
discontinued, must in the end be sufficient for this purpose.
Nor is it possible indeed that it should ever happen other-
wise in: nature, but that when any thing, which itself is
finite, continues still, in the course of infinite succession, to
recéive any new supply, or to suffer any constant diminu-
tion, it must in the end arrive at its fullest possible
inérease, or, on the other hand, be wasted and destroyed ;
even though the addition, or the loss, should be made by -
the least conceivable degrees. Butsince it is not any small
and inconsiderable portion, but; on the contrary, a very
great quantity of matter, that is poured continually into
these two beds, the consequence, of whicli we are speaking,
must bë considered, not as a remoté event, but rather as
one that is likely’ very soon to happén. I might almost say
that it has already happened. For the Mzotis is indeed
$o' nearly filled, that in most parts of itthe water scarcely
exceeds the depth of fifteen or of twenty feet; so that large
Vessels cannot pass securely through it without a pilot.
We may alsó add, that-the Mæotis, as all writers have
declared, was anciently a sea, and flowed intermingled with
the*Pontus: whereas at this time it is known to be a sweet
and stagnant lake; the waters of the Pontus’ being still
forced backwards, arid excluded from it, by the banks’ of
sand; while the rivers continue still to enter, and possess
all the space.
‘ The same event must happen likewise in the Pontüs.
And indeed this also has in part already happened: though
by reason of the largeness of the bed; there are few that
have yet perceived it. Buta slight dégreé of attention will. *//
even | now D shew the truth’ of this ‘opinion. For the
the- Pontus: by many mouths, has already, with the’ sand
and other matter which'it brings down with it, formed a
batik which is called by’ the seamen Stethe, of almost a
Bb2

372 THE GENERAL HISTORY BOOK IV.

thousand stadia in its length, and at the distance of one
day’s course from land; against which the vessels that pass
through the Pontus, as they are sailing in mid-sea, often
strike unwarily in the night. The cause to which it: must
be ascribed, that this bank, instead of being settled near
the shore, is pushed forward to so great a distance from it,
is plainly this which follows. As long as the rivers retain.
so much of their impetuosity and force, as is sufficient to
surmount the resistance of the sea, and to make it yield its

place, so long likewise the sand, and every thing besides that.
is brought down with them, must still be dria forwards,
and not suffered either to stop or to subside. But when the
violence and rapidity of the current are once checked and,
broken by the depth and quantity of the opposing waters,
then the heavy earth, which before was wafted in the
_ Stream, is by its own nature sunk towards the bottom, and
settled there. And from hence it happens, that those,
banks of sand, which are formed by large and rapid rivers,
are thrown together either at a distance from the shore, or
in some deep water near it: while those, on the contrary,
that are brought down by small and gentle streams, lie
close to the very entrance of the mouths, from whence they
are discharged. This remark may be confirmed, by that
which is known to happen after the fall of strong and
violent rains., For at those times, even the smallest rivers,
having been once enabled to surmount the resistance ofthe
waters at their entrance, force their way far into the sea,
and still drive the sands before them, to a greater or more, `
moderate distance, in proportion to their respective Mie:
and force.

With regard to that which we have affirmed, of the size.
and vast extent of that bank which was just now mentioned,
as well as of the great quantities in general both of stones,
of wood, and of earth, which are conveyed continually into
the Pontus by these rivers, there is no man surely so weak
in judgment, as to entertain any kind of doubt concerning
the possibility of the facts. For. we see that torrents, even

CHAP. V. OF POLYBIUS. 373

not the most considerable in strength or violence, open
deep trenches for their passage, and force their way even
through the midst of mountains, carrying with them every
kind of matter, earth, and stones; and so covering and
filling up the countries over which they pass, that they are
scarcely known to be the same, having assumed a face far
different from their own. It cannot therefore be thought
incredible or strange, that rivers of the largest size, and
which also flow continually, should produce the effects
which we have above described; and roll together such vast
quantities of matter, as must in the end entirely fill the
Pontus. For I speak not of it as an event that is barely
probable, but as of one that cannot fail to happen; of which
this circumstance may also serve as a kind of antecedent
proof. As much as the waters of the Mzotis are now
sweeter than the Pontus, so much sweeter also is the latter
than the waters of our sea. Now from hence we may con-
clude, that when the time, in which the Mzotis was com-
pletely filled, and that which may be requisite for filling up
the Pontus, shall stand in the same proportion to each other
as the different greatness of their respective beds, the latter
likewise will.then become a fresh and standing lake, as the
former is now known tobe. But this indeed will happen so
much sooner also in the Pontus, as the rivers which it re-
ceives are more in number than those that fall into the
Meotis, and of larger size.

This then may be sufficient to satisfy the doubts of those,
who are unwilling to believe, that the Pontus is now con-
tinually receiving a large increase of matter within its bed;
and that in the course of time it must be entirely filled, and
this great sea become a lake and stagnant marsh. From
these reflections we may also learn to be secure against ‘all
the monstrous fictions, and lying wonders, which usually
are reported to us by those that sail upon the sea; and no
longer be compelled through ignorance to swallow greedily
like children every senseless tale: but having now some
traces of the trath impressed upon our minds, may be able

Bb3

374 THE GENERAL HISTORY Book iv.

to form always some certain judgment; by which we may
distinguish fact from falsehood. We now return again to
describe the situation of Byzantium, from whence we made
this digression. »
i «The strait, which joins the Pontus with the Propesitiey
contains in length a hundred and twenty. stadia, as we have
already-mentioned. ‘The extreme limits of it are, on the one
side towards the Pontus, a place called Hieron; and on
the other, towards the Propontis, that space that lies be-
tween Byzantium and Chalcedon. Between these two
boundaries there is a promontory, called Hermzeum, which
advances far into the sea. It stands on the side of Europe;
in the most narrow part of all the Strait: for the distance
of it from the coast of Asia does not exceed five stadia. It
was in this place that Darius is.reported to have laid -a
bridge across the sea, in his expedition against the Sey-
thians. Now the water, coming from the Pontus, at first
flows on in the same uniform and unbroken course, because
the coast on either side is smooth and equal. But as it
approaches near Hermæum, being now inclosed, as we
have said, in the most narrow part of all the strait, and
driven with violence against this promontory, it is suddenly
struck back, and forced over to the opposite shore of Asia.
From thence it again returns to the side of Europe, and
breaks against the Hestizan promontories. From these
again, it is once more hurried back to Asia, to the place
called Bos; where Io is fabled by the poets. to have first .
touched the land, when she passed this strait. And lastly,
falling back again from Dos, it directs its course. towards
Byzantium; and there breaking into eddies, a small part of
it winds itself into a pool which is called the Horn; while ^
the rest, and. greater part, flows away towards Chalcedon,
upon the opposite shore, which however, it*in vain attempts.
to reach. For as the strait, is in this part; of, a greater.
breadth, and. because the. strength also, of the.current, has.
already been, so often. broken, it, is now no: longer, able ta
flow, and to return in short. and. sharp, angles as before ;:

CHAP. V. OF POLYBIUS. 375

but falling away obliquely from Chalcedon, takes its course
forwards along the middle of the Strait.

Now from hence it happens, that Byzantium, in point
of situatión, possesses great advantages, of which Chalce-
don is entirely destitute: though, when we only take a
view of these two cities, they appear to be in this respect
alike and equal. But the truth is, that a vessel sailing
towards Chalcedon, cannot gain the port without the
greatest difficulty; while on the other hand, the current
itself will waft us, even whether we will or not, into the
harbour of Byzantium. For thus when any vessels at-
tempt to pass from Chalcedon to Byzantium, as the current
will not suffer them to cross the strait in a direct and everi
line, they first steer obliquely towards Bos and Chryso-
polis; which last city was in former times possessed by the
Athenians, who, by the advice of Alcibiades, first exacted
there a ceftain impost from all vessels that sailed into the
Pontus; and from thence, committing themselves at once
to the current of the water, they are conveyed without any
pain or difficulty to Byzantium. Nor is the navigation
less favourable and commodious on the other side also of
the city. For whether we are sailing from the Hellespont
towards Byzantium before a southern wind, by taking our
route along the shore of Europe, we perform the voyage
with ease; or whether, on the contrary, we are carried by
a northern gale from Byzantium towards the Hellespont,
kéeping still our course along the same coast of Europe,
we enter without any danger the strait of the Propontis;
between Sestus and Abydus; and may also return again
with safety, in the same manner as before. But the people
of Chalcedon are so far from being possessed of these ad-
vantages, that, on the contrary, they can never steer their
course along theif own proper coast, because the shore is
full of bays and promontories, and the land of Cyzicus espe-
cially runs far out into the sea. In sailing therefore from
the: Hellespont towards Chalcedon, they are forced to keep
closé along the shore of Europe, till they arrive very near

Bb 4

376 THE GENERAL HISTORY xook iv.

Byzantium: and from thence they first turn away, anddi-
rect their course across the strait, to gain their own har-
bour ; which is indeed no easy task, by reason of the cur-
rents which have before been mentioned. And thus again,
‘when they design to sail from Chalcedon to the Hellespont,
taking. still their course along the shore of Europe, they
are at no time able to steer directly over from their own
port to the coast of Thrace: since, besides the current that
obstructs their passage, they are also forced to struggle
against those winds, which alike are contrary to the course
that they would wish to take. For either they are. driven
by the south too far towards the Pontus; or, on the other
- hand, are turned from the direction of their route by the
northern wind, which blows against them from that sea.
Nor is it possible to sail from Chalcedon.to Byzantium, or
to return back again from the.coast of Thrace, without
being met by the one or other of these winds. . Such then,
as we have now remarked, are the advantages which the
Byzantines derive from the situation of their city, with
respect to the sea. . We shall next consider also the dis-
advantages to which the same situation has exposed them,
on the side towards the land. |
As their country then is every way surrounded ad in-
Weed, even from the Pontus to the Augean Sea, by the
barbarous tribes of Thrace, they are from thence involved
in a very difficult as well as constant war. Nor is it pos-
sible, by any force which they can raise, that they should
ever free themselves entirely from these enemies. For
when they have conquered one, three other states, more
powerful than the first, stand ready to invade their country.
And even though they should submit to enter into treaties,
and pay heavy tributes, they still are left in the same con-
dition as before. For the concessions, that are made to
any single power, never fail to raise against them many
enemies in the room of one. Thus are they worn-and
wasted by a war, from which they never can get free: and
which, on the other hand, they are scarcely. able to sustain.

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CHAP. V. OF POLYBIUS. 377

For what danger is so close and pressing, as a faithless
neighbour? or what. war more terrible, than that which
is practised by barbarians? From hence it happens, that
this people, besides that they are doomed to struggle against
those calamities which are the usual consequence of war,
are also exposed continually to that kind of torment,
which Tantalus, among the poets, is feigned to suffer.
For when they have employed great pains to cultivate
their lands, which are by nature also very fertile, and the
rich fruits stand ready to repay their labours; on a sudden
these barbarians, pouring down upon the country, destroy
one part, and carry away the rest: and only leave to the
Byzantines, after all their cost and toil, the pain of behold-
ing their best harvests wasted; while their beauty also
adds an aggravation to the grief, and renders the sense of
their calamity more sharp and unsupportable.

The Byzantines however, amidst all the distress of these
wars, the very continuance of which had rendered them
perhaps in some degree more easy to be borne, never
changed their conduct with respect to the states of Greece.
But afterwards, when the Gauls, that were led by Comon-
torius, arrived also in their country, and began to turn
their arms against them, they were then reduced at once
to very great extremities. /'l'hese Gauls were a part of -|
that numerous army, which had left their native seats: un-
der the command of Brennus. But having happily
escaped the general slaughter that was made of their com-
panions in the neighbourhood of Delphi, and arriving
near the Hellespont, they were so much charmed with the
beauty of the country that lay round Byzantium, that they
resolved to settle there, and not pass over into Asia. And
having in a short time subdued the neighbouring inhabit-
ants of Thrace, and fixed -their seat of government at
Tyle, they seemed to threaten Byzantium with the last
destruction. The Byzantines therefore, in the first incur-
sions that were made by Comontorius upon their country,
paid sometimes three ‘and five thousand, and sometimes

378 THE GENERAL HISTORY Book iv.

even ten thousand pieces of gold, to save their lands from
being plundered. And. afterwards, they submitted to pay
a yearly tribute of fourscore talents; which was continued
to the time of Cavarus, who was the last of all their kings.
For the Gauls were then conquered by the Thracians in
their turn, and the whole race extirpated,

During this time, the Byzantines, unable to support the
burden of these heavy tributes, implored. assistance from
the states of Greece. And when the greater part of these
entirely slighted their solicitations, they were forced at last,
through mere necessity, to exact a certain impost from all
vessels that sailed into the Pontus. /But the merchants,
beginning soon to feel the loss and inconvenience that arose
to them from this proceeding; exclaimed aloud against the
injustice of it, and all joined to blame the Rhodians for
permitting it: for these were at that time the most powet-
ful people upon the sea. From hence arose the war, which
we are now going to describe. For the Rhodians, being
excited partly by their own particular loss, and partly by
the wrong which their neighbours were forced also to sus
tain, having secured to themselves the assistance of their
allies, sent ambassadors to Byzantium, and demanded that
this impost should be abolished. But the Byzantines paid
no regard to. the demand: but, on the contrary, adhered to
the opinion of Hecatondorus and Olympiodorus, who were
then the first in the administration of the city; and who
maintained, in a public conference with the ambassadors;
that what they had done was just and reasonable. The.
ambassadors were forced therefore to return, without
having obtained the end of their commission: and: thé
Rhodians immediately declared war against the Byzantines:
They sent some’ deputies also to king Prusias, whom they
knew to be inflamed by an old resentment against the peo-

= ple of Byzantium; and pressed him to join his forces with
Yb) them.in the war. The Byzantines made on their part all
^ the necessary preparations; and sent to demand assistance
also: from Attalus and Achzeus. The first of these was

CHAP. Y. OF POLYBIUS. | 379

heartily disposed to support their interests: but because
he was now confined within the limits of his own hereditary
kingdom hy the victories of Achzus, his power. was small
and inconsiderable, .But: Achzus, who was at this time
master of the countries that.were on this side of mount
Taurus, and who lately had assumed the regal title, pro-
mised to.assist them with all bis forces; and by this assur-
ance, stryck no small terror into Prusias and the Rhodians, `
while on the other hand he raised the courage of the By-
zantines, and filled them with the fairest expectations of .
success. -

This prince Achzeus was nearly allied in blood to Anti-
ochus, who at this time reigned in Syria: and had gained
for himself the sovereignty of all those countries that were
just now mentioned, in the following manner,

When Seleucus, the father of Antiochus, was dead, and
the kingdom had devolved upon the eldest of his sons, who -
was also called Seleucus, Achæus. being allied, as we have
said, to.the royal house, attended the young king in the
expedition which he made into the provinces on this side
of mount Taurus, about two years before the times of
which we are speaking. For scarcely was. he seated upon
the throne, which he. received the news, that Attalus. had
possessed himself by force of all this country. He resolved
therefore to. attempt. without delay to recover again his
paternal rights, But when, he. had passed. the. mountains
with, a numerous, army, he was. there. treacherously. killed
by. Nicanor, aud a certain Gaul whose name was Apaturius.
Achaus, having, as his duty then, required, revenged. this
murder by the death, of both the traitors, and: taken, upon
himself. the command of all. the forces, with, the. entire

. ness, as; well as. wisdom, in: his conduct,, that, though. all
circumstances highly: favoured him, and the troops thems
selves conspired, together witb;the times to, place the dia~
dem upon his head, he persisted to refuse: that: honour ; and
reserved, the country. for Antiochus, the youngest of the

380 THE GENERAL HISTORY Book iv.

children of Seleucus: for whose sake also he still went on
to extend his conquests, and to regain the places that were
lost. But when the success began at last to exceed even
his greatest hopes; when he had not only subdued the
country by his arms, but shut up Attalus himself in Per-
gamus; being then no longer able to maintain his steadi-
ness, upon the height to which he was thus raised: ‘by
fortune, he fell aside at once from virtue, and having
usurped the diadem and royal name, from that time was
regarded as the greatest and most formidable prince of all
that were on this side of mount Taurus. Upon: his as-
sistance therefore the Byzantines with good reason built
their strongest hopes; and entered with confidence into
the war, against Prusias and the Rhodians.

“With regard to Prusias, he had long before this time
accused the people of Byzantium of having treated him
with contempt and scorn. For when they had decreed
some statues in his honour, instead of taking care to erect
them with all the usual rites of consecration, they on the
contrary made afterwards a jest of their own decree, and
suffered it to lie neglected and forgotten. He was also
much dissatisfied with the pains which they had employed,
to procure a peace between Attalus and Achzeus ; which
must have proved in all points hurtful to his interests.
Another cause of his resentment was, that the Byzantines
had deputed some persons from their city, to join with
Attalus in the celebration of the games that were sacred to
Minerva; but had sent none to him, when he held the
solemn feast of the Soteria. Incensed therefore by a pas-
sion which had long been working in his mind,'he seized
with joy the occasion that was offered; and resolved in
concert with the ambassadors, that while the Rhodians
pressed the Byzantines upon the sea, himself would carry
on the war by land against them. Such were the causes
and such the commencement of the war between the Rho-
dians and Byzantines.

The Byzantines, encouraged, as: we have said, by the

diii: v. OF POLYBIUS. 38h.

hope of that assistance which they expected from Achaus,

at first performed their part with great alacrity and spirit.
They sent to invite Tibites back from. Macedon; imagin-

ing, that through his means, they should be able to excite
some disorders in Bithynia, and involve Prusias in the
same dangers and alarms, as those with which they were
threatened by him. For this prince, having begun the

war with all that vigour which his resentment had in-.

spired, had already taken Hieron, which stood at the very
entrance of the strait, and which the Byzantines, on ac-
count of its happy situation, had purchased not long before
at a great expence; that from hence they might be able to
protect the merchants that traded into the Pontus, and
secure the importation of their slaves, together with the
other traffic also of that sea. He made himself master
also of that part of Mysia, on the side of Asia, which for a
course of many years had belonged to the Byzantines.
At the same time the Diedie having equipped six
vessels of their own, and received four more from their
allies, steered their course towards the Hellespont. And
when they had stationed nine of the ships near Sestus, to

intercept the vessels that should attempt to pass into the,

Pontus, Xenophantus, who commanded all the fleet, sailed

forward in the tenth, and approached near Byzantium;.
with design to try whether the Byzantines might be in-.
clined by the sight of danger to desist from their first.
design. But perceiving that his expectations were in no.
way answered, he returned and joined the other ships, and.
with the whole fleet sailed back again to Rhodes. In the.

mean while the Byzantines pressed Achzeus to join them
with his forces: and sent some persons into Macedon, to
bring away Tibites; who was the uncle of king Prusias,
and was judged, on that account, to hold as fair a claim as
the king himself to the sovereignty of Bithynia.

°

But when the Rhodians remarked the firmness, with .
which the Byzantines-had resolved to carry on the- war,
they had recourse to a very wise expedient, by which they ,

382 THE GENERAL HISTORY móox iv.

at last accomplished all their purpose. They saw that
this great confidence, which the Byzantines had assunied,

was. founded only on the succours which they’ éxpécted
from Achseus. They knew likewise, that Andromachus,

the father of this prince, had for some’ time been detained.
4 prisoner at Alexandria, and that Acheus was very
anxious for his-safety. They formed therefore the désign
of sending an embassy to Ptolemy, to: desire that Andro-
machus might bé released. They had indéed before this
time slightly urged the same request. But now they pressed
it with the greatest earnestness; imagining, that when
Achzus should be indebted to them’ for a'service so con-
siderable, he must be forced in gratitude to consent to
every thing that they should afterwards demand. When
the ambassadors arrived, they found that Ptolemy was
willing: still to detain Andromachus, from whom lie ex-
pected to draw great advantage, in the conjunctures that
were likely to arise. For some disputes were now sub-
sisting between Antiochus and himself. The power of
Achzeus likewise, who lately had' declared himself an
independent sovereign, was such as could not fail to bring
considerable' weight, in certain matters of importance.
And this prisoner not only was the father of Achzus, but
the brother also of Laodice, the wife of Seleucus. But on
the other hand, as the king was strongly inclined to gratify
the Rhodians in all their wishes, and to favour all their
interests, he at last consented to deliver Andromachus into’
their hands, that they might restore'him to his son. They
restored him accordingly without delay: and having de-
creed also certain honours to Achzus, they at once de-
prived the people of Byzantium of their strongest hope.
Tibites also died, as he was returning back from‘ Macedon.
This fatal accident, with that which had already happened,
entirely disconcerted all the measures, and damped the
ardour of the Byzantines. But Prusias on’ the contrary
conceived new hopes; and maintained the’ war against
them, upon the coast of Asia, with’ great vigour and suc-

CHAP. V. OF POLYBIUS. 888

cess: while the Thracians also, whom he had engaged into
his service, pressed them so closely on. the side of Europe,
that they dared not even. to. appear without. their gates.
Perceiving, therefore, that all their expectations were de-
stroyed and lost, and being harassed thus by their enemies
on every side, they began. now only. to.consider,. by. what
means.they might at last be disengaged: from the war with
honour.

Happily about this time Cavarus, king of the Gauls,
came. to Byzantium. And as he wished with, no small
earnestness that these disputes might. be accommodated,
he employed his pains with such success, that both Prusias
and. the Byzantines consented to the terms that. were pro-
posed. When the Rhodians were informed of the zeal
which Cavarus had shewn to procure: a peace, and that
Prusias. had submitted to his mediation, they were: willing
on their part also to put an end to the war; on condition
however, that they should be suffered: to accomplish their
first design. They. deputed therefore. Aridices. as their
ambassador to Byzantium; and at the same time sent
Polemocles with three triremes, to.offer, as we express it;
tlie spear or the caduceus, to the choice of the: Byzantines:
But on their first arrival, the peace was instantly. con-
cluded; Cothon, the son of Calligiton, being at this time
Hieromnemon of Byzantium. With respect to the: Rho-
dians, the terms were simply these: ‘The Byzantines
shall exact no impost from the vessels that pass into the
Pontus. Upon this: condition, the Rhodians: and their
allies will remain in peace with the people of Byzantium.”
With Prusias, the treaty was concluded in the-words. that
follow: ** There shall. be perpetual peace and friendship
between Prusias and: the. Byzantines. ‘The Byzantines
shall not. commit hostilities: of any kind against Prusias,
nor Prusias against the-Byzantines. Prusias- shall restore
to the Byzantines without any ransom:all the:lands and
fortresses, the people and the prisoners, that have been
taken or subdued. He shall restore the vessels also that

384 THE GENERAL HISTORY BOOK IV.

were taken in the beginning of the war: together with the.
arms that were found in any of the fortresses; and all the
timber, tiles, -and marble, that were carried away from
Hieron, or from the country round it.” . For Prusias,
dreading the arrival of Tibites, had removed from all the
fortresses whatever was fit for any use. It was added in
.the last’ place, * that Prusias should compel the Bi-
thynians to restore all that had been taken from the men
who were employed to cultivate the PEE in that part of
Mysia which belonged to the Byzantines." Such was the
beginning, and stich the end of the war of Prusias n"
the Rhodians, against the people of Byzantium.

After these transactions, the Cnossians deputed some
ambassadors to the Rhodians, and requested that they
would send to them the fleet that was under the command
of Polemocles, together with three open boats. But when
these vessels arrived upon the coast of Crete, the Eleu-
thernzans, suspecting that some mischief was designed
against them, because one of their citizens had been killed
by Polemocles to gratify the Cnossians, at first expostu-
lated with the.Rhodians concerning this proceeding, and
afterwards declared war against them. Not long befote
this time, the Lyttians also were involved in the worst
calamities of war.. And indeed the whole isle of Crete
had been lately made the scene of very great disorders,
which were occasioned in the following manner.

The Cnossians and Gortynians, having joined together
their forces, had made themselves masters of all the places
in the island, Lyttus alone excepted. And when this
single city still refused to submit, they resolved to conquer
it by force, and to punish the inhabitants with the last
destruction; that thus they might strike a terror into the
rest of Crete. At first then, all the people of the island
were engaged in this design, and turned their arms against
the Lyttians. But after some time, jealousies and dis-
content having sprung, as it often happens among the
Cretans, from small and inconsiderable causes, grew at

CHAP. V. OF POLYBIUS. 385

last to an. open and declared dissension, and broke the
force of this confederacy. For the Polyrrhenians, the
Ceretze, the Lampzans, the Orians, and the Arcadians,
separated themselves with one consent from their alliance
with the Cnossians, and resolved to support the Lyttians.
Among the Gortynians also, while the oldest men adhered
still firmly to the Cnossians, the young men, on the other
hand, contended with equal warmth in favour of the
Lyttians. The Cnossians, being greatly alarmed by this
sudden revolt of all their chief allies, called in to their
,assistance-a thousand mercenary soldiers from Ætolia.
As soon as these arrived, the oldest men among thé Gor-
tynians, having first gained possession of the citadel, ‘and
received into it the Cnossians and ZEtolians, killed or
drove out all the young men, and delivered their city to
the Cnossians. And not long afterwards, when the Lyt-
tians had led out all their forces, to make incursions upon
the territories of their enemies, the Cnossians, having
received notice of their absence, marched in haste, and
possessed themselves of Lyttus, when it was destitute of all
defence. And having sent the women and the children
away to Cnossus, they set fire to the city, pillaged, and
razed it to the ground. "The Lyttians, returning from
their expedition, and perceiving what had happened, were
so struck with consternation and despair, that not one
among them had the courage to set his foot within the
city. “But when they had all marched round it, deploring
with loud groans and lamentations the ruin of their country
and their own unhappy fate, they again turned back, and
retired for refuge to the Lampzeans. They were received
by these with all marks of friendship and affection: and
being thus in one day’s time, from citizens become stran-
gers, without laws or city, they continued afterwards to
carry on the war against the Cnossians, in conjunction
with the rest of the allies. Thus, in a manner most
astonishing and strange, Lyttus, a colony from Lacedsemon,
the most ancient city of the island, and whose people,
VoL. I. cc

386 THE GENERAL HISTORY BOOK 1V.

descended from the Spartan race, were confessed to be the
bravest of all- that were produced in Crete, was at once
sunk and lost in irrecoverable ruin.

The. Polyrrhenians, the Lampæans, and rå rest of the
allies, having considered that the Ætolians, from whom
the Cnossians had received their mercenary forces, were at
this time engaged in war, against: the Acheans and king
Philip, sent some deputies to these, to desire that they
would enter into an alliance with them, and send some
troops to their assistance. To this request both Philip
and the Achzans readily consented: and having received
them into the general confederacy, they sent soon after-
wards to their assistance, four hundred Illyrians under the
command of Plator, two hundred Achzans, and a hun-
dred Phocsans. The Polyrrhenians, having obtained
these succours, were now able to maintain.the war with.
so great vigour, that they soon forced the Eleuthernsans,
the Cydoniatze, and the Apterseans, to keep. close behind .
their walls; and at last compelled tbem to join their party,
and desert the alliance of the Cnossians. After this suc-
cess, they sent in return to Philip and the Achzeans, five
hundred Cretans; as the Cnossians also, not long before,
had sent a thousand of their troops to the Ætolians; to .
assist them severally in the war in which they were en-
gaged. ‘The young men likewise, that had been driven
from Gortyna, having gained possession of the port of
Pheestia, and afterwards of their own harbour also, main-.
tained their posts with the greatest intrepidity; and from
thence carried on the war. without remission against the
old Gortynians that were masters of the eis Such was
the condition of affairs in Crete. ; -s

About this time also, Mithridates began that war mind
the Sinopeans, which was indced the source and first occa-
sion of all-those great calamities. that afterwards befel this
people. Upon this occasion they sent. an -embassy to
Rhodes, to solicit some assistance.. The Rhodians, having
made choice of three among their own: citizens, délivered

CHAP, V. OF POLYBIUS. 387

to them a hundred and forty thousand drachme; that
from thence the Sinopeans might be furnished with the
stores that were necessary for the war. From this sum
they were supplied with ten thousand casks of wine; three
hundred pounds of twisted hair, and one hundred pounds
of strings, all prepared for use; a thousand suits of ar-
mour; three thousand pieces of coined gold, and four
catapults, with some engineers. The ambassadors having
received these stores, returned again in haste to Sinope.
For the Sinopeans were now filled with the greatest ap-
prehensions; and were persuaded that Mithridates would
at once invest them both by land and sea. They hastened
therefore to make such a disposition of their forces, as
might secure the city on both sides against the danger of
a siege.

Sinope is situated in a peninsula, which extends into
the sea, upon the right side of the Pontus, as we sail
towards the Phasis. It stands upon the isthmus of the
peninsula, and covers the whole extremity of the land, in
the part which is connected with the continent of Asia,
and which contains about two stadia only in its breadth.
The peninsula itself, as it falls down towards the coast, is
all flat and open; but the borders of it, that are nearest to
the sea, are rough, unequal, and very difficult of access.
The Sinopeans therefore, being apprehensive that Mithri-
dates would invest them on the side of Asia, and at the
same time land some forces from the sea upon the opposite
side, and possess himself of the open plain, together with
all the posts that might command the city, began to fortify
the circuit of the coast; driving sharp stakes into the
ground, and throwing up intrenchments in every part'in
which the enemy could attempt to land; and distributing
their machines and troops into all the advantageous: posts.
And indeed, as this peninsula is of very moderate extent, a
small body of forces may:at all times be sufficient for its
defence. But we shall here leave the Sinopeans, and re-
turn again to the Social War.

cc2

-

388 THE GENERAL HISTORY BOOK IV. '

CHAP. VI.

PHILIP, beginning his march from Macedon with all the
forces, advanced towards Thessaly and Epirus, with design
to enter that way into ZEtolia. At the same time Alex-
ander and Dorimnachus, having conceived some hopes- of
being able to take /Egira by surprise, drew together a body
of twelve hundred ZEtolians to CEnanthia, a city, of ZEtolia,
which stood opposite to the before-mentioned city: and
having prepared some vessels for their transport, they
waited for the proper time to pass the gulf, and carry their
purpose into execution. For a certain soldier, who had
deserted the service of the /Etolians, and for some time
past resided in Ægira, having remarked that the guards,
who were posted at the gate which opened on the side of
ZEgium, were often drunk with wine, and remiss in all their
duty, had frequently importuned Dorimachus, whom he
knew to be singularly formed for conducting all such enter-
prises, to take advantage of this negligence, and to enter by
surprise into the city. —7Egira is situated in Peloponnesus,
near the gulf of Corinth, between Sycion and ZEgium, upon
hills that are rough and difficult of access. It looks towards
Parnassus, and the country that is extended round that
mountain, on the opposite side of the gulf, and is distant
from the sea about seven stadia. When the proper time
was come, Dorimachus, having embarked his forces, sailed
away by night, and cast anchor in the river that ran near
the city: and from thence, accompanied by Alexander, .
and by Archidamus the son of Pantaleon, he directed his
march towards /Egira, by the way that leads from A:gium.
At the same time the deserter also, who had formed the
project, took with him twenty of the bravest soldiers; and
having, by some private roads with which he was acquainted,
gained the summit of the hills before the rest, he entered
the city through an aquceduct, and finding all the guards
buried fast in sleep, killed them even in their beds, broke
the bars of the gates with hatchets, and set them open to

‘N

CHAP. VI. OF POLYBIUS.. 389

the enemy. The Aitolians entered’ in crowds together,
exulting in their success; and began to act as if the victory
had already been their own. But this rash confidence
proved afterwards the very cause of safety to the people of
JEgira, and of destruction to themselves; who were fool-
ishly persuaded, that in order to be masters of a city, it was
spfficient only to be within the gates. Under this belief,
when they had kept together in a body for some little time
in the public place, as the day began now to appear, they
were no longer able to restrain their appetite, but spread
themselves through all the city in search of plunder, and
forced their way into the houses, to sack and pillage them.
Those, therefore, of the citizens who saw the enemy in
their houses, before they had any notice of their approach,
were struck with consternation, and fled in haste out of the
city, not doubting but that the /Etolians were already
masters of the place. But the rest, to whom the danger
had not reached, being alarmed in time by the distant
noise, ran together for their defence, and all took their way
towards the citadel. And as their numbers grew continu-
ally, so their courage also and their confidence increased:
while on the other hand the body of the 7Etolians, from
which many, as we have said, had fallen away, and dis-
persed themselves on every side in search of plunder,
became more and more disordered and diminished. When
Dorimachus therefore perceived the danger to which he
was now exposed, having again collected all the troops to-
gether, he led them on towards the citadel; in the hope,
that by ene bold and vigorous effort he should strike the
enemy with terror, and force them instantly to retreat.
But the Aigirates, having encouraged each other by mutual
exhortations, sustained the charge with the greatest bravery.
And as the citadel was not fortified by any wall, man with
mah, every one was engaged in close and single fight. The
contest therefore was for some time such as might be ex-
pected from the condition of the combatants. For asthe one
were struggling in thelast defence of their children and their
cc3

$90 THE GENERAL HISTORY BOOK IV.

country, so the others had no way to escape with safety, but
by victory. At last, however, the /Etolians were constrained
to fly: and the 7Egirates, taking care to seize the very mo-
ment in which they first began to yield, pressed upon them
with such force and fury, that the greater part were thrown
down in heaps together at the gate, and were trodden
under foot, in the haste and consternation of their flight.
Alexander was killed in the action, and Archidamus stifled
among the crowds that pressed to gain their passage
through the gate. ‘The rest either fell in that disorder, or
were hurried down the precipices, and there lost their lives.
A small number only gained their ships, and were saved in
a manner the most dishonourable; having thrown away
their arms, and carrying nothing back but disappointment
and despair. Thus the citizens of Ægira, by their cou-
rage and intrepid firmness, recovered again their country,
which, through their negligence, they had almost lost.

About the same time Euripidas, who had been sent by
the ZEtolians to command the forces of the Eleans, made
incursions upon the lands of Dyme, Pharse, and Tritæa;
and having gained a very great booty, was preparing to
return back again to Elis; when Micus, a Dymzan, who
was also the lieutenant of the Achzan prætor, drew
together the troops of all those provinces, with design to
pursue the enemy, and harass them in their retreat. But
as he advanced without sufficient caution, he fell into an
ambuscade, in which forty of his men were killed, and two
hundred taken prisoners. Euripidas, elate with this suc-
cess, again led out his forces within some days afterwards,
and made himself master of a fort called Tichos; which
was situated near the promontory Araxus, in the Dymean
territory; and, as fables relate, was built in ancient times
by Hercules, who used it as his citadel and place of arms
in his wars against the Eleans.

The Dymeans, the Phareans, and Triteeans, having
suffered so considerable a defeat, and dreading likewise
that they should now be exposed to greater dangers since

CHAP. VI. OF POLYBIUS. 391

this fort had fallen into the possession of the enemy, at first
sent couriers to inform the Achzean prætor of what had
happened, and to request some succours; and aflerwards
they deputed to him some ambassadors, to urge the same
demand. But Aratus not only was unable to procure at
this time any foreign troops, because the Achzans had
neglected to discharge the stipends that were owing to their
mercenaries from the time of the war against’ Cleomenes,
but was in general wholly unskilled to form the measures
that were necessary in such. conjunctures; and, in a word,
betrayed the greatest want of courage and activity, in all
things that related to the affairs of war. From hence it
happened, that Lycurgus possessed himself of Athenzeum,
in the Megalopolitan territory; and Euripidas, besides his
late success, took also Gorgon, a fortress situated in the
district of Telphussa. i

When the Dymæans therefore, the Pharæans, and Tri-
tæans, perceived that no assistance was to be expected
from the prætor, they resolved, that they would withdraw
their share from the common contributions that were raised
among the Achæan states, and maintain, at their own ex-
pense, three hundred foot and fifty horse, to cover their
lands from the incursions of the enemy. But though this
measure was, perhaps, both wise and proper, with respect
to their own particular safety and advantage, it is certain
that nothing could be more pernicious to the common
interests of the republic. For by this conduct they gave
not only the example, but furnished also a ready method
and pretence to all that should, at any time, be inclined to
break the general confederacy, and dissolve the union of
the states. Yet it cannot be denied that, in justice, the
blame must chiefly be imputed to Aratus; whose delays
and negligence still frustrated the hopes of those who
depended on him for assistance. For though all men, in
the time of danger, most willingly adhere to their allies, as
long as any succours are to be expected from them; yet,
on the other hand, when they find that they are deserted

ces

392 THE GENERAL HISTORY BOOK IV.

by those very friends upon whom they had fixed their
liopes, they are then forced to have recourse to themselves
alone for safety, and to employ such remedies as are within
their power. The Triteeans therefore, aud the rest may
with good reason be excused, for having raised some forces
at their own expence, when none could be obtained from
the Achzans; but, on the other hand, they are greatly to
be blamed that they refused any longer to contribute their
proper share towards defraying the common wants of the
republic. It was just, indeed, and necessary, that they
should pay a due regard to their own immediate safety.
But it was also no' less reasonable that they should dis-
charge, as the occasion then required, their duty to the
states. And this was rather to be expected from them, not
only because, by the laws of the confederacy, they were
sure of being again repaid whatever they should advance
for the common service, but becnuse they had also borne
the first and greatest part in establishing this form of
government in Achaia. Such was the state of affairs in
Peloponnesus. .

In the mean while Philip, having advanced trough
Thessaly into Epirus, and being joined there by all the
forces of the Epirots, together with three hundred slingers
from Achaia, and the same number of Cretans also that
were sent to him by the Polyrrhenians, continued his
march through the province, and arrived upon the confines
of the Ambracian territory. . If, at this time, he had passed
forwards without delay, and fallen suddenly with so great
an army upon the inmost parts of Ætolia, he might at once
have put an end to the war. But having resolved, at the
request of the Epirots, to lay siege first to Ambracus,.he
by that means gave full leisure to the ZEtolians to draw
together their forces, and to form the measures that. were
necessary for their defence. For the Epirots, regarding
rather their own particular advantage than tlie common
interest of the allies, and being desirous to get Ambracus
into their hands, had pressed the king with the greatest

CHAP. VI. OF POLYBIUS. 393

earnestness, that he would endeavour to reduce that place.
Their intention was, to recover Ambracia from the 7Eto-
lians. But this conquest could never be obtained but by
first gaining’ Ambracus, and making their attacks from
thence against the city. For the place called Ambracus
was a fortress of considerable strength, situated in the
middle of a marsh, and secured by a wall and out-works.
It was only to be approached by one narrow causeway,
and commanded entirely both the city of Ambracia and all
the adjoining country. Philip, therefore, yielded to their
request, and having fixed his camp near Ambracus, began
to make the necessary preparations for the siege.

But while he was employed in this design. Scopas, having
drawn together all the ZEtolian forces, directed his route
through Thessaly, and made incursions into Macedon.
And when he had ravaged all the open country in the
district of Pieria, and had gained a very great booty, he
continued his march from thence to Dium; and finding the
place deserted by the inhabitants, he threw down the walls
and all the houses, and razed the Gymnasium to the
ground. He set fire also to the porticoes that stood round
the temple; destroyed the sacred offerings that were de-
signed either as ornaments of the place, or for the use of
those who came to celebrate the public festivals; and broke
all the images of the kings. And having thus, in the very
beginning of the war, declared himself the enemy of the
gods as well as men, he then returned back again to his
country; and, instead of being looked upon with horror on
account of these impieties, was on thé contrary received
by the Ætolians with honours and applause, and regarded
as a man who, by his brave and vigorous conduct, was able
to perform the greatest services to the republic. For him-
self, by his discourses, had so highly raised the confidence
of all the people, that they were filled with new and eager
hopes; and began to be assured that, after these exploits,
no enemy would dare so much as to approach the Æto-
lians; and that themselves. might, on the contrary, here-

é

394 THE GENERAL HISTORY Book wy.

after pillage without resistance, not Peloponnesus only, as
they had done in former times, but even Thessaly and
Macedon.

When Philip was informed of all the outrages that had
been committed in his kingdom, he perceived that he was:
justly punished for having yielded to the folly and ambi-
tious spirit of the Epirots. He.continucd, however, still
to press the siege of Ambracus. But when he had raised
causeways in the marsh, and completed all the necessary
works, the forces that were in the place were struck with
terror, and surrendered to him after forty days. "The king
dismissed the garrison, which consisted of five hundred
ZEtolians, upon terms of safety; and gratified the Epirots
iu their wishes, by leaving the fortress in their hands.
He then decamped, and continued his march in haste
along Charada, with design to pass the Ambracian gulf, in
that part which was the narrowest, and which lay near the
temple of the Acarnanians called Actium. For this gulf,
which flows from the sea of Sicily, is less than five stadia
in its breadth, at its first entrance between Acarnania and
Epirus. But advancing farther within the land, it spreads
afterwards to the breadth of a hundred stadia, and extends
in length to about three hundred from the sea. It divides
Epirus from Acarnania, leaving the first on the side
towards the north, and the latter on the south. Philip
then passed the gulf, in the place which we have mentioned,
and continued his route through Acarnania. And having
increased his army with two thousand Acarnanian foot,
and two hundred horse, he came and encamped before
Phoetize, a city of /Etolia, and pressed the siege with so
great force and vigour that, after two days, the garrison,
being struck with terror, surrendcred upon conditions, and
were dismissed with safety. On the following night five
hundred Astolians, ignorant of what had happened, began
their march towards the place. But Philip, having received
timely notice of their approach, posted some troops in am-
buscade, and killed the greater part as they advanced.

CHAP. VI. OF POLYBIUS. 395

The rest were taken prisoners, a very small number only
excepted, who saved themselves by flight. He then distri-
buted among the troops an allowance of corn for thirty
days from the stores that had been found in Phoetiz ; and
continuing his march afterwards towards Stratus, he en-
camped upon the river Achelous, at the distance of ten
stadia from the city; and from thence, sending out detach-
ments from his army, wasted the whole country at his
leisure, and found no resistance.

The Achzans, who were at this time scarcely able to
support the burden of the war, no sooner were informed
that Philip was so near, than they deputed to him some
ambassadors, to request that he would advance immediately
to their assistance. The ambassadors, when they had
joined the king in the neighbourhood of Stratus, discharged
their commission to him, agreeably to their instructions;
and having represented also to him how vast a booty might
be gained if he would now invade Elea, they pressed him
to transport his forces over to Rhium, and to fall suddenly
from thence upon that province.

The king, when they had ended, gave orders that they
should not yet depart, and said, that he would deliberate
with his friends concerning that which they had proposed:
but at the same time he decamped, and began his march
towards Metropolis and Conope. "The inhabitants of Me-
tropolis all left their houses upon his approach, and retired
into the citadel. Philip therefore, having first set fire to
the city, advanced forward to Conope. But when he ap-
proached the river that ran near the town, and which was
distant from it about twenty stadia, a body of /Etolian
cavalry appeared ready to dispute his passage; being per-
suaded, that they should either entirely stop the Macedo-
nians from advancing, or that the attempt would be at-
tended with considerable loss. But Philip, perceiving
their design, gave orders that the peltastz should first pass
the river in separate divisions, closing all their ranks, and
forming that. figure which is called the tortoise. When

396 THE GENERAL HISTORY Book 1v.

this was done, and the first cohort had now gained the
opposite side, the cavalry advanced against them and began
the combat. But as the Macedonians still stood firm,
covering themselves with their shields in every part; and
when the second and third divisions, having passed the
river also in the same close order, came forwards to sup-
port the first, the ZEtolians, perceiving that they fatigued
themselves in vain, retreated back again towards the city:
and from that time these haughty troops were forced to
remain quite behind their walls.

The king then passed the river with the rest of the
forces; and having wasted all the country without resist-
ance, he arrived near Ithoria, a fortress that was strongly
fortified both by art and nature, and which commanded
the road along which the Macedonians were obliged to
pass. The Adtolians that were left to guard it fled from
their post as the king approached; and Philip, being thus
master of the place, immediately razed it to the ground.
He gave orders also to the foragers that they should, in
like manner, destroy all the fortresses that were scattered
through the country. Having then gained the end of
these defiles, he continued his march slowly forwards, that
the army might have leisure to collect the booty. And
when the troops were loaded with. supplies of every kind
in great abundance, he directed his route towards the
Achzan CEniade. But having, in his way, encamped
near Pzanium, he resolved first to make himself master of
that city. He repeated, therefore, his attacks against it
without any intermission; and in a short time took the
place by storm. Pzanium was a city not very consider-
able in size; for it was less than seven stadia in its circuit.
But with regard to the houses, walls, and towers, it scarcely
was inferior to any of the cities of that country. The
king, having razed the walls to the ground, demolished
likewise all the houses, and gave orders that the timber
and the tiles should be floated, with the greatest care,
across the river to Œniadæ. The Ætolians at first re-

CHAP. VI. OF POLYBIUS. 397

solved to hold possession of the citadel of this last city,
which was strongly fortified with walls and other works.
But as the king approached they were struck with terror,
and retired. Philip, having thus gained this city also, con-
tinued his march, and encamped before a fortress in the
Calydonian district, called Elaeus; which was not only very
strong by nature, but was fortified also with a wall, and
filled with all the necessary stores of war, which Attalus
had sent to the Ætolians not long before. But the Mace-
donians, in a short time, took the place by storm; and
when they had wasted all the Calydonian territory, they
returned back again to CEniada. The king, having then
remarked that this city was situated with very great ad-
vantage, as well for other purposes as because it afforded
_ also an easy passage into Peloponnesus, resolved to inclose
it with a wall. For Œniadæ is situated upon the coast,
near the entrance of the gulf of Corinth, in the very ex-
tremity of those confines which divide the provinces of
Acarnania and /Etolia. Opposite to it, on the side of Pe-
loponnesus, stands Dyme, with the country that lies round
Araxus; and the distance between Œniadæ and this pro-
montory is so small that it does not exceed a hundred
stadia. Philip, therefore, having carefully considered all
these circumstances, began first to fortify the citadel; and
afterwards having raised a wall round the docks and har-
bour, he resolved to join these also to the citadel, employ-
ing in the work all those materials which he had brought
with him from Peanium. But before he had completed
this design he received the news, that the Dardanians,
imagining that his intention was to advance forwards into
Peloponnesus, had drawn together a numerous army, and
were preparing to make incursions into Macedon. Judg-
ing it, therefore, to be necessary that he should provide
without delay for the security of his own proper kingdom,
he now sent back the ambassadors of the Achzeans; having
first assured them, that as soon as he had repelled this
danger he would lay aside every other project and employ

398 THE GENERAL HISTORY _ Book tv.

all his power to assist their state. He then decamped,
and returned back again in haste along the same way by
which he had arrived. As he was preparing to pass the
Ambracian gulf, which separates Acarnania from Epirus,
he was met by Demetrius of Pharos, who had been de-
feated in Illyria by the Romans, and had escaped in a
single frigate, as we related in the former book. ‘The king
received him favourably, and directed him to sail on to
Corinth, and from thence to go, through Thessaly, into
Macedon; while himself passed. the gulf, and. continued
his march in haste through Epirus. But no sooner was
he arrived at Pella than the Dardanians, having received
notice from some deserters of his near approach, were
struck with terror, and dismissed. their army, though they
had then advanced very near to the borders of the king-
dom. Philip; being informed of their retreat, sent: home
likewise all the’ Macedonian troops: to gather in their
harvest; and ‘himself went into: Thessaly, with design’ to
pass the rest of the summer at Larissa.

At this time it was that ZEmilius returned with conquest
from Illyria, and ‘entered Rome in triumph. About the
same time Annibal having taken Saguntum by storm, sent
his army into winter quarters. The Romans also, when
they had received the news that Saguntum was destroyed,
deputed some ambassadors to Carthage, to demand that
Annibal should be delivered to them; and at the same
time chose for consuls Publius Cornelius and Tiberius
Sempronius, and began to make the necessary preparations
for awar. We have already given, in the preceding book,
a particular and distinct account of these transactions ;
and now mention them again, for the sake only of recalling
to the reader’s view, agreeable to fhe method which we
promised still to observe, the chief events that were coin-
cident with those which are now related. á

CHAP. VII. OF POLYBIUS. 399

CHAP. VII.
"T HUS then was ended the first year of the hundred and

fortieth Olympiad ; and as this also was the time in which
the ZEtolians usually elected their chief magistrates, they
now chose Dorimachus for their prætor. As soon as he
was invested with this dignity he assembled the troops in
arms, and making an incursion into the upper. parts of
Epirus, plundered and destroyed the country with a more
than common rage and fury; being much less solicitous to
gain any advantage to himself, than to work the greatest
mischief that was possible to the Epirots. Arriving at
Dodona, he set fire to the porticoes of the temple, destroyed
the votive offerings, and levelled the walls of the sacred
edifice with the ground. Thus the tolians disdained to
be confined within the ordinary limits either of peace or
war; pursuing still, in both conjunctures, their own rash
and violent designs; and shewing not even the least regard
either to the laws of nations, or the established rights and
customs of mankind. After this exploit Dorimachus re-
turned back again to Ætolia.

. The winter was now approaching fast, and no person
had expected that the Macedonians would at this time take
the field, when Philip, advancing from Larissa, with three
thousand chalcaspides, two thousand peltaste, three hun-
dred Cretans, and four hundred of the royal cavalry,
passed from Thessaly into Euboea, and from thence to
Cynus, and continuing afterwards his route through Boeo-
tia and the Megarisian district, arrived at Corinth in the
very depth of winter; having performed his march with so
much secrecy and diligence, that the people of Peloponne-
sus were all ignorant of his approach. He immediately
shut the gates of Corinth, and placed guards upon the
roads; and sent to invite the elder Aratus to come to him
from Sicyon. He wrote letters also to the prætor of the
. Achzans, and to the several cities, to appoint the place
and time in which he expected to be joined by the troops

400 THE GENERAL HISTORY Book iv.

of the republic. He then marched away from Corinth,
and encamped near Dioscurium in the Phliasian territory.

About the same time Euripidas, who knew not that the
king had entered Peloponnesus, began his march from
Psophis, with two cohorts of Eleans, some bodies of pirates,
and some mercenary troops, amounting in the whole to two |
thousand and two hundred men, together with two hun-
dred ‘horse, and advanced by the way of Pheneum and
Stymphalus towards Sicyon, with design to waste the
country. And having, on that very night in which Philip
had encamped near Dioscurium, passed beyond the army
of the king, he was ready just to enter the Sicyonian ter-
ritory on the following day. But some Cretan soldiers,
who had left their ranks and wandered far into the country
in search of forage, fell in among the Eleans as they
marched. Euripidas, being informed by these that the
enemy was near, changed immediately the direction of his
route, and, not communicating to any person his know-
ledge of this accident, marched back again in haste by the
way along which he had advanced; in the hope, that he
might be able again to pass beyond the Macedonians, and
to possess himself the first of certain mountainous defiles,
that were on the other side of the Stymphalian district.
The king, who on his part also was wholly ignorant of the
arrival of these troops, pursued his first design, and con-
tinued his march forwards in the morning, by the way of
Stymphalus towards Caphya. For this was the city in
which he had desired that the Achzeans would meet to-
gether in arms. But when the advanced guards of the
Macedonian army was just now ready to ascend the hill
called Apeaurus, which was distant from Stymphalus about
ten stadia, it happened that the foremost troops of the
Eleans arrived also upon the same ascent. Euripidas, who,
from the intelligence which he had received before, knew
what the forces were that now appeared in sight, made
haste to avoid the-impending danger, and taking with him
some few horsemen only, fled through private roads to

CHAP. VII. - OF POLYBIUS; .- 401

Psophis. The Eleans, being thus deserted by their chief,
were struck with consternation, and for some time stopped
their march, not knowing which way they should turn, or
what measures were the best to take. For’ their’ officers
were at first persuaded, that these were some Achzan
forces, that had been drawn together to defend the country.
This mistake was occasioned chiefly by the’ sight of the
chalcaspides, whom they supposed to be the troops.of Me-
galopolis. For in the battle against Cleomenes ‘that was
fought near Selasia, the Megalopolitans had all made-use
of brazen bucklers; having received their arms on that óc-
casion from Antigonus. "They retreated therefore, keeping
their ranks entire, towards the neighbouring hills; and
were still inclined to think, that they were not mistaken in
their hopes. But when the Macedonians, as they continued
to advance, approached more nearly to-their view; they
then soon discerned the truth, and, throwing away their
arms, began to run with great precipitation. But twelve
hundred of them were taken prisoners ; and the rest either
were destroyed by the Macedonian soldiers, or lost their
lives among the precipices. About a hundred only escaped
by flight. Philip sent away the spoils and prisoners to
Corinth ;-and pursued his route, as he had at first designed.
The people of Peloponnesus were all struck with wonder,
at an event so strange and unexpected by them: for they
now first received the news togetlier, both of the arrival "
the king, and also of his victory.

The sMicidoniatis continued their route through p
dia; and having suffered great fatigue and hardship, as
they passed the mountain called Oligyrtus, which was at
this time covered deep with snow, they arrived in the nigbt
of the third day at Caphyz. The king, when he had
rested here during two whole.days for the refreshment of
the troops, and being joined also by the younger Aratus
with the Achzan forces, so that the whole army now con-
sisted of ten thousand men, again marched forwards,
through the Clitorian district, towards Psophis; carrying

VOL, I. pd

402 THE GENERAL HISTORY Book iv.

witli him all the machines and ladders that were found in
any of the cities through which he passed.

..Psophis is.a city of very high antiquity in Arcadia,
being »acknowledged to have been first built in ancient
times by the Azanes. With regard to the whole of Pelo-
ponnesus, :it ‘is situated near the middle of the country.
But with respéct to the single province of Arcadia, it
stands .upon:the’ extreme borders of it toward the west;
and is on that side closely joined to the confines of Elea.
It commands with great advantage the whole territory of
the Eleans; and was at this time associated to their re-
public. „Philip, arriving near this place in three days’
march from Caphyz, encamped upon the hills that stood
opposite to the city, and which afforded a safe arid commo-
dious view both of the place itself, and of all the neigh-
bouring country.. But when he: had seen from hence the
advantageous situation and uncommon strength of the city,
he was for some time in doubt, what resolution he should
take. -For Psophis on the side towards the west is se-
cured by a rapid’ and impetuous torrent, which descends
from the neighbouring hills, and in a short time forms for
itself a channel very large and deep,.which is not fordable
in any place during the greatest part of the winter season.
On the éastern side flows the Erymanthus, a great and
rapid river, the subject of many well known fables. And
this river likewise receives the torrent just now mentioned,
which falls into it on the side towards the south. Thus
three sides of the city are completely covered by these
waters, and guarded against all access. On the fourth side,
towards the north, stands a hill, well fortified and inclosed
with walls, and which serves indeed as a citadel to the city;
being perfectly adapted, both by nature and by art, for
sustaining, the efforts of an enemy.. ‘The. city itself was
also secured by walls of an unusual height, completely
built, and fortified with care; and was defended by.a gar-
rison of Eleans. Euripidas was also in the place, having
saved himself in it after his flight.

CHAP. VII. - OF POLYBIUS. 403

When Philip had considered all these circumstances, he
was in part ‘inclined to:abandon the, design which he had
formed, to take the city either by storm or siege. But on
the other hand, he was no less earnest to persist in the at-
tenipt, when he had again reflected upon’ the manner in
which the place was situated. For as much as the Arca-
dians and Achsans were incommoded by this city, which
pressed close upon the very confines of their country, and
furnished the Eleans with the power to carry.on. the war
against them with vigour and security, so. much on, the
other hand would they-be advantaged by it, if it should
now be taken: since it would not only serve to cover their
own lands from insult, but might be used also as a place of
arms, from whence they might on their part make.incur-
sions into the Elean territory. ‘The king therefore, having
at last resolved to persist in his design, gave orders that
the troops should take their usual repast, and hold. them-
selves in readiness, by break of day. And when the
morning came, he passed the Erymanthus, upon the bridge
that was across it, without any resistance;from the enemy,
who were surprised at the attempt, and wholly unprepared
against it. He then advanced towards the city in bold and
terrible array. Euripidas and the rest were struck with
doubt and consternation. For they at first had been per-
suaded,. that the Macedonians would neither ‘attack . by
storm a city of so considerable strength, nor yet venture
on the other hand to engage in'a long and regular siege
‘in so severe a season. They were therefore. thrown into
great perplexity, and began to fear, that some persons .in
the city had entered into a secret correspondence with the
king. But:when no proofs appeared to confirm this ap-
prehension, the greater.part ran in haste to defend the
walls; while the mercenaries also that belonged to the
Eleans advanced through a gate that was above the enemy,
with design to fall.upon them by surprise. The king,
having ordered the ladders to be fixed against.the walls in
three different parts at once, and divided the Macedonians

nd2

404 THE GENERAL HISTORY rook w.

also into three separate bodies, gave the signal for the at-
tack. 'The troops then advanced together, and began to
scale the city on every side. The besieged for some time
maintained their ground with courage, and threw down
many of the soldiers from the ladders. But as their store
of darts and other weapons, provided only for the present
exigency, soon began to fail; and when they also found,
that the Macedonians were so far from. being deterred by
this resistance, that on the contrary no sooner was one
man tumbled from the ladders; than the next that followed |
succeeded without any hesitation to his place; they at last
turned their' backs, and fled for safety to the citadel, while
the Macedonians entered by the walls. At the same time
also the Cretan troops attacked the Elean mercenaries with
such vigour and success, that they forced them soon to
throw away their-arms, and to fly in great disorder: and
having pursued them to the very gate from whence they
had made their sally, they entered it together with them.
Thus: the city was taken at once in every part. The
Psophidians, with their wives and children, fled all into
the citadel, together with Euripidas, and the rest that were
able to escape. The Macedonians, being thus become the
entire masters of the city, pillaged all.the goods, and took
possession of the houses. But those that had retired into
the citadel, being destitute of all supplies, resolved. to pre-
vent a worse misfortune, by submitting to the king.
Having therefore dispatched a herald, and obtained per-
mission to make a. deputation to him, they sent their chief
magistrates, together with Euripidas, by whose means a
treaty was concluded, in which full safety was allowed to
all, both’ citizens and strangers. The deputies then re-
turned, having received orders from the king, that they
should all still remain within the citadel, till the army had
left the city; ‘lest the soldiers, forgetful of their duty,
should be tempted by Pe hopes of yc to insult and
pillage them.

The king,: being forced by the snow, which about this

CHAP. VII. oc OF POLYBIUS. 405

time began to fall, to remain for some days in. Psophis,
assembled together the Achzeans, and pointed out to them
thé strength mé commodious situation of the place, and
the advantages that might. be drawn from it in.the progress
of the war.' He spoke largely also of the affection and
warm esteem, which he had conceived for their republic ;
and added, that he would now give this city.to them; and
that in'all future times he should be' ready to employ’ his
ütmost power to gratify their wishes; and seize every occa-
sion to advance their interests. After this discourse, which
was received by Aratus. and the Achæans with | igreat
acknowledgments, he dismissed the assembly, and. began
his march towards Lasion. ‘The Psophidians then left the
citadel, and again took possession of their .houses :: and
Euripidas went away to Corinth, and from thence. into
fEtolia. The Achæan chiefs that were present in the
place left the care of the citadel to Proslaus of Sicyon,
with a sufficient garrison, and appointed Pythias of Pellene
to ‘be governor of the city. In this manner was ended the
siege of Psophis. . dame

The Eleans that were in garrison at Lasion, having
been informed of all the circumstances of this conquest, no
sooner heard that the Macedonians were advancing. fast
towards them, than they immediately left the place : .and
Philip, being thus become master of it upon his first ap-
proach, gave this city also to.the Acheans, as a farther
testimony of his regard for their republic. : He. restored
Stratus likewise, from whence the Eleans in like manner
had retired, to the people of Telphussa, from whom it had
before been taken. ‘He then decamped, and. arriving at
Olympia after five days’ march, offered sacrifice to the
deity of the place, and feasted the chief officers of his
army. And when he'had allowed three days for the re-
freshment also of the troops, he advanced farther. into the
Elean territory, and having encamped near the place called
Artemisium, and from thence sent out detachments from

pd3

406 THE GENERAL HISTORY _ nook iv,

his army to collect the plunder of the country, he after-
wards returned again to Dioscurium. r

» While the Macedonians. were employed i in ravaging the
country, many of the Eleans fell into their hands, but a
much’ greater number fled for safety to the neighbouring
towns, and to places that were not easy to be forced.
: For Elea far exceeds all the other parts of Peloponnesus,
both.in the number: of inhabitants, and in the natural
riches also which are there produced. For there are many
among this people, who are so fixed in the enjoyment of a
country life, and so satisfied with the, abundance of which
they are possessed, that in the course even of two or three
generations, they are never known to visit the capital of
the. province. . This affection for the country is chiefly
nourished by that high regard, which, by the constitution
of their government is shewn to’those that are settled in it.
For justice is administered amongst them in every district ;
and great pains employed, that they may always be sup-
plied with all things that are necessary to life. The motive
that inclined their legislators first to invent such laws, and
to give such attention to their safety, seems partly to have
been, that the province was itself of very wide extent; but
principally, because the inhabitants lived in ancient times a
kind of holy.life; when their country, on account of the
Olympic Games that were celebrated in it, was regarded by
the Greeks as sacred and inviolable, and the people all
enjoyed a full repose, secure from danger, and exempted
from the miseries of war. . But afterwards indeed, when
the Arcadians attempted. to take Lasion from, them, with
the lands that lay round Pisa, the Eleans were then forced
to have recourse to arms, and to change their former way
of life. And since that time, they have not even made the
least attempt to restore their country to.those privileges of
which they had been so long possessed; but have still re-
mained in the condition, into which they were thrown by
that invasion. But certainly in this respect they. have been

CHAP. VII. OF POLYBIUS. 407

far from shewing a due regard to their own future interests.
For since peace is that blessing, which we all implore the
gods to give us; since it is that for whose sake we bear.to
be exposed to every danger; since, in a word, among all
the things that are esteemed good by men, there is none
more generally acknowledged to deserve that name; it
surely must be allowed to be a high degree of folly in the.
conduct of the Eleans, to refuse an acquisition; of such
value and importance, which they not only might obtain
from the states of Greece upon fair. and honourable terms,
but might hold possession of it also to all future -times.
Some perhaps may think, that if this people. should again
return to their former life, they must be exposed to the
attempts of every enemy that should be inclined to ‘violate
treaties, and to fall by surprise upon their .cóuntry.
But as this would rarely happen, so the Greeks also would
all join together to revenge the insult. And with regard
to any private robberies, they might at all times be ‘effec-
tually secured against them: since, by the help of that
abundance which the continuance of peace would of neces-
sity bestow, they might with ease maintain some troops of
mercenaries, to be eghed as occasion should require.
But now from having dreaded dangers that-were never,
likely to arrive, they expose their goods to constant pillage,
and their country to perpetual war. I could wish there-
fore, that these reflections might raise in the Eleans an
attention to their proper interests; since they never will
find a time more favourable than the present, to recover
again an acknowledged confirmation of their rights, from
all the states of Greece.

But though these immunities have been long since last,
the people, however, as we observed before, still retain
some traces of their ancient manners, and especially of their
attachment to a country life. Upon the: arrival .therefore
of Philip i in the. province, great numbers of them were taken
prisoners by the Macedonians, and greater still escaped by
flight. ‘There was a fortress called a into which

pd 4

408 THE GENERAL HISTORY .Boox tv.

the chief part of the people had retired, together with their
goods and:cattle. The country.round it was only to be
entered by certain close defiles: and the place itself, besides
that it was difficult of all access, was also judged to be im-
pregnable. But the king, being informed of the numbers
that had fled together to this fortress, resolved to attempt
and hazard every thing, rather than leave his work imper-
fect., He.ordered the mercenaries therefore first to take pos-
session of the posts that commanded the entrance of the
passes. . And having left behind him in the camp his
baggage, with the greater part of all his army, he then
marched: through the defiles, with the peltastee . and the
light-armed troops, and arrived in. sight of the fortress,
without resistance. The Eleans, who were wholly unpre-
pared to sustain a siege, and unpractised likewise in all the
art of war, and who at this tine had among them great
numbers of the very meanest of the people, were struck with
terror at -his approach, and immediately surrendered.
Among the prisoners were two hundred mercenaries, which
Amphidamus, the prætor of the Eleans, had drawn to-
gether from different countries, and had brought them
with him to this place. The king, having gained a very
great: quantity. of valuable goods, with more. than five
thousand slaves, and cattle that scarcely could be num-
bered, returned again to his camp:. and from thence,
because the troops were so encumbered with their booty,
that they were wholly unfit to engage in any new attempt,
he directed his route back to Olympia, and there en-
camped.

CHAP. VIII. | p

ABOUT this time Apelles, who, among those that were.
appointed by. Antigonus to be the guardians of young.
Philip, was possessed of the greatest sway in all the coun-
sels: of the king, formed. the base design of reducing the
Achieans.to the same vile condition as that to which the

CHAP. VIIL OF POLYBIUS. 409

people of Thessaly are subject. For though the Thessa-
lians were still governed, in appearance, by their own pe-
culiar laws, and seemed on that account to be distinguished
from the Macedonians, yet in reality there was no differ-
ence between them. For both were equally obliged to
yield strict obedience to the royal orders, and to submit
without reluctance to all that was imposed. This man
then, having regulated his project in’ his mind, began first
to try the tempers of the Achzeans that were now present
in the army. He gave permission to the Macedonians, to
dispossess them of their quarters, and defraud them of
their booty. And afterwards, he ordered many to be
scourged, upon the slightest pretexts: and when any of
their companions interposed to save them, or shewed any
resentment of this treatment, himself conducted them to
prison. By these means he was persuaded that the Achz-
ans might insensibly be led to an entire and blind sub-
mission; and think nothing cruel or severe, which at any
time they should be forced to suffer by order of the king.
And yet he had seen not long before, when he was present
in the army of Antigonus, that this very.people exposed
themselves to every danger, and seemed ready to encounter
every hardship with the greatest firmness, rather than fall
into subjection to Cleomenes. But some young Achzans,
having run together in a body, went and disclosed to Ara-
tus the whole of this design. Aratus, wisely judging that
it was necessary to defeat such evils in their first commence-
ment, ran in haste to Philip. , The king, when he had
heard him, ordered the young men to lay aside their fears ;
assuring them, that nothing of this kind should hereafter
happen: and at the same time he strictly forbade Apelles
to exact any thing from the Achzans, without the know-
ledge and. consent of their own prætor. In this: manner
Philip, by his humane and gentle treatment of those that
were with him in the camp, as well as'by his courage like-
wise, and activity in the field, not only gained the affec-
tions of the soldiers, but the favour also and esteem of all

410 THE GENERAL HISTORY BOOK IY.

the people of Peloponnesus. And indeed we can scarcely
find a prince, more admirably formed by nature, with all
those talents that are requisite for enlarging conquests, and
sustaining the weight of empire. For he was possessed of
a ready and clear discernment; a happy memory; a grace-
. fulness that. was peculiar to all his actions; with such a
dignity of aspect, as. declared the monarch, and inspired
respect and awe. His activity also in the field was never
wearied, and his courage never daunted. By what means
afterwards these noble qualities were all destroyed, and
from whence it happened that this prince, from a mild and
gentle monarch, became at last a merciless and brutal
tyrant, cannot be explained in a few words only. We
shall take some occasion therefore more favourable than
the present, to examine closely into the causes that pro-
duced so wonderful a change. |

Philip having now decamped, continued his route from
Olympia towards Pharsea, and from thence advanced to
Telphussa, .and afterwards to Heræa. In this place he sold
his booty, and laid a bridge across the river Alpheus, with
design to pass that: way into Triphylia. About the same
time Dorimachus the- ZEtolian prstor, being pressed by
the Eleans to save their country from destruction, sent to
their assistance six hundred Ætolians under the command
of Phylidas. When this general, arriving in Elea, had
joined his troops with the forces that were at that time in
the: service of the leans, five hundred mercenaries, a
thousand soldiers-of the country, and a-body of Taren-
tines, he from thence directed his march also towards
Triphylia. This: country, which derives its name from
Triphylus a native of Arcadia, is a part of Peloponnesus,
lying near the sea, between the provinces of Messenia and
Elea. -It looks upon the sea of Afric; and is situated in
the extremity of all Greece, on the side of the south-west.
The towns which it contains are Samicum, Lepreum,
Hypana, Typaniea, Pyrgus, ZEpyum, Bolax, Styllagium,
and Phrixa. The Eleans, having forced these towns to

CHAP. VIII. — OF POLYBIUS. 411

submit to their republic, added to them not long afterwards
Aliphira likewise; which stood within the limits of Arca-
dia,’ and at first was subject to the Megalopolitans. But
Alliadas, the tyrant of Megalopolis, in return for some per-
sonal advantages, surrendered it to the Eleans.

Phylidas, having entered this country with his army,
sent away the Eleans to Lepreum, and the mercenaries to
Aliphira ;; while; himself with the A&tolians, remaining in
the neighbourhood of Typanæa, attended to the motions
of the Macedonians. Philip, being now disencumbered of
his booty, passed the Alpheus, which flows close along the
city of Hera, and directed his route to Aliphira. This
city is built upon a hill, which is on every side steep. and
craggy, and more than ten stadia in its height. Upon the
summit stands the citadel, and a brazen statue also of Mi-
nerva, of a very uncommon size as well as beauty. With
what design it first. was wrought, and at whose expence;
the place from whence it came, and the person by whom
it was here fixed and dedicated; are things that even the
inhabitants. of the country are not’ able to explain with
certainty. But all acknowledge it to have been the work
of. Sostratus and ph mes and regard it as one of the
most finished pieces, that ever were produced by those
great. artists.

The king, having saiid for a day that was serene and
bright,. commanded the men whose task it was to carry
the ladders, to advance first from different parts, with the
mercenaries in front to cover them. ‘The Macedonians,
divided also into separate bodies, followed close. behind:
and were ordered, with the rest, to ascend the hill, as soon
as the sun should begin to shine. The troops advanced
accordingly with great.alacrity and vigour; while the
Aliphireans ran' together in crowds .to every side, from
whence they saw the Macedonians ready to approach.'. At
the same time the king, with a select body of soldiers,
having climbed up certain precipices, ascended unperceived
‘to the suburbs of the citadel. The signal was now given

x

412 THE GENERAL HISTORY ~” xoox 1v.

far the assault; the ladders raised against the walls; and
the troops began in every part to scale the city. But the
king, having first gained possession of the suburbs, which
were left wittei 'ddfedos, immediately set fire to them.
When those therefore, that were employed in defending
the walls against the enemy, saw what had happened, they
were seized with consternation; and began to fear, that if
the citadel should be lost, there would be then left to them
no resource. They abandoned therefore all their posts,
and fled into the citadel; and thus the Macedonians be-
came masters of the city, almost without resistance. Not
long afterwards, a deputation was sent also from the citadel
to the king, and the place delivered into his hands, oi con-
dition only that the people should be safe? Ca

This conquest struck no small terror into all the people
of Triphylia; and forced them to ‘consult together, by what
measures they might best preserve their country. About
the same time also, Phylidas led away his troops from `
Typanæa, and retired to Lepreum; plundering all the
province as he passed. -For this was the reward, which
the allies of the ZEtolians seldom failed to receive; being
either deserted by them in the time of their most pressing
need; or else pillaged, and. betrayed: and forced to suffer
from their confederates and friends such cruel treatment,
as could scarcely be expected even’ from a ‘conquering
enemy. As soon therefore as the king approached, the
inhabitants of Typanza and of Hypana surrendered their
cities.to him. The Phialians also, being informed of all
that had happened in Triphylia, and -having’ been’ long
desirous. to shake off their alliance with the ZEtolians, ran
together in arms, and took possession of the place in which
the polemarchs were accustomed to assemble.’ There were
at this time some ZEtolian pirates in Phialia, who- had
fixed. their residence in ‘the. city, that from thence they |
might be able to make incursions. upon the lands of the
Messenians. These men, upon the first appearance of this
commotion, had resolved to take arms and reduce the in-

4

CHAP, VIII. OF POLYBIUS.“ 4:13

habitants by force. But when they saw. that the people all
ran together in crowds, and-were preparing to make a
vigorous resistance, they abandoned ‘their design, and,
having obtained conditions for their safety, retired from
the place, carrying with them all their baggage. The
Phialians then.sent some deputies to Philip, and invited
him to take possession of their city.

During the time of this transaction, the inhabitants of
Lepreum also, having possessed themselves of a certain
part of the city, commanded the Eleans, the /Etolians, and
the Lacedsemonians, who had likewise-joined them, to
retire both from the citadel and city. "This demand, how-
ever, was at first entirely slighted.. Phylidas still: “kept his
post; and was persuaded, that heishould ‘be able to deter
the Lepreates from attempting any thing against him.
But when he heard that Taurion, with one: part of the
Macedonian forces, had already gained possession of Phia-
lia, and that the king himself was advancing towards Le-
preum with the rest, he began. at once to lose all hope,
while the Lepreates on the contrary assumed new confi-
dence. And though there were at this time in the place
a thousand Eleans, with a thousand pirates and ZEtolians;
five hundred mercenaries, and two hundred Lacedeemoni-
ans; and though the enemy were masters of their citadel;
yet so admirable was the spirit, and such the glorious con-
stancy of this people, that they resolved on no account to
yield to these invaders, or throw away the hope of being
able to defend their country. When Phylidas, therefore,
saw their firmness, and heard also that the Macedonians
were just ready to approach, he at last left the .city,
together with the Lacedeemonians and Eleans. ‘The Cre-
tans, that had joined the troops of Sparta, returned back
again to their own country through Messenia; while Phy-
lidas, with the other forces, directed his route towards
Samicum. .The Lepreates, having thus recovered -the
entire possession of their country, sent some deputies 't Mo
Philip, and surrendered their city to him.

414 THE GENERAL HISTORY Book iv.

As soon as the king was informed of these transactions,
he sent the chief part of his army away.to Lepreum, while
himself with the peltaste and the light-armed troops, pur-
sued the enemy, and, falling upon them in their retreat,
made himself master of all their baggage. But Phylidas,
having marched with the greatest haste, escaped safe to
Samicum. Philip, therefore, encamped before the place;
and, when the rest of his forces had advanced from Le-
preum to join him, began to make such preparations, as
threatened the iMonliitahts with the prospect of a siege.
But the ZEtolians and Eleans, being wholly unprepared to
sustain a siege, and having nothing but their hands only
to defend them, were struck: with terror, and: offered to
surrender upon terms of safety and having obtained per-
mission to leave the city with their arms, they retreated to
Elea. After this success; the. neighbouring cities all sent
their.deputies to the king, and submitted to him at dis-
cretion. - These were, Phrixa, Styllagium, Epyum, Bolax,
Pyrgus, and Epitalium.: Philip, having thus in the course
of six days only reduced the whole province of Triphylia,
returned again to Lepreum. And when he had first ex-
horted the inhabitants to remain steady in their duty, and
had placed a garrison in the citadel, he marched away to
Herza with all his forces, leaving to Ladicus an Acarna-
nian the government of Triphylia.. Arriving at. Herza,
he there divided the booty among his soldiers: and having
taken again the baggage, which he had left behind him in
this place, he continued his route from thence to Megalo-
polis, though it was now the depth of winter.

While Philip was employed in reducing the 'cities-of
Triphylia, Chilon, a citizen of Lacedeemon, who thought
that his birth had given him the fairest title to the sove-
reignty of Sparta, being enraged that the -ephori had
slighted his pretensions, and bestowed that dignity upon
Lycurgus, resolved to raise some disorders in.the state.
He flattered himself, that by following only the example of
Cleomenes, and tempting the hopes and ambition of the

CHAP. VIII. OF POLYBIUS. . 415

multitude with the prospect of a new division of lands, he
should at once draw all the people to his party. Having
communicated his intention, therefore, to his friends, and
engaged about two hundred of them to share in the
danger with him, he made haste to carry his project into
execution. As Lycurgus, and the ephori who had raised
him to the kingdom, were the chief obstacles to his design,
it was necessary that these should be first removed. He
took the occasion therefore when the ephori were at
supper, and falling upon them by surprise, killed them at
their table. Thus that punishment befel them, which was,
in justice, due to their late transactions. For whether we
consider the hand' by which they fell, or the cause that
drew this vengeance down upon them, they may well be
thought to have merited their fate.

As soon as this work was finished, Chilon ran in haste
towards the house of Lycurgus. But though this magi-
strate was then at home, he found means, with the assist-
ance of some friends and neighbours, to retire unperceived,
and escaped through private roads to the town that was
called Pellene of Tripolis. Chilon, having thus failed in
the chief and most important part of his intended enter-
prise, began to lose all hope. But as there was now no
room left to retreat, he advanced into the forum, killing all
his enemies, and calling aloud to his friends to join him;
inviting the people also to his party, by those hopes and
promises that were just now mentioned. But when the
citizens were so far from shewing even the least regard to
his pretensions, that, on the contrary, they began to run
together in parties to oppose him, he secretly withdrew,
and, passing through Laconia, fled unattended into the
Achzan territory. The Lacedsemonians, being at this
time also terrified by the near approach of Philip, removed
all their stores from the open country; and abandoned
likewise the fortress of Athenzum in the Megalopolitan
territory, having first razed it to the ground.

Thus this people, who, from the first establishment of

-

416 THE GENERAL HISTORY Book iv.

their state, under the laws of the wise Lycurgus, had en-
joyed the fairest form of government, and flourished in
great strength and power, to the time of the battle of
Leuctra, began, after that period, gradually to decline from
their former fortune, and to fall into contempt and ruin.

And having long been torn by intestine tumults and com-
motions, their peace being still disturbed by Agrarian laws,
and their citizens driven into banishment, they’ at last were
forced to bow. to a succession of severe and ‘haughty
tyrants, to the time of Nabis, and to yield to all the
miseries of the very vilest servitude; those, who, in ancient
times, had’ been unable to support even the name of
slavery. But there are many who have written very
copious accounts of the former condition of this people,
and of all their various fortunes; and with.regard to the
changes that have happened to them since Cleomenes first
subverted the legal constitution of the state, we shall take
occasion to m in the progress of this history, all those
that were of chiefest note, and which best deserve to be
remarked... : «

Philip now: decamped from Megalopolis, and taking his
route through Tegea, arrived at ‘Argos, and passed the rest
of the winter in that city; haviug obtained among all the
Greeks the highest admiration and esteem, as well from his
manners and whole deportment, as by those great actions
also which he had now performed in war, beyond all
that could be Tm from a pr ince of — tender
age. ffs. nn) .

During ibis time , Apis who had not yet desisted
from his project, was revolving in his mind the measures
by which he might best be able to reduce the Achzeans by
degrees beneath the Macedonian yoke.: As he saw that
Aratus and his son were likely to prove the greatest obstácles
in the way of this design, and that Philip was inclined to
pay no small regard to these two magistrates, especially to
the eldest of them, not only: because: he had. stood in high
esteem and favour with Antigonus, and was a man of great

`

CHAP. VIII. OF POLYBIUS. i 417

authority among the Achzeans, but chiefly on account of
his ready talents and profound discernment in all the
affairs of governinent; he judged it to be, in the first place,
necéssary that he should frame some contrivance by which
he might destroy their credit with the king. With this
view, having made enquiry after thosé Acheeans who òp-
posed: Aratus ih the government, he invited them to come
to him from their several cities, and spared no kind of
pains or flattery that might win their favour, and fix them
in liis interests. He then introduced them all to Philip ;
having first'instructed éach of theii to insinuate to the
king, that as longas he was guided by the counsels of Aratus,
he must be forced, in all things that related to the Achzeans,
closely to observe the terms of the alliatice ; but that, on the
contrary, if he would subinit his interests to the care of these
new friends, he might soon, with their | assistance, become
the master of Peloponnesus, and govern the people by his
own single will. When ‘Apélles | had thus far advanced in
his désign, his next care was to obtain, if it were possible,
that one of this faction should be elected prætor of the
Achieaiis; by which means Aratus would entirely be
excluded from ‘the ‘administration ‘of ‘the state. As the
time, ‘therefore, of the election now drew near, he pressed
the king to go himself to ZEgiuin, on pretence of marching
that way into Elea. Philip yielded his ‘consent, and
Apelles, who- was likewise present, partly by the force of
threatenings, and partly by solicitation, ‘prevailed at last,

though tiot without great difficulty, and gained the point
which he had in -view. For Eperatus, a citizen of Phare,
was elected, ,pr&tor; and Timoxenus, supported by the in-
terest of Aratus, was repulsed.

From ZEgium the king ‘began his march, and passing
through Patre ‘and Dyme, arrived at Tichos, a fortress
situated upon the extreme borders of the Dymzan terri-
tory, and ‘which had been ‘taken by Euripidas ` not long
before, às we have ‘already 'Tüeiítionéd. The ‘king, having
résolved to employ his utmost power to recover ‘again this

VOL, I. Ee

418 THE GENERAL HISTORY BOOK IV.

place for the Dymzeans, encamped before it with all his
forces, But the Eleans that were posted in it were struck
with terror and surrendered. © This fortress was of no
great size, being not more than a stadium and half in its
circumference. But the strength of it was considerable;
for the height of the walls was full thirty cubits. Philip
restored the place to the Dymzeans, and from thence made
incursions into the Elean territory. And having wasted
all the country, and gained a very great booty, hé led his
army back again to Dyme. "at
But Apelles, having thus far accomplished his, design;
and obtained a prætor of his own election, began now to
renew his attacks against Aratus,in order wholly to re-
move him from the confidence of the king. For this
purpose, he had recourse to a calumny, which was thus
contrived. When Amphidamus the Elean 'general; who
had been taken prisoner with the rest that had retired to
Thalame, was conducted to Olympia, he employed the
mediation of some friends to procure admission for him to
the king: and when he had gained a time of audience, he
displayed in a long discourse the high authority and credit
in which he stood among the Eleans, and assured the king,
that he could easily engage that people to enter into an
alliance with bim. . Philip, being prevailed on by: these
promises, immediately released Amphidamus, and sent him
to the. Eleans; with orders to assure them, -that if ‘they
would embrace his friendship, he would restore to them all
their prisoners without any ransom, and secure their
province against all incursions; and that they still should
live in perfect freedom, without garrison or tribute, and
'enjoy their own form of government. But, how generous
soever and inviting these conditions might appear, the
Eleans remained od and rejected all that was pré.
posed. : ;
Apelles seized on this refusal as a proper ground. for the
calumny. which he now contrived, and carried to the king.
He told him, that it might now be ‘seen, how false were

CHAP. VIII. Á OF POLYBIUS. 419

those professions of zeal and friendship, with which Aratus
and his son had hitherto deceived him: thatin their hearts
they were far from being disposed to favour his preten-
sions, or promote the interests of the Macedonians: that
the aversion which the Eleans had now shewn towards
him was solely to be imputed to their arts and manage-
ment: that when Amphidamus was sent from Olympia to
Elis by the king, they had employed in secret all their
pains to convince him, that it was by no means for the
advantage of the people of Peloponnesus that Philip should
become the master of the Eleans: and that from hence
alone had sprung that haughtiness, and fierce disdain,,
with which this people had rejected all his offers, and had
resolved to adhere to their alliance with the Ætolians, and
still sustain the war against the Macedonians. i

Philip, when he had heard this accusation, ordered
Aratus and his son to be called before him. Apelles then
repeated in their presence all the charge, urging it against
them with a bold and threatening confidence. And as the
king still kept silence, he added, that since they had shewn
themselves so thankless and ungrateful, and had so ill
repaid the many favours which they had received from
Philip, this prince had now resolved to call together the
Achaan states, and, when he had explained to them the
motives of his conduct, to return again to Macedon. But
the eldest Aratus, beginning now to speak, besought the
king, that he would by no means judge with passion, or
give a hasty credit to the things which he had heard, with-
out some previous examination and enquiry: that in every
charge especially, that was directed against any of his
allies or friends, it was proper first to weigh the evidence
with the nicest and most scrupulous care: that such a con-
duct was not only worthy of a prince, but of the last im-
portance also, with respect to his own interests and advan-
tage. He desired, therefore, that those who hed heard
these matters of which Apelles had accused them, might be
called to the presence of the king: that Apelles also should

Eez

420. . THE GENERAL HISTORY zoox iv.

attend, with the person from whom he had recelved his
information: and, in a word, that, before any complaint was
made to the Achzan states, every method should be tried,
by, which it was possible t to gain a knowledge of the truth.
Philip approved of this advice; and haying promised to
pursue it, he then dismissed them.

Some days afterwards had passed, and Apelles had not
yet roduced tlie proofs that were desired, when an acci-
dent fell out, which proved of. great advantage to Aratus.
While Philip was employed in plundering the country of
the Eleans, this people having conceived some suspicion « of
Amphidamus, resolved to seize, and send him as a prisoner
into ZEtolia. But Amphidamus gained early notice of
their design, and fled at first to Olympia. And being
there informed that the king was gone to Dyme, to dis-
tribute the Booty a among his troops, he made haste to join
him in the city. As soon as Aratus heard that this gene-
ral had escaped from Elis, and was arrived at Dyme, being
conscious of his own innocence, he ran to Philip with great
alacrity and joy, and requested that Amphidamus might
immediately be called before him : that no one better knew
the grounds of the charge that had ‘been brought against
him, than the man who had been a partner in the secret:
and that, on the other hand, it clearly was his interest to
disclose the truth; ; since he bad now been forced to leave .
his country on account of his attachment to the king, and
had no hopes of safety but in his protection, The king
consented to this request ; and having ordered Amphi-
damus to be examined in his presence, he found that the
accusation was in all points false. From this time, there-
fore, his affection for Aratus every day increased, and his
attachment to him became stronger. than before; while
Apelles on the contrary sunk Jow in his esteem, But his
mind had been now so long possessed with prejudice. in
favour of this minister, that it forced. him still to overlook,

e 77 4

In the mean while Apelles, “not being in any, degree

CHAP. VII. OF POLYBIUS. . --- . 421

deterred by what had happened from persisting still in the
same designs, made his next attack against Taurion, who
was. ‘entrusted with the care of the affairs of Peloponnesus.
He charged bim, however, with no, kind of crime; but on
the contrary spoke largely i in, his praise ; and represented
to the king, what great services might be expected from a
man of such abilities, if he were present in the camp. But
; his intention was, to bestow this | charge upon : some person
of his own appointment. “For this is one of those new
methods, contrived by men of bad designs: to destroy t the
fortunes of. their neighbours, not by detraction, but by
praise. An artifice, replete with malignant rancour, ‘and
the basest treachery ; invented first i in the courts of ' princes,
to be the instrument of jealousy. and sordid ` avarice ; and
employed solely to promote the purposes ‘of those, who
strive to rise upon the ruins of another. He seized every
occasion also that was ‘offered to censure Alexander, the
captain of the guards ; .having resolved to. fill this post
likewise with another of his own election: and, in a word,
to change, if possible, the whole disposition which Anti-
gonus had made. For Antigonus, not only while he lived,
had governed Macedon and the young prince himself with
the greatest prudence, but left behind him also at his
death such wise provisions, as seemed most proper to
secure the future ease and safety of the kingdom. He
explained to the Macedonians in his will, the measures
which himself had followed in the affairs of government;
and prescribed the plan of the administration for the time
to come; naming the persons also, to whom he left the
conduct of the state, and allotting severally to each his
proper post; that he might thus cut off at once all pretence
for jealousy, and remove every incitement to sedition. By
these directions, Apelles was appointed guardian to the
prince; Leontius, general of the infantry; Megaleas, the
chief secretary; Alexander, captain of the guards; and
Taurion, the commander, to preside in Peloponnesus.
Among these, Leontius and Megaleas were already in all

422 THE GENERAL HISTORY, &c. Book iv

points devoted to Apeiles. The great object therefore of
his present care was to remove Taurion and Alexander
from their posts; by which means the whole administration
of the government would fall into his own hands entire, or
into the hands of those who possessed his confidence. And
this design must soon have been accomplished, if he had
not raised against himself an enemy in Aratus. But that
wrong policy defeated all his measures; and drew after it
the punishment that was justly due to his imprudence and
insatiable ambition : so that within a short time afterwards,
he was himself involved in those calamities which he had
prepared for others, In what manner this misfortune hap-
pened to him, we shall at present forbear to mention,
having ELM this book to its conclusion. “But in that
which follows, we shall take occasion to give a clear
account of this event, with all the circumstances that
attended it. Philip, after these transactions which we
have now related, returned to Argos, to pass the winter

there together with his friends, and sent the forces back to
Macedon.

END OF VOL. I.

_—_ ———— M
BAXTER, PRINTER, OXFORD.

BINN wees. JUN 20 1961

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P713 Polybius. 5th ed.
1823
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